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i 
ABSTRACT  
 
The existing literature has provided only a partial explanation of the political role of 
South Korean humanitarian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in government 
food aid policy making towards North Korea between 1995 and 2007. Using a 
constructivist approach which includes non-state actor and normative factors in the 
analysis of state policy making, this thesis demonstrates that South Korean 
humanitarian NGO advocacy was consequential in explaining changes in South Korea’s 
food aid policy making in respect of state agenda setting, the formation of a discursive 
position and institutional and policy development. Humanitarian NGO advocacy finally 
contributed to government establishment of a legal framework that could provide for 
more consistent and large scale food aid to North Korea, irrespective of the vagaries of 
inter-Korean political relations. 
Despite humanitarian NGO advocacy, however, changes at different stages of 
state food aid policy making differed among the three administrations. This thesis 
demonstrates that these differences were attributable to the differing abilities of NGO to 
set agendas, network and graft new norms in respect of government policy on food aid 
to North Korea. These differing abilities resulted from changes in organisational 
mandates, funding capacities and the expertise of NGOs over time. Firstly, a strong 
humanitarian mandate between 1995 and 2000 was a key factor that enabled NGOs to 
overcome the organisational limits that stemmed from their poor funding capacity and 
lack of expertise. Secondly, stable funding capacity contributed to improvements in 
organisational expertise; however, increased reliance on government funding after 2000 
resulted in the weakening of NGOs’ advocacy ability. Lastly, given the favourable 
operational environment after the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000, the organisational 
expertise of NGOs developed to a level where it was possible to exert direct influence 
on government food aid policy making towards North Korea. 
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CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter, as the introductory chapter to the thesis, presents the overview of the 
thesis. It first presents the overview of the study including the research problem and 
questions, hypotheses, analytical framework and argument of this thesis. This chapter 
next elaborates the contribution of this thesis. Lastly, it outlines the structure of the 
thesis.  
 
 
1.2 Overview of the Study 
 
This thesis provides an explanation of state food aid policy making, filling a gap in the 
current dominant state- and interest group-centred approaches to food aid policy making. 
The thesis focuses on the hitherto neglected issue of the impact of non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) on state food aid policy making.  
      Since 1995 when international development and relief organisations had 
recognised the existence of a chronic food deficit, South Korean humanitarian NGO 
advocacy urging the South Korean government to provide humanitarian food aid to 
North Korea developed into a vigorous civil society movement. Given this operational 
environment, the South Korean government made official policy pronouncements that 
humanitarian food aid would be provided irrespective of political issues such as the 
nuclear development programme. During the severe food deficit in North Korea 
2 
between 1995 and 2007, however, the amount of food aid delivery from the South 
Korean government severely fluctuated. The pattern of fluctuation during this period did 
not relate to changes in North Korea’s food need.  
     Why was there a discrepancy between the South Korean government’s policy 
pronouncements and their actual behaviour relating to food aid to North Korea? Why 
did the amount of food aid to North Korea fluctuate and finally reach the stage of 
consistent food aid delivery with large scale bilateral food aid to North Korea 
throughout most of the years between 2000 and 2007? Based on these research 
problems, this thesis examines how and to what extent South Korean humanitarian 
NGOs have influenced their government food aid policy making on North Korea, and 
why the extent of the influence from NGOs has differed between administrations.  
     The dominant explanation of food aid policy making, however, adopts a state-
centred approach which sees states as unitary political actors in food aid policy and 
consequently obscures the important role of humanitarian NGOs in influencing the 
formation of state food aid policy. To answer the research questions above, this thesis 
developed three hypotheses as follows: 
 
Hypothesis I: Organisational mandates, funding capacities and expertise 
were important in the constitution of each non-governmental organisation’s 
capacity to influence South Korean government food aid policy. 
 
Hypothesis II: Differing non-governmental organisation capacities were 
consequential in explaining the capability of non-governmental organisation 
advocacy to set agendas, network and engage in the grafting of norms in 
3 
respect of South Korean government policy on food aid to North Korea.  
 
Hypothesis III: These differences in non-governmental organisation capacity 
shaped different outcomes at different stages of South Korea’s food aid 
policy-making. South Korea’s food aid policy processes are disaggregated 
according to the different stages of agenda setting, the formation of a 
discursive position, and institutional and policy development. 
  
To demonstrate South Korean humanitarian NGO influence on the state policy making 
process, this thesis uses a constructivist approach which includes non-state actor and 
normative factors in the analysis of state policy making. The analytical framework of 
this thesis divides the NGO advocacy movement into the four stages of agenda framing, 
networking, grafting and institutionalisation. By analysing these differing stages, the 
thesis demonstrates that South Korean humanitarian NGO advocacy was consequential 
in explaining changes in South Korea’s food aid policy making in respect of state 
agenda setting, the formation of a discursive position and institutional and policy 
development.       
Firstly, South Korean humanitarian NGO advocacy introduced new norms which 
are characterised as ‘humanitarianism, brotherly love1 and peaceful unification’ to the 
South Korean government and the civil society. Humanitarian NGO advocacy finally 
contributed to the incorporation of these new norms into the government agenda and 
discursive position of the South Korean government, particularly the Kim Young-Sam 
administration (1995-1997), changing the norm of hostility towards North Korea, which 
was dominant at the beginning of the North Korean food crisis, with these new norms 
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supporting the provision of food aid to North Korea. 
Secondly, South Korean humanitarian NGO advocacy contributed to the 
establishment of government institutions for the promotion of NGO participation in 
state food aid policy making and to the establishment of a legal basis assuring the 
consistent provision of food aid, irrespective of NGO advocacy and inter-Korean 
relations.  
Lastly, humanitarian NGO advocacy contributed to the resumption of large scale 
government food aid to North Korea in 2000 by establishing a favourable operational 
environment enabling the convening of the Inter-Korean Summit in the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration (1998-2002) and to the institutionalisation of food aid to North Korea by 
urging the Roh Moo-Hyun administration (2003-2007) to assure the consistent 
provision of food aid to North Korea by law and official government policy. In 2005 
and 2006, humanitarian NGO advocacy further contributed to the resumption of 
government food aid which was suspended by ruptured inter-Korean relations. The Kim 
Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administrations thereby delivered the largest amount of 
food aid to North Korea throughout the entire period of the food crisis in North Korea 
between 1995 and 2007. 
This thesis also shows that at the different stages the state food aid policy- 
making process differed between administrations. These differences in the Kim Young-
Sam, Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administrations’ food aid policy making 
processes were attributable to the differing abilities of NGOs to set agendas, network 
and engage in the grafting of norms in respect of South Korean government policy on 
food aid to North Korea. Organisational mandates, funding capacities and expertise 
were important in the constitution of the abilities of NGO advocacy. 
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Firstly, a strong humanitarian mandate adhered to by the South Korean 
humanitarian NGOs was a key factor which enabled the humanitarian NGOs to 
overcome the organisational limits coming from their poor funding capacities, the lack 
of expertise and the negative operational environment in the early years of the advocacy 
movement between 1995 and 2000. The strong humanitarian mandate thereby enabled 
the South Korean humanitarian NGOs to unfold a nationwide advocacy movement in 
the early years of the North Korean food crisis from 1995 to 1999. The self-steering role 
of the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administrations in the provision of food aid to 
North Korea after 2000, however, resulted in the diversification of the organisational 
mandates of South Korean humanitarian NGOs. Such diversification of organisational 
mandates accelerated the weakening of NGO advocacy to pressurise the South Korean 
government to provide food aid to North Korea.  
Secondly, the stable funding capacity of humanitarian NGO contributed to the 
improvement of NGO expertise by enabling the humanitarian NGOs to establish 
divisions and to recruit experts which were specialised in the advocacy movement. 
Increased reliance on government funding after the government decision to fund NGO 
activities in 2000, however, resulted in the weakening of the ability of NGO advocacy 
to pressurise the South Korean government to resume the food aid to North Korea when 
the South Korean government suspended the provision of food aid given ruptured inter-
Korean relations.  
As South Korean humanitarian NGO advocacy of food aid to North Korea 
continued, lastly, the organisational expertise to advocate the provision of food aid to 
North Korea gradually improved and finally reached the level where the humanitarian 
NGOs could exert direct influence on the different stages of the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh 
6 
Moo-Hyun administrations’ food aid policy making processes. In the early years of the 
advocacy movement from 1995 to 2000 humanitarian NGOs mainly relied on 
conventional movements, such as public campaigns. Such grafting strategy, which is a 
specific activity NGOs exploit to achieve their intended outcome, was effective in 
replacing the hostility towards North Korea with the norms of humanitarianism and 
brotherly love. The influence of this strategy on the state food aid policy change, 
however, was not enough to overcome the non-democratic government political 
structure in the Kim Young-Sam administration and the hostile inter-Korean relations in 
the early Kim Dae-Jung administration (between 1998 and 1999). Given the favourable 
operational environment after the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000, humanitarian non-
governmental organisations improved their organisational expertise by widening and 
deepening direct networks with the government through various types of government 
and NGO bodies. Exploiting these government consultative bodies, humanitarian NGOs 
finally came to achieve the organisational expertise which made it possible to exert 
direct influence on the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administrations’ food aid 
policy making processes.  
 
 
1.3 Contribution of the Thesis 
 
This thesis makes both empirical and theoretical contributions. The thesis provides 
empirical evidence of the important role of NGOs in South Korean government food aid 
policy making towards North Korea. By doing so, it contributes to the literature of the 
North Korean famine and international humanitarian assistance, and also the literature 
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of NGOs in domestic policy making. In terms of the theoretical aspect, by examining 
state food aid policy making and the role of NGOs in these processes from the 
perspective of international relations, this thesis will provide a new complementary 
approach to the existing literature of food aid studies, which has been dominated by the 
scholars of development and international political economy (IPE) studies. In addition 
to this, by applying the constructivist theory of international relations to the explanation 
of state food aid policy making, this thesis will widen the scope and validity of the 
application of constructivist theory, which has been hitherto limited to the analyses of 
customary areas of human rights, the environmental movement, apartheid and women’s 
suffrage. 
 
 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
 
The thesis consists of a total of 8 chapters including Chapter 1. Introduction and 
Chapter 8. Conclusion. Chapter 2 provides the context for and methodology of the study. 
Chapter 3 and 4 examine the operational environment for NGO advocacy and the 
organisational capacities of NGOs respectively. Chapter 5 and 6 contain the case studies 
of NGOs’ advocacy of food aid to North Korea. Chapter 7 demonstrates how NGO 
advocacy changed state food aid policy making. Chapter 8 lastly summarises the thesis 
and presents limitations and future research. 
Chapter 2 presents the research problems and questions, hypotheses, analytical 
framework, methodology, constraints and opportunities of the thesis. Chapter 2 first 
identifies the research problems through the literature review on the role of NGOs. 
8 
Based on the research problems identified, it outlines the research questions and 
hypotheses of this thesis. It next examines the appropriacy of a constructivist approach 
in the analysis of the role of non-state actors in state policy making. Based on the 
research questions and a constructivist approach, Chapter 2 presents the hypotheses of 
the thesis. It then outlines the analytical framework for analysis of NGO influence on 
state policy making and the methodology of the study. This chapter lastly outlines the 
constraints and opportunities of the thesis. 
Using the constructive analytical framework developed, Chapter 3 examines the 
operational environment for where South Korean humanitarian NGOs worked. Chapter 
3 first examines how the condition of the North Korean food crisis had changed 
between 1995 and 2007 through the examination of food supply and demand analysis, 
nutritional indicators and mortality rate. Chapter 3 next examines how the domestic 
political structure of South Korean government food aid policy making which 
responded to the North Korean famine changed over time.  
Chapter 4, as the case study chapter, examines the differing NGO capacities 
which were consequential in explaining the capability of NGO advocacy to set agendas, 
network and engage in the grafting of norms in respect of South Korean government 
policy on food aid to North Korea. It demonstrates the differing capabilities of the 
Korean Sharing Movement (KSM) and Good Friends in respect of their advocacy of 
food aid to North Korea, by examining KSM and Good Friends organisational mandates, 
funding capacities and expertise. 
Chapter 5 and 6 examine the KSM and Good Friends’ advocacy movement 
respectively. Each chapter first examines how these humanitarian NGOs framed the 
issue of food aid in order to proselytise the South Korean government and the public to 
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provide food aid to North Korea. Chapters next examine the types and quality of 
networks which were established by these humanitarian NGOs in order to maximize 
their influence on the state and civil society. The last sections of Chapter 5 and 6 
examine how KSM and Good Friends endeavoured to changes existing norms within 
the state political system and the public by introducing new norms and ideas.  
Chapter 7 tackles the individual administrations of Kim Young-Sam, from 1995 
to 1997, Kim Dae-Jung, from 1998 to 2002, and Roh Moo-Hyun, from 2003 to 2007 
respectively.2 This chapter examines to what extent the different influences of the KSM 
and Good Friends, stemming from the difference in the abilities of these NGOs, were 
finally internalised in each administration’s food aid policy making towards North 
Korea. It more specifically examines changes in the different aspects of state food aid 
policy making, which are changes in state agenda setting, discursive position, institution 
and policy. 
      Lastly, Chapter 8 summarise the thesis and presents limitations and future 
research. 
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1 North and South Korea are one ethnic group. Although both Koreas were divided 
after the Korean War in 1953, both North and South Korean people share a sense of 
brotherly love for their counterparts. In this context, the term ‘brotherly love’, which 
will be used in this thesis, conveys the sense of fraternity between the people of the 
Korean peninsula.    
2 In Korean names the last name (family name) comes first and there is no middle name. 
This thesis uses names in two different formats. It uses the name of the three presidents, 
Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun, in the Korean style as this form is 
internationally accepted in respect of the naming of administrations. With regard to the 
writing of other Korean names in the main text and references, however, this thesis 
follows the western style which places the family name after the first name. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND DEVELOPING THE  
             ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter outlines the research problem and questions, hypotheses, analytical 
framework, methodology, and constraints and opportunities of this thesis. This chapter 
first identifies the research problem and questions of the thesis. For this, Section 2.2 
reviews the literature on the overall role of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in 
politics and the role of humanitarian NGOs in state food aid policy making. This section 
then reviews the literature on the role of South Korean humanitarian NGOs in South 
Korean government food aid policy making towards North Korea. In doing so, this 
section identifies the research problems of this thesis. Based on the research problems 
identified, the section presents the research questions of this thesis. Section 2.3 next 
demonstrates the usefulness of constructivist theory as a theoretical framework to 
explain NGO influence on state food aid policy making. Based on the research 
questions identified and the literature review on the constructive perspective, Section 
2.4 presents the hypotheses of the thesis. This chapter then develops an analytical 
framework that will be used in this thesis to demonstrate the hypotheses of the thesis by 
explaining NGO influence on South Korean food aid policy making to North Korea. 
Drawing on the works of Thomas Risse-Kappen, Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn 
Sikkink,1 Section 2.5 first examines the operational environment which circumscribes 
or catalysesnon-governmental organisation influence on state policy making. This 
section examines how the operational environment, which is identified as the issue 
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characteristics and the domestic political structure, circumscribes or catalyses NGO 
influence on state policy making. This section also examines NGO capacity which is 
directly related to the strength of its influence and is a product of mandates, funding 
capacities and expertise. This section draws particularly from the work of Richard Price, 
Keck and Sikkink.2 Section 2.6 then outlines the research methodology of this thesis. It 
provides the rationale for the NGO in this thesis. This section outlines how the 
analytical framework of this thesis was applied to the analyses of the Korean Sharing 
Movement (KSM) and Good Friends advocacy in South Korean government food aid 
policy making. Section 2.7 lastly presents the constraints and opportunities of this study.   
 
 
2.2 The Literature Review: Identifying the Research Problem 
 
This section demonstrates the specific research problem derived from the analyses of 
South Korean food aid policy making towards North Korea between 1995 and 2007. It 
also examines the political role of NGOs in society and the role of humanitarian NGOs 
in state food policy making. This section then examines the literature on the role of 
South Korean humanitarian NGOs in North Korean famine relief. This section lastly 
examines the literature on South Korean government food aid policy making towards 
North Korea between 1995 and 2007.  
 
 
2.2.1 The Scholarship on Non-governmental Organisations 
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The focus of the literature of civil society and NGOs is the political role of NGOs in 
society. The literature shows how NGOs communicate with the state and the public 
through their unique three functions of research and educational provision, service 
delivery and advocacy.3 Studies of civil society and NGOs then conclude that the 
communication with the state and the public through these three functions enables them 
to interact with and exert influence on the state and civil society. 
Scholars of civil society and NGO studies have examined the political role of 
NGOs in society. Ann Marie Clark argues that “while NGOs often challenge 
governments and sometimes complement government-provided services, they nearly 
always act in counterpoint with governmental actors.”4 Thomas Carothers and William 
Barndt argue that the objective of NGOs is not to replace governments or usurp state 
decision-making authority but to complement the state and business sector. Carothers 
and Barndt further note that NGOs persuade their government to adopt or abandon 
certain policies or positions, foster citizen participation and civic education, and provide 
certain services.5 Peter Willets and Nell P. Stromquist classify these various NGO 
activities into three categories. These are (i) research and educational provision, (ii) 
service delivery and (iii) advocacy.6 Using this categorisation, the following sections 
examine how NGOs work as a political actor in society.  
Firstly, NGOs perform a research and educational function. In contrast to the 
state that deals with varied and competing policy concerns, NGO commitment to a 
single issue enables them to specialise and gather relatively high volumes of knowledge, 
information and expertise on the given issue area.7 NGOs’ close ties to the field and 
prompt responses to newly emerging issues are another factor that renders them more 
suited to perform a pioneering research function. By disseminating new and specific 
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information and accumulated expertise, NGOs exert influence on state policy making. 
In the humanitarian sector, Abby Stoddard has shown how U.S. humanitarian NGOs’ 
field information has contributed to increased knowledge for government policymakers, 
a better understanding of international crises and the framing of policy problems.8 
Through the case studies of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Somalia, Stoddard argues 
that NGOs’ information has had significant influence on U.S. humanitarian aid policy 
making.9 NGOs’ close interaction with society also renders them better suited to foster 
citizen participation and perform civic education.10 By providing leadership training for 
young people who want to engage in civic life and issue-specific seminars for the public, 
for instance, NGOs perform an educational role in civil society. Anthony Bebbington 
and Roger Riddle add that the belief that NGOs contribute to democratisation by 
providing an educational role in civil society makes western donors provide funding to 
NGOs that are based in states undergoing democratisation.11 
Secondly, NGOs provide certain services that are ignored or cannot be delivered 
by the government or business sector.12 These services can be relief, welfare and basic 
skills. The countries in need of essential or proper services in general are not northern 
hemisphere countries but southern hemisphere countries. Northern NGOs provide those 
southern countries in need of services with their aid in the form of development or 
emergency assistance. Western donor countries and agencies more specifically prefer 
delivering their aid through northern NGOs or in collaboration with southern 
counterpart NGOs based in recipient countries. This preference for using NGOs, as 
Stromquist argues, comes from the belief that NGOs’ close ties to the local populations, 
sensitivity to local needs, flexibility of action and experience render them better suited 
to perform this service delivery function.13 Hugo Slim argues that NGOs’ neutral 
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characteristics and their humanitarian mandates render them suited to be aid 
distributers.14 Anthony Bebbington and Roger Riddle also note that since NGOs are 
considered as ‘better performers’ and more ‘cost-effective’ than recipient local or central 
governments, western donor countries or agencies allocate their aid through NGOs.15 
These scholars consider NGOs as a counterpoint to the state, complementing the role of 
government.  
Lastly, NGOs are advocacy organizations.16 NGO advocacy movements organise 
activities that exert influence on state policy. NGO advocacy movements tackle various 
issues in the areas of human rights, women’s rights, the protection of the environment, 
banning landmines, the anti-war movement, animal rights and so on. Through their 
advocacy, NGOs seek to achieve large-scale change promoted through influence on the 
state political system. In this regard, Julie Fisher argues that despite recipient 
governments’ suspicion and repression, advocacy NGOs have made significant 
contributions to the political development of the Third World.17 Many constructivist 
scholars, who tackle the role of norms and ideas in state policy making, see NGOs as a 
significant independent political actor rather than a passive agent of the state. In their 
work, NGOs are considered as a key constituent of civil society and as norm 
entrepreneurs. Constructivist scholars who examine the role of civil society in state 
policy making therefore focus on analysis of the role of NGOs. Margaret E. Keck, 
Kathryn Sikkink 18  and Ann Florini 19  in particular argue that NGOs and their 
transnational advocacy networks shape and change the policy and practice of states and 
international organisations. Audie Klotz in the area of anti-apartheid,20  David P. 
Forsythe 21  and Kathryn Sikkink 22  in human rights, Richard Price in banning 
landmines23 and Karl Raustiala in environmental institutions 24 trace how norms and 
16 
ideas have changed state policies and practices. Through tremendous empirical studies, 
these scholars argue that non-state actors, such as NGOs and their transnational 
advocacy networks, play a significant political role in the process of state norm 
adoption and internalisation. With regard to the effectiveness of the NGO advocacy 
movement, however, there are some scholars who hold a sceptical view. Jonathan A. 
Fox and L.D. Brown,25 and Paul J. Nelson26 argue that not all NGO advocacy 
movements ensure state or international organisation policy changes. Although there 
were some progresses, they argue, NGOs either played a minor role or were involved 
solely during the implementation phase. Charlotte Ku, 27  Dianne Otto, 28  Peter 
Willetts,29 and Thomas G. Weiss and Leon Gordenker30 also recognise the deficiencies 
of the current system for international organisation-NGO interactions. They argue that 
under the current system the incorporation of NGO advocacy movements into the 
agenda and practice of international organisations is limited.  
NGOs, in summary, communicate with the state and the public through these 
three functions of research and educational provision, service delivery and advocacy. As 
Peter Willetts argues, the distinction among these three types of NGO function is not as 
sharp as the labels suggest.31 NGOs which have their main aim as service delivery 
usually run regular campaigns in order to mobilise supporters and to attract publicity. 
Advocacy NGOs often operate by themselves or with other NGOs’ programmes that 
provide certain types of services in response to urgent needs in their policy domain. In 
the same way, NGOs’ role in research and education as producers and disseminator of 
information, knowledge and expertise overlaps with the activities of advocacy NGOs. A 
key feature which is found in these three main functions is that the communication with 
the state and the public through these three functions form NGOs’ unique channels and 
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political influence which enable them to interact with and exert influence on the state 
and the public.   
 
 
2.2.2 South Korean Government Food Aid Policy Making Towards North Korea 
 
Since 1995, international development and relief organisations had recognised the 
existence of a chronic food deficit and that deficit’s demographic impact on North 
Korea.32 Given this demonstrable humanitarian need for food assistance to North Korea, 
South Korean NGOs began their advocacy movement urging the South Korean 
government to provide humanitarian food aid to North Korea and prompting the public 
to participate in fundraising for humanitarian aid to North Korea. This advocacy 
movement, as shown in the above section, developed into the most vigorous civil 
society movement since the democratisation movement of the 1970s and 1980s which 
was the largest civil society movement in South Korean history after the end of the 
Korean War in 1953.  
Given this operational environment, the South Korean government made 
official policy pronouncements that humanitarian food aid would be provided 
irrespective of political issues such as the nuclear development programme.33 With the 
South Korean government official policy pronouncements, the amount of food aid 
delivery to North Korea from the South Korean government radically increased and 
finally delivered the largest amount of food aid to North Korea, a total of 2,862,934 
tonnes,34 between 1995 and 2007. The amount of food aid delivery however severely 
fluctuated, and the pattern of fluctuation during this period did not relate to changes in  
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Table 2.1 The Amount, Delivery Type and Contents of the South Korean 
 Government Food Aid to North Korea (in tonnes; U.S. Dollars)   
 
 
Multilateral Aid Bilateral Aid 
(on loan terms except 
for 1995 and 2006) 
Sum 
WFP UNICEF 
1995   Paddy: 150,000 
($232,000,000) 
150,000 
($232,000,000) 
1996 Mixed Grains: 3,409 
 ($2,000,000) 
Dried Milk: 203 
 ($1,000,000) 
 3,612 
($3,000,000) 
1997 
Mixed Grains: 9,852 
($6,000,000) 
Maize: 50,000/Dried milk: 300 
($10,530,000) 
Corn-Soya Blended: 8,389 
($4,000,000) 
Dried Milk: 781 
($3,600,000) 
 69,322 
($24,130,000) 
1998 Maize: 30,000/Flour: 10,000 
($11,000,000) 
  40,000 
($11,000,000) 
1999     
2000   Rice: 500,000 
 ($90,000,000) 
500,000 ($90,000,000) 
2001 Maize:100,000 ($17,250,000)   100,000 ($17,250,000) 
2002 Maize: 100,000 ($17,390,000)  Rice:400,000 
($106,000,000) 
500,000 
($123,390,000) 
2003 Maize: 100,000 ($18,000,000)  Rice:400,000 
($106,000,000) 
500,000 
($124,000,000) 
2004 Maize: 100,000 ($2,400,000)  Rice: 400,000 
($124,000,000) 
500,000 
($120,380,000) 
2005   Rice: 500,000 
($150,000,000) 
500,000 
($150,000,000) 
2006   Rice:100,000 
($40,010,000) 
100,000 
($40,010,000) 
2007 
Maize:24,000 
Soya beans:12,000 
Whole wheat:5,000 
Wheat flour:2,000 
Dried milk:1,000 ($20,000,000) 
 Rice: 400,000 
($154,000,000) 
444,000 
($174,000,000) 
Sum 511,950 
($108,570,000) 
984 
($4,600,000) 
2,850,000 
($994,340,000) 
2,862,934 
($1,107,510,000) 
 
Source: Various sources, but mainly from the Ministry of Unification, 2008 Nambukhyeobryeokgigeum 
Baekseo [English Translation: White Paper on the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund], (Seoul: Ministry of 
Unification, 2008); Ministry of Unification, “WFP Daebukjiwone Daehan Woori Jeongbueui Chamyeo 
Hyeonhwang” [English Translation: The South Korean Government response to the WFP's Food Aid to 
North Korea], (Seoul: Ministry of Unification, undated); Ministry of Unification, 2008 Unification White 
Paper. (Seoul: Ministry of Unification, 2008). 
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North Korea’s ‘import requirement’, indicating the amount of food which is not covered 
by national production.35 After the fluctuation of food aid to North Korea between 1995 
and 1999, the South Korean government was finally able to institutionalise its provision 
of large scale government food aid to North Korea between 2000 and 2007.36 
In 1995, two months before North Korea’s appeal for food aid to the 
international community on 23 August, the Kim Young-Sam administration had already 
pledged 150,000 tonnes of bilateral aid to North Korea in June and delivered it during 
the four months between June and October 1995.37 In 1996, the Kim Young-Sam 
administration responded to the appeal of the WFP and UNICEF again, when, on 11 
June, the Minister of Unification Okie Kwon said that the government would provide $3 
million worth of aid to North Korea through multilateral agencies.38 The WFP procured 
the equivalent of 3,409 tonnes of mixed grains and provided it to North Korean children. 
The South Korean government in addition delivered 203 tonnes of domestic dried milk, 
worth $1 million, to UNICEF.39 In 1997, the Kim Young-Sam administration provided 
food aid worth $24.13 million to North Korea through the WFP and UNICEF.40 The 
37th National Council for Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation (the National Council) 
which was held on the following day decided to commit food aid worth $6 million to 
the WFP and the WFP provided 9,852 tonnes of mixed grains to North Korea.41 The 
39th National Council on 20 June responded to the second UN Consolidated Inter-
Agency Appeal which covered the period from April 1997 to March 31 1998.42 The 
Council decided to provide food aid to North Korea through the WFP worth $10.53 
million, comprising 50,000 tonnes of maize and 300 tonnes of domestic dried milk. On 
23 August, the spokesperson of the Ministry of Unification said that the government 
would provide additional food aid through the WFP and UNICEF.43 Following the 41st 
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Council’s approval on 29 August 1997, the Kim Young-Sam administration delivered $4 
million in cash to the WFP,44 and the WFP provided 8,389 tonnes of corn-soya blended 
(CSB) to North Korea. The government donated domestic dried milk worth $3.6 million 
to UNICEF, the equivalent of 781 tonnes. Despite the severe financial situation in the 
aftermath of the 1997 currency crisis, the Kim Dae-Jung administration took office on 
25 February 1998 and on 30 April 1998, it issued a press release announcing the 
provision of 30,000 tonnes of maize and 10,000 tonnes of flour.45 During 1999, the 
Kim Dae-Jung administration did not provide any humanitarian food aid, putting its 
emphasis on the provision of development assistance for the resuscitation of North 
Korea’s agriculture. For this reason, although the Kim Dae-Jung administration 
provided $28.25 million worth of chemical fertiliser, equivalent to 155,000 tonnes, food 
aid was not provided during 1999.46 
After the fluctuation of food aid to North Korea between 1995 and 1999, the 
South Korean government consistently committed to their pledges, delivering large 
scale bilateral food aid to North Korea between 2000 and 2007.47 Given the political 
rapprochement after the Inter-Korean Summit on 15 June 2000, there was a big change 
in the food aid delivery mode. Since 2000, a massive volume of food aid, an average of 
50,000 tonnes on loan terms, continued to be shipped to North Korea until 2007 except 
the years 2001 and 2006. The discussions of food aid via loans were made through the 
institutionalised inter-Korean diplomatic channels, such as annual Inter-Korean Vice-
Ministerial and Ministerial Talks, the Special Envoy Meetings and a series of meetings 
of the Committee on Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation. At these meetings, North 
Korea continuously requested the provision of large scale food aid. Considering the 
inter-Korean relations, the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administration 
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consistently provided large scale food aid to North Korea, except for the two years of 
2001 and 2006. In 2001, the 76th National Council held on 8 February decided to 
provide $17.25 million worth of food aid to North Korea through the WFP.48 The Kim 
Dae-Jung administration, however, did not provide additional food aid on loan terms 
during 2001. The Kim Dae-Jung administration was not able to pledge food aid to North 
Korea under the unfavourable diplomatic environment between North Korea and the 
international community caused by the 9.11 Terror in the United States and the absence 
of the Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks. North Korea’s missile experiment on 6 July 2006 
acted as a disabling factor for the food loans which had continued since 2000. The day 
following the missile experiment, the South Korean government announced that their 
provision of food loans would cease in response to North Korea’s missile launch. While 
the diplomatic tension between North and South Korea became worse, severe flood 
damage occurred in North Korea in August 2006. The North Korean side of the 6.15 
Joint Statement South Korean Committee (the 6.15 Committee) made an official request 
for flood recovery support to the 6.15 Committee. Public opinion urging the provision 
of flood recovery aid simultaneously formed at all levels of society in South Korea. The 
Roh Moo-Hyun administration, as a result, decided to provide 100,000 tonnes of food, 
equivalent to $40,010,000, and flood recovery equipment and goods worth a total of 
$229,670,000 as flood recovery support at the 175th National Council meeting on 25 
August. In the middle of the process of transporting 100,000 tonnes of flood recovery 
food support in 2006, however, North Korea once again proceeded with a nuclear 
experiment on 9 October. After North Korea’s nuclear experiment, the South Korean 
government suspended the delivery of 100,000 tonnes of food aid for flood victims and 
the negotiation with North Korea on the resumption of bilateral food aid which had 
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been ongoing since 2000. In 2007, the South Korean government resumed the large 
scale of food aid and provided 444,000 tonnes of food aid to North Korea. 
 
 
2.2.3 The Research Problem and Questions 
 
As shown above, there was a discrepancy between the South Korean government’s 
policy pronouncements and their actual behaviour relating to food aid to North Korea. 
The amount of food aid to North Korea between 1995 and 2007 severely fluctuated and 
the pattern of fluctuation during this period also did not relate to changes in North 
Korea’s ‘import requirement’ which is not covered by national production. Why was 
there a discrepancy between the South Korean government’s policy pronouncements 
and their actual behaviour relating to food aid to North Korea? Why did the amount of 
food aid to North Korea fluctuate and finally reach the stage of consistent food aid 
delivery with large scale bilateral food aid to North Korea throughout most of the years 
between 2000 and 2007?  The existing literature does not answer these questions.  
Firstly, the attempt to answer the above questions has rarely been conducted. 
The main reason is that most studies treated South Korean humanitarian NGOs as a 
service provider merely serving as agents of a national government and therefore 
neglected the political role of humanitarian NGOs in the South Korean and U.S. food 
aid policy making. Under this assumption, the existing studies focused on the causes of 
the North Korean famine,49 the outcomes achieved by the efforts of states’ agencies and 
international humanitarian organisations,50 the role of NGOs as humanitarian and 
development aid providers51 and the operational constraints which the international 
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community has encountered inside North Korea during their humanitarian activities.52 
Although there have been numerous analyses listing what international humanitarian 
NGOs have achieved in North Korea and what operational constraints they have 
encountered during this process, the analysis of South Korean government food aid 
policy making and the political of humanitarian NGOs have drawn few scholars’ 
attention.53 
Secondly, the handful of works which have attempted to explain the fluctuations 
identified in the provision of South Korean and U.S. food aid to North Korea are flawed, 
because many scholars in North Korean studies have adopted a ‘security-centred’ 
approach without scientific examination.54 Given the severe political confrontation 
between North Korea and the international community, in particular South Korea and 
the United States, the security-centred approach has become a dominant explanatory 
viewpoint in explaining all the other socio-economic and political issues. In this 
political and academic environment, scholars who adopted this security-centred 
approach showed a tendency to interpret all the interactions between North Korea and 
the international community as a supplementary issue that is subordinate to the national 
security matters. Andrew S. Natsios, Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, Deok-Jun 
Kim and David Kelleher, for instance, argue that South Korea and the United States 
used food aid to North Korea as leverage to achieve their political interests in the 
negotiations with North Korea.55 Based on this approach, they interpret, without 
tremendous scientific examination, the provision of food aid as merely a ‘quid pro quo’ 
for an improvement in political relations between North Korea and the donor states.56 
They also conclude that the fluctuations in the amount of food aid to North Korea were 
the inevitable and direct results of political oscillations between North Korea and South 
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Korea. This tendency has therefore resulted in weakening scientific scrutiny in scholars’ 
works on the major donor states’ food aid policy making towards North Korea. 
Thirdly, scholars who have studied the major donor states’ food aid policy 
towards North Korea, mainly South Korea and the United States, have underestimated 
the dilemmas stemming from the clash of national security interests, humanitarian 
principles and human rights that were identified in South Korean and U.S. food aid 
policy making. Natsios, Haggard and Noland have recognised the dilemmas of 
humanitarian aid to North Korea as a critical factor in South Korean and U.S. food aid 
policy making.57 They nevertheless did not pay proper attention to analysing these 
dilemmas, as they posited that national security interests ‘ultimately’ trump the other 
two values of humanitarian principles and human rights and the clash of these values. 
Although Michael Schloms has traced why these dilemmas occured and how various 
humanitarian NGOs have dealt with it,58 he has neither explained why and by whom 
these dilemmas were intensified nor how these dilemmas have affected major donors’ 
food aid decision making. 
Lastly, scholars such as Natsios, Schloms, Haggard and Noland did not pay 
proper scholarly attention to the role of humanitarian NGOs in their governments’ food 
aid policy making. Since the securitised approach identified in North Korean studies 
considers the state as the unilateral actor in domestic and international politics, their 
analyses of food aid policy making have neglected the role of humanitarian NGOs 
despite their recognition on the role of humanitarian NGOs in their government food aid 
decision making. Thus, they did not pay scholarly attention to explaining how these 
NGOs changed their government’s food aid policy making.        
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Despite the significant political role of South Korean humanitarian NGOs, in 
summary, the existing literature has provided only a partial explanation of the 
fluctuation identified in the delivery of South Korean government food aid to North 
Korea, excluding humanitarian NGOs from their explanation. The scholars who adopted 
the realist approach therefore have not offered a comprehensive explanation of the 
discrepancy between states’ official policy pronouncements and their actual delivery of 
food aid to North Korea between 1995 and 2007. To understand the food aid policy 
making of the South Korean government, this thesis therefore focuses on the role of 
South Korean humanitarian NGOs in their government food aid policy making towards 
North Korea. 
      Based on the research problem identified above, the research questions of this 
thesis are set out as follows:  
 
Given the demonstrable humanitarian need for food assistance in North 
Korea from 1995 to 2007, how and to what extent have South Korean 
humanitarian non-governmental organisations influenced their government 
food aid policy making on North Korea, and why has the extent of the 
influence from non-governmental organisations differed between 
administrations?  
 
This research question relates to the fundamental question of food aid study: why does a 
state provide food aid? This thesis, however, narrows down the scope of analysis to the 
role of NGOs in state food aid policy making. By doing so, this thesis brings proper 
scholarly attention to, and examines the role of, NGOs as a political actor that is already 
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significant in state food aid policy making. This thesis hence attempts to provide a 
complementary explanation to the existing approaches to food aid policy making that 
have neglected such roles as those of NGOs. 
 
 
2.3 The Literature Review: The Constructivist Perspective 
 
This section demonstrates the usefulness of constructivist theory as a framework of 
analysis to explain NGO influence on state food aid policy making. It examines how a 
constructivist approach incorporates norms and ideas, NGOs and dynamics of advocacy 
in the analysis of foreign policy making. In doing so, this section demonstrates that the 
constructivist theory is an alternative approach to explain how the South Korean 
humanitarian NGOs, advocating humanitarianism and brotherly love for food aid to 
North Korea, shaped and changed the South Korean government food aid policy 
towards North Korea.   
      Conventional realist accounts argue that food aid was motivated by the 
economic and political self-interests of the donor.59 These realist interpretations of food 
aid is that food aid has a surplus-food-disposal function and market-creating function in 
terms of economic self-interest.60 From this perspective, food aid acts as a leverage to 
induce recipient countries to comply with the foreign policy objectives of the donor in 
terms of political self-interest.61 This perspective can well be understood through the 
classical realist framework of international relations theory that denotes ‘maximization 
of interest and power,’ ‘state as unilateral actor in chaotic international politics’ and 
‘interest as fixed or taken-for-granted goal.’62 
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Peter Uvin and Raymond F. Hopkins, however, argue that in the field of food aid 
in the 1960s the realist interpretation was dominant, but as the international food aid 
regime has evolved objectives and mandates promoting donors to provide food aid have 
changed from economic and foreign policy interests to developmental and humanitarian 
preferences.63 Uvin and Hopkins argue that international food aid regime has evolved 
by the establishment of new international laws and institutions.64 In 1964, for instance, 
the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), a United Nations organisation 
responsible for project and emergency food aid, was created. In 1967, a Food Aid 
Convention (FAC), which aimed to persuade rich countries to contribute more and to 
share the burden of food aid, in particular the United States (U.S.), was ratified by the 
major cereal trading nations. In 1976, an International Emergency Food Reserve (IEFR), 
whose goal was to make sure that there would always be multilateral food aid available 
for a rapid response to emergencies, was established. These institutions, international 
laws and covenants, they argue, curb the conventional flow of food aid characterised by 
politically useful flexibility, surplus disposal and additionality to commercial flows.65 
By tracing the evolution of international food aid regime and the flow of international 
food aid, Uvin and Hopkins conclude that the flow of international food aid is 
increasingly governed by the international food aid regime that consists of those 
multilateral institutions, norms and procedures.  
The international regime approach, however, has received criticisms. Christoper 
B. Barrett and Daniel G. Maxwell in particular argue that the international food aid 
regime has no enforcement mechanism to pressurise the signatories of international 
covenants or laws to comply with their legal and moral commitments or to put non-
signatory countries under the influence of this international regime.66 Barrett and 
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Maxwell instead argue that in the United States three subgroups, domestic food 
processors, maritime interests and the NGO community, support international food 
aid. 67  Polly J. Diven in particular has demonstrated the relationship between 
commodity producer interests and food aid policy makers by tracing the empirical 
analysis of U.S. food aid flows.68 These scholars have made a contribution to the 
development of food aid studies, expanding the object of food aid analysis from a state-
centred approach to non-state actors.  
Barrett, Maxwell and Diven’s work, however, only ended in the analysis of the 
role of interest groups driven by private interests. From this perspective, U.S. NGOs 
support food aid as they depend on food aid as a resource for their operations and an 
operating expense for their administrative costs. Humanitarian NGOs argue that their 
fundamental objectives are not self-interest driven by commercialism and the 
availability of donor funds but are based on normative principles.69 In Britain, Save the 
Children Fund, the oldest of the non-governmental foreign aid organisations, was 
founded from the Fight the Famine Council as a response to humanitarian distress in 
Europe after World War I.70 Oxfam was founded in Britain during World War II and 
campaigned for grain ships to be sent through the allied naval blockade to provide relief 
for women and children in enemy-occupied Greece.71 As part of the same impetus, in 
the United States, CARE (initially formed as the ‘Cooperative for American 
Remittances to Europe,’ but now stands for ‘Cooperative for Assistance and Relief 
Everywhere, Inc.’) was founded in 1945 to provide relief to the survivors of World War 
II.72 With the end of the period of post-war reconstruction, then, these humanitarian 
NGOs broadened their objectives from immediate relief in the form of food aid 
programmes to development assistance in the form of projects. Although there are still 
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debates over using food aid as a resource for development,73 a progressive change has 
occurred within many NGOs. NGOs, especially U.S.-based NGOs, have gradually 
broadened their mandate from relieving the suffering caused by poverty to encouraging 
participation of the poor in the political process.74 
With the traditional role of delivering food aid and essential goods for living, 
humanitarian NGOs also affect the formation of state food aid policy making. Firstly, 
humanitarian NGOs provide an alternative source of information to the official state 
policy-making process in event of an emergency.75 Humanitarian NGOs have the 
merits of exploiting their high level of knowledge, information and expertise which is 
taken from their presence in the field.76 Secondly, through their advocacy movements 
in executive and legislative bodies, they exert influence on decision makers who direct 
state food aid policy.77 Lastly, by educating the public about an emergency and 
proselytising its active support to relief efforts, humanitarian NGOs shape public 
opinion and thereby affect policy.78 
Despite the humanitarian NGO role in state food aid policy making, the study of 
the political role of humanitarian NGOs in state food aid policy making has rarely been 
conducted. In the existing food aid studies, the analyses have mainly focused on the role 
of service delivery of NGOs. The dominant views based on the realist and international 
regime approach are still that the state is a unitary actor which has unchallenged 
authority to decide whether or not to provide food aid and that political, economic and 
foreign policy interests of a donor state are the key motivations of food aid decision 
making. However, these approaches do not explain why state interest changed over time 
and how non-state actors influenced the formation of state interest and its changes. 
Neither do these approaches explain the role of norms and ideas on state policy making.  
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Most scholars in the analysis of South Korean and U.S. food aid policy making, 
as discussed above, adopted the realist interpretation where a state is seen as a unitary 
political actor driven by self-economic and political interests. This realist interpretation 
has resulted in overlooking normative factors, such as humanitarianism and brotherly 
love, and the role of non-state actors such as humanitarian NGOs as norm entrepreneurs 
in the analysis of state food aid policy making. The constructivist approach, however, 
provides a framework to explore whether and how NGOs have exerted influence on and 
shaped state foreign policy formation. By providing a different understanding of 
‘interest’ (‘exogenised’ or ‘indigenised’), ‘actors’ (individuals, states, non-state actors) 
and ‘dynamics’ (decision-making) in foreign policy analysis, the constructivist 
approach enables the explanation of the role of NGOs in state food aid policy making. 
The constructivist approach views the world as socially ‘constructed’ through a 
process of interaction between various agents and the structure of their broader 
environment which firstly allows the explanation of national interest formation and 
change often identified in state policy making. Instead of assuming that a state has 
certain fixed and exogenised – or ‘taken-for-granted’ – interests, constructivists 
presume that national interests are constructed through a process of social interaction.79 
The existing literature of food aid policy making was mostly underpinned by the realist 
approach that states are understood, primarily as being driven and motivated by political 
and economic interests.80 The scholars based in this realist approach consequently have 
not explained how and why these interests have changed. Contrary to this traditional 
approach to food aid policy making, a key assumption of the constructivist approach –
that national interests are constructed through a process of social interaction – is a 
beginning point enabling scholars to explore how national interests in relation to food 
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aid policy are constructed and changed through a process of interaction with broader 
environments. This assumption in particular helps explain why state food aid policies 
sometimes appear to be in contradiction to stated national interests.  
Secondly, constructivists put proper scholarly attention on normative and 
ideational factors in the analysis of state policy making. Although international relations 
scholars recognised the importance of normative and ideational factors in foreign policy 
analysis through the 1905s and 1960s, there were difficulties to theorise these processes. 
Realism excluded normative and ideational factors in foreign policy analysis because 
the limitation of the methodology made measurement difficult.81 In the 1970s and 
1980s, this tendency to exclude normative and ideational factors for methodological 
reasons was further reinforced by the emerging infatuation of political scientists with 
economic methods: the dominance of economic models and methods in the study of U.S. 
politics.82 From the middle of 1980s, however, John Ruggie,83 Friedrich Kratochwil,84 
Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, 85  and Alexander Wendt 86  introduced 
normative and ideational factors to the analysis of international politics. Finnemore and 
Sikkink’s article ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Changes’ in particular 
documented the origins and emergence of norms, the mechanism by which they 
exercise influence and the conditions under which norms will be influential.87 They 
argue that the tendency to analyse state behaviour from either a norm-based perspective 
or a rationalist perspective is not helpful in explaining state behaviour. Instead they 
argue that state policy and behaviour should be understood by analysing the mechanism 
of ‘strategic social construction’ through which actors rationally reconfigure their 
preferences, identities and social context.88 Based on the theoretical development of 
constructivism in foreign policy analysis, constructivists, such as Ann Florini, Audie 
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Klotz, Tomas Risse-Kappen, Stephen C. Ropp, Kathryn Sikkink, David P. Forsythe, 
Margaret E. Keck and Abby Stoddard,89 have analysed norms and ideas in state foreign 
policy making. Through empirical studies in various policy areas, such as the 
environment movement, the ban on land mines, the anti-apartheid movement, women’s 
suffrage and human rights, these scholars have documented that differing national or 
international NGOs motivated by moral principles or commonly held values and norms 
have exerted significant influence on state policy making and international politics.90 
This body of scholarship argues that the norms and ideas underpinning NGOs influence 
on state discursive positions, procedures, policies and behaviour, alters state self-
perception of identities, interests and preferences.  
Thirdly, the constructivist approach provides a tool to explain the role of NGOs 
in state policy making, considering them as norms and ideas entrepreneurs. By whom 
are norms and ideas initiated and catalysed? Constructivist scholars’ answer, in 
particular North-American/conventional constructivists, is that non-state actors and their 
networks at the domestic and transnational level have been significant actors as it is 
NGOs that have introduced and catalysed new norms and ideas.91 Constructivist 
scholars have documented how NGOs catalyse norms and ideas and how they have 
changed national interest. By doing so, these scholars supplemented the traditional 
foreign policy analysis approach by broadening its scope of actor analysis from its 
emphasis on national bureaucracies and actors to non-state actors as norms and ideas 
entrepreneurs. Viewed from the constructivist perspective, therefore, foreign policy 
analysis needs to take into account non-state actors and their advocacy movements. 
Lastly, the constructivist approach incorporates new dynamics of decision 
making, such as ‘advocacy,’ ‘persuasion’ and ‘arguing’ which are mainly exploited by 
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NGOs, into the analysis of state policy making. A question raised by realist and 
liberalist scholars is whether constructivism can explain dynamics of decision making in 
foreign policy analysis. More specifically, how does constructivism explain ‘arguing’ 
and ‘persuasion’ which non-state actors use to shape or change state interest and 
preference in foreign policy analysis? The traditional view in the broader international 
relations literature has been to assume that the actors involved in the decision-making 
process are instrumentally rational and seek to maximise given interests. 92  As 
international relations scholars have recognised, however, decision-making processes 
are not just about ‘hard-headed bargaining.’93 Rather, constructivist scholars see the 
agents involved as ‘social’ actors who redefine and reshape their interests, preferences 
and ultimately their policies through the process of interaction.94 In this process of 
communicative interaction for decision making, as Johnston95 and Risse-Kappen96 
documented, communicatively rational actors do not so much carefully calculate the 
costs and benefits; rather, these actors use the tactics of ‘persuasion,’ ‘arguing’ and 
‘convincing’ in their decision-making process. Jeffrey T. Checkel97, Alastair Iain 
Johnston,98 Tomas Risse-Kappen, Stephen C. Ropp, Kathryn Sikkink99 and Audie 
Klotz100 have also documented that under certain conditions arguing and persuasion did 
affect both national and international policy making.   
 
 
2.4 Hypotheses of the Thesis 
 
As discussed in the literature review, humanitarian NGOs perform two main functions: 
service delivery and advocacy. The main function of humanitarian NGOs is to provide 
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humanitarian aid to people who are in humanitarian distresses,101 but they also play a 
political role. Humanitarian NGOs pressurise donor governments to provide 
humanitarian aid by providing ‘hands-on information’ from their field experience102 
and by advocating humanitarianism.103 By doing so, humanitarian NGOs proselytise 
donor states to provide more humanitarian aid.  
Given the humanitarian need in North Korea from 1995 when North Korea 
officially appealed to the international community for food aid, the international 
community provided humanitarian aid on the largest scale, mainly consisting of food 
aid, to North Korea. Among the total shipment from various donor states during this 
period, South Korea shipped the largest amount of food aid, 2,862,934 tonnes, to North 
Korea.104 As the biggest stakeholder which had mixed interests in the Korean Peninsula 
in terms of national security, regional and international security, the South Korean 
government experienced a serious dilemma between the conflicting interests of national 
security, humanitarian principles and human rights during the food aid policy making 
process. Since the South Korean government began shipping food aid to North Korea in 
1995 and 1996, South Korean humanitarian NGOs have indeed exercised differing 
influences over the policy makers in relation to food aid decision making and civil 
society. 
Between 1995 and 2007, South Korean humanitarian NGOs, which are 
motivated and underpinned by religious beliefs and ethnic fraternalism, actively 
engaged in operations for the relief of humanitarian distress in North Korea. During this 
period the South Korean humanitarian NGOs, which usually consisted of humanitarian 
aid organisations and religious organisations, played an active advocacy role in 
pressurising the South Korean government to provide food aid to North Korea. For this 
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aim, the humanitarian NGOs exploited various advocacy activities, such as domestic 
and international conferences, public campaigns, fundraising events, petitions, and 
hearings for the public and policy makers.105 By organising consecutive international 
conferences, for instance, the South Korean humanitarian NGOs attempted to 
proselytise their government and the international community to provide food aid to 
North Korea.106 By building the NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea and 
the Government-Civilian Council for North Korean Aid Policy, the humanitarian NGOs 
sought to incorporate their voices and demands into government food aid policy 
making.107 
      Given the food deficit in North Korea between 1995 and 2007, South Korean 
humanitarian NGOs have played an active role in advocacy movements in order to 
change their governments’ food aid policy towards compliance with their fundamental 
goals. Despite of the consistent advocacy movement by these South Korean 
humanitarian NGOs between 1995 and 2000, however, the provision of food aid from 
South Korea severely fluctuated and finally reached the stage of consistent delivery of 
food aid after 2000 until 2007. In the explanation of these fluctuations, this thesis 
demonstrates that the differences in the organisational capabilities of NGOs influenced 
the different stages of state food aid policy making. These differences in NGO abilities, 
in turn, contributed to the different outcomes at the different stages of the state’s food 
aid policy making, eventually inducing a fluctuation in the amount of food aid to North 
Korea between 1995 and 2007. This thesis set the organisational capability of NGO and 
NGO’s capability to set agenda, network, graft and institutionalise new norms and ideas 
onto state policy making as key variables. However, the study of NGO and 
constructivist approach shows that the changes in the issue characteristics of 
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humanitarian distress and the domestic political structure of a target state are the 
secondary factors influencing the degree of NGO advocacy on state policy making 
process.108 In this sense, the thesis sets the issue characteristics of the North Korean 
famine and the domestic political structure of the South Korean government as the 
assumption of the study. 
     Drawing on the literature review and a constructivist approach, this thesis is based 
upon an assumption and develops three hypotheses as follows:  
 
Assumption: 
 
The issue characteristics of the North Korean food crisis and the domestic 
political structure of South Korean government food aid policy making 
changed over time, shaping the differing operational environment in which 
South Korean humanitarian non-governmental organisations worked. 
 
 
Hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis I: Organisational mandates, funding capacities and expertise 
were important in the constitution of each non-governmental organisation’s 
capacity to influence South Korean government food aid policy. 
 
Hypothesis II: Differing non-governmental organisation capacities were 
consequential in explaining the capability of non-governmental organisation 
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advocacy to set agendas, network and engage in the grafting of norms in 
respect of South Korean government policy on food aid to North Korea.  
 
Hypothesis III: These differences in non-governmental organisation capacity 
shaped different outcomes at different stages of South Korea’s food aid 
policy-making. South Korea’s food aid policy processes are disaggregated 
according to the different stages of agenda setting, the formation of a 
discursive position, and institutional and policy development. 
  
 
 
2.5 Developing an Analytical Framework 
 
A constructivist perspective assumes that state interest is not exogenised or ‘taken-for-
granted’ but socially constructed through mutual interaction. For the constructivist, 
norms and ideas are one critical factor that influences state decision making and 
behaviour. With regard to actors in politics, the constructivist approach considers non-
state actors, such as NGOs, as political actors in domestic and international politics. 
NGOs work as norm entrepreneurs in practice. In this sense, the constructivist 
perspective provides an analytical framework to explain how the norms of 
humanitarianism and brotherly love influenced South Korean government food aid 
policy making, by replacing the existing norms of hostility towards North Korea with 
humanitarianism and brotherly love. The constructivist scholars, however, do not 
elaborate on how NGOs, as norm entrepreneurs, incorporate new norms and ideas into 
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the norms of policy makers in the government and civil society. Neither do the existing 
literature and the constructivist approach provide an appropriate explanation of how 
NGOs, as norm entrepreneurs, maximise their influence over the state and state policy 
makers.  
      Using the analytical framework based on the constructivist approach, this thesis 
therefore focuses on the entire process of norm grafting by the NGOs: the operational 
environment which circumscribes or promotes NGO’s norm grafting, the agenda 
framing and networks which are exploited by NGOs to maximise norm grafting and the 
process of internalising norms in the differing stages of state policy making as a final 
process of norm grafting. This section outlines an analytical framework for the analysis 
of NGO influence on state food aid policy making, beginning with how the operational 
environment circumscribes or catalyses NGO influence. The two factors which 
comprise the operational environment that NGOs operate in are the issue characteristics 
and the domestic political structure. Another factor, which is directly related to the 
strength of NGO influence, is NGO organisational capacity which is subject to 
mandates, funding capacities and expertise. Drawing on the work of Richard Price, 
Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink,109 this section then outlines an analytical 
framework for evaluating NGO influence on state food aid policy making. The four 
stages which are identified in the process of the NGO advocacy movement are (i) 
agenda setting, (ii) networking, (iii) grafting and (iv) institutionalisation.  
 
 
2.5.1 The Operational Environment for Non-governmental Organisation Advocacy 
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This section discusses how the operational environment circumscribes or catalyses 
NGO influence on state policy making. This section draws on the works of Thomas 
Risse-Kappen, Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink.110 The section first evaluates 
why some issue-specific NGOs have more impact on state policy making than others 
and how changes in the issue characteristics influence NGO advocacy. Secondly, this 
section explains how the domestic political structure shapes NGO influence on state 
policy making. To identify the characteristics of domestic political structure, this section 
examines the state policy making structure, institutions linking the state and NGOs, the 
degree to which the state accommodates humanitarianism and humanitarian institutions, 
and the diplomatic relationship between donor states and recipient states. Lastly, the 
section shows how differing mandates, funding capacities and expertise shape NGO 
organisational capability in advocacy. 
 
 
2.5.1.1 Issue Characteristics 
 
Keck and Sikkink argue that there are two variables that explain the relative influence of 
issue-specific NGOs on state policy making. One is related to issue characteristics itself; 
the other is NGOs’ ability to reframe the issue. With regard to the issue characteristics, 
bodily harm to vulnerable individuals is the more frequently and effectively tackled 
issue that led to the formation of transnational advocacy networks and their success in 
state policy change. Existing empirical studies of the environment movement, women’s 
suffrage, the anti-apartheid movement, the ban on land mines, anti-corruption 
movements, democracy movements and human rights show that not all principled ideas 
40 
or NGO movements lead to success in influencing state policy change. Among them, as 
Keck and Sikkink argue,111 the issues related to bodily harm to vulnerable individuals 
such as humanitarian aid to individuals stricken by famine, domestic or inter-state 
conflicts, female circumcision, torture and disappearance are more amenable to NGOs 
than other issues such as anti-corruption movements or environmental issues. Issues 
involving bodily harm indeed tend to allow advocacy NGOs to recruit more volunteers 
and supporters and to infuse a strong normative meaning into these volunteer activities. 
Since these issues arouse strong feelings and are also strongly underpinned by various 
international principles, it is easier for these NGOs to raise material resources required 
for organisations’ administration and their operation of activities. NGOs advocating 
bodily harm issues, therefore, are more successful in resonating with the state policy-
makers and the general public than with some other issues.112 
Secondly, NGOs’ ability to reframe the issue is another factor that helps to 
explain NGO policy impact on state policy. NGOs enhance their influence on state 
policy through the use of three different strategies. Firstly, Keck and Sikkink argue that 
issues involving bodily harm to populations perceived as vulnerable and innocent 
resonate more easily with the public and the national government and tend to be 
effective.113 It is therefore more effective to reframe the issue into bodily harm to the 
vulnerable and innocent. Secondly, Deborah A. Stone argues that NGOs can make the 
issues more convincing by reframing them into a ‘short’ and ‘clear causal chain’ that 
establishes who bears responsibility and how the issue raised can be improved.114 
Lastly, Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom argues that when the issue is framed by the norms of 
international regime that is related to the issue, it is easy for NGOs to gain leverage in 
state policy change. More specifically, when the issues that NGOs advocate are 
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underpinned by international norms and principles, NGOs can easily build transnational 
advocacy networks that are considered as a critical factor required for the success of the 
NGO advocacy movement.115 
 
 
2.5.1.2 The Domestic Political Structure  
 
The domestic political structure of an NGO-based host state circumscribes or catalyses 
NGO influence by shaping the operational ground in which NGOs work, determining 
the availability of channels for NGOs into the political system and dictating the degree 
to which the state accommodates norms and ideas. The diplomatic relationship between 
donor state and recipient states also comprise the domestic political structure which 
shapes the operational environment in which NGOs work. 116  This section first 
operationalises the concept of the domestic political structure. Secondly, it shows how 
the domestic political structure circumscribes or catalyses the influence of Noosing 
terms of the institutional features of the state. Thirdly, this section shows how policy 
networks linking the state and NGOs shape differing influence on NGO advocacy. 
Fourthly, this section addresses how the degree of government accommodation to 
norms and ideas and international institutions advocating these norms and ideas 
influenced NGO advocacy. Lastly, this section shows how the diplomatic relationship 
between donor states and recipient states determines the extent of NGO influence. 
Originally developed in the field of comparative foreign economic policy,117 the 
notion of domestic political structure used in this thesis refers to the institutional 
features of the state, the policy networks linking state-society, the state’s embeddedness 
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in international institutions, the degree of state accommodation to international norms 
and ideas and the diplomatic relationship between donor states and recipient states. 
Contrary to the earlier conceptualisation of the domestic political structure which 
emphasised organisational and legal characteristics of political institutions, the domestic 
political structure as used here incorporates the concept of ‘political culture’ that is 
drawn from the insight of ‘new institutionalism.’118 By including the concept of 
political culture that incorporates communicative action, duties, social obligations and 
norms of appropriate behaviour, it is possible to capture the normative structure of state-
society. 
The characteristics of domestic political structure can first be captured by the 
institutional features of the state.119 They can be analysed in terms of their extent or 
their degree of power of ‘centralisation’ in the decision-making process.120 This more 
specifically can be distinguished by to what extent executive power is concentrated in 
the hands of small groups of decision makers or in the specific institutions of decision-
making procedure. Another characteristic is how the institutional features which 
regulate the relationship between the executive and the legislative constrain the national 
government’s ability to make policies and to implement those policies. ‘Centralised 
states’ would then be characterised by political institutions and cultures which 
concentrate executive power at the top of the political system, in which national 
governments enjoy considerable independence from legislatures.121 Those centralised 
states therefore are prone to be less sensitive to the influence of NGOs.  
       Secondly, the institutions of the policy networks which link state and society 
need to be examined in the analysis of domestic political structure. Intermediate 
organisations between state and society play a role to incorporate societal demands into 
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the political process. Organisational types of those intermediate institutions are political 
parties, national advisory councils and committees and consulting bodies such as think 
tanks. Whether or not those intermediate organisations exist within the state policy-
making process, and if they do, to what degree those intermediate organisations 
aggregate societal demands and channel them into the state policy-making process, can 
be a factor facilitating or circumscribing the policy impact of NGOs in state policy 
making.122 
       Thirdly, the degree of state accommodation to new norms and ideas comprises 
one of the characteristics of domestic political structure. As Thomas Risse-Kappen 
argues, centralised states, in terms of the institutional features of the state, are less 
susceptible to new norms and ideas.123 States that have strong policy networking 
between state and society are more sensitive to new norms and ideas.124 The more the 
state is embedded in international institutions, the more vulnerable to new norms and 
ideas the state is.125 The more sensitive to new norms and ideas the domestic political 
structure of NGO-based host state or target states are, in short, the more significant 
influence NGOs can exert.  
       Fourthly, the domestic political structure can be captured by the state’s 
embeddedness in international institutions.126 Regime analysts, in particular Stephen D. 
Krasner, Friedrich V. Kratochwil and Volker Rittberger, argue that there are issue-
specific international institutions. The international human rights regime for instance is 
supported and legitimised as an organisational platform exists in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the United Nations Human Rights Council.127 
International food aid motivated by humanitarianism is legitimised by the World Food 
Summit and the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent 
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Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief.128 As organisational platforms, the United 
Nations World Food Programme (WFP) and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
have been established to defeat hunger by providing food aid and resonating these 
humanitarian principles with its member states.129 
Regime analysts argue that those international institutions influence national 
government’s policy formation and changes. 130  Those regime analysts more 
specifically argue that international institutions can catalyse the influence of NGOs in 
two ways: by providing material support such as expertise and funds required for NGO 
advocacy movements, and playing a role in strengthening NGOs’ capabilities to gain 
access to national policy-making processes. If norms and goals that NGOs attempt to 
advocate are in compliance with international institutions’ principles, NGOs rely on 
these issue-specific international institutions in order to enhance their legitimacy. The 
international institutions also play a role in pressurising their member state to be more 
sensitive to the demands of NGOs. The more the state is embedded in the international 
institutions, the more the state is sensitive to the influence of NGOs. In this sense, 
NGOs exploit moral or material leverage to maximise their influence. Moral leverage – 
‘name and shame’–provides effective leverage for the countries that seek to belong to a 
normative community of nations. If the host or target states care about their status in 
international society, NGOs exploit this strategy of moral leverage. By exploiting a 
‘name and shame’ strategy, NGOs pressurise their host or target state to change its 
policy and practice in compliance with their goals. To what extent the host or target 
states care about their reputation in the international community, therefore, dictates the 
effectiveness of the moral leverage exploited by NGOs and it in turn facilitates or limits 
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the policy impact of the NGO advocacy movement. The degree of state embeddedness 
in international institutions, therefore, catalyses or circumscribes the influence of NGOs. 
       Lastly, diplomatic relationships are another important variable that affects the 
influence of NGOs by creating an amicable or unfriendly operational environment. 
Diplomatic relationships however are not fixed over time. Changes in the bilateral 
diplomatic relationship between a host state and target state provide shifting 
opportunities and constraints for NGOs. NGO leverage on state food aid policy making 
therefore may vary with changes tithe diplomatic environment. As L. Gordon Flake and 
Scott A. Snyder have shown, for instance, when the United States as a NGO-based host 
state and North Korea as the target state maintained a close diplomatic relationship, the 
U.S. was more sensitive to the influence of humanitarian NGOs that were considered to 
promote the existing relationship.131 In this diplomatic environment, other NGOs that 
were considered to exert negative influence on the existing relationship, for instance 
human rights NGOs, were deliberately excluded by the U.S. government. When the 
diplomatic relationship between North Korea and the United States was hostile and the 
United States sought to improve it, the U.S. governments tended to be more sensitive to 
the demands from humanitarian NGOs which were deemed to improve the existing 
hostile diplomatic relationship. By using humanitarian NGOs as leverage to keep 
communication open with the target state, the U.S. governments sought to change the 
current diplomatic relationship. When the U.S. governments did not wish to improve the 
diplomatic relationship with North Korea, however, they tended to be more responsive 
to the voices from human rights NGOs which are more hostile to North Korea.         
In summary, the domestic political structure of the NGO-based host state in terms 
of power centralisation, the relationship between the executive and legislative, and the 
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policy networks linking the state and NGOs determines to what extent NGOs are 
allowed to gain access to the political system. The degree of state accommodation to 
new norms and ideas, and international institutions advocating these norms and ideas 
along with the diplomatic relationship between donor states and recipient states shape 
differing domestic political structures which circumscribe or catalyse the influence 
NGOs have in state policy making. To understand the differing influence of NGOs in 
state policy making, therefore, it is necessary to examine the domestic political structure 
of state policy making.  
 
 
2.5.1.3 Non-governmental Organisations’ Organisational Capability 
 
This section examines the actor characteristics of NGOs separated from the operational 
environment. NGO organisational capabilities combined with the normative attraction 
of NGOs is an important factor in the explanation of the extent of NGO influence on 
state policy. 132  Key organisational features are mandates, funding capacities and 
expertise. NGO organisational capabilities, however, are inherently limited and NGO 
influence on state policy making also relies on the normative appeal of NGOs. This, 
through the advocacy movement, is the main theme of this thesis and therefore the main 
chapters will tackle this theme later. This section shows how the differing mandates, 
funding capacities and expertise of NGOs shape NGO organisational capability.  
The ideational and normative mandates of NGOs are important in evaluating the 
strength of NGOs’ influence. Peter Willetts and Lars Jørgensen defined an NGO as an 
independent organisation of people who have ‘freely chosen’ to support the organisation 
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and aims to pursue the ‘public interest.’133 It is rare for NGOs to use ‘illegal activities’ 
in order to try to effect changes in state policy. The limited and unstable financial 
structure of NGOs and their limited instruments means that they have inherent 
difficulties in achieving goals.134  NGO efforts do not assure their members and 
supporters economic compensation or a position of government. NGOs rely instead on 
material and normative support from their staff, supporters and volunteers. Since NGOs 
work in this limited operational environment, Finnemore and Sikkink argue, a strong 
ideational and normative mandate is created in respect of appropriate or desirable 
behaviour.135 The ideational and normative mandates that underpin NGO activity 
strengthen the unity of NGO members, staffs and supporters. In so doing, NGOs are 
able to overcome the constraints created by material and operational difficulties.136 
     Secondly, stable and sufficient funding is an important factor for the 
sustainability and efficiency of NGO advocacy movements.137NGO funding comes 
from a variety of sources including voluntary contributions, private corporations and 
state financing. Sustainability and efficiency of NGO activity is therefore constrained by 
the absence of a secure income stream. As Estelle James has argued, however, if NGOs 
become over-reliant on a single funding source they may become subject to the 
influence of funding organisations. Such overreliance on a single source of funding can 
damage the legitimacy of NGOs.138 Julie Fisher139 and Michael Edwards and David 
Hulme140argue that NGOs’ funding mechanism, generally relying on state funding, 
makes it difficult to maintain NGOs’ organisational autonomy. These scholars argue 
that as NGOs grow larger and become more bureaucratic, they become increasingly 
reliant on state funding and in turn they may lose their autonomy and flexibility. Helga 
Baitenmann also argues that funding from governments or private corporations can 
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damage NGO legitimacy by undermining the autonomy and flexibility of NGO 
advocacy movements.141 
 Lastly, NGOs’ expertise in a given issue area implies an ability to exploit 
appropriate tactics at the right time and to build dense networks in support of their goals. 
NGOs do not possess material instruments such as military power and normally do not 
have access to large economic resources. Their power and strength comes largely from 
issue-specific expertise which allows them to maintain their legitimacy and 
accountability in relation to the public and the state.142 This expertise includes the 
ability to identify economic, political or moral leverage to pressurise the state to change 
policy and to employ such leverage in a timely manner. 143  The capability and 
experience to build dense networks also assists NGOs to support their activity. In this 
sense, Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink argue that the extent of NGO influence 
on the state’s policy making is directly related to their expertise in exploiting 
appropriate tactics in respect of the target actor, the stage of the issue and the 
operational environment.144 They argue that there are likely to be five tactics generally 
used by NGOs.145 These are information politics, symbolic politics, leverage politics, 
accountability politics and networking politics. Keck and Sikkink characterise the tactic 
of information politics as when NGOs quickly and credibly generate politically useful 
information and disseminate it in a timely manner to where it will have the most impact. 
Symbolic politics is when NGOs exploit symbols, actions or stories that make sense of a 
situation for an audience that is usually distant from a humanitarian crisis. Leverage 
politics is when NGOs use leverage to gain influence on target actors normally 
understood as beyond their direct influence to change target actors’ policy and practice. 
Accountability politics is whinges use the official pronouncements or legal 
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commitments of target actors as opportunities to call upon those actors to be 
accountable for their actions. Networking politics refers to the ability of NGOs to build 
domestic and transnational networks around shared goals with international institutions 
to mobilise public support and to enhance the accountability and legitimacy of their own 
goals.146 By using these tactics, NGOs seek to pressurise target states to change their 
policies or practices and in this process NGOs’ expertise to exploit these different 
tactics effectively and in a timely manner is directly related to the strength of their 
influence. 
  
 
2.5.2 Framework for the Analysis of Non-governmental Organisation Influence on 
 State Policy Making 
 
This section draws up an analytical framework that allows for an examination of the 
research question and hypotheses of this thesis. It draws particularly from the works of 
Richard Price, Keck and Sikkink147 to provide an analytical framework for evaluating 
NGO influence on state food aid policy making. This thesis identifies four stages in the 
process of the NGO advocacy movement. These four stages are (i) agenda setting, (ii) 
networking, (iii) grafting and (iv) institutionalisation. At each stage of NGO advocacy, 
the different operational environments facilitate or circumscribe NGOs influence on 
state food aid policy making. The capability to set the agenda, build networks, graft 
norms and institutionalise policy goals within state food aid policy is different for each 
NGO and these different capacities are consequential. By tracing NGO activities 
through these four stages, therefore, it is possible to trace the evolution of NGO 
influence on state food aid policy making.  
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2.5.2.1 Agenda Setting 
 
The NGO advocacy movement begins with ‘agenda setting.’ In this initial stage, an 
individual NGO generates attention towards issues that previously have not been a 
matter of public debate or that have not been considered as problems. To set a problem 
as a policy agenda, Keck and Sikkink argue, NGOs first of all attempt to change the 
‘value context’ in which policy debates take place.148 
       To change the value context, NGOs exploit various tactics related to 
information politics and symbolic politics to resonate issues or ideas with both the state 
and public or even the international community. Firstly, NGOs try to disseminate facts 
related to the issues through the media, debates, hearings, testimonies, meetings on the 
issues and public campaigns. At this time, the facts must be reliable and well 
documented. Secondly, to maximise its effectiveness, information used by NGOs must 
be timely and dramatic. For this, as Deborah A. Stone argues, NGOs reframe the issues 
into sufficiently short and clear causal stories that identify the root of the problem, the 
responsible party or parties and credible solutions. This tactic allows NGOs to persuade 
the state and public more effectively.149 Thirdly, another tactic exploited by NGOs to 
make their issue dramatic is symbolic politics. NGOs try to reframe the issue by 
symbolic events. By developing convincing explanations for powerful symbolic events 
and linking them with the given issues, they catalyse domestic and transnational 
mobilisation and its support and thereby they seek to set new issues as policy 
agendas.150 In the same vein, whether a given issue is framed as a bodily harm issue or 
not151 is another factor that determines the success and failure of agenda setting. When 
a given issue is framed as bodily harm to vulnerable and innocent people, the issue 
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raises strong feelings so that it is easier to resonate with the public. As Lisa McIntosh 
Sundstrom argues, whether the issue is framed by norms of the international regime or 
not can also make it difficult or easy to set an agenda.152 When the given issues are 
framed by norms and ideas underpinned by international principles or regimes, NGOs 
find it easier to acquire support from the state or public. In summary, agenda setting, as 
the first stage of the NGO advocacy movement, is important in that it provides basic 
groundwork for the rest of the three stages, networking, grafting and institutionalisation. 
An individual NGO’s capability to generate reliable and well documented information, 
to reframe the issue by symbolic events or norms and values, and to exploit various 
tactics to disseminate this information effectively is an important factor required for this 
stage of agenda setting.  
 
 
2.5.2.2 Networking 
 
Networking follows agenda setting. It is an essential instrument for the successful NGO 
advocacy movement. Since NGOs have no powerful tools such as electoral punishment 
or financial power, their legitimacy to generate broad support from the public or 
leverage to proselytise government depends to a large extent on the NGOs’ ability to 
build different levels of networks. Networks, more specifically, enable NGOs to 
maximise their influence by facilitating an exchange of information about on-going 
issues and activities. Networks play a coordinating role linking individuals and 
organisations, consolidating them and mediating relationships between individuals and 
between organisations. Networks, as Richard Price argues, are deemed to provide 
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chances and forms of participation for the socialisation of individuals and organisations 
to specific sets of values.153 
        For these reasons, NGOs endeavour to mobilise broad networks. These can be 
categorised into three levels: the individual level, inter-organisational level and 
transnational level. The individual level of networking refers to prior social ties 
operating as a basis for broader recruitment and networks. It becomes a locus of 
movement emergence. In this individual level of networking, relationships may be 
either direct or indirect ties, formal or informal ties, or private or public ties. Personal 
friends, relatives, colleagues and neighbours for instance may all affect individual 
decisions to become a member of a movement. In this stage and type of networking, by 
exploiting various kinds of relationships NGOs endeavour to amplify their quantitative 
influence through the recruitment of volunteers, staff and activists and through public 
support. NGOs also seek to deepen their qualitative network by recruiting technicians 
and experts, bureaucrats, political elites and leaders, journalists and reporters.     
       Secondly, inter-organisational networking is another form of NGO networking. 
It has the very same reasoning as individual networking, but in this type NGOs attempt 
to build more formal and public networks. This inter-organisational network provides 
the function of information production and circulation, the pooling of mobilisation 
resource and the allocation of mobilised resources. Mario Diani and Doug McAdam 
argue that this inter-organisational network facilitates the negotiation of agreed goals, 
joint participation in specific actions and events, exposure to the media, shared 
personnel and protection of small individual organisations against oppositional 
groups.154 
      Thirdly, as Tomas Risse-Kappen has explored, transnational advocacy networks 
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is one of the critical factors that ensure successful advocacy movements.155 By building 
transnational networks, norm and idea entrepreneurs in particular, NGOs can acquire 
their legitimacy by relying on international principles underpinned by international 
society. Transnational networks also pressurise the host or target states to comply with 
policies and practices that NGOs pursue. It furthermore provides expertise and material 
resources.  
 
 
2.5.2.3 Grafting 
 
What happens before the institutionalisation of new norms or ideas introduced by NGOs 
and their networks? Richard Price uses the term ‘grafting’ to describe the process of 
norm adoption.156 The term ‘grafting’ refers to the process in which new norms and 
ideas introduced by NGOs compete with existing norms within the public and the state 
political system and then are finally accepted as a norm governing state behaviour or 
practices. If the previous two stages, agenda setting and networking, are the preparatory 
stages, this stage of grafting is a substantial stage where NGOs attempt to persuade the 
state and the public to embrace new norms and ideas through their advocacy movement 
and thereby seek to induce the state, as the fundamental target, to change their policy 
and practice.  
       Before looking at how NGOs incorporate their voices into state policy and 
practice, it is necessary to examine what motives induce states to adhere to new norms 
and ideas. There are two motives: material motives and normative motives. Some states 
generally in need of material resources such as the countries in the category of Least 
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Developed Countries (LDC) tend to adopt international norms and ideas in order to 
acquire material compensation or aid rather than to promote their reputation in the 
international community. For these countries, it is an effective strategy that makes 
material resources conditional on the promotion of international norms and ideas. A 
state with a normative motive desires to be a member of liberal democracy states and 
cares about their reputation or image as recognised by other states and international 
society. These states proclaim themselves to be and behave as protectors of liberal 
democratic values such as individual rights, equality of opportunity and the democratic 
decision-making process. 157 These states therefore are sensitive to shaming, 
condemnation and blacklisting which are exploited by NGOs. To avoid these 
reputations that devastate their liberal democratic image, these states adhere to norms 
and ideas introduced by NGOs. By including demands of NGOs into state policy 
making, they attempt to show that they are a member of international society.  
       In this stage of grafting, then, how do NGOs incorporate their voices into state 
policy and practice? NGOs exert their influence through the mechanism of persuasion 
and argument. NGOs disseminate on-going information, reframe a given issue by 
international principles, symbolise events more dramatically, build broader networks 
and link the issue with normative and material leverage. By doing so, they endeavour to 
persuade the public and states to adopt new norms and ideas.  
       NGOs more specifically distinguish the target and deploy different movement 
strategies to each target: public campaigns for the public and lobbying for the state. 
There are advocacy strategies preferred by NGOs for each category of target, but these 
strategies, and objectives to be achieved by using these strategies, are neither mutually 
exclusive nor competitive. NGOs in general exploit both public campaigns and 
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lobbying policy makers simultaneously to achieve their fundamental goal. First, NGOs 
organise public campaigns to proselytise the public to change their norms and ideas 
embedded in their practice and attitude. NGOs exploit a broad range of ‘promotion and 
recruitment’ strategies using various communication skills. These include mass media 
such as TV, radio and newspapers, telecommunication methods such as the internet, 
telephone, email or paper-based letters, organisation’s periodicals, issue-specific reports 
and newsletters. NGOs also exploit face-to-face or door-to-door leafleting and 
petitioning, proselytising on pavements, at protests and parades, movement-sponsored 
events, conventions, festivals, conferences such as hearings, testimonies and seminars 
for the general public and experts.158 Secondly, as Thomas R. Dye argues, state policy 
making flows not only upward from the masses but also downward from the governing 
elites.159 For the same reason, NGOs target political elites, leaders and bureaucrats who 
are deemed to be significant within the state policy-making institutions. By lobbying 
these key policy makers, NGOs attempt to exert direct influence on the policy-making 
process. By recruiting lobbyists or establishing organisational units for lobbying within 
the organisation, NGOs monitor and assess policy-making institutions and the roles and 
activities of individuals and groups of key policy makers in the state policy making 
process. After identifying key persons or players as lobbying targets, NGOs mobilise 
human or material resources which can be exploited in lobbying the key players.        
      Another question raised is how one can explain or know which norms and ideas 
get selected and finally grafted. This question is related to the methodology to identify 
norm and idea change. The difficulty in measuring normative change in social science 
has resulted in intentional exclusion of normative and ideational factors in foreign 
policy analysis.160 With the efforts of constructivist scholars, however, it became 
56 
possible to explore how norms and ideas are incorporated into state policy through the 
norm adoption process, which is referred to differently as ‘socialisation,’ 161 
‘internalisation,’162 or ‘institutionalisation.’163 It also became possible to assess which 
norms and ideas emerge, cascade, and finally become internalised. By using empirical 
methodology such as tracing changes in public-opinion polls, the amount of media 
coverage, the number and scale of events such as parades and protests, and changes in 
human and material mobilisation of norm advocacy organisations, it is possible to 
recognise norm grafting and adoption. A more convincing and comprehensive 
methodology to assess norm and idea grafting, however, is to examine the stage of norm 
institutionalisation within the state policy-making structure. For this reason, this thesis 
separates norm institutionalisation from this stage of grafting. In this stage of grafting, 
therefore, the thesis will focus on what kinds of strategies NGOs exploit to incorporate 
new norms and ideas into public and state policy.  
 
 
2.5.2.4 Institutionalisation  
 
‘Institutionalisation’ is the final stage of incorporating NGO influence into state policy. 
The notion of ‘institutionalisation’ means to what extent the influence of NGOs is 
embedded in the state’s constitutional, regulative and judicial system, and in the 
attitudes and beliefs of political actors such as political leaders, politicians and 
bureaucrats. The different level of institutionalisation means, as Robert O. Keohane and 
Friedrich V. Kratochwil argue, the strength of norms and ideas that various 
entrepreneurs seek to resonate with the target states.164 Since NGOs’ fundamental goal 
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is to incorporate their advocacy movements into state policy and practice, it is important 
to assess to what extent NGOs have changed state policy and practice. To assess the 
influence of NGOs in state policy making, this thesis distinguishes the 
institutionalisation of NGO influence into four types: ‘state agenda setting,’ ‘discursive 
position change,’ ‘institutional change’ and ‘policy change and rule-consistent 
behaviour.’165 
       The first type of institutionalisation of NGO influence can be identified from 
changes in ‘state agenda.’ NGOs endeavour to pressurise their government to adopt the 
issues that had never previously been a matter of public debate. When these discussions 
are held at official and public places such as conferences, meetings, or seminars 
convened or sponsored by government or at closed places such as the policy-making 
process in executive or legislative bodies, it signifies that the issue begins to germinate 
as a ‘state agenda.’ Although it is difficult to identify the existence of such debates when 
they are managed informally or in secret forms, as time goes on these kinds of debates 
rise to the surface, and then one can say that it is the beginning of state policy change. 
      The second type of institutionalisation is changes in the state discursive position. 
NGOs pressurise the state to support their norms and ideas. When the states change 
their position in relation to norms and ideas brought by NGOs by making public 
pronouncements for their commitment or supporting remarks on international covenants, 
laws and conventions, this second type of institutionalisation occurs. The public 
pronouncements or remarks themselves, however, do not carry an obligation to do 
anything. Since there is no enforcement mechanism in international politics to compel 
states to comply with their commitment to international conventions or declarations, 
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this second type of change is sometimes exploited by the state to divert NGOs or to save 
face temporarily.166 
      The third type of institutionalisation generally comes after verbal or normative 
changes in domestic and international politics: changes in ‘institutional procedures’ of 
the state policy-making process. NGOs pressurise the state to incorporate their ideas and 
norms into state policy making processes. In this process, NGOs proselytise the state to 
establish ‘official consulting bodies’ or ‘councils’ for the discussion of issues within the 
government institutions or to change state decision making procedures and institutions. 
These procedural and institutional changes contribute to the increase of opportunity for 
NGOs to contact with key policy-makers within the state policy making process. This 
change in institutional procedures becomes a precondition that lead to actual policy 
changes in the future.167 
       The final type of institutionalization of NGO influence is state ‘policy change’ 
and ‘rule-consistent behaviour.’168 These two types are closely related but need to be 
differentiated. The main criterion to distinguish these two types is whether the states 
‘consistently’ comply with their policy commitments or not. In the stage of ‘policy 
change,’ new policies initiated or consulted by NGOs are established. The states 
incorporate new norms and ideas into its policies by adopting domestic policies, 
legislation and international conventions. They try to establish relevant institutions and 
procedures to implement new policy. Despite state policy change, however, there can be 
still inconsistencies between the state policy and its actual behaviour. In this sense, 
Kathryn Sikkink, Margaret E. Keck, and Thomas Risse-Kappen differentiate the stage 
of ‘policy change’ from the stage of ‘rule-consistent behaviour.’169 According to their 
differentiation between these two stages, the stage of ‘policy change’ can be defined as 
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‘prescriptive status’ that precedes ‘rule-consistent behaviour.’ As the final stage of 
‘norm compliance’ and ‘self-reliance,’ the stage of rule-consistent behaviour comes 
when the states consistently commit themselves to their policy by exerting enforcement 
power as well as by making verbal or legislative commitments regardless of the 
existence of external monitoring or pressure. This stage of ‘rule-consistent behaviour’ 
thus comes when norms and ideas introduced by NGOs are fully institutionalised 
internally and organisationally so that ‘national governments are continuously pushed to 
live up to their claims.’170 
 
 
2.6 Research Methodology  
 
South Korean humanitarian NGOs played a significant political role in pressurising 
their government in relation to food aid to North Korea. This thesis is based therefore 
on case studies of South Korean humanitarian NGOs. This section first defines the 
terms of civil society, civil society organisations, non-governmental organisation 
(NGO), civil society organisations, and humanitarian NGOs. It next shows the efforts of 
South Korean humanitarian NGOs in the North Korean famine relief between 1995 and 
2007. It then justifies the rationale for selecting the Korean Sharing Movement and 
Good Friends as the case studies of this thesis. This section lastly explains how the 
thesis applies the analytical framework to the case studies.  
 
 
2.6.1 Definitions of Terms 
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The most distinctive characteristic of the advocacy of food aid to North Korea between 
1995 and 2007 was that the advocacy was a nationwide movement. Before the 
examination of the scale and the role of Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs), this 
section clarifies the key terms which will be used in this thesis, such as, relief Non-
governmental Organisations (relief NGOs), civil society organisations and humanitarian 
Non-governmental Organisations (humanitarian NGOs).  
      Firstly, this thesis uses the basic definition of a Non-governmental Organisation 
(NGO) by Peter Willetts in his article ‘What is a Non-governmental Organization?’171 
Willetts defines a Non-governmental Organisation (NGO) as “an independent voluntary 
association of people acting together on a continuous basis, for some common purpose, 
other than achieving government office, making money or illegal activities.”172 Based 
on this definition, the thesis uses the term of ‘relief NGOs’ as the organisations which 
are mandated to deliver humanitarian and development aid to other countries. The term 
of civil society organisations is a broad concept that encompasses all types of NGOs, 
such as religious circles, relief NGOs and advocacy NGOs, and therefore the relief 
NGOs fall into this category of civil society organisations. However, this thesis uses the 
term of civil society organisations narrowly, by limiting it to non-relief NGOs to make it 
distinct from relief NGOs. By doing so, this thesis uses the term of humanitarian NGOs 
as a bridging concept. The definition of humanitarian NGOs which will be most 
frequently used in this thesis, uses the term of humanitarian NGOs as a concept to refer 
to the NGOs which are mandated to deliver humanitarian and development aid. 
Generally, relief NGOs fall into the category of humanitarian NGOs because these 
NGOs engage in either the delivery or advocacy of aid. This thesis also uses the term 
humanitarian NGOs as a concept referring to the civil society organisations that 
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expanded their original organisational mandates to include actively engaging in the 
advocacy of humanitarian and development aid. Between 1995 and 2007, religious 
groups and civil society organisations engaged in the advocacy and delivery of 
humanitarian and development assistance to North Korea by expanding their mandates 
or establishing independent aid delivery organisations within their main body 
irrespective of their original mandate. To cover these civil society organisations, this 
thesis uses the term of humanitarian NGOs as a concept which includes relief NGOs 
and civil society organisations which heavily engaged in the advocacy of food aid to 
North Korea. 
 
 
2.6.2 South Korean Humanitarian Non-governmental Organisations 
     and North Korean Famine Relief 
 
Since North Korea’s appeal for food aid in August 1995, the South Korean humanitarian 
NGOs developed into a significant political actor in state food aid policy making, 
forming a favourable operational environment prompting the South Korean government 
to provide humanitarian food aid to North Korea. Between 1995 and 2007, various 
types of humanitarian NGOs that were committed to relieve the food crisis in North 
Korea were newly founded.173 Religious groups and civil society organisations engaged 
in the advocacy and delivery of humanitarian and development assistance to North 
Korea by expanding their mandates or establishing independent humanitarian NGOs 
within their main body.  
      In the beginning of the advocacy of food aid to North Korea from 1995 to 1997, 
more specifically under the Kim Young-Sam administration, the number of South 
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Korean humanitarian NGO’s was meagre. Instead, religious groups and civil society 
organisations played a steering role in the advocacy of humanitarian food aid to North 
Korea. As the severity of North Korean food deficits became known to the international 
community in 1996 and 1997, in particular, South Korean religious groups and civil 
society organisations began to take further steps to establish key humanitarian NGOs 
able to steer the advocacy of humanitarian aid to North Korea. Along with the 
establishment of new humanitarian NGOs, a wide range of networks, which mainly 
consisted of religious and civil society organisations, contributed to the participation of 
other religious and civil society organisations in the advocacy movement. As shown in 
Table 2.2, as a result, the total number of humanitarian NGOs, including the 
membership NGOs within the humanitarian networks, increased from 91 organisations 
in 1995 to 112 organisations in 1997.  
 
 
Table 2.2 The Number of South Korean Humanitarian Non-governmental Organisations  
        (NGOs) during the Kim Young-Sam Administration 
 
Year 1995 1996 1997 
Humanitarian NGOs 1) 5 9 13 
Newly Founded 
Humanitarian NGOs  
1 3 1 
Total2) 91 69 112 
 
Note: 1) Humanitarian NGOs refers to NGOs that engaged in the consistent advocacy movement or the 
delivery of humanitarian food aid to North Korea; 2) The figures include humanitarian NGOs, newly 
founded NGOs and all NGOs that participated in the campaigns and networks for humanitarian food aid 
to North Korea. 
 
Source: Sarangbang Group for Human Rights, Bukhan Sujaemin Deonggum Mogum, 570ho [English title: 
63 
North Korean Flood Aid Movement, No. 570]. Unpublished Material, Seoul, 25/1/1996; Sarangbang 
Group for Human Rights, 870ho, Yeosunggye 717 myeong Seomyeong "Jeongbu Jeuk Bukhan 
sikryangjiwoneul! [English title: No. 870, 717 Women leaders' signature urging the government to 
provide immediate food aid to North Korea]. Unpublished Material, Seoul, 24/4/1997; Sarangbang Group 
for Human Rights, Je 485ho Bukhan Sujaemin Dobgi Campaign [English title: The 485th Campaign for 
the North Korean Flood Aid]. Unpublished Material, Seoul, 1995; Sarangbang Group for Human Rights, 
915ho, Dongpodobgiundong Uidojeok Humjibnaegi [English title: No. 915, Intended Scaring the 
Brotherly Love Movement]. Unpublished Material, Seoul, 1/7/1997. 
 
 
Given the lack of reliable data on the North Korean food deficits in 1995, the 
South Korean civil society organisations and religious groups played a steering role in 
the advocacy of humanitarian food aid to North Korea. During the first year of the 
advocacy movement the total number of NGOs in the advocacy networks was 91 which 
led the early civil society movements, such as the National Alliance for Democracy & 
Unification of Korea (NADRK) and the Korean Women’s Association United 
(KWAU). 174  During 1996, then, the South Korean civil society organisations’ 
participation in the advocacy of humanitarian food aid to North Korea was not as 
significant as in 1995. The total number of NGOs, including humanitarian NGOs in the 
advocacy networks, decreased to 69 organisations. As the severity of North Korean food 
deficits became known to the international community in the early days of 1996, 
however, the religious and civil society organisations began to recognise the need for 
humanitarian NGOs to have permanent organisational ground and be mandated to 
relieve the North Korean food crisis. The six religious groups and the civil society 
organisations thus founded the Korean Sharing Movement (KSM) as a successor to the 
Inter-religious Committee on the North Korean Flood Victim Aid (Inter-religious 
Committee). In December 1996, 33 Buddhist organisations founded the Korean 
Buddhist Sharing Movement, a predecessor of Good Friends, in order to strengthen the 
advocacy of humanitarian food aid. Under the steering role of KSM and Good Friends 
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in 1997, the South Korean humanitarian NGOs unfolded the most influential advocacy 
movement throughout the period of 1995 to 2007. During the year 1997, as the result of 
this vigorous advocacy movement, the total number of NGOs, including humanitarian 
NGOs, in the advocacy networks increased to 112 organisations. The humanitarian 
NGOs and the religious and civil society organisations organised a wide range of 
networks, which had stronger ties and focused on a strong mandate to relieve the food 
crisis in North Korea.  
       
Table 2.3 The Number of South Korean Humanitarian Non-governmental Organisations  
        (NGOs) during the Kim Dae-Jung Administration 
 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Humanitarian NGOs 1) 
· 
( 94 ) 2) 
9 
( 24 ) 3) 
13 
( 16 ) 4) 
19 
 
25 
 
Member of NGO Council 5) 
· 
( 2 ) 6) 
· 
( 1 ) 7) 
· 
 
21 
 
28 
 
 
Note: 1) The humanitarian NGOs refer to the NGOs that were designated by the Ministry of Unification 
to open the bilateral channel with North Korea for the delivery of humanitarian and development 
assistances.; 2) The figure refers to the total number of NGOs that participated in ‘The Day of Fasting for 
the North Korean Compatriots Assistance’ on 28 April 1998.; 3) &4) These figures refer to the number of 
NGOs that could not open the bilateral delivery channel with North Korea.; 5) Member of NGO Council 
refers to the number of NGOs that joined NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea.; 6) & 7) 
These figures refer to the number of newly founded humanitarian NGOs that are committed to relieve the 
food crisis in North Korea. 
 
Source: Jong-Moon Lee, Daebuk Indojiwon Sistemeui Banjeon Bangan Yeongu [English Translation: 
Study of a Plan for the Development of the Humanitarian food aid System for North Korea], Master's 
Degree, The Graduate School of North Korean Studies, Kyungnam University. 2005; Ministry of 
Unification, 2008 Nambukhyeobryeokgigeum Baekseo [English Translation: White Paper on the Inter-
Korean Cooperation Fund], 2008 Nambukhyeobryeokgigeum Baekseo [English title: White Paper on the 
Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund], Seoul: Ministry of Unification. 2008.; National Archives of Korea, 
NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea. [Web Page] Available at: < 
http://contents.archives.go.kr/next/content/viewMain.do> (Accessed 20/6/2009) 
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At the beginning of the Kim Dae-Jung administration (1998-2002), then, the number of 
religious and civil society organisations actively engaged in the advocacy and delivery 
of humanitarian food assistance to North Korea continued to decrease. The number of 
humanitarian NGOs that were committed to the advocacy and delivery of humanitarian 
and development assistance to North Korea, however, increased consistently. Given the 
favourable operational environment where the government supported the role of 
humanitarian NGOs, the number of humanitarian NGOs designated by the Ministry of 
Unification to maintain the bilateral channel with North Korea, gradually increased 
from 9 NGOs in 1998 to 25 NGOs at the end of the Kim Dae-Jung administration in 
2002. Under such government support, the religious and civil society organisations that 
played a steering role in the advocacy and delivery of humanitarian food aid to North 
Korea on a temporary basis began to fade. Instead, the humanitarian NGOs that had 
permanent organisational ground and expertise in the advocacy and delivery of 
humanitarian and development assistance to North Korea became more dominant. From 
2001 to 2002, in fact, a few dedicated humanitarian NGOs steered the advocacy 
movement and the delivery of humanitarian and development assistance to North Korea 
became more apparent. The total number of NGOs that were designated to maintain the 
bilateral channel with North Korea continued to increase to 19 and 25 organisations in 
2001 and 2002 respectively.175 During the same period other figures from the NGO 
Council for Cooperation with North Korea (NCCK) also show that the membership 
organisation of NCCK increased from 21 NGOs in 2001 to 28 NGOs in 2002.176 
      Lastly, during the Roh Moo-Hyun administration (2003-2007), a series of 
government policy changes contributed to a significant increase of South Korean 
humanitarian NGOs. During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration the government relaxed 
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Table 2.4 The Number of South Korean Humanitarian Non-Governmental 
 Organisations (NGOs) during the Roh Moo-Hyun Administration 
 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2005 
Humanitarian 
NGOs 1) 
31 33 54 65 77 
Member of NGO 
Council 2) 
31 39 42 51 58 
 
Note: 1) Humanitarian NGOs refer to NGOs that were designated by the Ministry of Unification to open 
the bilateral channel with North Korea for the delivery of humanitarian and development assistances; 2) 
Member of NGO Council refers to the number of NGOs that joined the NGO Council for Cooperation 
with North Korea. 
 
Source: Jong-Moon Lee, Daebuk Indojiwon Sistemeui Banjeon Bangan Yeongu [English Translation: 
Study of a Plan for the Development of the Humanitarian food aid System for North Korea], Master's 
Degree, The Graduate School of North Korean Studies, Kyungnam University. 2005; Ministry of 
Unification, 2008 Nambukhyeobryeokgigeum Baekseo [English Translation: White Paper on the Inter-
Korean Cooperation Fund], 2008 Nambukhyeobryeokgigeum Baekseo, Seoul: Ministry of Unification. 
2008; National Archives of Korea, NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea. [Web Page] 
Available at: < http://contents.archives.go.kr/next/content/viewMain.do>, (Accessed 20/6/2009) 
 
 
 
the qualification for NGOs to be entitled to open the bilateral channel with North Korea. 
The government also increased the government financial support for NGOs. These 
government policy changes finally resulted in a significant increase of South Korean 
humanitarian NGOs. This increase contributed to the expansion of the private level of 
humanitarian and development assistance to North Korea, into a nationwide movement 
with many humanitarian NGOs, religious groups and civil society organisation. In 2003, 
more specifically, President Roh Moo-Hyun proclaimed the succession of engagement 
policy promoting inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. Under this favourable 
political environment in 2003 and 2004, the number of humanitarian NGOs gradually 
increased. The humanitarian NGOs that were designated to maintain the bilateral 
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channel with North Korea increased to 31 in 2003 and 33 in 2004. The membership of 
the NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea (NCCK) also gradually increased 
to 31 in 2003 and to 39 in 2004.177 Then, in 2005, the number of humanitarian NGOs 
that maintained the bilateral channel with North Korea significantly increased from 33 
in 2004 to 54 in 2005, 65 in 2006 and 77 in 2007. The membership of NCCK also 
continued to increase from 42 in 2005, to 51 in 2006 and 58 in 2007.178 Such a radical 
increase of humanitarian NGOs during these three years was attributable to the 
government policy change in 2005 that relaxed the qualification of NGOs for the 
bilateral humanitarian food aid to North Korea.179 The increase in NGOs was also 
possible as the religious and civil society organisations that terminated their delivery of 
assistance to North Korea after the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000, resumed their 
activities under favourable government policy.  
      Although the existing literature shows only the quantitative increase of South 
Korean humanitarian NGOs between 1995 and 2007, the South Korean humanitarian 
NGOs developed into a significant political actor demanding that the South Korean 
government change its food aid policy towards North Korea. 
 
 
2.6.3 The Rationale for Selecting the Korean Sharing Movement and Good Friends 
 
To increase the reliability of argument in this thesis, it is necessary to examine the 
overall influence of humanitarian NGOs that participated in the advocacy of 
humanitarian food aid to North Korea between 1995 and 2007. It is, however, 
impossible to examine the entire humanitarian NGO advocacy due to the limitation of 
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the study. The overall number of NGOs that participated in the advocacy and the 
delivery of humanitarian food aid to North Korea between 1995 and 2007 was also over 
112.180 Among them, the humanitarian NGOs that were designated by the government 
to maintain the bilateral channel with North Korea increased from 9 organisations in 
1999 to 77 in 2007.181 It is therefore difficult to examine the entire South Korean 
humanitarian NGOs in this thesis.  
      The thesis instead selects the most influential South Korean humanitarian NGOs, 
the Korean Sharing Movement (KSM) and Good Friends, in respect of the advocacy of 
humanitarian food aid to North Korea during the given period of 1995 to 2007. Some 
relief NGOs such as World Vision Korea, Good Neighbours and KFHI had expertise in 
humanitarian assistance and these relief NGOs engaged in the delivery of large scale 
humanitarian and development assistance to North Korea from the beginning of the 
food crisis in North Korea in 1995. These relief NGOs, however, mainly focused on 
acquiring assistance materials through fundraising rather than on the advocacy 
movement that targets the government and public. It is because these relief NGOs were 
prone to place more emphasis on the achievement of organisational interests, to save as 
many lives, by maximising the acquisition and delivery of humanitarian assistance to 
the targeted recipients.  
       The KSM and Good Friends delivered direct humanitarian and development 
assistance to North Korea too. The scale of this, however, was insignificant compared to 
that of relief NGOs. Instead, the KSM and Good Friends played a key role in steering 
the advocacy of humanitarian food aid to North Korea urging the South Korean 
government and civil society to take action to relieve the humanitarian crisis in North 
Korea. The KSM started it work as a consultative body linking differing social groups, 
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such as the South Korean humanitarian NGOs, six religious groups, civil society 
organisations, politicians, congressmen and women and state elders. Based on its 
networks, the KSM played a steering role in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea 
between 1995 and 2007, exerting direct and indirect influence on the entire South 
Korean society. Good Friends’ organisational scale and capacity was not as significant 
as that of the KSM throughout the entire period of advocacy. Good Friends was a 
Buddhist organisation. In addition, in the later stages of the advocacy movement, Good 
Friends changed its organisational mandate from the advocacy of food aid to North 
Korea to a human rights movement for North Korean defectors. Nonetheless, Good 
Friends’ commitment to the field research on the North Korean famine and the 
dissemination of these on-going data contributed to the increase in public awareness of 
the humanitarian crisis in North Korea and thereby made the norms of brotherly love 
and humanitarianism resonate with South Korean civil society. Such norm grafting in 
South Korean civil society and government was consequential in the explanation of the 
changes in state food aid policy making towards North Korea. 
       In summary, the KSM which maintained a broad network with other 
humanitarian and civil society organisations was the most influential humanitarian NGO 
in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea from 1995 to 2007. Good Friends was also 
one of the pioneering NGOs regarding the increase in public awareness of the 
humanitarian crisis in North Korea and thereby made the government policy makers and 
South Korean civil society recognise the severity of the humanitarian crisis and support 
the norms of brotherly love and humanitarianism for food aid to North Korea. In this 
sense, the KSM and Good Friends were selected as the case studies to demonstrate the 
main argument of this thesis. 
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      Despite the significant and representative role of the KSM and Good Friends in 
the aspect of the advocacy of food aid to North Korea from 1995 to 2007, the ability to 
generalise the key argument of this thesis (that the South Korean humanitarian NGOs 
were consequential in the explanation of the changes in state food aid policy making 
towards North Korea) is still limited as only two case studies were carried out. It is, 
however, difficult to examine the role of all the South Korean humanitarian NGOs in 
South Korean government food aid policy making due to the limitation of space in this 
thesis. To overcome this methodological constraint, the thesis focuses on the networks 
that the KSM and Good Friends maintained with other humanitarian and civil society 
organisations between 1995 and 2007. The thesis endeavours to examine the overall 
networks which the KSM and Good Friends had established with other humanitarian 
and civil society organisations. It further examines how the KSM and Good Friends 
exploited these networks in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea. By examining 
how they exploited the networks to maximise their political influence on South Korean 
government food aid policy making towards North Korea, this thesis therefore seeks to 
consider the role of all South Korean humanitarian NGOs during the advocacy of food 
aid from 1995 to 2007. In doing so, the thesis overcomes the methodological weakness 
which comes from focusing on just two case studies, those of the KSM and Good 
Friends. 
 
 
2.6.4 Application of the Analytical Framework 
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This section outlines how the analytical framework above is applied into the analysis of 
KSM and Good Friends advocacy of food aid policy making. This section first shows 
how to examine the operational environment which circumscribed or catalysed the 
influence of KSM and Good Friends advocacy in South Korean government food aid 
policy making towards North Korea. It more specifically outlines how to capture the 
issue characteristics of the food crisis in North Korea between 1995 and 2007. The 
section next outlines how to examine the domestic political structure of South Korean 
government food aid policy making towards North Korea and then provides the 
methodology used to trace changes in KSM and Good Friends organisational 
capabilities through the examination of mandates, funding capacities and expertise. 
After the identification of the operational environment, this section provides the 
methodology used to trace the influence of KSM and Good Friends advocacy in the 
South Korean government food aid policy towards North Korea through the 
examination of the stages of agenda setting, networking, grafting and institutionalisation.  
 
 
2.6.4.1 The Operational Environment 
 
This section outlines the methodology used to examine the operational environment 
which circumscribes or catalyses the influence of KSM and Good Friends advocacy in 
the South Korean government food aid policy making towards North Korea. The 
operational environment consists of the issue characteristics of the North Korean food 
crisis, the domestic political structure and the organisational capability. 
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The Issue Characteristics 
 
The severity of the North Korean food crisis first circumscribes or catalyses the 
influence of the KSM and Good Friends advocacy movement in relation to the South 
Korean government food aid policy making towards North Korea. By examining the 
changing conditions in the North Korean food crisis over time, the thesis identifies the 
issue characteristics. For this, it examines domestic cereal production, Public 
Distribution System (PDS) data and the amount of overall cereal production including 
commercial import capacity and concessional imports. In addition, this thesis uses 
nutritional indicators and mortality rates to show the humanitarian impact of the North 
Korean food crisis. 
 
 
The Domestic Political Structure 
 
To understand the domestic political structure of South Korean government food aid 
policy making, the thesis examines the overall procedures of government food aid 
decision making, the institutions of policy networks linking the states and NGOs, the 
degree of government accommodation to humanitarianism and humanitarian institutions 
and the diplomatic relationship between South Korea and North Korea. It first evaluates 
the overall procedures of South Korean government food aid decision making. It aims 
to identify the extent of the concentration of executive power and the relationship 
between the executive and the legislative bodies in relation to South Korean 
government food aid policy making towards North Korea. Secondly, the thesis 
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examines the structure of policy networks linking the South Korean government and 
NGOs. For this, it considers the intermediate organisations between the state and NGOs 
and the characteristics of the consensus-making process between the state and civil 
society. Thirdly, the thesis examines the South Korean governments’ normative 
identities to evaluate the degree of accommodation of each state to humanitarian 
principles and humanitarian institutions. It explores South Korean governments’ 
domestic and international goals and values in relation to humanitarianism and their 
embeddedness in international humanitarian institutions. For this, it examines the 
treaties and covenants that the state ratifies and implements, international organisation 
membership and to what extent policies and practices of the South Korean government 
comply with the tenets of ratified covenants. Lastly, the thesis examines the diplomatic 
relationship between South Korea and North Korea. It considers the political affairs and 
military provocations which affect their diplomatic relationship. It particularly examines 
each administration’s official policy towards North Korea between 1995 and 2007. The 
three consecutive presidential administrations which are under the consideration of this 
thesis are as follows: Kim Young-Sam (1995 to 1997), Kim Dae-Jung (1998 to 2002) 
and Roh Moo-Hyun (2003 to 2007). 
 
 
Non-governmental Organisations’ Organisational Capability 
 
The thesis examines the actor characteristics of the KSM and Good Friends in terms of 
mandates, funding capacity and expertise. In terms of organisational mandates, it 
analyses anniversary reports and white papers published by the KSM and Good Friends. 
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Anniversary reports and white papers 182  of these NGOs provide the rules and 
regulations that stipulate the organisational mandates. They also include overall 
information on the activities of the KSM. Through the examination of their activities it 
is possible to identify the actual mandate of the KSM too. For the analysis of funding 
capacities, the thesis examines how NGOs raise funds and to what extent those NGOs 
depend on government funding, private funding, public donation or other types of 
funding. For this, it analyses the accounting reports issued by humanitarian NGOs and 
Unification White Papers showing government funding for humanitarian NGOs. Lastly, 
with regard to the analysis of organisational expertise, it evaluates organisational 
structure and human resource management, such as recruitment style and staff capacity. 
NGO expertise in exploiting tactics to make the advocacy movement effective will be 
examined in each substantive study of the KSM and Good Friends. 
 
 
2.6.4.2 Non-governmental Organisation Advocacy Movement 
 
This section shows how the analytical framework outlined earlier is applied to a study 
demonstrating the relationship between KSM and Good Friends advocacy of food aid to 
North Korea and changes in South Korean government food aid policy making. As 
shown in the section of the theoretical framework, the NGO advocacy movement 
generally goes through an agenda setting, networking, grafting and institutionalisation 
process. This section first shows how to examine agenda setting, networking and 
grafting by the KSM and Good Friends. The section then will outline how to examine 
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changes in the different stages of agenda setting, discursive position, institution and 
policy.        
 
 
Agenda Setting 
 
This section provides the methodology used to examine how the KSM and Good 
Friends attempted to set the agenda on North Korean food aid. The thesis assesses KSM 
and Good Friends capabilities to disseminate new facts and to frame and symbolise 
information and events in a timely and effective manner. It shows how the KSM and 
Good Friends attempted to frame issues persuasively as short and clear causal stories. 
These stories attempted to identify the cause of problem, the responsible party and to 
offer credible solutions. The thesis assesses KSM and Good Friends capabilities to 
frame their perspective on North Korea through internationally accepted norms. It also 
assesses how NGOs attempted to frame the issue into that which focused on bodily 
harm to vulnerable and innocent people. It lastly evaluates KSM and Good Friends 
capabilities to develop symbolic strategy such that the respective NGO perspective 
resonated with the public and the state.  
 
 
Networking 
 
The thesis assesses the networking capacity of the NGOs under consideration in this 
thesis. It examines what the KSM and Good Friends have done to build inter-
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organisational networks, how these networks were established and what role these 
networks played in the effort to influence South Korean food aid policy making towards 
North Korea. It examines who the NGO networks were targeting in order to enhance 
their networking in terms of recruitment of volunteers, staff and activists and the 
targeted public. It further examines how the KSM and Good Friends attempted to link 
their goals with those of transnational networks and international institutions. It also 
assesses to what extent these transnational networks contributed to enhancing NGOs’ 
legitimacy and effectiveness through the provision of expertise and material resources. 
The thesis also examines NGO qualitative networking. Qualitative networking is the 
recruitment of technicians and experts, bureaucrats, political elites and leaders, 
journalists and reporters. In so doing it will assesses the organisational ability to build 
various levels of networks, the number of networks and members within the networks 
as well as the relationships between members and between networks. 
 
 
Grafting 
 
The thesis assesses how the KSM and Good Friends were able to graft norms onto 
South Korean government food aid policy towards North Korea. It starts by identifying 
dominant norms and ideas behind the public and the state in respect of food aid to North 
Korea. It focuses on the specific strategies exploited by NGOs to try to persuade the 
public and the state to adopt new norms in relation to this area. It next shows how new 
norms and ideas introduced and promoted by the KSM and Good Friends competed 
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with existing norms and ideas. In order to trace the ‘grafting’ process, the thesis mainly 
relies on tracing changes in public opinion polls in respect of food aid to North Korea.  
 
 
Institutionalisation 
 
The state’s institutionalisation of new norms provides the most convincing test as to 
whether and to what extent norms and ideas have been selected and grafted onto the 
policy process. The South Korean food aid policy process to North Korea can be 
understood through the prism of the state’s political agenda, discursive position, 
institution building and policy change in its food aid policy towards North Korea. If 
norms and ideas introduced by NGOs become adopted as part of the state’s own agenda 
and are internalised into the state’s discursive positions and institutions, it is fair to 
judge that NGOs have been successful in encouraging the grafting of new norms into 
state policy. This is not to say that NGO activity provides the only explanation of 
changes in South Korean food aid policy towards North Korea which is why each case 
study will examine carefully the linkages between NGO and state policy so as to 
attempt to determine the extent of NGO influence. The analysis of individual NGO 
activity will therefore be founded on a detailed empirical charting of the relations 
between the respective humanitarian NGOs so as to assess the extent of the contribution 
of NGOs to the institutionalisation of changing norms in South Korean food aid policy 
towards North Korea.  
 To identify state agenda change this thesis consults the official pronouncements 
of South Korean governments. Governmental sources include reports from 
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Congressional hearings. These sources also include policy conferences and seminars 
convened by the executive and legislative branches of government in South Korea. The 
thesis also uses as sources policy conferences or seminars convened by government 
sponsored policy institutes. It uses document research and elite interviews. Major 
interviewees will be researchers from bureaucrats in the Ministry of Unification dealing 
with food aid decision making towards North Korea.  
        In assessing changes in the South Korean discursive position in respect of 
food aid to North Korea, the thesis examines the official pronouncements written or 
spoken by government, political elites and highly positioned bureaucrats. For this, it 
draws on South Korean newspapers and internet sources since the media, especially key 
newspapers, provides details of changes made by government or key policymakers at 
that time. 
       Changes in state institutional procedures signify substantial incorporation of 
norms and ideas introduced by NGOs into state policy making. The thesis examines 
changes in the institutions and procedures of the South Korean government food aid 
policy making process. It traces the establishment or abolition of relevant institutions or 
procedures in respect of food aid policy making within the executive and legislative 
bodies. It also examines how these institutions or procedures worked in practice; more 
specifically, whether they were strengthened or weakened. It finally investigates 
whether such new institutions were stable and effective to incorporate the demands of 
NGOs into the state policy change. 
        To identify whether new norms and ideas finally induced the state to change 
their policy and practice, the thesis examines whether the state adopted new policies and 
if so, whether they complied with the tenets that NGOs attempted to advocate and how 
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such new policies were implemented in practice. It also examines whether such new 
policies were accompanied by the establishment of relevant enforcement institutions or 
implementing ordinances that made the state adhere to their policy commitment 
consistently. By doing so, it identifies whether the state lived up to its claims or just 
attempted to divert the demands of NGOs. Such examination allows the identification of 
where the state was positioned between the stage of ‘policy change’ and the stage of 
‘rule-consistent behaviour.’ 
 
 
2.7 Overcoming Biases: Securitisation Paradigm, Experience-oriented Bias 
   and Scientific Reliability 
 
Potential problems regarding the methodology of this thesis need to be raised: the 
securitisation paradigm, the suspicion of the author’s favourable attitude towards NGOs 
and the scientific reliability of the argument.  
       Firstly, much of the scholarship on North Korea is handicapped by its 
commitment to what Hazel Smith has termed the securitisation paradigm.183 This 
tendency comes from a lack of reliable sources. One result is the absence of tremendous 
scientific underpinning to much of the literature on North Korea and humanitarian aid to 
North Korea. Every secondary and tertiary source, as well as the primary sources, 
therefore, is scrupulously checked and cross-checked in this thesis.  
 With regard to collecting primary and secondary sources and arranging 
interviews, the author has work experience as an NGO activist in South Korea. Since 
2003, the author has developed a personal network with government officials and NGOs 
in South Korea throughout the preparation of the research proposal for this thesis and 
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previous research projects. As regards interviewing, the author drew on interviewees 
who are relatively easy to access, as leverage to then access other interviewees whom it 
is more difficult to contact, for example high-ranking policy makers and officials in the 
South Korean government and the NGOs. The author’s NGO-friendly attitude and 
personal experience as a former NGO staff member, however, might result in a value-
added outcome in the analysis. To remove this bias, the author endeavoured to maintain 
an analytical and scholarly perspective in the analysis of the given research topic. Such 
perspective enabled the author to demonstrate the political of the South Korean 
humanitarian NGOs in state food aid policy making. This scientific perspective also 
allowed the author to conclude that the humanitarian NGOs’ heavy reliance on 
government funding and their divergence from their organisational mandate resulted in 
the weakening of their advocacy of food aid to North Korea by jeopardising NGO 
independence and neutrality. This conclusion is enough to have a negative impact on the 
author’s personal relationship with the South Korean humanitarian NGOs which were 
deeply engaged in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea from 1995 to 2007.     
      This thesis demonstrated that the South Korean humanitarian NGOs were 
consequential in explaining changes in state food aid policy making. Given the 
limitations of space, this thesis examined the role of humanitarian NGOs through the 
case studies of two major humanitarian NGOs, the KSM and Good Friends, so as to 
demonstrate the argument of the thesis. Each NGO, however, has unique organisational 
capability and networks, which shape differing influence on state policy making. The 
influence of humanitarian NGOs in state food aid policy making therefore should be 
understood further as a whole, not as the outcome of individual NGO advocacy. In this 
sense, this thesis has an intrinsic limitation in the methodology of the thesis. To solve 
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this limitation, the thesis presented the rationale for the NGO selection in section 2.6.1 
above. By choosing two humanitarian NGOs which were heavily involved, and played a 
steering role, in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea between 1995 and 2007, the 
thesis endeavoured to enhance the scientific reliability of the argument. Nonetheless, 
this thesis recognises the fact that it might be possible to increase the reliability of the 
argument by increasing the number of case studies of humanitarian NGOs and their 
networks. 
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CHAPTER 3. THE NORTH KOREAN FOOD CRISIS AND THE DOMESTIC 
             POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF SOUTH KOREAN 
             GOVERNMENT FOOD AID DECISION MAKING TOWARDS 
             NORTH KOREA   
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter demonstrates an assumption of this thesis. It demonstrates the underlying 
assumption that the issue characteristics of the North Korean food crisis and the 
domestic political structure of South Korean government food aid policy making 
changed over time, shaping differing operational environments in which South Korean 
humanitarian non-governmental organisations worked. 
       The first section demonstrates how and why the North Korean food crisis 
changed between 1995 and 2007 through the examination of food demand and supply 
analysis, nutritional indicators and famine deaths. As shown in the theoretical 
framework of Chapter 2 the issue characteristics of the operational environment 
circumscribe or catalyse non-governmental organisation (NGO) influence on state 
policy making. This chapter first identifies the issue-specific characteristics of the North 
Korean food crisis. It demonstrates that the severity of the crisis changed over time, 
going through three different stages: ‘a famine phase’ between 1995 and 1999, ‘a 
transition phase from an acute famine to a chronic food deficit’ between 1999 and 2001 
and ‘a chronic food deficit phase’ between 2001 and 2007. How the issue characteristics 
of the North Korean food crisis circumscribed or catalysed the influence of the Korean 
Sharing Movement (KSM) and Good Friends advocacy movement on state food aid 
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policy making is examined in Part Three: The Advocacy Movement of the Korean 
Sharing Movement and Good Friends. 
       The second section demonstrates how and why the domestic political structure 
of South Korean government food aid policy making changed, thus allowing for the 
promotion of NGO advocacy and a political role in state policy making. This section 
demonstrates that the domestic political structure of South Korean government food aid 
policy making became more transparent and democratic, establishing standard operating 
procedures (SOP) for state food aid policy making. Such changes increased the degree 
of state accommodation to NGO advocacy in state policy making. Secondly, this section 
demonstrates that the South Korean government gradually developed policy networks 
linking the state and NGOs and thereby these administrations came to have a political 
structure which was more sensitive to NGO advocacy. Thirdly, this section demonstrates 
that the level of government accommodation to humanitarian norms and international 
institutions advocating these norms gradually increased in the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh 
Moo-Hyun administrations. Lastly, it demonstrates that the hostile inter-Korean 
relations improved, achieving political rapprochement.  
 
 
3.2 The Phases of the North Korean Food Crisis 
 
The severity of the North Korean food crisis is one of the factors which shaped the 
operational environment in which the South Korean NGOs operated. The changes in the 
severity of the food crisis circumscribed or catalysed the influence of humanitarian 
NGO advocacy in relation to state food aid policy making towards North Korea. This 
section therefore identifies three stages of the North Korean food crisis based on cereal 
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productions, the Public Distribution System (PDS ration) data, nutritional indicators and 
famine deaths in North Korea. The continued decline in cereal production and PDS 
rations led to a ‘famine’ between 1995 and 1999. In this first phase, the acute food crisis 
resulted in many deaths from starvation and malnutrition-related disease. The second 
phase from 1999 to 2001 was ‘a transition phase from an acute famine to a chronic food 
deficit.’ After the severe cereal production decline which had started in the late 1980s, 
two relatively stable cereal production years in 1998/1999 and 1999/2000 
(October/November) appeared to produce a moderate recovery in food supply. The 
1998/1999 marketing year here is a threshold point between famine and chronic food 
deficit. The cereal production in the 2000/2001 marketing year, however, had slumped 
again due to the combination of drought in 2000 and the cumulative effect of underlying 
problems. The third phase from 2001 to 2007 was ‘a chronic food deficit.’ In this phase, 
the cereal production and the PDS rations continued to improve but still remained a 
chronic food deficit, failing to reach minimum domestic needs.  
To demonstrate the assumption of this thesis above, this chapter uses sources 
from international aid and development organisations, such as the United Nations World 
Food Programme (WFP), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United 
Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF), individual scholars and NGO reports. The main reason that this thesis relies 
on these sources is that much of the literature on North Korean studies is scientifically 
problematic due to the lack of information on North Korea and the securitised 
perspective often used to understand and explain North Korean domestic and 
international politics.1 Since the Korean War in 1953, North Korea has treated all social 
data as state secrets. North Korea deliberately attempted to insulate itself from the 
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outside world by preventing the international community from getting access to sources 
of information other than governmental and party-controlled output.  
In addition, under the ideological and political confrontations since the Korean 
War in 1953, North Korea was viewed by South Korea as presenting an ever-present 
threat of war. It led to heavy commitments on a normative assumption that all tensions 
on the Korean peninsula came from the domestic and foreign politics of North Korea.2 
This normative assumption is characterised by terms such as ‘bad’, ‘mad’ and ‘rogue 
state’ which are often used to describe North Korea. Since the food crisis in the early 
1990s, North Korea’s continuation of a nuclear armament programme and long-range 
missile plans had further heightened its image as a ‘bad’ country.3 From the securitised 
perspective which was heavily committed to by this normative assumption, the food 
shortages were viewed without scientific scrutiny as a direct consequence of the 
militarisation of North Korea and the failure of its economic policy.4 To increase 
scientific reliability and scrutiny of sources, therefore, this chapter uses sources, mainly 
from international aid and development organisations, through cross-checks with other 
sources wherever possible. 
This chapter mainly uses the data of cereal production and utilisation and the 
PDS ration.5  With regard to the nutritional indicator, UNICEF and the WFP in 
collaboration with the North Korean government conducted three nutrition surveys in 
order to assess the nutritional status of children in 1998, 2002 and 2004.6 With regard 
to the data on nutritional status for 2000, the chapter examines an independent Multiple 
Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) conducted by the North Korean government. 7 
Although these three surveys did not assess the nutritional status of the total population 
or the famine mortality, these surveys were considered the only scientific and reliable 
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references that allowed the international community to grasp the magnitude of the North 
Korean food crisis.  
 
 
3.2.1 The Famine Phase from 1995 to 1999 
 
Between 1995/1996 and 1998/1999 (marketing year: November/October), cereal 
production and PDS rations continued to decline and reached their lowest production 
and ration levels. During this period, the famine resulted in many deaths from starvation 
and malnutrition-related disease.  
      Since the late 1980s, North Korea continued to experience economic difficulties 
due to unfavourable changes in trade with its traditional partners.8 In the absence of 
significant external trade and assistance, North Korea’s domestic food production based 
on heavily intensive inputs of chemicals, machinery and irrigation began to collapse.9 
The precarious foreign exchange situation at the time did not allow significant 
commercial food imports. A series of consecutive natural disasters, such as extremely 
cold weather in 1994, the two successive years of floods in 1995 and 1996 and 
prolonged drought in 1997, also affected agriculture with varying degrees of severity, 
with consequent adverse impacts on food production.10 These natural disasters made an 
already and rapidly deteriorating food supply situation much worse, weakening cereal 
production, the irrigation network, transport, property and the energy supply system.11 
All these economic and natural constraints resulted in the continued decline of food 
production to far below minimum food requirements until the 1997/1998 marketing year.  
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Figure 3.1 North Korean Cereal Productions and Utilisation 
 
 
Note: Including potatoes in cereal equivalent at 25 per cent conversion rate; Converted from paddy with a 
milling of 65 per cent; Other uses at 3 per cent of the total availability; A population of each year, 
obtained by applying an annual growth rate of 1~1.5 per cent per annum to the Government estimates 
provided to FAO/WFP Crop and Supply Mission; A consumption requirement of 167 kg/caput of cereals 
representing about 1,600 kcal or 75 per cent of the average person’s daily energy requirement of 2,130 
kcal; Post-harvest losses of 15 per cent; Figures of 2003/04 and 2004/05 include household garden 
production and production on slopes; Figures excluded food aid on hand or pledged; All figures of cereal 
production, except for the figure of 2004/2005, were from the revised mission paper in each following 
year.   
 
Source: FAO/WFP. “Special Report: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” (1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004) 
 
 
Given the lack of reliable data from 1995 to 2004, the FAO/WFP in 
collaboration with the North Korean government provided relatively reliable data on 
North Korean cereal production through the ‘crop and food supply assessment missions.’ 
Figure 3.1 shows that cereal production was recorded at 4.077 million tonnes in 
1995/1996 and fell to 2.837 million tonnes in 1996/1997. In 1997/1998, North Korean 
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cereal production recorded the worst level at only 2.663 million tonnes, which 
represented only 57.7 per cent of the minimum cereal requirement (‘Total Utilisation’). 
During the same period, the FAO/WFP estimated the capacity of North Korea 
commercial food imports as 0.7, 0.5 and 0.7 million tonnes each year. In spite of these 
commercial imports, North Korea was far below the average minimum cereal 
requirements of 5 million tonnes to feed the population. The uncovered food deficits 
remained in excess of 1.2 million tonnes from 1995/1996 to 1997/1998.  
In North Korea, the PDS ration is another essential indicator that shows the 
severity of food security. The North Korean government divides the population into two 
broad categories in terms of food allocations: cooperative farmers and workers. The 
cooperative farmers constitute about 30 per cent of the total average population of 23 
million, which represents seven million people.12 Another 70 per cent, which are 
workers including officials, factory and state farm workers, and their families, about 16 
million people, depend on the PDS for their supply of staple cereals.13 As the North 
Korean government could not afford the existing PDS rations with the food production 
decline, they made adjustments to the PDS rations.   
       The lack of reliable data on the PDS rationing, however, constrains 
understanding of since when, from where and how the adjustment of PDS rations had 
occurred. International agencies, such as the WFP and FAO, and observers, such as 
Hazel Smith and Jon Bennett, regarded the PDS as a guarantee for an equitable 
distribution system across the whole population. They noted that food rations had been 
equitably allocated to workers and their families according to the PDS based on 
occupational status and age. As the government did not have access to sufficient food 
stocks to supply the PDS between 1994 and 1999, however, some counties had no food 
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to allocate at all in some months. From the late 1990s, Hazel Smith argues, the PDS 
evolved as an equitable supplier of last resort rations, adopting a notional common ‘flat-
rate’ minimal ration of around 300 grams per day to those sectors of the population who 
were deemed most in need at any particular time.14 
       For others, mainly Francois Jean, Andrew Natsios, Stephan Haggard and 
Marcus Noland, and Kwangmin Chung, the PDS was the opposite of an equitable 
distribution mechanism. These observers, who commonly adopted the Food Entitlement 
Decline (FED) approach and used refugee interviews as their main sources of 
argument,15 note that the central authorities responded to the breakdown of the PDS by 
the inequitable distribution of scarce food mainly according to rank and the triage of the 
north-eastern provinces. Amongst them, Andrew Natsios argued that in the north-eastern 
provinces food distribution became intermittent between 1992 and 1994 and at last 
stopped during the summer of 1994, though two to three days’ worth of rations were 
still distributed six times a year on national holidays.16 In 1994, he underlined, the 
central authorities coped with the sharp decline in food availability by shutting down 
any food shipments from other regions to the four north-eastern provinces (North 
Hamgyong, South Hamgyong, Ranggang, and Kangwon).17 These arguments were 
based on refugee interviews, so they received criticisms in terms of source reliability. 
These analyses nonetheless show that at least the famine had already begun in these 
north-eastern provinces by 1994.   
       Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland instead reviewed the data on the PDS 
rationing provided by North Korean authorities to the WFP and FAO assessment teams 
since the autumn of 1995.18 Figure 3.2, generated by Haggard and Noland, is broadly 
consistent with that generated by the refugee interviews. Figure 3.2 shows that the 
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Figure 3.2 Estimates of Daily per Capita Public Distribution System (PDS) Rations 
 
 
Note: Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland generated this data based on the review of various reports 
provided by the North Korean authorities to the WFP and FAO assessment teams since the autumn of 
1995. They note that in most cases averages were taken directly from WFP/FAO publications; Farm 
ration of 1997/98 was not available; Based on the FAO/WFP data, it revised a figure of 2003/04 from 
300g to 305g. 
 
Source: It adopted this figure from Haggard, Stephan and Noland, Marcus (2005) “Hunger and Human 
Rights: The politics of Famine in North Korea.” U.S.: U.S. Committee for Human rights in North Korea.  
 
       
average PDS rations, which already fell below the minimum human need of 457 grams 
per day before 1995, fell steadily to 196 grams until the end of 1999. PDS rations 
between November 1998 and October 1999, as Figure 3.2 shows, recorded the peak 
famine period while the food production began to revive at the end of 1998. It appears 
that the severely depleted PDS rations could not be resuscitated by only a year-round 
revival of food production.       
       During this phase of the famine, farmers and their families had better access to 
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food. Farmers received a share of the sale proceeds of the cooperative farm, 
proportionate to each member’s working days during the year. These amounts varied 
across the country as not all farms are able to produce equal quantities in excess of their 
members’ allocations. The amount also could be substantially lower than the workers’ 
salaries. Farmers and their households, nonetheless, were still better off than PDS-
dependant workers and their families in terms of access to food, as their cereal rations 
were substantially higher. In addition, most cooperative farm households had kitchen 
gardens or sloping land. This enabled them to produce food for their own consumption 
as well as for sale in the consumer markets. They also had more livestock and small 
animals than urban populations. 
During this phase of famine evolution and the peak period between 1994 and 
1998/1999, the North Korean government attempted to deal with the food crisis by 
adopting some reform policies. Initially, after massive floods in 1995, the North Korean 
government, which had emphasised the ideology of self-reliance in the economy, 
appealed to the international community for assistance. International humanitarian and 
development agencies, such as the WFP, UNDP, FAO, and UNICEF, bilateral agencies 
such as the European Commission Humanitarian Aid & Civil Protection (ECHO), and 
NGOs responded to the crisis through the provision of large-scale assistance. 
Secondly, in 1996 the North Korean central authorities made a breakthrough 
decision to deal with the food deficits by decentralising authority for feeding the 
population from national bureaucracies in Pyongyang to county administrators.19 In 
January 1998, when the average daily per capita PDS rations continued to fall below the 
minimum daily human need of 457 grams, the North Korean government eventually 
announced through the government apparatus that each individual family was 
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henceforth responsible for feeding itself, rather than relying on the traditional public 
distribution as before the famine or on the county administrators since 1996.20 
      Nutritional indicators are enough to identify the situation of the North Korean 
food deficit between 1995 and 1999 as a famine. In the WHO classification,21 stunting 
refers to a ‘low height-for-age’ that reflects a failure to reach linear growth potential as a 
result of long-term, cumulative inadequacies of health or nutrition. Stunting therefore is 
used as an indicator for ‘chronic malnutrition.’ Wasting refers to a ‘low weight-for-
height,’ which indicates ‘acute malnutrition’ reflecting significant weight loss due to a 
recent and severe pathological process such as acute starvation and/or severe disease. 
Underweight lastly refers to ‘low weight-for-age,’ and it is an indicator of ‘general 
nutritional status.’ In 1998, the UNICEF, WFP, and the ECHO in collaboration with the 
North Korean government, conducted the first nutritional status assessment of 1,762 
children from six months to seven years of age. The 1998 survey indicated that 62.3 per 
cent of all children surveyed suffered from chronic malnutrition which is referred to as 
‘stunting,’ 15.6 per cent of them were acutely malnourished (wasting), and 60.6 per cent 
were underweight.22 These main findings put North Korea among the top 10 countries 
with the highest malnutrition rates in the world.23 The high figure of stunting, which 
reflects chronic malnutrition, at the same time indicated that widespread malnutrition 
must have affected a large population group, in particular children, for several years 
before the first nutrition survey was conducted in 1998. 
 
 
3.2.2 The Phase of Transition from a Famine to a Chronic Food Deficit from 1999 
 to 2001 
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After the worst cereal production in 1998/1999, two relatively stable cereal production 
years in 1998/1999 and 1999/2000 appeared to indicate a moderate recovery in the 
cereal production and PDS rations.24 Cereal production in 2000/2001, however, again 
declined and recorded the worst level during the 11 years between 1995 and 2005.25 It 
was attributed to the combination of drought in 2000 and the cumulative effect of 
underlying problems.26 In this phase, although North Korea recovered slightly from the 
worst famine situation, North Korea entered into a chronic food deficit, far below the 
minimum human need level.  
       In 1998, the North Korean government and the international agencies promoted 
double crop production of wheat and barley and the production of potatoes in order to 
meet food requirements. From 1998/1999 to 1999/2000, a slight increase in rice and 
double crop production was attributed to the increased fertiliser input, and generally 
favourable irrigation, and the low onset of pest attacks.27 The volume of fertiliser in 
1999 in particular was almost double compared with the amount in 1998 and it largely 
contributed to increasing the entire domestic cereal production.28 
      Despite two relatively stable years in 1998/1999 and 1999/2000, the economic 
recession and the shortage of foreign exchange for the purchase of inputs and food 
continued to constrain agricultural production.29 While rice and potato production 
increased, the total amount of cereal production was offset by the reduction in maize 
output. The reduction was attributed to the decrease in arable land for maize production 
with the increased emphasis on potatoes and the restriction of maize cultivation on hill 
slopes to control degradation, as well as prolonged dry spells at critical stages in the 
crop cycle.30The fertiliser use in 1999 and 2000 increased by almost double that in 1998, 
but supplies were still less than a third of needs.31 Given these constraints, the cereal 
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production in 2000/2001 again fell to 2.573 million tonnes, which was the worst cereal 
production during the 11 years between 1995 and 2005.32 This decline was due to the 
drought in 2000, at critical stages in the crop cycle, particularly planting.33 The lack of 
electricity and fuel with the economic recession and a chronic foreign exchange deficit 
hindered the operation of irrigation systems, resulting in lack of water in reservoirs and 
in arable fields at important periods during the crop season. As a result of these factors, 
there was a sizeable reduction in cereal production.34 
      In the second period between 1998/1999 and 2001, cereal production levels 
indicate that North Korea entered a chronic food deficit phase. Even in the absence of 
major natural hazards, domestic food production remained well below minimum needs. 
In 1998/1999, domestic cereal production increased to 3.783 million tonnes but fell to 
3.421 million tonnes in the following marketing year, 1999/2000.35 The uncovered 
cereal deficit in 1998/1999 recorded a level of 1.293 million tonnes, offsetting 0.3 
million tonnes of estimated commercial import.36 With the same level of estimated 
commercial imports, domestic cereal production improvement narrowed this gap to 
0.993 million tonnes in 1999/2000.37 A drought in 2000, however, again adversely 
affected cereal production. With an offsetting of 0.5 million tonnes of concessional 
imports from South Korea and 0.2 million tonnes of estimated commercial import, the 
uncovered cereal deficit in 2000/2001 reached 1.165 million tonnes.38 
      Despite the revival of the domestic cereal production which began in 1998/1999, 
the PDS ration continued to fall to 196 grams in 1998/1999, which represented only 42 
per cent of minimum human needs.39 In 1999/2000, average food distribution through 
the PDS increased to 271 grams, which meant an increase of 38 per cent from the worst 
PDS ration of 196 grams in 1998/1999.40 In the 2000/2001 marketing year, however, 
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cereal production decline caused by a drought in 2000 again led to a decrease in the 
PDS ration to 208 grams.41 With a little fluctuation in the PDS rations, it covered a 
small part of the individual's energy needs. This implied a higher rate of nutritional 
decline amongst the PDS dependants and their families. As indicated earlier, this meant 
that other coping strategies, such as purchasing food from markets, receiving food 
assistance from relatives in agricultural areas, rearing and selling small livestock, and 
activities to make foreign currency, increased in importance.  
      Farmers’ rations remained substantially higher than the PDS dependants and 
their families though the amount of farm rations varied. With the revival of cereal 
production beginning in the 1998/1999 marketing year, the farm rations continued to 
improve. Although the farm rations in 1998/1999 were below the minimum human need 
of 457 grams, they received an average post-harvest ration of 400 grams.42 Since then, 
during 1999/2000 and even though a cereal production decline in 2000/2001, the farm 
rations continued to increase and farmers received average post-harvest rations of 550 
and 575 grams respectively, which were substantially higher than the minimum human 
need of 457 grams.43 The farmers in addition benefited from the supplementary food 
coming from the double crops of cereals and potatoes started in 1998 and the 
opportunity to grow food on family plots. 
     In 1999, the North Korean government took positive steps to optimise the 
domestic food production. These measures included: (i) prioritising food production in 
development planning and the allocation of resources, especially energy; (ii) 
introducing greater crop diversification to reduce the adverse effects of mono cropping 
of cereal; (iii) development of new rice varieties considered more fertiliser responsive; 
(iv) developing the use of microbial fertilisers to reduce dependence on chemical 
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fertilisers; and (vi) encouraging rearing of small livestock.44In particular, the North 
Korean government collaborated closely with international agencies in developing and 
implementing appropriate strategies to enhance food production and reduce 
environmental damage. Through the Agricultural Recovery and Environmental 
Protection (AREP) plan which began in 1998, North Korea and the UNDP supported 
agricultural policy changes that put emphasis on double cropping, an introduction of 
potatoes as a staple crop, reorganisation of farm-working practices, and, more discreetly, 
the eventual acceptance of farmers’ markets as legitimate arenas for price-setting and 
distribution.45 These efforts combined with inputs from international assistance, in 
particular fertiliser assistance mainly from South Korea from 1999, contributed to 
increases in cereal production despite few signs of a resuscitation of the wider 
economy.46 
Lastly, during this period of transition between 1999 and 2001 the nutritional 
indicators showed that the severity of the North Korean food crisis became relieved, but 
it was still a desperate situation. After the 1998 survey, cereal production increased 
from 1999 and international humanitarian assistance improved the PDS rations in North 
Korea. In 2000, the North Korean government conducted an independent Multiple 
Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) without foreign participation.47 Although there was a 
controversy over the reliability of the survey,48 the WFP and UNICEF used the 2000 
survey results citing that the results of the 2002 survey were consistent with the 
improvement observed by the 2000 survey.49 According to the 2000 survey, the overall 
nutritional status of children improved compared to the figures of the 1998 survey. The 
prevalence of stunting in 2000 fell from 62.3 per cent to 45.2 per cent and wasting fell 
from 15.6 per cent to 10.4 per cent. The percentage of underweight children fell from 
118 
60.6 per cent to 27.9 per cent. These figures show that North Korea began to get out of a 
famine phase, before entering the stage of a chronic food deficit which has continued 
since 2001.50 
 
 
3.2.3 The Phase of a Chronic Food Deficit from 2001 to 2007 
 
From 2001 to August 2005 when the North Korean government proclaimed its decision 
to halt international humanitarian assistance, cereal production and PDS ration levels 
continued to improve. North Korea, however, still remained in a chronic food deficit, 
failing to achieve the minimum human needs in domestic cereal production. 
       Since 2001, North Korea continued its recovery in agricultural production. The 
production increase in 2001/2002 was attributed to more favourable weather.51 It also 
included a relatively low incidence of crop pests and diseases, improved irrigation 
facilities in the main cereal region of the country with the completion of the Kechan-
Taesong Lake canal funded by OPEC, improved availability of electricity for irrigation 
pumping stations and enhanced mechanisation resulting from greater availability of fuel 
and spare parts.52  Farmers and international agencies in particular cited that the 
increased cereal production was attributable to the application of fertiliser provided 
through the international assistance.       
       The cereal production for 2001/2002 was at 3.657 million tonnes, which was a 
42 per cent increase over the 2000/2001 production level of 2.573 million tonnes.53 
During the three consecutive years since 2001/2002, cereal production gradually 
increased. Cereal production in 2002/2003 and 2003/2004, including garden and slope 
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production, went up to 3.969 and 4.079 million tonnes.54 The cereal production in 
2004/05 was forecasted at 4.235 million tonnes, the best harvest over the last ten years 
since 1995 when the international agencies began to engage in North Korean 
humanitarian operations.55 In the 2001/2002 marketing year, the uncovered food deficit 
remained in excess of 1 million tonnes, around 1.201 million tonnes.56 Since then, 
continued improvement in cereal production, commercial imports estimated at 0.1 
million tonnes, and the anticipated concessional imports at 0.3 million tonnes each 
marketing year from 2002/2003 to 2004/2005 contributed to the improvement in total 
food production.57 The uncovered food deficits of these three consecutive marketing 
years were as a result narrowed to 0.684, 0.544 and 0.492 million tonnes. Despite these 
consecutive improvements, however, domestic production still fell below minimum 
cereal needs and thus the country had to depend on the external assistance.58 
       The more favourable harvest situation has had a positive overall effect on 
household food security, but as in previous years the PDS allocation of basic cereals fell 
far short of the all-time goal of 575 grams per person per day. For the urban population, 
increased domestic production and the concessional loan of 0.3 million tonnes of rice 
that the country received from South Korea have allowed the North Korean government 
to increase PDS rations to an average of 300 grams per person per day since the 
marketing year 2001/2002.59 This was 48 per cent higher than in the previous year. 
North Korea’s plan for the 2002/2003 marketing year was 270 grams, but the actual 
average was 319 grams, 18 per cent more than anticipated.60 During 2003/2004 and 
2004/2005, the average actual allocation through the PDS was about 305 grams and 300 
grams, which provides only half of a person’s daily energy needs. During the same 
period, the North Korean government increased farmers’ daily rations to 600 grams.61 
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       While the PDS rations were on the whole more favourable, they still provided 
less than 50 per cent of the minimum human need. The WFP Mission was concerned at 
the continuing significant urban/rural inequalities in access to food, the worst affected 
being urban populations in general.62 There was also clear regional disparity, which 
gives cause for concern. The predominantly industrial areas of the north and north-east 
remained the hardest hit in terms of food security.63 Situated in relatively infertile land, 
they had at the same time less produce available on the markets and less scope for 
successful kitchen garden cultivation.64 In an attempt to feed their families, desperate 
urban families in these regions walked long distances to mountain areas where they had 
found small plots to cultivate.65 For them, the other sources of food outside of the PDS 
were insufficient to make up the individual and family food deficit, particularly in the 
winter and spring months when commodities are scarce in urban markets.66 Vulnerable 
groups within the population as a whole, such as children, pregnant and lactating 
women and the elderly, were still far away from food security. The poorest groups thus 
continued to rely on wild foods, such as edible mountain grasses that might have a 
negative impact on the digestive system, particularly for children.  
     In July 2002, the North Korean government announced substantial increases in 
wages, prices and the currency exchange rate from previously highly subsidised or 
artificially low levels. The rice and maize prices in the public distribution centres were 
raised to 46 won and 24 won/per/kg, respectively, compared to about 0.9 and 0.7 
won/kg before July 2002.67 Farm gate prices after the adjustment are 29 won/kg for 
paddy (or 42 won for rice) and 20 won/kg for maize.68 Prices of various inputs such as 
seed, fertiliser, pesticides, fuel, electricity, etc. went up and it seemed to have resulted in 
better overall economic incentives to farmers.69 Cash crops such as tobacco and cotton 
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were considered more profitable than the usual staple crops, but their cultivation was 
restricted until the targets for staple cereals are met.70 There was another market reform 
in June 2003; farmers’ markets for the first time were officially recognised in the 
country.71 All these activities have increased greatly over the 12 months since the 
economic reform in July 2002. In addition to food items from kitchen gardens, a variety 
of non-food items of all sorts were sold in these markets. Cooperative farm families, 
however, did not have direct access to these markets to sell their staple food 
commodities because these had to be sold to the government procurement agency. 
       The price reforms conducted in 2002 and 2003 had a positive impact on overall 
food security, widening the opportunity to access alternative foods for urban and rural 
households. Most favoured groups were the hard labourers such as coal miners and the 
people who could access foreign currency. The less favoured were the ‘non-productive’ 
urban dwellers, such as housewives, the elderly and those working in less productive 
industries. These groups had seen the free benefits which they enjoyed under the old 
coupon system disappear. At the same time, they had watched the disparity between 
their income and the standard of living, and the gap between them and the more 
‘productive’ groups widen. 
       In August 2005, the North Korean government announced its decision to halt 
international humanitarian assistance. They pronounced the suspension of humanitarian 
operations which had focused on emergency assistance. They further highlighted the 
necessity of development assistance focusing on the resuscitation of agricultural 
productivity and overall economy which is essential to achieve self-reliance in food 
production. With this decision, the humanitarian assistance which had lasted over the 
previous 11 years since 1995 finally ended. 
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With regard to the people’s nutritional status during this period of a chronic 
food deficit from 2001 to 2007, nutritional indicators showed that the North Korean 
food crisis gradually improved, but chronic malnutrition remained. In October 2002, the 
North Korean government, in cooperation with the WFP and UNICEF, carried out 
another nutrition survey covering 6,000 children under 7 and their mothers. The survey 
indicated a continued improvement in the general nutritional status of children since the 
2000 survey. Among the surveyed children the prevalence for stunting fell from 45.2 
per cent to 39.2 per cent and wasting fell from 10.4 per cent to 8.1 per cent.72 
Underweight children fell from 27.9 per cent to 20.2 per cent.73 In 2004, the WFP, 
UNICEF and the North Korean government, conducted another nutrition survey. The 
main finding of the 2004 survey was that though there was a little improvement in view 
of stunting and wasting since the 2002 survey, the malnutrition of children which had 
entered into the stage of chronic malnutrition continued. Stunting slightly fell from 39.2 
percent to 37 per cent, but it was still 7 per cent higher than the WHO criterion which 
considers the prevalence of stunting higher than 30 percent as a severe public health 
problem.74 Wasting remained at 7 per cent – a slight fall from the 2002 figure of 8.1 per 
cent. The prevalence of underweight people in the survey had worsened by 3.3 per cent, 
from the 2002 figure of 20.1 per cent to 23.4 per cent in 2004.75 
 
 
3.3 The Domestic Political Structure of South Korean Government Food Aid 
   Decision Making 
 
This section examines another underlying assumption that the domestic political 
structure of South Korean government food aid policy making changed over time, 
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shaping differing operational environments in which South Korean humanitarian non-
governmental organisations worked. As shown in 2.5.1.2, The Domestic Political 
Structure, in Chapter 2, the domestic political structure is identified as the domestic 
policy-making process, the institutions of policy networks linking the state and NGOs, 
the degree of government accommodation to humanitarianism and institutions 
advocating these humanitarian norms and the diplomatic relationship between both 
Koreas. 
This section first demonstrates that the domestic political structure of South 
Korean government food aid policy making became more transparent and democratic, 
establishing SOP for state food aid policy making. Such changes increased the degree of 
state accommodation to NGO advocacy in state policy making. Secondly, this section 
demonstrates that contrary to the Kim Young-Sam administration which had a negative 
view of the role of NGOs, the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administrations 
gradually developed policy networks linking the state and NGOs and thereby these 
administrations came to have a political structure which was more sensitive to NGO 
advocacy. Thirdly, this section demonstrates that the level of government 
accommodation to humanitarian norms and international institutions advocating these 
norms gradually increased in the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administrations. In 
the early stage of the food crisis in North Korea between 1995 and 1997, the Kim 
Young-Sam administration was less sensitive to this. The Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-
Hyun administrations, however, maintained a domestic political structure susceptible to 
the international efforts and institutions underpinned by the norms of humanitarianism. 
This section lastly demonstrates that the hostile inter-Korean relations improved, 
achieving political rapprochement. The Kim Young-Sam administration maintained 
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ideological, political and military confrontation which had continued since the Korean 
War ended in 1953. Kim Dae-Jung administration’s engagement policy, however, 
established the first ever cooperative and peaceful relationship between both Koreas.76 
During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration the external threats had a negative influence 
on inter-Korean relations. These external threats, however, did not rupture the 
cooperative and peaceful relations between both Koreas. 
This section is composed of four sub-sections. In order to identify changes in the 
domestic political structure, each sub-section examines the characteristics of the three 
administrations’ domestic political structure in relation to North Korea. The first sub-
section examines state food aid decision making. The second sub-section considers the 
institutions and policy networks linking the state and non-governmental organisations. 
The third sub-section examines the degree of government accommodation to the 
humanitarian norms. The last sub-section then examines the diplomatic relationship 
between South Korea and North Korea. 
 
3.3.1 State Food Aid Decision Making 
 
This section demonstrates that the overall procedures of South Korean government food 
aid decision making towards North Korea became more transparent and democratic, 
establishing and adhering to the standard operating procedures (SOP) and increasing the 
degree of state accommodation to NGO advocacy in state policy making. To 
demonstrate this argument, this section examines the extent of power centralisation 
between the executive bodies and the legislative bodies and between the state and 
NGOs in respect of state food aid decision making towards North Korea. This section 
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also examines transparency and accountability in the SOP of state food aid decision 
making, changes in the SOP and each administration’s adherence to them. For this, this 
section examines how each administration changed the SOP of state food aid policy 
making, to what extent each administration adhered to the SOP and to what extent each 
administration’s SOP were sensitive to NGO advocacy. 
 
 
The Kim Young-Sam Administration’s Food Aid Decision Making 
 
The Kim Young-Sam administration’s food aid to North Korea was made through a 
non-democratic policy making process where the decisions of food aid to North Korea 
were made by a few of the highest decision makers in the Blue House (the Presidential 
Office), rather than through the SOP of state aid decision making as stipulated by laws 
and related ordinances.  
      In 1995 when the food crisis in North Korea broke out, the SOP of state aid 
decision making towards North Korea was as follows.77 The Inter-Korean Exchange 
and Cooperation Bureau of the Ministry of Unification first established a draft to 
provide aid to North Korea.78 The Unification Policy Bureau of the Ministry of 
Unification next coordinates aid to North Korea within the overall framework of inter-
Korean relations. 79  Afterwards, proposed aid arrangements are submitted to the 
Unification and National Security Policy Coordination Meeting (the Unification 
Meeting) of the Blue House, which is the final deliberation institution for unification, 
foreign affairs and security policy in the Blue, and for final approval by the President.80 
When aid decisions are reached at this point, the Bureau of Inter-Korean Talks of the 
Ministry of Unification 
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Figure 3.3 The Kim Young-Sam Administration’s Food Aid Decision-Making Process  
(Bilateral Aid in 1995) 
 
 
 
Note: 1) The Presidential Office 
 
Source: Bong-Geun Jun, "Lee Myeongbak Jeongbu OegyeoAnbo Jojeongchegyeoeui Teukjingkwa Euimi 
[English Translation: The Meaning and Characteristics of the Lee Myeongbak Administration's Foreign 
Policy and Security Policy Mediation System]", Domestic Affairs and Policy, Vol. May, 2008; Ministry of 
Unification, Tongilgwangyejanggwanhoieuiwunyeongsechik  [English Translation: The Operational 
Regulations on the Unification-related Ministerial Meeting], <Available at: http://www.unikorea.go.kr> 
Accessed 22/02/2009. 
 
 
discusses with North Korea the detailed support method, period, quantity and 
monitoring methods for the aid to North Korea.81 When the agreements are adopted 
through the Inter-Korean Talks, the National Council for the Inter-Korean Exchange and 
Cooperation deliberates and adopts final resolutions on the provision of food aid to 
North Korea.82 The Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Bureau then becomes the 
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institution for the implementation of aid.83 
When North Korea requested food aid from the international community in 1995, 
however, the decision-making process for food aid to North Korea was not made in this 
way through the SOP of state food aid decision making as stipulated by laws and related 
ordinances. Nakseo Baek examined the Kim Young-Sam administration’s food aid 
decision-making process through investigating the case of rice aid to North Korea in 
1995.84 He found the time and quantity of the direct aid to North Korea by the Kim 
Young-Sam administration in 1995 was unilaterally determined by the President and the 
Blue House rather than through the Inter-Korean Talks as the SOP of state food aid 
decision making.85 The decision to grant direct aid to North Korea was made through 
the Unification Meeting which was a presidential body. After food aid decisions were 
made at the Blue House and the Unification Meeting, a private task force, headed by Ji-
Sun Hong and the staff of the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA), 
not the personnel of the Ministry of Unification, took charge of negotiating with North 
Korea.86 Prior to the official meeting of the Beijing Inter-Korean Talks, this task force 
was an ad-hoc creation, not foreseen in state decision making SOP with regard to 
exchange and cooperation with North Korea. With regard to this decision of food aid to 
North Korea in 1995, the Unification, Foreign Affairs and Trade Committee of the 
National Assembly recommended through the parliamentary audit in 1995 that the 
observance of SOP in relation to state food aid decision making towards North Korea as 
well as the necessity of holding a Unification-related Ministerial Meeting as a policy 
coordination and deliberation process within the administration.87 
During the Kim Young-Sam administration, in addition, the National Council 
for Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation (the National Council), which was the 
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highest decision-making institution by law in relation to inter-Korean exchange and 
cooperation, was a post approval institution. Unification Ministers and spokespersons 
officially announced most aid decisions for North Korea before the National Council 
promulgated a resolution. 88  Many meetings of the National Council were also 
conducted in the form of ‘documentary meetings’ which the meetings for the discussion 
of agendas did not held, but instead the documents which were sent to the ministers and 
vice-ministers who were deemed to participate in the meetings were signed by these 
personnel without holding meetings. Since the establishment of the National Council in 
1990, 76.4% of council meetings in fact were in documentary form – 159 sessions out 
of the total of 208 sessions – until the end of September 2008.89 The Humanitarian 
Cooperation Bureau, lastly, was not established until 1996.90 This indicates that, as the 
Unification Minister Okie Kwon states, the Ministry of Unification during the Kim 
Young-Sam administration from 1995 and 1997 did not have expertise in the assessment 
of needs in North Korea and the establishment of aid plans, as the Kim Young-Sam 
administration did not recognise the severity of the food crisis in North Korea in 1995.91 
 A strong political objective resulted in centralised presidential decision making 
in the decision of bilateral aid in 1995. The Kim Young-Sam administration looked at 
the humanitarian crisis in North Korea from the standpoint of brotherly love in that 
North Korean people are the same ethnic group, despite political and ideological 
differences.92 When the Japanese government decided to provide North Korea with rice 
aid, the Kim Young-Sam administration was embarrassed and upset.93 It perceived the 
preemptive support by Japan, which might be delivered to North Korea ahead of South 
Korea’s pledge, as a decision that might negatively portray the South Koreans as 
ignoring their same ethnic group’s humanitarian crisis.94 Given this recognition, the 
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Kim Young-Sam administration implemented its aid to North Korea in haste while 
putting pressure on Japan to prevent the Japanese Government sending support before 
South Korea did so.95 
 As the international community increased the amount of aid in 1996 and 1997, 
the South Korean humanitarian NGOs and their advocacy of food aid to North Korea 
radically increased in 1996 and 1997.Given this operational environment demanding 
government food aid to North Korea, the Kim Young-Sam administration established 
the Humanitarian Cooperation Bureau within the Ministry of Unification to oversee 
government and private aid to North Korea in December 1996.96 With the National 
Assembly audit on the decision of food aid in 1995 and the establishment of related 
institutions within the Ministry of Unification at the end of 1996, there seemed to be an 
improvement in the Kim Young-Sam administration making state aid decisions through 
the SOP, but the aid decisions in 1996 and 1997 were still made through non-democratic 
decision making-processes driven by strong political objectives and the Presidential 
Office.97 
 
 
The Kim Dae-Jung Administration’s Food Aid Decision Making 
 
The Kim Dae-Jung administration often made decisions about food aid to North Korea 
in a similar way to the Kim Young-Sam administration in those decisions were often 
made by a small number of political leaders such as the President and special envoys. 
The Kim Dae-Jung administration, however, gradually improved transparency in state 
food aid decision making, institutionalising aid decision-making procedures.  
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      As various scholars, such as Dongwan Kang, Jeong-Ho Bae and Bong-Keun 
Jeon, have explained the Kim Dae-Jung administration implemented its engagement 
policy by certain figures delegating authority.98 These include Dong-Won Lim and Jae-
Gyu Park who were appointed to major posts and shared the same political view on 
policies towards North Korea. During the Kim Dae-Jung administration, Lim held key 
positions including the Director of National Intelligence Services (NIS), the Senior 
Secretary for Foreign Affairs and Security of the Blue House, Unification Minister, the 
Secretary of the National Security Council (NSC) and the Special Envoy to North Korea. 
Lim exercised unparalleled influence within the NSC Standing Committee, the 
administration’s final policy making institution.99 After Lim was particularly appointed 
as the Special Envoy to North Korea in 2000 and 2001, he played a leadership role in 
formulating policy on aid to North Korea and on loan terms through the Special Envoy 
Talks.  
The Kim Dae-Jung administration in addition did not hold Unification-related 
Ministerial Meetings which was a policy coordination procedure among differing 
ministries on inter-Korean exchange and cooperation issues. The Kim Dae-Jung 
administration replaced the National Council meetings with documentary meetings, 
where ministers signed off the meeting resolutions without real participation in the 
meeting. The deliberation and resolution of major issues related to North Korea should 
have been made with the attendance of vice-premier level government officials as 
stipulated by the law and regulations in accordance with the SOP. In fact, the National 
Council resolution for the first provision of food aid on loan terms in 2000 was made 
through a documentary meeting a month after the agreement was adopted on 28 
September.100 
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With the rapid increase of inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation under the 
Engagement Policy, however, the Kim Dae-Jung administration also achieved 
improvements in transparency and accountability in state food aid decision making. The 
Kim Young-Sam administration had operated the Unification and National Security 
Policy Coordination Meeting without any legal basis. By revising the National Security 
Council Act, the Kim Dae-Jung administration established the NSC Standing 
Committee and Secretariat as the final policy making institution within the Blue House 
and established a parallel system with the Office of the Senior Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs and Security.101 As inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation increased along 
with the implementation of the engagement policy, the Kim Dae-Jung administration 
also took measures to elevate the status of the Ministry of Unification which had 
previously maintained a lower position than other ministries since its establishment at 
the ministerial level on 28 February 1998.102 Thirdly, the Kim Dae-Jung administration 
increased the authority of the Ministry of Unification in state food aid decision making 
towards North Korea. 
Based on these procedural improvements, the decisions of food aid on loan 
terms in 2000 and 2002 were made in the following fashion. At the first stage in 
establishing aid policy, the Humanitarian Cooperation Bureau established the overall 
plan for the aid to North Korea through consultation with various experts, NGOs and 
policy research institutes. The Humanitarian Cooperation Bureau next established the 
outline of policies under the coordination of the Unification Policy Bureau and the 
Bureau of Inter-Korean Talks. The plans were then transmitted to the National Security 
Policy Coordination Meeting, the final policy-making institution, through deliberation 
by the NSC and the Office of the Senior Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Security. 
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Figure 3.4 The Kim Dae-Jung Administration’s Food Aid Decision-Making Process 
 (Bilateral Aid in 2000 and 2002)   
 
 
Note: 1) The Presidential Office 
 
Source: Bong-Geun Jun, "Lee Myeongbak Jeongbu OegyeoAnbo Jojeongchegyeoeui Teukjingkwa Euimi 
[English Translation: The Meaning and Characteristics of the Lee Myeongbak Administration's Foreign 
Policy and Security Policy Mediation System]", Domestic Affairs and Policy, Vol. May, 2008; Ministry of 
Unification, Tongilgwangyejanggwanhoieuiwunyeongsechik  [English Translation: The Operational 
Regulations on the Unification-related Ministerial Meeting], <Available at: http://www.unikorea.go.kr> 
Accessed 22/02/2009. 
 
 
At this point, provisional decisions were from the internal discussions on the 
provision of aid to North Korea. Based on these provisional decisions, Ministers and 
Special Envoys to North Korea discussed the proposed aid to North Korea along with 
other inter-Korean pending issues at the Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks and the Special 
Envoy Talks.103 After the decision to grant aid to North Korea was reached, the 
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decision was communicated to the Bureau of Inter-Korean Talks for discussions on a 
practical level. Various types of Inter-Korean Talks – the Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks, 
the Inter-Korean Vice-Ministerial Talks and the Committee on Inter-Korean Economic 
Cooperation – were held, at which detailed discussions and agreements were concluded. 
Afterwards, the Humanitarian Cooperation Bureau established detailed plans for the 
support method, quantity and monitoring and implemented the support, following 
deliberation and a resolution by the National Council on the agreement and the support 
plan. 
 
 
The Roh Moo-Hyun Administration’s Food Aid Decision Making 
 
The Roh Moo-Hyun administration increased the role of the Ministry of Unification and 
consultation with civil society and the National Assembly in state food aid decision 
making and adhered to the SOP of state food aid decision making. These efforts which 
started in the Kim Dae-Jung administration enabled the decision of food aid to North 
Korea to be made through transparent and accountable procedures rather than through 
anon-democratic procedure driven by an administration’s political interests or 
motivations. 
       During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, the decisions on food aid to North 
Korea were made through the SOP of state food aid policy making as the Ministry of 
Unification had greater authority in the state food aid decision-making process. Firstly, 
the Roh Moo-Hyun administration strengthened the status of the Ministry of Unification 
in state aid policy making towards North Korea by appointing the Unification Minister  
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Figure 3.5 The Roh Moo-Hyun Administration’s Food Aid Decision-Making Process 
 (Bilateral Aid in 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2007)   
 
 
 
Note: 1) The Presidential Office 2) With regard to the agreements or legislation placing a significant 
financial burden on the government and taxpayer, the Law on Advancing Inter-Korean Relations 
stipulates that such agreements and legislation are subject to ratification by the National Assembly. 
 
Source: Bong-Geun Jun, "Lee Myeongbak Jeongbu OegyeoAnbo Jojeongchegyeoeui Teukjingkwa Euimi 
[English Translation: The Meaning and Characteristics of the Lee Myeongbak Administration's Foreign 
Policy and Security Policy Mediation System]", Domestic Affairs and Policy, Vol. May, 2008; Ministry of 
Unification, Tongilgwangyejanggwanhoieuiwunyeongsechik  [English Translation: The Operational 
Regulations on the Unification-related Ministerial Meeting], <Available at: http://www.unikorea.go.kr> 
Accessed 22/02/2009. 
 
 
to the Chair of the Special Committee of NSC. In doing so, the Ministry of Unification 
played the major role in North Korea aid policy. This institutional change indicates that 
the Roh Moo-Hyun administration prioritised the Ministry of Unification over any 
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particular political figures, such as Dong-Won Lim and Jae-Gyu Park in the Kim Dae-
Jung administration. Secondly, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration integrated the dual 
Kim Dae-Jung administration structure of the Office of the Secretary of Security and the 
Secretariat of the National Security Council into the single National Security Council, 
which was made the final decision-making institution. As mentioned above, the Chair of 
the Special Committee of the National Security Council was held by the Unification 
Minister.104 Lastly, the decisions on food aid to North Korea on loan terms were made 
through the Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks which were held regularly rather than the 
Inter-Korean Special Envoy Talks which had been held on an irregular basis.105 The 
issue of food aid was therefore discussed through a more institutionalised procedure 
than in previous administrations. 
Secondly, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration took measures to institutionalise 
the participation of other civil groups, administrative offices and the National Assembly 
in the process of making North Korea aid policies. The Roh Moo-Hyun administration 
improved transparency in the management of the National Council as a final institution 
determining the decisions of food aid to North Korea, by assuring the participation of 
civil society in the state food aid policy-making process. The Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration increased the number of National Council members from 15 to 18, 
including more than three civil members through the revision of the Inter-Korean 
Exchange and Cooperation Act on 31 May 2005.106 In addition, the Act of Advancing 
Inter-Korean Relations that was adopted on 29 December 2005 required that the 
National Assembly play a coordinating role, and engage in the food aid decision 
making.107 This act also institutionalised the participation of civil society by including 
inthe National Committee on Advancing Inter-Korean Relationsseven members 
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appointed by the Committee Chair who should have professional knowledge and in-
depth experiences on inter-Korean relations.108 
 
 
3.3.2 Policy Networks Linking the State and Non-governmental Organisations 
 
This section demonstrates that contrary to the Kim Young-Sam administration which 
had a negative view on the role of NGOs, the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration gradually improved policy networks linking the state and NGOs and 
thereby these administrations came to have a political structure which was more 
sensitive to NGO advocacy. For this, this section first examines the existence of policy 
networks linking the state and NGOs through the examination of intermediate 
organisations between the South Korean government and NGOs. The section next 
examines how these policy networks worked in practice. 
 
 
The Kim Young-Sam Administration’s Policy Networks 
 
During the Kim Young-Sam administration, policy networks linking the state and NGOs 
existed, but they were not significantly institutionalised. The Kim Young-Sam 
administration’s degree of accommodation to these policy networks was not significant. 
The Kim Young-Sam administration maintained three consultative institutions 
linking the state and civil society. The first was the National Unification Advisory 
Council (NUAC).The administration created the NUAC as a direct consultative body 
for the President. The NUAC was established on 27 October 1980 to provide 
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recommendations on overall unification policies. The President served as the Chair of 
the NUAC which had an independent secretariat and 16,000 members from all levels of 
society with domestic and overseas representation.109 Within the structure of the NUAC, 
the two standing subcommittees, the Welfare Subcommittee and the Human Rights 
Special Committee, tackled the issue of humanitarian aid to North Korea. These 
standing subcommittees consisted of private professionals in the field of inter-Korean 
social welfare, humanitarian aid, human rights and refugee issues. These subcommittees 
provided consultations/recommendations to the President through policy studies, 
domestic and overseas activities in support of unification, and assessed public 
opinion.110 
The second consultative institution, the Unification Advisory Meeting (UAM), 
was originally established within the Ministry of Unification in 1969 to gather cross-
party, pan-national public opinions regarding the issue of unification and discuss 
effective unification policies.111 The advisory members consisted of 60 ‘national elder 
statesmen’ of scholarship and moral influence from various levels of society. On 31 
December 1996, the Kim Young-Sam administration reformed the UAM, by reducing 
the number of members from 60 to 40 and the term of office from four years to two 
years.112 
The third consultative institution wasthe Policy Advisory Committee in the 
Ministry of Unification which was originally established in 1981 in accordance with 
Official Order 107 of the Ministry of Unification.113 The Policy Advisory Committee 
responded to enquiries from the Unification Minister in hearing the opinions of 
professionals from various circles in drafting, establishing and implementing important 
policies in relation to unification.114 The Ministry of Unification was mandated to hold 
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general meetings of the Policy Advisory Committee, which consisting of private 
professionals – academics, research institutes and NGOs – at least once every year and 
one subcommittee meeting every quarter. 
The Kim Young-Sam administration however was not significantly influenced 
by these institutions connecting government to these policy networks linking the state 
and NGOs. The Kim Young-Sam administration was basically a unilateral decision 
maker given the political and military confrontation that has lasted over a half-century 
and the lack of experience of democratic decision making coming from a short history 
of political democracy.115 Although the Kim Young-Sam administration maintained the 
consultative institutions, their involvement in state policy making was not substantial. 
The Kim Young-Sam administration did not recognise NGOs as counterparts116 and 
worried that NGO advocacy and their aid through private channels might threaten 
national security given the severe political and military inter-Korean confrontation. For 
this reason, the Kim Young-Sam administration sought to put NGO advocacy and 
private aid to North Korea under government control by not allowing fund raising and 
direct assistance through private channels. The Kim Young-Sam administration further 
strengthened the execution of the National Security Act, which prohibited direct contact 
with North Korea, to limit the scope of humanitarian and other civil society NGOs that 
attempted to provide aid to North Korea. Given this government stance on the role of 
NGOs and civil society in state policy making and execution, the government 
consultative institutions that were mandated to link the state and NGOs did not work 
effectively. 
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The Kim Dae-Jung Administration’s Policy Networks 
 
The Kim Dae-Jung administration recognised NGOs as an important counterpart to the 
government in the delivery of humanitarian and development aid to North Korea and as 
a means of implementing the engagement policy. Government consultative institutions 
recovered their fundamental functions through the policy networks linking the state and 
NGOs. 
Since the food crisis in North Korea began in 1995, South Korea civil society 
and humanitarian NGOs pressurised the government to provide humanitarian aid to 
North Korea. A presidential election was held in the end of 1997 and Kim Dae-Jung, 
who maintained a close relationship with civil society and humanitarian NGOs, was 
elected as a new president. After winning the election, President Kim attended an NGO 
New Year’s Greeting on 4 January 1998 before his inauguration. The attendance of 
President Kim was interpreted by the media and researchers as implying a close 
relationship between the Kim Dae-Jung administration and NGOs.117 President Kim 
Dae-Jung argued that NGOs could serve as a catalyst for inter-Korean exchanges and 
cooperation through various areas of politics, the economy, society, culture and 
humanitarian assistance. The Kim Dae-Jung administration began to take steps towards 
improving the policy networks linking the state and NGOs. This was different from the 
policy of the previous administration that had maintained a closed process of policy 
making towards North Korea.  
      Seok-Chun Yoo found that NGO personnel who were recruited by the Kim Dae-
Jung administration accounted for 36.1 per cent of a total of 416 positions in 
government bodies. Those personnel were mainly from the People’s Solidarity for 
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Participatory Democracy (PSPD) which was one of the leading NGOs in South 
Korea.118 This high level of recruitment indicates that the Kim Dae-Jung administration 
did form closer relationships with NGOs and civil society than the Kim Young-Sam 
administration.  
      Institutionalisation of policy networks linking the state and NGOs were made 
through the establishment of a new consultative body and the strengthening of the status 
of the existing consultative bodies. The Kim Dae-Jung administration perceived the 
civil society groups as important partners in implementing the policy of reconciliation 
and cooperation with North Korea.119 The Kim Dae-Jung administration established the 
Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation (the Korean Council) and the 
Government-Civilian Council for North Korean Aid Policy (the Government-Civilian 
Council) in order to better canvass public and NGO opinion. Although the Korean 
Council was founded as an NGO, it exerted significant influence on government policy 
making. Such influence was possible as the Korean Council had quasi-government 
status. The Korean Council maintained a close relationship with the Ministry of 
Unification as it was established under the steering role of the Ministry of Unification. 
As President Kim stated in September 1998 “[in regard to the future role and status of 
the Korean Council] I think that the Korean Council would evolve as an organisation 
which handles the overall affairs of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation at both the 
levels of government and private,” 120 the Korean Council had an organisational 
structure which was able to evolve such that it could participate in government decision 
making. 
      The Kim Dae-Jung administration’s effort to enhance NGO involvement 
continued with the establishment of the Government-Civilian Council in August 2001. 
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The Ministry of Unification had four preliminary public-private meetings with 
humanitarian NGOs– the first meeting on 17 November 2000, a second meeting on 24 
November 2000, a third meeting on 6 October 2000 and a fourth meeting on 2 March 
2001.121 Although the establishment of the Government-Civilian Council was realised 
towards the end of the Kim Dae-Jung administration, the preliminary meetings created a 
de facto government consultative body linking the Kim Dae-Jung administration and the 
humanitarian NGOs. 
       Lastly, the Kim Dae-Jung administration improved the status of existing 
government consultative bodies linking the state and NGOs, such as the NUAC and the 
UAM. The Kim Dae-Jung administration strengthened the function of NUAC in 
canvassing public opinion and conveying these opinions to the President. Under 
President Kim’s order on 22 April 1998, the elder statesmen from various circles and the 
representatives of humanitarian NGOs were appointed as advisors to the NUAC.122 The 
Kim Dae-Jung administration also strengthened the function of the UAM as the 
advisory organisation for the President on the issue of unification. The administration 
improved the status of the UAM by having the President appoint the chair of the UAM 
and by assuring the term of the UAM members to 30 months.123 
 
 
The Roh Moo-Hyun Administration’s Policy Networks 
 
The Roh Moo-Hyun administration developed a political structure that was the most 
sensitive to NGO and civil society influence among the three administrations evaluated 
here. The Roh Moo-Hyun administration established new policy networks and new 
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institutions linking the state and NGOs incorporated in new and existing consultative 
bodies. The Roh administration also promoted NGO participation in state policy making 
as well as the execution of policy.  
During the presidential election in 2002, Roh Moo-Hyun was supported by 
young voters and progressive groups, which became a decisive factor in the presidential 
election. After the election, President Roh Moo-Hyun attended an NGOs’ New Year’s 
Greeting event held on 6 January 2003, before his inauguration, and stated that “[I] 
could not win the presidential election if the civil society movement accumulated over a 
decade had not existed.”124 The Roh Moo-Hyun administration stressed participatory 
democracy as one of the government’s priority agendas. President Roh Moo-Hyun 
emphasised the participation of the public and NGOs in state policy making, 
implementation and evaluation. He adopted the phrase ‘the Participatory Government’ 
as the slogan for the administration.125 
     The Roh Moo-Hyun administration recruited more NGO personnel for the 
government and the Blue House. From a total of 416 government positions, NGO 
personnel accounted for 50.5 per cent.126 President Roh Moo-Hyun appointed Jae-In 
Moon, who had an NGO background as the Senior Secretary to the President for Civil 
Affairs. This position worked as a communication channel to connect the President with 
civil society. Keun-Sik Kim argues that the Roh Moo-Hyun administration finally 
institutionalised the cooperative relationship between the state and NGOs in relation to 
state policy making towards North Korea.127 
      At the beginning of the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, the National Council for 
Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation (the National Council) played a similar role as 
that during the Kim Dae-Jung administration. The institutionalisation of the National 
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Council as a policy network linking the state and civil society, however, was made in 
the middle of the Roh Moo-Hyun administration. On 31 May 2005, the Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration increased the number of the National Council to 18 members through 
revision of the legislation. The revised legislation stipulated that more than three private 
experts equipped with expertise and experiences in the inter-Korean exchange and 
cooperation be included in the National Council. It increased to four private members in 
2007.128 The National Committee on Advancing Inter-Korean Relations was also 
established on 26 July 2007 through the enactment of the legislation in the Act of 
Advancing Inter-Korean Relations on 29 December 2005. The purpose of this 
legislation was to increase the transparency of policy making and implementation and to 
expand national level consensus. This new legislation institutionalised private 
participation by including nine civilians on the committee: seven persons are appointed 
by the Prime Minister and two persons are appointed by the Minister of Unification. 
 The Roh Moo-Hyun administration established new institutions to survey 
public opinion and to institutionalise it as part of the process of state policy making. 
During the period of the presidential takeover, the new President launched the Centre 
for Public Participation and the post of Senior Secretary to the President for Public 
Participation. The President appointed an NGO worker to this position. In doing so, he 
tried to incorporate the demands of civil society into the state policy-making process.129 
Roh Moo-Hyun altered the position of Senior Secretary to the President for Public 
Participation, establishing the Senior Secretary for the President to Civil Society on 16 
May 2004. Thus President Roh Moo-Hyun attempted to strengthen the role of the Blue 
House in coordinating various social demands, appointing Jae-In Moon, who was his 
closest senior secretary and former Senior Secretary to the President for Civil Affairs, to 
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that position.130 
      The Roh Moo-Hyun administration established the Committee of Civil Society 
Development under the Prime Minister’s Office thus promoting civil and NGO 
participation in government policy making and execution in August 2003. The 
Committee of Civil Society Development acted as an official channel to convey the 
demands of civil society to the state. This Committee in particular adopted a 
recommendation advising the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to amend the Regulation 
Act on Fundraising and Donation.131 This recommendation finally contributed to the 
improvement of financial arrangements of NGOs, by making the Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration fund NGO activities and organisational management. 
The Roh Moo-Hyun administration exploited ‘Open Forums,’ ‘Dialogue with 
the Minister of Unification’ and ‘Public Opinion Polls’ as official channels to 
communicate with the civil society. The Ministry of Unification held ‘Open Forums’ on 
the issues of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation eight times in 2003. The Ministry 
of Unification changed the ‘Open Forum’ to ‘Dialogue with the Unification Minister’ 
which was held three times and fourteen times in 2004 and 2005 respectively.132 From 
January to August 2006, for example, the Dialogue with the Unification Minister was 
held 12 times.133 The Ministry of Unification also organised on 212 occasions a 
‘Dialogue with the Heads of Bureaus of the Ministry of Unification’ during the Roh 
Moo-Hyun administration.134 The Roh Moo-Hyun administration used public opinion 
surveys to gather national public opinions on pending inter-Korean issues. During the 
Roh Moo-Hyun administration, the Ministry of Unification conducted public opinion 
polls ten times between 2003 and 2005.135 These institutions finally contributed to the 
increase of the degree of government accommodation to NGO and civil society 
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movement. 
 
 
3.3.3 The Degree of Government Accommodation to Humanitarianism 
 
The level of accommodation to humanitarian norms and international institutions 
advocating these norms gradually increased in the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun 
administrations. In the early stage of the food crisis in North Korea between 1995 and 
1997, the Kim Young-Sam administration was not sensitive to these norms and the 
international community advocating these norms. This low level of accommodation was 
attributable to the lack of the Kim Young-Sam administration’s normative identity and 
awareness of the international community’s effort to relieve the humanitarian crisis. 
Given the increase in the awareness of the humanitarian crisis in North Korea and the 
political rapprochement between both Koreas in 2000, however, the Kim Dae-Jung and 
Roh Moo-Hyun administrations were more sensitive to the norms of humanitarianism 
and the international efforts underpinned by these norms. 
To demonstrate this argument above, this section examines the Kim Young-Sam, 
Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administrations’ normative identities. To analyze 
each administration’s normative identities, this section uses the data of each 
administration’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) contribution, the ratio of grant 
aid to the overall ODA and examines each administration’s efforts in the international 
effort to relieve the humanitarian crisis.136 
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The Kim Young-Sam Government’s Accommodation to Humanitarianism 
 
The international community urged the Kim Young-Sam administration to provide 
humanitarian aid to North Korea, and the Kim Young-Sam administration became, for 
the first time, an aid donor. International humanitarian standards, however, remained 
only superficially applied, rather than being internalised in the policy and practice of the 
Kim Young-Sam administration. It participated passively in the efforts of the 
international community to relieve the humanitarian crisis overseas, only pledging a 
small amount of aid to the international community through the ODA. 
After the end of the Korean War in 1953, South Korea was a major recipient of 
international assistance and foreign assistance continued until 1995. 137  The 
development of international humanitarian organisations in South Korea began in 1991 
after South Korea became a member nation of the United Nations and the Korea 
International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) was established. KOICA is a government 
organisation mandated to deliver humanitarian and development assistance to 
developing countries at a government level. During the early 1990s the size of ODA, 
including grant, non-grant, expense sharing and investment, was merely $57,400,000 
and $76,800,000 respectively in 1991 and 1992. 138  Among these disbursements, 
humanitarian grant aid was only $25,040,000 in 1991 and $30,990,000 in 1992.139 
When the Kim Young-Sam administration came into power in 1993, the ODA 
contribution increased to 0.03 per cent of the GNP in 1993 to 0.042 per cent in 1997. 
The amount of grant aid increased by $22,090,000, from $32,680,000 in 1993 to 
$54,770,000 in 1997, giving an annual average expenditure of about $45,880,000. The 
Kim Young-Sam administration, however, allocated more to bilateral aid, to which it 
was easier to attach political and economic interest, than multilateral aid in the ODA 
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contribution. More resources were allocated to loans, $69,900,000 in 1996 and 
$56,570,000 in 1997, than grant aid, $53,410,000 in 1996and $54,770,000 in 1997.140 
The small amount of ODA and high ratio of non-grant aid to grant aid, indicates that the 
Kim Young-Sam administration was not sensitive to the norms of humanitarianism and 
the efforts of international organisation advocating these norms. 
 
 
The Kim Dae-Jung Government’s Accommodation to Humanitarianism  
 
During the Kim Dae-Jung administration, the South Korean government was more 
sensitive to humanitarian norms and the international efforts to relieve the humanitarian 
crisis worldwide than its predecessor. The Kim Dae-Jung administration also increased 
its contribution both quantitatively and qualitatively.  
    The outbreak of the food crisis in North Korea raised the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration’s awareness of humanitarianism and international cooperation to relieve 
humanitarian crises worldwide as well as in North Korea. Such awareness became 
interwoven with the economic recovery in 2000. Given the improved awareness of the 
necessity of international cooperation and the recovery from the economic downturn, 
the Kim Dae-Jung administration expanded its contributions to the international efforts 
to relieve humanitarian crises worldwide. The administration increased the amount of 
ODA in general by 0.06 per cent of the GNP from 0.035 per cent in the Kim Young-Sam 
administration.141 ODA increased from $182,700,000 in 1998 to $278,780,000 in 
2002.142  The Kim Dae-Jung administration proclaimed repeatedly that the South 
Korean government would participate in the international community’s effort to 
eradicate global hunger and poverty, and adopted the Millennium Development Goals 
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Table 3.1 South Korea’s Annual Official Development Assistance (ODA) Contribution  
Statistics (Million U.S. Dollar) 
 
 ODA Bilateral Aid Grant Loan Multilateral Aid 
ODA/GNP 
(%) 
1991 57.4 31.52 25.04 6.48 25.96 0.02 
1992 76.8 45.22 30.99 14.23 31.58 0.03 
1993 111.6 60.12 32.68 27.44 51.44 0.03 
1994 140.2 60.07 38.45 21.62 80.15 0.04 
1995 116 71.46 50.11 21.35 44.53 0.03 
1996 159.2 123.31 53.41 69.9 35.84 0.033 
1997 185.6 111.34 54.77 56.57 74.27 0.042 
1998 182.7 124.69 37.21 87.48 58.01 0.058 
1999 317.5 131.4 39.0 92.4 186.1 0.079 
2000 212.1 131.2 47.8 83.4 80.9 0.047 
2001 264.65 171.54 52.97 47.04 93.11 0.06 
2002 278.78 206.76 66.7 58.59 72.02 0.06 
2003 365.91 245.17 145.46 121.77 120.74 0.06 
2004 423.32 330.76 212.09 174.58 92.56 0.06 
2005 752.32 463.3 318.00 201.86 289.01 0.10 
2006 455.25 376.06 258.95 193.11 79.19 0.05 
2007 699.06 528.43 361.28 270.09 205.59 0.07 
 
Source: Figures are taken from KOICA, 2007 KOICA Daeoimusangwonjosiljeoktonggye [English 
Translation: 2007 KOICA Aid Statistics], 2008-2-136, Seoul, 2007.; KOICA, Urinaeui Yeondobyeol 
ODA Siljeok [English Translation: South Korea's Annual ODA Contribution Statistics], Seoul, 2004. 
 
 
(MDGs) in 2000. 143  The Kim Dae-Jung administration’s humanitarian grant aid, 
however, only modestly increased from $37,210,000 in 1998 to $66,700,000 in 2002. 
The average amount of grant increased from $45,880,000 in the Kim Young-Sam 
administration to $48,730,000 in the Kim Dae-Jung administration.144The Kim Dae-
Jung administration did not therefore fully internalise the norms of humanitarianism 
into their policy and practices although the Kim Dae-Jung administration was 
susceptible to these norms and the institutions advocating them.  
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The Roh Moo-Hyun Government’s Accommodation to Humanitarianism  
 
The Roh Moo-Hyun administration changed the practice that exploited the ODA as a 
channel to maximise national interests. It increased the size of the ODA and the ratio of 
grant aid to non-grant aid. The Roh Moo-Hyun administration thereby showed more 
accommodation to the norms of humanitarianism and the efforts of international 
institutions advocating these norms and proclaimed a collaborative policy with the 
international efforts to relieve the North Korean humanitarian crisis. 
     The Roh Moo-Hyun administration sharply increased the size of the ODA. 
Starting from $365,910,000 in 2003, the first year of the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, 
ODA was increased up to $699,060,000 in 2007, equivalent to 0.068 per cent of the 
GNP.145 The amount of grant aid was drastically increased. The Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration provided more international aid than any past administration; spending 
an annual average of $259,150,000 from 2003 to 2007. The Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration sought to participate in the international community’s efforts to eradicate 
hunger and poverty by issuing ‘MDGs: Progress Report, Republic of Korea’ in 2005.146 
The Plan for Improving International Development Cooperation which was adopted at 
the Cabinet Council in November 2005 also stated the year of 2010 as the anticipated 
time that South Korea would join the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) that 
deals with cooperation among the developing countries within the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 147  At the conference 
commemorating the tenth anniversary of joining the OECD in September 2006, the 
Prime Minister announced a further increase in contributions to the international aid 
community.148 
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3.3.4 The Diplomatic Relationship between South Korea and North Korea 
 
As L. Gordon Flake and Scott A. Snyder have shown, the diplomatic relationship 
between the donor state and the recipient state is a key factor which is able to promote 
or circumscribe NGO influence on the donor state’s decision-making process, changing 
the operational environment for NGO advocacy.149 This section demonstrates that inter-
Korean relations in the Kim Young-Sam administration were the product of ideological, 
political and military confrontation rather than the relations of cooperative partners. In 
this operational environment, the hostile policy in inter-Korean relations was dominant 
throughout the Kim Young-Sam administration. The Kim Dae-Jung administration 
emphasised engagement to forward inter-Korean reconciliation. The Kim Dae-Jung 
administration’s engagement policy contributed to the mitigation of antagonistic inter-
Korean relations. The Inter-Korean Summit Talk in 2000 provided momentum that 
achieved political rapprochement and ended the hostile political, military and 
ideological confrontation and established a more cooperative and peaceful relationship 
between both Koreas. The Roh administration also followed the engagement policy. 
During the Roh administration, the Bush administration’s hostile policy towards North 
Korea in relation to terrorism, North Korea’s human rights condition, the nuclear issue 
and North Korea’s missile launch and nuclear test in 2006 had a negative influence on 
inter-Korean relations. These political and military incidents, however, did not change 
the cooperative and peaceful relations between both Koreas.     
      This section examines the political and military affairs between both Koreas, 
using the yearly Unification White Papers issued by the Ministry of Unification.150 
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The Kim Young-Sam Administration’s Diplomatic Relationship with North Korea 
 
The adoption of the Geneva Agreement on North Korea’s nuclear development in 1994 
contributed the alleviation of the diplomatic confrontation between North Korea and the 
international community. 151  The diplomatic confrontation between both Koreas, 
however, was still continuing along the line of confrontation after the Korean War in 
1953. Although the year of 1995 was the period in which the first large-scale aid was 
delivered to North Korea, inter-Korean relations was ideologically, politically and 
militarily confrontational rather than cooperative.   
Between 1995 and 1997, the diplomatic confrontation mainly came from the 
differing views on the construction of Korean-type light-water reactors. As 
compensation for the suspension of the nuclear development programme in North Korea, 
the international community agreed to build a light-water reactor plant which would 
produce the electricity required in North Korea. By selecting two reactors which would 
be used in a nuclear plant in North Korea, the Kim Young-Sam administration 
emphasised the construction of Korean-type light-water reactors, but North Korea 
showed a negative response to this suggestion.152 The diplomatic relationship between 
both Koreas after the Kim Young-Sam administration’s food aid decision to North 
Korea was made worse by North Korea’s negative responses. The incident of raising the 
North Korean flag on the ship the Sea Apex that was shipping South Korea’s food aid to 
North Korea on 25 June 1995 and the incident of the detention of the crew of the 
Samsun Venus on 2 August 1995 resulted in negative public opinion on the provision of 
food aid to North Korea.153 
Although the decision was made to construct two Korean-type light-water 
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reactor in 1996, North Korea continued its military provocation at the Demilitarised 
Zone (DMZ) between 5 and 7 April 1996. The invasion of 26 armed guerillas using a 
submarine in the East Sea of Korea on 18 September 1996 in particular was the incident 
that had a devastating effect on inter-Korean relations which had been in the process of 
gradually improving. These military provocations resulted in the suspension of inter-
Korean cooperation on the issues of the nuclear development programme and 
humanitarian aid. With regard to North Korea’s military provocations, the Chair of the 
U.N., the South Korean National Assembly and the Kim Young-Sam administration 
adopted statements and resolutions condemning the behaviour of North Korea.154 In 
1997, the Kim Young-Sam administration renewed inter-Korean relations after an 
official apology from North Korea regarding the submarine incident, but relations were 
not substantially improved. Both the Kim Young-Sam administration and North Korea 
were waiting for the outcome of the South Korean presidential election. 
 
 
The Kim Dae-Jung Administration’s Diplomatic Relationship with North Korea 
 
The Kim Dae-Jung administration was the first government from an opposition party to 
take power since the end of the Korean War in 1953. It sought to improve inter-Korean 
relations, adopting an engagement policy. The engagement policy, often called the 
Sunshine Policy, emphasised inter-Korean reconciliation through inter-Korean exchange 
and cooperation. The antagonistic relationship began to become less tense, and the 
Inter-Korean Summit Talk in 2000 finally provided the momentum for political 
rapprochement, alleviating the hostile political, military and ideological confrontation. 
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The period of 1998 to 2000 was one of policy formation towards North Korea 
and a time when North Korea tested the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s engagement 
policy through continuous provocations. In 1998 North Korea dispatched a submarine 
and an armed spy to South Korea for espionage on 22 June and on 12 July respectively. 
In 1999 North Korea provoked the West Sea Battle on 15 June and detained Keumkang 
Mountain tourists on 20 June.155 Such provocations by North Korea weakened the 
engagement policy by causing conflict with the opposition party and worsening public 
opinion towards North Korea. 
 Despite the unfavourable diplomatic relations between 1998 and 2000, the Kim 
Dae-Jung administration continued with the engagement policy, advancing and 
expanding the quality and scope of inter-Korean exchanges and humanitarian 
cooperation. The Kim Dae-Jung administration implemented the macroscopic policy 
towards North Korea of perceiving North Korea as a cooperative ethnic partner from the 
standpoint of tolerance instead of a confrontational relation as in the previous 
administration.156 The Kim Dae-Jung administration made efforts to maintain stable 
inter-Korean relations under the principle of the separation of economy and politics.157 
With the Inter-Korean Summit Talk in 2000, the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s 
engagement policy was recognised by both Koreas as a common policy for the 
reunification of the Korean peninsula.158 North Korea showed a new attitude and 
abstained from acts that could have negative influences on inter-Korean relations, which 
contributed to the improvement in the perception of hostility towards North Korea by 
South Korea. The political rapprochement between both Koreas resulted in an 
improvement in the cooperative and peaceful diplomatic relationship between the Kim 
Dae-Jung administration and North Korea, shaping the foundation for the promotion of 
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inter-Korean exchange and cooperation during the rest of the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration from 2000 to 2002. 
 
 
The Roh Moo-Hyun Administration’s Diplomatic Relationship with North Korea 
 
The Roh Moo-Hyun administration maintained and advanced the cooperative inter-
Korean relations, expanding social, cultural, economic and humanitarian exchange and 
cooperation based on the engagement policy of the Kim Dae-Jung administration. 
Despite collaborative inter-Korean relations, the Bush administration’s hostile policy 
towards North Korea in relation to terrorism, North Korea’s human rights condition, the 
nuclear issue and North Korea’s missile launch and nuclear test in 2006 had a negative 
influence on inter-Korean relations.159 These negative political affairs and military 
developments, however, did not change the existing cooperative and peaceful relations 
between both Koreas during the Roh Moo-Hyun administration. 
Although the Roh Moo-Hyun administration proclaimed its succession of the 
Kim Dae-Jung administration’s engagement policy in 2003, North Korea ruptured the 
positive inter-Korean relations which were achieved in the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration. At the beginning of the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, North Korea 
acknowledged its development of enriched uranium in October 2002 and announced its 
withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on 10 January 2003.160 On 2 
October 2003 North Korea, which judged that the Bush administration was not fulfilling 
the Geneva Agreement any more, began operating five megawatt nuclear reactors in 
Youngbyeon and reprocessing work on 8,000 spent fuel rod which could be used in the 
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production of nuclear weapon. 161 The political confrontation between the Bush 
administration and North Korea, which resulted from the issue of counterfeit dollars and 
the nuclear weapons development programme, became more severe in 2006 when North 
Korea conducted missile and nuclear tests to put pressure on the U.S. government on 6 
July.162 After North Korea’s missile test, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration suspended 
the provision of rice and fertiliser on 7 July.163 The Roh Moo-Hyun administration 
supported the sanctions on North Korea by the U.N. Security Council. The Roh Moo-
Hyun administration also cast a vote of approval on the North Korea human rights 
resolution plan at the meeting of the United Nations Human Rights Council on 16 
November 2006.164 
The Roh Moo-Hyun administration, however, consistently took the position of 
resuming dialogue, even when only a limited apology had been made by North Korea 
for their negative incidents. Such a policy of toleration towards North Korea 
irrespective of North Korea’s negative and irresponsible behaviour and policies became 
the foundation of maintaining the cooperative inter-Korean relations. As a result, the 
Roh Moo-Hyun administration was able to maintain stable diplomatic relations with 
North Korea.  
During the political confrontation between the Bush administration and North 
Korea in 2003, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration consistently pressurised North Korea 
to hold Inter-Korean Ministerial and Vice-Ministerial Talks and the exchange of Special 
Envoys for the discussion of the issues of inter-Korean political, economic, social, 
cultural exchanges and humanitarian cooperation. Both Koreas in fact were able to hold 
the Inter-Korean Ministerial Talks and the exchange of Special Envoys in the midst of 
this unfavourable political environment, and these meetings and talks contributed to the 
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maintenance of stable inter-Korean relations through the Roh Moo-Hyun administration. 
After the adoption of a resolution blaming North Korea in relation to the missile test in 
July 2006, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration also pledged flood aid to North Korea.165 
Although the delivery of the flood recovery support was temporarily ceased again by 
North Korea’s nuclear experiment in October 2006, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration 
resumed its aid with the adoption of The Code of Conduct for the Nuclear Facilities 
Freeze of North Korea for the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula at the 6-Party 
Talk in 2007. 
 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter demonstrated the assumption of this thesis. It demonstrated that the 
underlying assumption that the issue characteristics of the North Korean food crisis and 
the domestic political structure of South Korean government food aid policy making 
changed over time, shaping differing operational environments in which South Korean 
humanitarian non-governmental organisations worked. Through the examination of the 
issue characteristics of the North Korean food crisis and the domestic political structure 
of the South Korean government food aid policy making towards North Korea from 
1995 to 2007, this chapter demonstrated that there were the three different phases of the 
North Korean food crisis in North Korea between 1995 and 2007. It also demonstrated 
that the domestic political structure of South Korean government food aid policy 
making changed over time, allowing for the promotion of NGO advocacy and a political 
role in state policy making. 
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      This chapter first demonstrated that there were the three different phases of the 
North Korean food crisis in North Korea between 1995 and 2007. These three phases 
were (i) a famine phase from 1995 to 1999; (ii) a transition phase from a famine to a 
chronic food deficit from 1999 to 2001; and (iii) a chronic food deficit phase from 2001 
to 2007.  
      Firstly, at the stage of famine between 1995 and 1999 food production and the 
PDS rations continued to decline and reached their lowest production and ration levels. 
In 1997/1998, North Korea recorded the worst level of cereal production of only 2.663 
million tonnes, which represented only 57.7 per cent of the minimum cereal 
requirement. With regard to the PDS rations on which 70 per cent of the entire North 
Korean population relied as their life line, the average PDS rations fell steadily to 196 
grams per person per day, which represented only 34 per cent of an individual’s 
minimum energy needs, until the end of 1999. The radical decrease of food production 
and the collapse of PDS rations thereby resulted in the poor nutritional status of North 
Koreans. During this period, 62.3 per cent of all children surveyed suffered from 
chronic malnutrition which is referred to as ‘stunting,’ 15.6 per cent of them were 
acutely malnourished (wasting), and 60.6 per cent were underweight. These main 
findings put North Korea among the top 10 countries with the highest malnutrition rates 
in the world.  
      After the severe famine from 1995 to 1999, North Korea entered into a phase of 
chronic food deficit, far below the minimum human need level, with repeated increases 
and decreases in food production and PDS rations. After the worst cereal production in 
1998/1999, two relatively stable cereal production years in 1998/1999 and 1999/2000 
appeared to indicate a moderate recovery in food production and PDS rations. The food 
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production in 2000/2001, however, again declined and recorded the worst levels. During 
this period, PDS rations also fluctuated, 196 grams in 1998/1999, 271 grams in 
1999/2000 and 208 grams in 2000/2001, covering a small part of an individual’s energy 
needs. While food production and PDS rations fluctuated, the severity of the North 
Korean food crisis in terms of the nutritional status of its people became relieved, but 
was still a desperate situation. A Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) in 2000 
showed that the overall nutritional status of children improved compared to the figures 
of the 1998 survey. The prevalence of stunting in 2000 fell from 62.3 per cent to 45.2 
per cent and wasting fell from 15.6 per cent to 10.4 per cent respectively. The 
percentage of underweight children fell from 60.6 per cent to 27.9 per cent. These 
figures, however, indicate that North Korea began to get out of a famine phase, before 
entering the stage of a chronic food deficit. 
Lastly, from 2001 to 2007food production adds ration levels continued to 
improve. North Korea, however, still remained in a chronic food deficit, failing to 
achieve the minimum human needs in domestic cereal production. With the increase of 
food production and the increased commercial and concessional imports during this 
period, the uncovered food deficit in 2004/2005 was narrowed to 0.492 million tonnes. 
Such increase in the total food production resulted in a positive overall effect on 
household food security, although PDS rations never reached the all-time goal of 575 
grams per person per day throughout the entire period between 2001 and 2007. The 
increase in food production and PDS rations during this period contributed to the small 
improvement in the nutritional status, but North Korea still remained in a state of 
chronic malnutrition. Wasting fell from 10.4 per cent in 2000 to 8.1 per cent in 2002 
and 7 per cent in 2004. Although underweight children fell from 27.9 per cent in 2000 
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to 20.2 per cent in 2002, it again worsened by 3.3 per cent, from 20.1 per cent in 2002 
to 23.4 per cent in 2004.Among the surveyed children the prevalence of stunting fell 
from 45.2 per cent in 2000 to 39.2 per cent in 2002 and 37 per cent in 2004, but it was 
still 7 per cent higher than the WHO criterion which considers a prevalence of stunting 
higher than 30 percent as a severe public health problem. These figures indicate that 
North Korea was in a state of continued food deficit between 2001 and 2007 although 
North Korea came out of the phase of famine between 1995 and 1999. 
      This chapter also demonstrated that how and why the domestic political 
structure of South Korean government food aid policy making changed, thus allowing 
for the promotion of NGO advocacy and a political role in state policy making.  
      It first showed that the domestic political structure of state food aid policy 
making became more transparent and democratic between 1998 and 2007 through the 
SOP and increasing NGO participation. The Kim Young-Sam administration had a non-
democratic decision-making structure, and therefore the domestic political structure of 
the Kim Young-Sam administration in relation to state food aid policy making was less 
sensitive to NGO advocacy. In contrast to the Kim Young-Sam administration, the Kim 
Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administrations emphasised adherence to the democratic 
SOP and the inclusion of government-NGO consultative bodies in state food aid policy 
making. The Roh Moo-Hyun administration further institutionalised the SOP of state 
food aid policy making and NGO participation in the state policy-making processes. 
The domestic political structure of state food aid policy making in Roh Moo-Hyun 
administrations thereby were highly sensitive to NGO advocacy.  
With regard to policy networks linking the state and NGOs, the Kim Young-Sam 
administration had a negative view on the role of NGOs, and maintained a passive 
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stance on the establishment of policy networks assuring NGO participation in state 
policy making. In contrast to the Kim Young-Sam administration, the Kim Dae-Jung 
and Roh Moo-Hyun administrations conceived NGOs as an important counterpart in 
state policy making and execution. They were active in the establishment of policy 
networks linking the state and NGOs, and these policy networks shaped an operational 
environment favourable to NGO advocacy.  
This chapter showed that the level of government accommodation to 
humanitarian norms and international institutions advocating these norms gradually 
increased in the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administrations. In the early stage 
of the food crisis in North Korea between 1995 and 1997, the Kim Young-Sam 
administration was less sensitive to the humanitarian norms and the influence of the 
international community advocating these norms due to lack of awareness of the 
humanitarian crisis in North Korea and experience in relation to the international effort 
to relieve humanitarian crises worldwide. With an increase in the awareness of the 
humanitarian crisis and the international efforts to relieve the humanitarian crisis in 
North Korea, the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administrations gradually 
increased their participation in the international efforts. Such changes indicate that the 
domestic political structures of the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administrations 
became more sensitive to international efforts to relieve the humanitarian crisis and 
institutions advocating these norms.  
Lastly, it demonstrated that hostile inter-Korean relations improved towards a 
political rapprochement which was favourable to NGO advocacy activities and which 
made the government more susceptible to NGO advocacy. The Kim Young-Sam 
administration maintained ideological, political and military confrontations, and such 
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confrontations shaped the operational environment so that it was less sensitive to NGO 
advocacy of food aid to North Korea. In the mid-Kim Dae-Jung administration in 2000, 
however, the engagement policy emphasising inter-Korean reconciliation achieved 
political rapprochement, establishing the first ever cooperative and peaceful relationship 
between both Koreas. During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration a series of political and 
military incidents jeopardised the inter-Korean relations, but did not worsen the 
fundamental cooperative and peaceful relations between both Koreas. 
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CHAPTER 4. THE ORGANISATIONAL CAPACITY OF THE KOREAN 
 SHARING MOVEMENT AND GOOD FRIENDS 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Non-governmental organisation (NGO) organisational capability is an important factor 
in the explanation of the extent of NGO influence on state policy.1 NGO organisational 
capability, however, is inherently limited because NGO influence on state policy 
making relies on the normative appeal of the NGOs. The core theme of this thesis is an 
investigation of NGO norm advocacy and subsequent chapters therefore deal with this 
issue in detail. This chapter, however, demonstrates how differing mandates, funding 
capacity and expertise of NGOs shape NGO organisational capability. This chapter 
instead demonstrates how and why the specific organisational mandates, funding 
capacity and expertise of the Korean Sharing Movement (KSM) and Good Friends 
combined to permit the KSM and Good Friends to exert influence over South Korean 
government food aid policy.  
This chapter demonstrates that in 1996 and 1997, the KSM had one single 
mandate to advocate for the provision of food aid to North Korea. After the inauguration 
of the Kim Dae-Jung administration in 1998, however, the KSM expanded their 
mandates to the issues of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation and such expansion of 
organisational mandate diluted the previous single mandate. With regard to the funding 
capacity of the KSM, the KSM improved their funding capacity through the 
diversification of funding sources. The increase in reliance on government funding since 
the mid-Kim Dae-Jung administration, however, resulted in the blunting of KSM’s 
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advocacy role, by making it difficult for KSM to criticise or pressurise government 
policy. With regard to the organisational expertise, the KSM gradually improved its 
expertise in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea, by organisational restructuring. 
Such improvement and accumulated experience enhanced the expertise of the 
organisation and individual staff. 
With regard to the organisational capacity of Good Friends, this chapter 
demonstrates, Good Friends adhered to a single mandate, which was to relieve the food 
crisis in North Korea until the end of 1998. After the inauguration of President Kim 
Dae-Jung, Good Friends began to diversify its mandate. Such diversification between 
1999 and 2003 consequently resulted in the weakening of the Good Friends’ original 
humanitarian mandate. From the end of 2006, however, Good Friends resumed its full 
advocacy movement urging the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to provide additional 
food aid to North Korea, by adhering to the single mandate of the advocacy of food aid 
to North Korea. This chapter next demonstrates that throughout the entire period of 
advocacy of food aid to North Korea from 1996 to 2007, Good Friends’ unique funding 
structure, as one of the Jungto Society-affiliated organisations, enabled them to keep 
their independent voice and adhere to an advocacy role free from the influence of 
funding sources. Lastly, it demonstrates that throughout the 12 years of the advocacy 
movement from 1996 to 2007, Good Friends improved its expertise in the advocacy of 
food aid to North Korea, but such expertise mainly came from individual personnel, 
rather than the organisational structure.  
This chapter consists of two main sections and a conclusion. The first section 
examines how and why the organisational capacity of the KSM has changed over time, 
by examining the mandate, funding capacity and organisational expertise. Under an 
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identical analytical framework, the second section next examines the organisational 
capacity of Good Friends. The last section then provides a summary of the chapter. 
 
 
4.2 The Organisational Capacity of the Korean Sharing Movement 
 
This section demonstrates that in 1996 and 1997, the KSM had one single mandate to 
advocate for the provision of food aid to North Korea. As the South Korean government 
became more pro food and humanitarian assistance to North Korea after the 
inauguration of the Kim Dae-Jung administration in 1998, the KSM expanded their 
mandates to the issues of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. Such expansion of 
organisational mandate diluted the previous single mandate. The KSM improved their 
funding capacity through the diversification of funding sources. The increase in reliance 
on government funding since the mid-Kim Dae-Jung administration, however, resulted 
in the blunting of KSM’s advocacy role, by making it difficult for KSM to criticise or 
pressurise government policy. When inter-Korean relations were ruptured between 2005 
and 2007 after which the South Korean government suspended food aid to North Korea, 
KSM advocacy in favour of food aid was constrained by its lack of organisational 
independence from the government. The KSM responded to these weaknesses by 
organisational restructuring. Such improvement and accumulated experience enhanced 
the expertise of the organisation and individual staff. 
      This section examines anniversary reports and white papers published by the 
KSM and interviews with KSM personnel. KSM anniversary reports and white papers 
provide the rules and regulations that stipulate the organisational mandates.2 These 
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reports and papers also include overall information on KSM activities which enables the 
actual mandate of the KSM and Good Friends to be identified. This chapter also uses 
interviews with KSM personnel and representatives. 3  To examine KSM funding 
capacity, the chapter next mainly uses internal materials and annual reports from KSM 
and government archives. In regard to KSM funding capacity between 1996 and 2002, 
this chapter uses the data provided by KSM’s finance officer.4 These data do not 
provide absolute figures of funding due to the reason that the KSM was reluctant to 
open their financial data to the public, but the data include the ratio of each funding 
source to the entire funding. The KSM has published annual reports since 2002 and 
these reports include the funding capacity of KSM.5 In order to examine the scale of 
government funding for the KSM, this chapter also uses the ‘White Paper on the Inter-
Korean Cooperation Fund’ published by the South Korean government.6 To examine 
the organisational structure and the human resource management of the KSM, this 
section uses the organisational charts in the annual and anniversary reports and 
interviews with KSM personnel.7 
      This section consists of three main parts. The first part examines the mandate of 
the KSM. The second section examines the funding capacity. The third part examines 
the organisational expertise of the KSM. The last part summarises the section. 
 
 
4.2.1 The Mandates of the Korean Sharing Movement 
 
In 1996 the newly established KSM had one single mandate. This was to advocate for 
the provision of food aid to North Korea. As the South Korean government became 
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more pro food and humanitarian assistance to North Korea since the inauguration of the 
Kim Dae-Jung administration in 1998, the KSM expanded their mandates to include 
inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. Such diversification of the organisational 
mandate resulted in the weakening of the humanitarian mandate to relieve the food 
crisis in North Korea, by diluting the previous single mandate and thereby by scattering 
the organisational resources. 
 
 
The Mandates of the Korean Sharing Movement during the Kim Young-Sam 
Administration 
 
Before North Korea’s appeal for food aid to the international community in August 
1995, the South Korean NGOs broadly recognised the situation of the North Korean 
food deficits through North Korea’s appeal for food aid to Japan in 1994 and to South 
Korea in early 1995.8 At that time these NGOs conceived the North Korean food 
deficits as temporary, resulting from severe floods. After North Koreas’ appeal, however, 
the largest six religious groups, Catholic, Confucianism, the National Council of 
Churches in Korea (NCCK), Chondogyo, Won-Buddhism and Chogye Order recognised 
the need for an organised advocacy movement to pressurise the Kim Young-Sam 
administration and South Korean civil society to take action to relieve the humanitarian 
crisis in North Korea.9 As a result the ‘Inter-religious Committee on the North Korean 
Flood Victim Aid’ (the Inter-religious Committee), the predecessor of the KSM, was 
founded as an inter-religious organisation for the advocacy of humanitarian food aid to 
North Korea. With the lack of information on the North Korean food deficits, the Inter-
religious Committee was recognised as a temporary organisation. The Inter-religious 
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Committee also had a loose network which did not have administrative personnel.10 As 
the severity of the North Korean food deficits in the early 1996 became more widely 
known to the international community and South Korean civil society, the 
representatives of six religious groups, former presidents of relief NGOs, elder 
statesmen and leaders of civil society organisations began to recognise the need for a 
consolidated advocacy organisation mandated to advocate humanitarian food aid to 
North Korea. In June 1996, the six religious groups and civil society organisations 
finally agreed to establish the Korean Sharing Movement as a consolidated network as 
an independent administrative and executive body.11 
       In 1995 and 1996 South Korean civil society and the Kim Young-Sam 
administration maintained a negative approach to the provision of food aid to North 
Korea. It was attributable to North Korea’s negative responses to the provision of 
150,000 tonnes of rice assistance in 1995, the announcement of non-recognition of the 
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between North Korea and South Korea on 4 April 1996 and 
the dispatch of armed forces to the Joint Security Area (JSA) in Panmunjom from 5 to 7 
April 1996. 12 Because of negative public opinion and the Kim Young-Sam 
administration’s passive view of the provision of food aid to North Korea, the 
preparatory meetings of the KSM argued for the necessity of a consistent and systematic 
advocacy movement and the delivery of private-level humanitarian food aid to North 
Korea. Clause 2 (objective) of the rules and regulations of the KSM stipulated that 
“KSM aims to prepare the ground for the unification of Korea through the inter-Korean 
cooperation, mainly the humanitarian food aid to the North Korean compatriots who 
confront the severe food deficits.”13 Clause 4 (projects) then specified that projects 
should include i) fundraising and assistance, ii) research and study, iii) civil education, 
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iv) expansion of membership and v) other projects that are deemed to require the pursuit 
of KSM’s objectives. 14  The KSM actively advocated that the Kim Young-Sam 
administration should resume humanitarian food aid to North Korea which was 
suspended due to North Korea’s provocations. The KSM also organised a nationwide 
fundraising campaign in collaboration with other humanitarian NGOs, religious groups 
and civil society organisations.  
The incident of 26 armed spies in the East Sea on 18 September 1996 interrupted 
the pursuit of KSM’s mandate to relieve the food crisis in North Korea, triggering 
negative public opinion towards the provision of food aid to North Korea. After the 
incident, the KSM was not able to continue the advocacy of food aid to North Korea 
and finally suspended the advocacy of humanitarian food aid to North Korea. After the 
suspension of the advocacy movement, the KSM mainly rolled out the ‘Movement for 
Korean-Chinese Victims of South Korean Fraud.’15 
As political relations between North Korea and South Korea improved in 1997, 
the KSM resumed its fundamental mandate to relieve the food crisis in North Korea. On 
29 December 1996 when North Korea made its official apology for the incident of 26 
armed spies, the resentment of South Korean civil society over North Korea’s action 
was softened. Since 1996, in addition, the severity of the North Korean food deficits and 
its humanitarian impacts became known to the international community and South 
Korean civil society. In the context of this changed operational environment, the KSM 
extended its most active advocacy throughout all three administrations. The KSM was 
outspoken in its mandate to relieve the food crisis in North Korea. It urged the Kim 
Young-Sam administration to resume government-level food aid to North Korea in 
various policy conferences, forums and international conference.16 The KSM engaged 
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in active fundraising and the collection of relief materials for the humanitarian aid to 
North Korea.17 
 
 
The Mandates of the Korean Sharing Movement during the Kim Dae-Jung 
Administration 
 
In 1998 the Kim Dae-Jung administration, which maintained a more positive and active 
stance on the provision of large-scale government food aid to North Korea, took office. 
Given changes in the operational environment, the KSM began to diversify its mandates 
to the delivery of humanitarian and development assistance to North Korea. The 
diversification of the KSM mandate consequently resulted in the weakening of KSM’s 
fundamental mandate urging the South Korean government and civil society to provide 
large scale food aid to North Korea irrespective of pending political issues.  
During the Kim Dae-Jung administration from 1998 to 2002, the economic and 
political environment made it inevitable that the KSM changed its mandate. South 
Korea’s economic downturn that started at the end of Kim Young-Sam administration in 
1997 resulted in the weakening of KSM’s mandate to relieve the food crisis in North 
Korea, by diverting public interest from the issue of food crisis in North Korea to the 
issue of South Korean domestic economic recovery. After 1998, South Korea came 
under the supervision of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) with the foreign 
currency deficits until 1999. Unemployment resulting from the economic reform 
became a major social issue in South Korean civil society.18 
Under this operational environment between 1998 and 1999, the KSM continued 
to urge the Kim Dae-Jung administration to provide government-level food aid to North 
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Korea, but it was difficult for the KSM to appeal to South Korean civil society for 
humanitarian food aid for North Korea.19 As the advocacy of food aid to North Korea 
had continued since 1995, South Korean civil society began to feel donor fatigue. This 
made it difficult for the KSM to proselytise the Kim Dae-Jung administration and civil 
society to provide emergency food aid to North Korea.20 Between 1998 and 1999,the 
KSM instead placed more emphasis on the provision of development assistance for 
North Korea’s agricultural resuscitation. 
After the Inter-Korean Summit Talk in June 2000, both North Korea and South 
Korea reached a political rapprochement. The Inter-Korean Summit Talk in June 2000 
provided momentum towards the institutionalisation of large-scale food and 
development aid to North Korea. From 2000, the Kim Dae-Jung administration 
maintained a favourable policy on the provision of humanitarian food and development 
aid to North Korea and delivered 500,000 tonnes of rice aid to North Korea in 2000 and 
2002 respectively.21 
The Kim Dae-Jung administration took measures to promote private-level inter-
Korean exchange and cooperation by humanitarian NGOs. Given the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration’s active and self-steering role in relation to the provision of food aid to 
North Korea, KSM’s advocacy was no longer necessary. Between the years 2000 and 
2002 the KSM thereby adjusted its main objective from the advocacy of food aid to 
North Korea to an assistance provider, mainly of development aid to North Korea.22 
The KSM emphasised that private-level humanitarian and development assistance to 
North Korea would have to run parallel with the government-level assistance to North 
Korea.23 Between the year 2000 and 2002, therefore, the KSM mainly engaged in the 
delivery of humanitarian and development assistance to North Korea and the 
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implementation of development projects for the recovery of North Korean agriculture.24 
In March 2001, the KSM was designated by the Ministry of Unification as one of the 
NGOs authorised to open a bilateral channel with North Korea for the delivery of 
humanitarian and development assistance.25  Such diversification of organisational 
mandate thereby resulted in the weakening of their fundamental mandate to relieve the 
food crisis in North Korea, by diluting the previous single mandate and distributing the 
organisational resources to multiple projects and activities. 
 
 
The Mandates of the Korean Sharing Movement during the Roh Moo-Hyun 
Administration 
 
From 2003 to 2007 KSM’s mandate to relieve the food crisis in North Korea continued 
to weaken as the South Korean government continued to provide large-scale food aid to 
North Korea irrespective of NGO advocacy. The KSM occasionally organised or 
engaged in the advocacy of humanitarian food aid and such advocacy achieved the 
intended outcomes, inducing the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to change its existing 
policy of food aid to North Korea. Because of the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s 
positive view both about providing humanitarian food and development assistance to 
North Korea and the role of NGOs in state policy making and implementation, the KSM 
did not need to urge the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to provide food aid to North 
Korea.  
      The Roh Moo-Hyun administration institutionalised the provision of large-scale 
food aid on loan terms and chemical fertiliser on grant aid to North Korea.26 It also 
expanded financial support for humanitarian NGO operations in North Korea and took 
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various measures to promote the role of NGOs in inter-Korean exchange and 
cooperation.27 The Roh Moo-Hyun administration further assured the participation of 
NGOs in state policy making in respect of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation 
including the provision of humanitarian food and development assistance to North 
Korea.28 
In the context of the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s active policy on the 
provision of food aid to North Korea, KSM’s fundamental mandate to advocate for the 
provision of food aid to North Korea was less relevant. The KSM instead advocated for 
food aid to North Korea when negative developments caused the Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration to suspend food aid. These negative developments included the second 
Bush administration’s hostile policy towards North Korea in 2005 and North Korea’s 
missile and nuclear test in 2006. 29  Renewed advocacy by the KSM and other 
humanitarian NGOs contributed to the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s decision to 
resume food aid to North Korea. The advocacy of food aid to North Korea, as KSM’s 
fundamental mandate underpinning the establishment of KSM in 1996, however, was 
replaced by the other mandates of delivery of humanitarian and development aid to 
North Korea in the Roh Moo-Hyun administration. 
 
 
4.2.2 The Funding Capacity of the Korean Sharing Movement 
  
Until early 1997, the KSM maintained poor funding capacity. During the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration from 1998 to 2002, the diversification of funding sources through new 
aid programmes, the government deregulation in relation to NGO fundraising and 
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government funding for humanitarian NGOs contributed to the stabilisation of KSM’s 
funding capacity. From 2003 to 2007, the KSM further stabilised its funding capacity by 
diversifying funding sources. This in turn contributed to KSM’s organisational 
development. During this period, however, the ratio of government funding to non-
government funding increased to a level which might blunt KSM’s advocacy role of 
pressuring the government to provide food aid to North Korea. 
 
 
The Funding Capacity of the Korean Sharing Movement during the Kim Young-Sam 
Administration 
 
After its establishment in 1996, government restrictions and poor public awareness 
about the necessity of humanitarian food aid to North Korea were the main reasons for 
the lack of organisational funding of the KSM. The Kim Young-Sam administration did 
not authorise NGO fundraising targeting civil society and the corporate sector.30 The 
Kim Young-Sam administration also exploited the Prohibition of Fundraising and 
Donation which was legislated in 1951. This prohibition act stipulated that NGOs must 
receive permission from the Minister of State Department or an equivalent level of local 
governors before fundraising. By maintaining this act, the Kim Young-Sam 
administration prohibited the autonomy of NGOs in fundraising.31 On 30 December 
1995 the Kim Young-Sam administration changed the name of the act to the Regulation 
Act on Fundraising and Donation.32 The Kim Young-Sam administration, however, 
maintained the stipulation of government approval and even decreased the limit of 
expenditure for the administrative budget among the raised funds, from 5 per cent to 2 
per cent.33 South Korean civil society had limited awareness of the need for  
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Table 4.1 Funding Capacity of the Korean Sharing Movement during the Kim Young- 
Sam Administration from 1996 to 1997 (Korean Won) 
 
 1996 1997 
Overall Budget (raised 
by public fundraising)  
317,858,494 
($394,953) 1) 
5,896,307,927 
($7,326,426) 2) 
Overall Administrative 
Budget Unknown Unknown 
Percentages of 
Administrative Budget 0 0 
 
Note: 1) and 2): The exchange rate of the Korean won versus US dollar was about 804.8 in the year of 
1996 and 1997. Source from Choi, Young-Sik, Daehan Minguk Saengjoneui Gyungjehak [English 
Translation: Republic of Korea: The Battle of Economic], Seoul: Reader’s Book. 2005. 
 
Source: Namhee Youn, The funding capacity of KSM from 1996 to 2001, [Internal material], KSM, 2010. 
 
 
humanitarian food aid to North Korea. The hostility against North Korea which was 
historically rooted from political and military confrontations was dominant in South 
Korean civil society.34 North Korea’s negative actions after the delivery of large-scale 
rice assistance from South Korea35 also worsened public opinion on food aid to North 
Korea.36 The lack of information on the North Korean food crisis and North Korea’s 
hermetic characteristics further made South Korean civil society hesitate to participate 
in fundraising for the humanitarian food aid to North Korea in 1995 and 1996.37 
Government restrictions, public antagonism against North Korea and limited public 
awareness about the severity of the food crisis in North Korea resulted in poor 
fundraising capacity for food aid to North Korea. The amount of KSM fundraising in 
1996 was only 317,858,494 won which was the equivalent of $394,953. 38  The 
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government restrictions stipulated that only two per cent could be used for 
administration. 
In 1997, with an active advocacy underpinned by a strong normative motivation 
and the Kim Young-Sam administration’s deregulation of government rules and 
regulation related to fundraising, the KSM began to improve its funding capacity. On 31 
March 1997 the Kim Young-Sam administration took a first step towards actual 
deregulation. It approved indoor fundraising activities for NGOs which allowed funds 
to be raised within a building but not in open public places such as the street or public 
squares. The Kim Young-Sam administration also allowed press releases, by mass 
media, giving the results of fundraising but not the advertising of fundraising.39 Despite 
government restrictions and poor public awareness, the KSM, which was motivated by 
a strong mandate of humanitarianism, organised active advocacy in 1997.This active 
advocacy along with deregulation resulted in a radical increase in fundraising in 1997.40 
As shown in Table 5.1, the amount of fundraising by the KSM for humanitarian food 
aid to North Korea increased 18.5 times, from 317,858,494 won in 1996 to 
5,896,307,927 won ($7,326,426) in 1997. 
 
 
The Funding Capacity of the Korean Sharing Movement during the Kim Dae-Jung 
Administration 
 
From 1998 to 2002, the diversification of funding sources through new aid programmes, 
government deregulation in relation to NGO fundraising and government funding for 
humanitarian NGOs contributed to the stabilisation of KSM funding capacity. From 
1998 and 2000, the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s active policy in large-scale 
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government-level assistance to North Korea resulted in the weakening of NGO 
assistance to North Korea. The scale of KSM funding for the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance to North Korea decreased from 5,104,180,000 won in 1997 to 750,000,000 
won in 1998 and 2,801,580,000 won in 1999.41 
The KSM expanded its mandates and projects from the advocacy of food aid to 
North Korea to the delivery of humanitarian and development assistance to North Korea 
and such expansion of mandates and projects contributed to the stabilisation of KSM 
funding capacity. The KSM expanded its organisational mandate from advocacy and 
general relief to health and medical support, agricultural recovery support and school 
feeding.42 The KSM encouraged the participation of the general public and other civil 
society organisations, corporations and local municipals in humanitarian and 
development assistance to North Korea.43 By delivering a coordinating and executive 
role in such humanitarian and development assistance, which attracted funding from 
local municipals and other NGOs, KSM diversified its funding sources.  
The Kim Dae-Jung administration deregulated the existing government acts in 
relation to the private-level humanitarian and development assistance to North Korea. 
The KSM consistently engaged in advocacy urging the Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-
Jung administrations to adopt measures to improve humanitarian NGOs’ financial 
conditions. A series of government measures contributed to the stabilisation of KSM’s 
funding capacity. These included the promotion of private-level assistance to North 
Korea, the limited approval of fundraising for North Korea through the Automatic 
Response Service (ARS) and the approval of NGO assistance through the Korean Red 
Cross, on 18 September 1998.44 In 1999, the Kim Dae-Jung administration further 
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approved the opening and maintaining of the private-level aid channel with North 
Korea.45 
Through these measures and deregulations, South Korean humanitarian NGOs 
and the KSM were able to visit North Korea for the purpose of project planning and 
coordination. Such deregulation consequently contributed to the promotion of civil, 
corporate, NGO and local municipal participation in the assistance to North Korea. The 
increase of opportunity for mutual exchange through the various aid programmes 
between both Koreas enabled South Korean civil society to better understand the 
severity of the North Korean food deficits. This, in turn, contributed to the improvement 
of KSM and other humanitarian NGOs’ funding capacities.46 The approval of the mass 
media and individual corporate events for the purpose of fundraising using the ARS 
further contributed to the improvement of KSM funding capacity, promoting civil and 
corporate participation in humanitarian and development assistance to North Korea.47 
The Kim Dae-Jung administration’s decision to provide financial support for 
humanitarian NGOs from the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund in 1999 and the passing 
of the Non-profit Organisation Support Act in 1999 contributed to improvement in the 
KSM’s funding capacity. Based on the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act, the 
KSM received 352,000,000 won in 2000, which was increased to 549,000,000 won in 
2001 and 1,347,000,000 won in 2002.48 The Rules of Implementation of Humanitarian 
Assistance to North Korea under the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act 
stipulated that NGOs receiving the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund could spend 5 per 
cent of government funding on its administration.49 
The Non-profit Organisation Support Act contributed to the reduction of the 
KSM’s administrative budget. The non-profit Organisation Support Act that stipulates 
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tax exemption, postal charge benefit and financial support was legislated on 16 
December 1999.50 The KSM also received government funding of 66,000,000 won in 
2000, 10,000,000 won in 2001, and 110,000,000 won in 2002, in addition to funding 
from the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund. From this funding, the KSM was able to 
expend 2-5 per cent of received funding for their administrative budget.51 From 1998 to 
2002, the various types of government funding for NGO activities consequently 
contributed to the stabilisation of KSM funding capacity.52 
 
 
The Funding Capacity of the Korean Sharing Movement during the Roh Moo-Hyun 
Administration 
 
From 2003 to 2007 the KSM further stabilised its funding capacity by diversifying 
funding sources. KSM promoted cash and commodity donations from individuals, civil 
society organisations, corporate and local municipals, by organising various aid 
programmes, mainly general relief support, health and medical support, agricultural 
recovery support and school feeding.53 
            In 2003, cash and commodity donations amounted to approximately 6,888 
million Korean won, which was an increase of approximately 1,205 million won 
compared to the 5,683 million won in 2002.54 In 2004, the Ryongcheon Station 
Explosion contributed to a radical increase in cash and commodity donations for 
explosion victims.55 Cash and commodity donations in 2004 came to 8,236 million 
won.56 In 2005, they decreased by around 2,189 million won to about 6,046 million 
won.57 This decrease was attributable to North Korea’s official announcement which  
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Table 4.2 The Percentages of Government Funding among the Overall Korean Sharing  
Movement’s Administrative Budget during the Kim Dae-Jung Administration 
from 1998 to 2002 (Korean Won; U.S. Dollar) 
 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Overall 
Administrative 
Budget (USD) 1) 
153,167,316 
($131,524.36) 
62,885,4332) 
($55,501.16) 
284,663,941 
($226,193.72) 
226,582,783 3) 
($171,005.51) 
276,299,945 
($230,681.63) 
Government Funding 
(A / B) 4) 0 0 
352,000,000 
(286,000,000/ 
66,000,000)
549,000,000 
(539,000,000/ 
10,000,000) 
1,347,000,000 
(1,237,000,000/ 
110,000,000)
Government Funding 
for Administrative 
Budget (C / D) 5) 
0 0 
17,600,000 
(14,300,000/ 
3,300,000)
27,450,000 
(26,950,000/ 
500,000) 
37,350,000 
(31,850,000/ 
5,500,000)
Percentages of 
Government Funding 
0 0 6.18 12.11 6) 13.52 
 
Note: 1) To convert Korean won to U.S. dollar, it used a private currency convert calculator which is 
provided by Forex, calculator available at: http://forex-history.net/main/l/eng/a/convert.; 2) & 3) The 
thesis drew these figures using the stipulation of the Regulation Act on Fundraising and Donation that 
allows 2 per cent of raised funding for the administrative budget of organisation.; 4) KSM received the 
government funding based on two different government acts for the financial support for NGOs: the one 
‘A’ is the Rules of Implementation of Humanitarian Assistance to North Korea under the Inter-Korean 
Exchange and Cooperation Act, and the other one ‘B’ is Non-profit Organisation Support Act.; 5) The 
figures ‘C’ were reproduced based on Article 9, Section 2 of the Rules of Implementation of 
Humanitarian Assistance to North Korea that stipulates the NGO is able to expend 5 per cent of funding 
received from the government for the organization’s administrative purpose. In regard to the government 
funding by Non-profit Organisation Support Act, the NGO is able to expend 5 per cent of total 
government funding maximum for its administrative budget.; 6) The figure should be understood as a 
maximum percentage as the figure of raised funding among the total administrative budget of KSM in 
2001 is a minimum estimation.  
 
Source: The figures in each year of ‘Overall Administrative Budget’ are from Namhee Youn, Internal 
material on the funding capacity of KSM from 2002 to 2007 on the request of author. The figures of ‘A’ in 
‘Government Funding’ are from Ministry of Unification, Nambukhyeobryeokgigeum Baekseo [English 
Translation: White Paper on the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund], Seoul: Ministry of Unification, 2008. 
The figures of ‘B’ in ‘Government Funding’ are from Ministry of Public Administration and Security, 
2000 Mingandanche Bojogeum Jiwon Naeyeok [English Translation: Government Financial Support for 
NGOs], Seoul: Ministry of Public Administration and Security, 2006. 
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Table 4.3 Funding Capacity of the Korean Sharing Movement during the Roh Moo- 
Hyun Administration from 2003 to 2007 (Korean won)  
 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Cash & 
Commodity 
5,683,006,351 
(80.12 ) 1) 
6,888,750,657 
(98.84) 
8,236,517,838 
(84.17) 
6,046,931,008 
(78.61) 
8,854,857,970 
(84.69) 
7,642,042,834 
(83.16) 
Government 
Funding 
1,347,155,860 2) 
(18.99) 
60,000,000 
(0.86) 
1,437,346,420 
(14.69) 
1,559,313,710 
(20.27) 
1,242,221,690 
(11.88) 
1,137,109,880 
(12.37) 
Others 63,152,360 
(0.89) 
20,186,790 
(0.29) 
111,819,670 
(1.42) 
86,227,954 
(1.12) 
358,177,692 
(3.43) 
410,197,436 
(4.46) 
Sum 7,093,314,571 
(100) 
6,968,937,447 
(100) 
9,785,683,928 
(100) 
7,692,472,672 
(100) 
10,455,257,352 
(100) 
9,189,350,150 
(100) 
 
Note: 1) These figures were drawn from government reports on the expenditure of the Inter-Korean 
Cooperation Fund and government financial support for South Korean NGOs.; 2) Figures in the brackets 
are the percentages of each funding source.  
 
Source: Ministry of Unification, Nambukhyeobryeokgigeum Baekseo [English Translation: White Paper 
on the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund], Seoul: Ministry of Unification, 2008.; Ministry of Public 
Administration and Security, 2000 Mingandanche Bojogeum Jiwon Naeyeok [English Translation: 
Government Financial Support for NGOs], Seoul: Ministry of Public Administration and Security, 2006. 
 
 
appealed for development assistance, proclaiming the withdrawal of international NGOs 
engaged in the delivery of emergency assistance in 2006. 
In 2007 the KSM still maintained a high level of cash and commodity funding of 
about 7,642 million won.58 Although the scale of donations in 2007 decreased to about 
7,642 million won, it was the highest amount to be raised under a normal operational 
environment without any humanitarian disasters in North Korea.59 
The overall increase of cash and commodity donations for the KSM contributed 
to the increase in their administration budget. Cash donations in 2003 and 2004 were in 
the region of 2,012 and 3,862 million won respectively.60 In 2005, cash donations  
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Table 4.4 The Ratio of Cash Donations to Commodity Donation in the Funding 
 of the Korean Sharing Movement during the Roh Moo-Hyun 
Administration from 2003 to 2007 (Korean won) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Cash 
Donation 
3,780,129,030 
(66.52) 1) 
2,012,160,598 
(29.21) 
3,862,783,261 
(46.90) 
3,977,586,458 
(65.79) 
7,959,119,649 
(89.88) 
5,492,766,468 
(71.88) 
Commodity 
Donation 
1,902,877,321 
(33.48) 
4,876,590,059 
(70.79) 
4,373,734,577 
(53.10) 
2,069,344,550 
(34.21) 
895,738,321 
(10.12) 
2,149,276,366 
(28.12) 
Sum 5,683,006,351 
(100) 
6,888,750,657 
(100) 
8,236,517,838 
(100) 
6,046,931,008 
(100) 
8,854,857,970 
(100) 
7,642,042,834 
(100) 
 
Note: 1) Figures in the brackets are the percentages of each funding source. 
 
Source: Youn, The funding capacityof KSM from 2002 to 2007,KSM, 2010. 
 
 
Table 4.5 The Percentages of Government Funding among the Overall Korean Sharing  
Movement’s Administrative Budget during the Roh Moo-Hyun 
Administration from 2003 to 2007 (Korean Won) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Overall 
Administrative 
Budget 
376,281,042 365,788,900 409,871,875 462,387,851 461,218,910 
Government 
Funding 1) 3,000,000 71,867,321 77,965,685 62,111,084 90,968,790 
2) 
Percentages of 
Government 
Funding 
0.80 19.65 19.02 13.43 19.72 
 
Note: 1) These figures are reproduced by the author based on Article 9, Section 2 of the Rules of 
Implementation of Humanitarian Assistance to North Korea that stipulates the NGO is able to expend 5 
per cent of funding received from the government for the organisation’s administrative purpose.; 2) This 
figure is applied to 8 per cent based on the Rules of Implementation of Humanitarian Assistance to North 
Korea amended in 14 March 2007. 
 
Source: Youn, The funding capacity of KSM from 2002 to 2007, KSM, 2010.; Ministry of Unification, 
Indojeokchawonui Daebukjiwonsaeob Cheorie Gwanhan Gyujeong[English Translation: The Rules of 
Implementation of Humanitarian Assistance to North Korea]. Seoul: Ministry of Unification, 1999; 
Ministry of Unification, Indojeokchawonui Daebukjiwonsaeob Cheorie Gwanhan Gyujeong[English 
Translation: The Rules of Implementation of Humanitarian Assistance to North Korea]. Seoul: Ministry 
of Unification, 2007. 
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increased to roughly 3,977 million won and in 2006 it peaked at about 7,959 million 
won. 
After its peak in 2006, cash donations in 2007 decreased to about 5,492 million 
won. As the Roh Moo-Hyun administration took measures increasing the percentage of 
administration among the raised funds, from 2 per cent to 15 per cent on 24 March 2006, 
the actual scale of the administrative budget available for the KSM increased 
considerably.  
As shown in Table 5.5, the Roh administration increased financial support for 
humanitarian NGOs and the KSM received a substantial amount of the Inter-Korean 
Cooperation Fund. From 2003 to 2007 government funding accounted for an average of 
12.01 per cent per year of the entire KSM funding.61 In absolute terms, government 
funding of the KSM increased to around 5,435 million won during the Roh 
administration.62 It increased by 2.64 times compared to about 2,062 million won that 
was available during the Kim Dae-Jung administration. 63  During the Roh 
administration, government funding covered around 14.52 per cent of the overall 
administrative budget of the KSM. With another deregulation which increased the 
administrative budget from 5 per cent to 8 per cent on 14 March 2007, the KSM’s 
budgetary reliance on government funding increased to 19.72 per cent in 2007.64 
 
 
4.2.3 The Expertise of the Korean Sharing Movement 
 
NGO expertise can be evaluated through the analyses of organisational structure, actual 
NGO performance and assessment of outcomes. Organisational structure shapes the 
200 
ground level of organisational expertise. How such ground level of organisational 
expertise shapes actual NGO expertise and performance can be understood through the 
examination of the overall advocacy of the NGO. This section examines the 
organisational structure of the KSM that shaped the ground level of organisational 
expertise. The actual NGO expertise in exploiting various tactics of information, symbol, 
leverage and networking will be examined in the next substantive chapters. 
     Organisational structure can be understood through the analyses of the overall 
structure, divisions, expertise of each division and coordination of the overall structure 
and divisions. This section demonstrates that, from 1995 to 2007,under the challenging 
economic and political environment, the KSM gradually improved its organisational 
expertise. By the end of the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, the KSM maintained the 
highest level of organisational expertise. 
 
 
The Expertise of the Korean Sharing Movement during the Kim Young-Sam  
Administration 
 
In 1996 and 1997, the KSM’s organisational structure was not yet stabilised nor 
developed. The KSM nonetheless had a unique organisational structure which appointed 
social and political elders representing various circles and groups in South Korean civil 
society to the important positions in the KSM. This unique organisational structure 
enabled the KSM to encompass all of South Korean civil society for the advocacy of 
food aid to North Korea. 
To encourage the participation of the overall civil society actors, the KSM 
appointed religious leaders, NGO personnel, scholars, elder statesmen and congressmen 
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to board-level positions. The KSM had a total of ninety-five positions at the board level 
playing a symbolic function representing the KSM, five executive personnel and around 
ten staff in the administration office.65 At the board level, the KSM had positions of 
three senior advisors, four executive representatives, 29 co-representatives, one chair 
and four vice-chairs of the central committee and 54 members of the National Assembly 
Advisory Committee.66 At the administrative level, the KSM had one chair and one co-
chair of the executive committee, one secretary-general, one director of the executive 
office, one external accountant and around ten administration staff.67 
With regard to divisions, the KSM’s administration office was a single division 
until the establishment of a Planning Division in 1997. In 1996, the founders of the 
KSM perceived the advocacy of food aid to North Korea as a temporary movement.68 
The KSM was considered as a temporary organisation mandated to steer the advocacy 
of food aid to North Korea and to promote the participation of civil society actors in the 
advocacy. As the fact that the North Korean food deficit was not a temporary but a 
chronic problem became known to the international community in late 1996 and 1997, 
the founders of the KSM recognised the need for the establishment of an organisation 
which was able to coordinate the overall advocacy on a permanent basis. The KSM 
thereby established the position of a Planning Officer in the administration office in 
1997to strengthen the function of coordination.69 
With regard to the expertise of each division, the administration office had 
expertise to organise nationwide advocacy encompassing the overall civil society actors. 
Considering the weak organisational ground of the KSM between 1996 and 1997, the 
expertise of NGO personnel in the administration office was a key factor determining 
the KSM’s organisational expertise. The chair and co-chair of the Executive Committee, 
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the Secretary-General and the Director of the Executive Office of the KSM were the key 
personnel who had a wide human and organisational network, expertise in the civil 
society movement and administrative capacity. The board members of the KSM were 
the personnel who were highly motivated by the inevitability of humanitarian food aid 
to North Korean compatriots. These personnel who had a strong motivation and 
expertise in the civil society movement provided solid organisational expertise in the 
advocacy of food aid to North Korea.  
In regard to the coordination of the overall structure and divisions, the KSM 
provided a successful function of coordination. At the internal level, its board members 
and administration staff were mutually collaborative and maintained strong solidarity. 
The high level of mutual collaboration among members and staff was attributable to the 
constitution of its personnel consisting of religious leaders, elder NGO personnel, 
scholars and elder statesmen who were highly motivated by a strong humanitarianism.70 
In addition to such a normative factor, KSM staff and executive personnel in the 
administration office already had expertise to coordinate the advocacy through many 
years of civil society movements. As the severity of North Korean food crisis became 
better known to the international community in 1996, the founders of the KSM 
recognised the importance of its coordination of the advocacy of food aid to North 
Korea. By establishing the position of a Planning Officer in 1997, the KSM 
strengthened the function of coordination in the administration office.71 
 
 
The Expertise of the Korean Sharing Movement during the Kim Dae-Jung 
Administration 
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During the Kim Dae-Jung administration, the KSM began to stabilise its organisational 
structure by restructuring it to a function-centred structure and division. The KSM 
improved its issue-specific expertise by establishing issue-specific committees and 
divisions and by appointing experienced experts to these new positions. It sought to 
strengthen coordination of the overall structure and divisions by strengthening the 
function of the Planning and Coordination Division and assigning more administration 
staff.  
The KSM gradually improved its organisational efficiency by restructuring its 
board-level positions and administration office from a personnel-centred structure to a 
function-centred structure. During the Kim Young-Sam administration the KSM’s 
organisational structure was a personnel-centred structure which appointed key 
personnel to the important positions of organisation, and the rest of staff supported these 
key personnel. Through the gradual structural adjustment after 1998, however, the KSM 
sought to change such a personnel-centred structure to a function-centred structure and 
division. In 1998, it removed the central committee at the board level and instead put in 
place the three positions of the Chair of the Planning Committee, the Chair of the 
Organising Committee and the Chair of the Committee for Overseas Korean Issues. The 
KSM appointed the three Co-representatives who only played a symbolic role within 
these positions.72 In 1999, the KSM again removed the two positions of the Chair of the 
Planning Committee and the Chair of the Organising Committee. It instead strengthened 
the authority of the Head of the Planning Division in the administration office, changing 
the name of division from the Head of Planning Division to the Head of Planning and 
Coordination Division. During the year of 1999 the KSM also established the position 
of the Policy Committee at the board level and two positions of the head and vice-head 
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of the Policy Division at the administrative level. The KSM strengthened its role as a 
civil think tank mandated to produce policy recommendations in relation to the 
advocacy of and the humanitarian assistance to North Korea. It, in addition, founded 
two new positions, the Head of Advocacy and Research Division and the Head of 
General Affairs Division, in the same year.73 Despite the existence of official positions 
and personnel, however, the tasks of the general administrative staff were not clearly 
defined until 2001. In 2001, the KSM at last established four divisions of Planning and 
Coordination, Inter-Korean Cooperation Project, Education and Advocacy and Overseas 
Korean Issues under the Secretary General of the KSM.74 Administrative staff were 
assigned to these divisions based on their expertise and personal interests. In doing so, 
KSM staff finally came to have defined tasks according to their division.  
The KSM improved its expertise in relation to advocacy and broadened the 
organisational network by putting in place new positions in the organisational structure. 
Recruitment of new personnel who represented differing groups or circles and who had 
expertise in specific issue areas implicated that the organisation recruiting those 
personnel was able to exploit the expertise and networks of the recruited personnel for 
their own purposes. In 1999, the KSM established the position of the Executive 
Committee.75 By appointing personnel from business and political circles and interest 
groups, it encouraged these circles and groups to participate in the advocacy. In 2000, 
the KSM established the Kwangjoo-Jeonnam Korean Sharing Movement in the local 
province of Kwangjoo. The KSM appointed local personnel to the positions of senior 
advisor, executive representative and co-representative of the Kwangjoo-Jeonnam 
branch. It also put in place an independent administration office for it.76 To encourage 
the participation of business circles, the KSM established six positions in the 
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Supervising Committee at the board level, and appointed personnel from the business 
circles. In 2001, the members of the Supervising Committee increased to eleven.77 By 
establishing new positions and branches, the KSM improved its organisational expertise 
in advocacy and networking.  
The KSM improved its issue-specific expertise by establishing issue-specific 
committees and divisions within the board-level committee and administration office. It 
established the Policy Committee in 1999 and appointed academically outstanding 
researchers and scholars from government institutes, academia and civil think tanks to 
the position of the Policy Committee. These appointed scholars and researchers had 
expertise in inter-Korean relations and humanitarian and development aid. The 
personnel, who mostly engaged in the government food and humanitarian aid policy-
making process through various channels, are as follows: Jong-Suk Lee, the 32nd 
Unification Minister from February to December 2006, Keum-Soon Lee, Sung-Ho Je 
and Hyeong-Jung Park, researchers from the Korea Institution for National Unification 
(KINU) which is a government institute for inter-Korean issues and unification, Won-
Hyeok Lim, a researcher from the Korea Development Institute (KDI), Cheol-Young 
Choi, a senior researcher from the Korea Legislation Research Institute, Professor Dae-
Suk Choi of Dongguk University, Professor Young-Soo Kim of Sogang University and 
Jong-Hoon Lee, a researcher from the Congress Research and Analysis Bureau.78 The 
KSM appointed health and medical experts to the positions in the Headquarters for 
Health and Medical Cooperation in 2000. The personnel, who were mostly doctors and 
experts in the health and medical community in South Korea, also contributed to the 
improvement of the KSM’s expertise in the health and medical cooperation between the 
two Koreas.79 By putting in place the positions of the Policy Committee in the 
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organisational structure and appointing experts to this position, the KSM improved the 
organisational expertise in policy research and recommendation in relation to the 
advocacy and delivery of assistance to North Korea.80 
The KSM gradually strengthened the function of coordination among divisions. 
As the KSM diversified its mandates and projects from 1999, its organisational structure 
became subdivided and administration staff also increased from around 10 in 1998 to 17 
in 2001.81 As such organisational expansion and subdivision became more apparent 
during the part of the Kim Dae-Jung administration, coordination of the overall 
structure among divisions became more important. The KSM gradually strengthened the 
position of the Head of the Planning Division which had been established in 1997. In 
1999, it gave the authority for coordination to the Head of the Planning Division, 
changing the official title to the Head of Planning and Coordination. The KSM 
additionally founded the position of Vice-head of the Planning Division.82 In 2001, the 
KSM put the Planning and Coordination Division at the highest position in the structure 
of the administration office. It also strengthened the function of coordination by 
assigning four administration staff to the Planning and Coordination Division.83 
 
 
The Expertise of the Korean Sharing Movement during the Roh Moo-Hyun  
Administration 
 
During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, the KSM established new committees at the 
board level in order to strengthen its role in advocacy, civil participation, policy 
research and development. It strengthened the function and expertise of each division by 
dividing the existing four administrative divisions into five divisions and two centres 
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according to its function. In doing so, the KSM was able to maintain the highest level of 
organisational expertise in the advocacy and the delivery of humanitarian and 
development aid to North Korea.  
The KSM established new committees at the board level in order to strengthen 
policy research and development, their advocacy role and civil participation. On 26 
November 2003 it established the Centre for Peace Sharing merging the previous two 
Policy Executive Committees to strengthen policy research and development.84 The 
Centre for Peace Sharing contributed to broadening the KSM’s expert networking 
providing scholars, researchers in government and civil think tanks, and government 
officials with the opportunity to share their expertise and intelligence through periodic 
policy forums. The KSM also set up three committees of Civil Participation, Public 
Relations and Editing, and the Vision of 2010 Korean Compatriots at the board level to 
strengthen the advocacy role and encourage the public to participate in the advocacy of 
humanitarian and development assistance to North Korea.85 The Vision of 2010 Korean 
Compatriots Committee was founded to promote inter-Korean exchange and 
cooperation in social and cultural areas. On 13 September 2007 the KSM established 
the Busan-Kyungnam Korean Sharing Movement at the end of the Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration. It was easy for the KSM to establish a local branch in Kwangjoo-
Jeonnam province due to an already established positive disposition towards pro inter-
Korean exchange and cooperation. By establishing the Busan-Kyungnam Korean 
Sharing Movement, the KSM at last prepared regional ground from which it was able to 
expand its advocacy to the Busan-Kyungnam region.  
The KSM strengthened a function-centred structure and division, expanding the 
existing four divisions to five and two centres. In 2001, for the first time the KSM 
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established four clear-cut divisions of Planning and Coordination, the Inter-Korean 
Cooperation Project, Education and Advocacy and Overseas Korean Issues under the 
Secretary General. From 2003 to 2007 in the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, the KSM 
transferred the function of planning and coordination to the Secretary General, the Vice-
Secretary General and the Executive Committee, closing the Planning and Coordination 
Division.86 In 2003, the KSM transferred a part of the planning function, which had 
been entirely allocated to the Planning and Coordination Division, to the Centre for 
Peace Sharing that was newly established. The KSM subdivided the Inter-Korean 
Cooperation Project Division into two divisions. The division of the Inter-Korean 
Cooperation Project I was mandated to manage the inter-Korean ago-livestock 
cooperation. The division of Inter-Korean Cooperation Project II was mandated to 
manage inter-Korean health and medical cooperation. The KSM also subdivided the 
Education and Advocacy Division into the Resource Development Team and the 
Human Resource Development Centre. The Resource Development Team took charge 
of advocacy and membership management. The Human Resource Development Centre 
was mandated to develop human resource development in North Korea. The Centre for 
Peace Sharing also took charge of the education of South Korean civil society. The 
overseas Korean Issues Division was maintained. Two teams of General Affairs and 
Accounting were newly established to manage the general affairs of the administrative 
office and the funding capacity of the KSM.  
The expertise of the division during the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, a 
function-centred division that was adopted at the end of the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration contributed to the improvement of divisional expertise. During the Roh 
Moo-Hyun administration the total number of administration staff decreased from 17 in 
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2001 to 15 in 2006.87 By maintaining a function-centred structure and division system, 
the KSM assured that each division was able to accumulate divisional expertise. The 
establishment of the Centre for Peace Sharing also contributed to the improvement of 
divisional expertise by promoting knowledge exchange between expert groups and the 
divisions of the KSM.88 
KSM closed the Planning and Coordination Division and transferred the 
function of planning and coordination to the Secretary General, the Vice-secretary 
General, the Executive Committee and the Centre for Peace Sharing. The closure of the 
Planning and Coordination Division was attributable to the decrease of administrative 
staff and the emphasis on pragmatism in restructuring the organisational structure of the 
KSM to a project-centred division. The KSM transferred the function of planning and 
coordination to the executive officers. It established the position of Vice-secretary 
General under the Secretary General. Through the amendment of the rules and 
regulations the KSM changed the management of the Executive Committee, which has 
authority to deliberate and make overall decisions on the issues of the KSM, to be more 
realistic and practical. In 2004, the KSM amended the number in the Executive 
Committee, from 30 personnel among the members of the Executive Committee,89 to 5 
executive personnel who represented the major projects of the KSM.90 By changing the 
frequency of the executive meetings from monthly to every other month, the KSM 
improved the practicality of the management of the Executive Committee. In doing so, 
it strengthened the function of the Executive Committee in the coordination of the 
overall structure and divisions. The Centre for Peace Sharing took over some of the 
planning within the KSM. By organising periodic expert forums, the Centre for Peace 
Sharing played a role in the development of new policies and projects and the 
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improvement of the existing inter-Korean exchange and cooperation.91 Such roles of 
the Centre for Peace Sharing replaced the planning function of the previous Planning 
and Coordination Division. 
 
 
4.3 The Organisational Capacity of Good Friends 
 
Using the identical analytical framework which is employed in the examination of the 
organisational capacity of the Korean Sharing Movement, this section demonstrates 
how and why the specific organisational mandates, funding capacity and expertise of 
Good Friends combined to permit Good Friends to exert influence over South Korean 
government food aid policy.  
     Until the end of 1998, Good Friends adhered to a single mandate, which was to 
relieve the food crisis in North Korea. After the inauguration of President Kim Dae-
Jung, Good Friends began to diversify its mandate. Such diversification between 1999 
and 2003 consequently resulted in the weakening of the Good Friends’ original 
humanitarian mandate. In 2003, Good Friends attempted to strengthen its humanitarian 
mandate, resuming active advocacy from 2004 and 2006. During this period, however, 
Good Friends’ commitment to the advocacy movement was occasional and secondary. 
From the end of 2006, however, Good Friends resumed its full advocacy movement 
urging the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to provide additional food aid to North Korea. 
This chapter next demonstrates that throughout the entire period of advocacy of food aid 
to North Korea from 1996 to 2007, Good Friends’ unique funding structure, as one of 
the Jungto Society-affiliated organisations, enabled them to keep their independent 
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voice and adhere to an advocacy role free from the influence of funding sources, such as 
the South Korean government and the corporate sector. Lastly, it demonstrates that 
throughout the 12 years of the advocacy movement from 1996 to 2007, Good Friends 
improved its expertise in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea, but such expertise 
mainly came from individual personnel, rather than the organisational structure. Good 
Friends maintained a personnel-centred structure, in which a few founders of Good 
Friends continued to play an overarching management role. Such distinctive 
characteristics enabled Good Friends to maintain the relatively high level of 
organisational expertise in relation to advocacy despite the downsizing of the 
organisational structure of Good Friends from its peak at the beginning of the Kim Dae-
Jung administration in 1998. 
This section uses anniversary reports, white papers and interviews with Good 
Friends personnel. The anniversary reports and white papers provide the rules and 
regulations that stipulate the organisational mandates.92 It also uses interviews with 
Good Friends personnel.93 For the examination of Good Friends funding capacity, it 
mainly uses internal materials and annual reports from Good Friends and government 
archives. Good Friends was reluctant to open their accounting to the public and 
researchers for the organisation’s internal reasons. Based on a telephone interview with 
Good Friends personnel and government archives showing the list of NGOs that 
received government financial support from 2000 to 2007,94 it examines the funding 
capacity of Good Friends and its reliance on government funding. Good Friends 
published a ‘10 year Foundation Anniversary Report’, other periodic newsletters and 
reports do not include the details of organisational features or human resource 
management. To examine the organisational structure and the human resource 
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management of Good Friends, this section therefore uses the data from interviews with 
An-Sook Jung, the former Secretary General of Good Friends and other personnel from 
Good Friends.95 
The first part examines the mandates of Good Friends and how and why they 
changed during each administration. The second part examines the funding capacity of 
Good Friends. The third part examines organisational expertise through an analysis of 
changes in organisational structure. In the analyses of the funding capacity and expertise, 
however, the second and third parts do not follow a chronology by administration due to 
the lack of reliable sources on the funding capacity and the organisational expertise of 
Good Friends. 
 
 
4.3.1 The Mandates of Good Friends 
 
This section demonstrates that until the end of 1998, Good Friends adhered to a single 
mandate to relieve the food crisis in North Korea. Between 1999 and 2003, Good 
Friends diversified its mandates to the issues of North Korean human rights, defectors 
over the Chinese-Korean border and the reunification movement. Such diversification 
resulted in the weakening of Good Friends’ mandate to relieve the food crisis in North 
Korea. Following the continued weakening of the humanitarian mandate, Good Friends 
then attempted to strengthen it again. Between 2004 and 2006, Good Friends resumed 
active advocacy of food aid to North Korea. During this period, however, Good Friends’ 
commitment to advocacy was occasional and secondary. At the end of 2006, Good 
Friends recognised the high possibility of a recurrence of the North Korean food crisis. 
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Throughout 2007 Good Friends engaged in advocacy that pressurised the Roh Moo-
Hyun administration to provide additional food aid to North Korea. 
 
 
The Mandate of Good Friends during the Kim Young-Sam Administration 
 
From 1995, Good Friends maintained a single mandate to relieve the humanitarian crisis 
in North Korea. Between 1995 and 1996, the Jungto Society, which was a Buddhist 
ascetic exercise organisation, and other Buddhist organisations recognised the need for a 
more active role in Buddhist circles in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea, but this 
recognition was not realised until the establishment of the Korean Buddhist Sharing 
Movement (KBSM) on 12 December 1996. In 1995 and 1996 the Jungto Society, which 
emphasised individual ascetic exercise and the role of Buddhists in civil society, 
engaged in the advocacy, prompting the Kim Young-Sam administration and South 
Korean civil society in fundraising campaigns. In 1995 and 1996, Buddhist circles also 
engaged in the establishment of the Korean Sharing Movement (KSM) replacing the 
Inter-religious Committee on June 1996.96 Upon taking the position of Co-director of 
the Executive Committee of the KSM in particular, Revd Beobryun contributed to 
strengthening the KSM’s status as a collaborative network encompassing major 
religious groups and civil society organisations. At the end of 1996, 33 Buddhist 
organisations including the Jungto Society recognised the need for an advocacy NGO 
committed to relieving the food crisis in North Korea. On 12 December 1996, they 
finally founded the Korean Buddhist Sharing Movement (KBSM), the predecessor of 
Good Friends. After the establishment of the KBSM, it adhered to a single mandate to 
214 
relieve the food crisis in North Korea. Under the negative socio-political environment, 
which resulted from North Korea’s military actions and negative response to South 
Korea’s rice assistance in 1995, the KBSM recognised the need for active and religion-
driven advocacy which was able to proselytise the Kim Young-Sam administration and 
South Korean civil society to change their negative view on the provision of food aid to 
North Korea.97 The KBSM committed to enhance public awareness about the severity 
of the North Korean food crisis, so that South Korean civil society would take action to 
provide humanitarian assistance to North Korea. Under a single mandate to relieve the 
food crisis in North Korea in 1997, The KBSM consistently adhered to its mandate to 
advocate food aid to North Korea, and this strong mandate was a motivation which 
Good Friends was able to extend in its most active advocacy in 1997. 
 
 
The Mandate of Good Friends during the Kim Dae-Jung Administration 
 
Until the end of 1998, Good Friends adhered to a single mandate to relieve the food 
crisis in North Korea. Between 1999 and 2002, Good Friends diversified its mandates to 
include the issues of North Korean human rights, defectors over the Chinese-Korean 
border and the reunification movement. Such diversification resulted in the weakening 
of Good Friends’ mandate to relieve the food crisis in North Korea. 
In 1998, the first year of the Kim Dae-Jung administration, the KBSM, the 
predecessor of Good Friends, still had in place its mandate to relieve the food crisis in 
North Korea and focused on pressing the Kim Dae-Jung administration. Although the 
Kim Dae-Jung administration was more pro food aid to North Korea than the Kim 
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Young-Sam administration, the Kim Dae-Jung administration had a lukewarm policy on 
food aid to North Korea. This was attributable to the situation in which the Kim Dae-
Jung administration had not yet established its policy towards North Korea. Given this 
operational environment, the KBSM recognised the necessity for continued advocacy 
prompting the Kim Dae-Jung administration to establish a policy more favourable to the 
provision of large-scale food aid to North Korea.98 In 1998, the KBSM therefore 
committed to a single mandate to advocate food aid to North Korea. 
       Between 1999 and 2002,the KBSM diversified its mandates to various North 
Korea-related issues changing its name to Good Friends. Such diversification resulted in 
the weakening of Good Friends’ fundamental mandate to relieve the food crisis in North 
Korea. In 1999, the fact that the severity of the North Korean food crisis was relieved 
after its peak at the end of 1997 became known to the international community. The 
Kim Dae-Jung administration adopted a policy that strengthened the role of the 
government in inter-Korean exchange and cooperation, as well as the provision of food 
and other humanitarian assistance to North Korea. In May 1999, under these changes, 
The KBSM expanded its single mandate to relieve the humanitarian crisis in North 
Korea to various North Korea-related issues.99 Good Friends committed to a movement 
for North Korean defectors at the Korean-Chinese border and their human rights.100 In 
2000, Good Friends engaged in the unification movement.101 Good Friends expanded 
its mandate to a movement for the Korean-Chinese victims of South Korean fraud at the 
Korean-Chinese border and a peace movement opposing the development of a Missile 
Defence System on the Korean peninsula.102 In 2002, the last year of the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration, Good Friends narrowed down its mandate to the unification 
movement.103 Such diversification of organisational mandates between 1999 and 2002 
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hence resulted in the weakening of Good Friends’ mandate to relieve the food crisis in 
North Korea. 
 
 
The Mandate of Good Friends during the Roh Moo-Hyun Administration 
 
After the continued weakening of the humanitarian mandate between 1999 and 2003, 
Good Friends attempted to strengthen its humanitarian mandate, extending active 
advocacy between 2004 and 2006. During this period, however, Good Friends’ 
commitment to the advocacy was occasional and secondary. 
In 2003, the first year of the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, the weakening of 
the Good Friends’ humanitarian mandate continued. Under the establishment of the Roh 
Moo-Hyun government which encouraged the provision of large-scale government food 
aid to North Korea, the advocacy that proselytised the government to provide food aid 
to North Korea was no longer necessary. Given the operational environment in 2003, 
Good Friends mainly engaged in the unification and human rights movement and hence 
the advocacy of humanitarian food aid to North Korea was a secondary. 
In 2004, although Good Friends resumed its mandate to advocate the provision 
of humanitarian food aid to North Korea, it was a temporary and occasional one for 
Good Friends. In February 2004, Good Friends framed the food crisis in North Korea’s 
violation of human rights, through the publication of the report ‘Human Rights in North 
Korea and The Food Crisis.’104 Good Friends sought to improve public awareness of 
the recurrence of the food crisis in North Korea. In April 2004, it also pressurised the 
United Nations Human Rights Committee to take action to resolve the North Korean 
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food crisis.105 After the occurrence of the humanitarian disaster of the Ryongcheon 
Station Explosion on 22 April, Good Friends actively engaged in fundraising for 
humanitarian assistance to the North Korean victims and advocacy urging the Roh 
Moo-Hyun administration to provide humanitarian assistance,106 but it was a temporary 
movement responding to the incidents of the humanitarian disaster in 2004.  
Between 2005 and 2006, under the unfavourable operational environment for the 
provision of food aid to North Korea, Good Friends engaged in advocacy encouraging 
the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to provide government-level food aid to North Korea, 
but it still was an occasional and secondary mandate for Good Friends. Negative 
political incidents, such as the second Bush administration’s hostile policy towards 
North Korea in 2005 and North Korea’s missile and nuclear test in 2006, resulted in the 
suspension of the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s food aid. A flood in 2006 further 
resulted in severe damage in food production in North Korea. Under this operational 
environment, Good Friends continued to engage in the joint advocacy of food aid to 
North Korea. Good Friends’ engagement in advocacy, however, was indirect through 
the NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea, rather than an active role in 
organising the advocacy of humanitarian food aid to North Korea. During this period of 
2005 and 2006, Good Friends’ major mandate was still the unification movement.107 
At the end of 2006, Good Friends recognised the high possibility of a recurrence 
of the North Korean food crisis. Under this recognition, Good Friends resumed 
advocacy that pushed the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to provide additional food aid 
to North Korea. On 26 December 2006, Good Friends began to strengthen its 
fundamental mandate to relieve the food crisis in North Korea, informing the South 
Korean civil society of the likelihood of the recurrence of a food crisis in North Korean 
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2007 at the conference titled ‘The North Korean Food Crisis, a Recurrence?’108 After 
this conference, Good Friends consistently sought to enhance public awareness about 
the likelihood of the recurrence of the food crisis in North Korea.109 
In mid-2007 when the actual victims of food deficits began to increase in North 
Korea, Good Friends further strengthened its organisational mandate to advocate food 
aid to North Korea and increased its advocacy activities. Given this strong mandate, 
Good Friends resumed various advocacy activities, such as issuing web-magazine 
providing information on the increase of famine victims in North Korea and fundraising 
for North Korean famine victims which was suspended with the establishment of the 
Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administrations.110 
 
 
4.3.2 The Funding Capacity of Good Friends 
 
Throughout the entire period of advocacy from 1996 to 2007, the funding of Good 
Friends was not sufficient, due to its limited organisational capability to improve its 
funding source and scale. Despite this poor funding capacity, Good Friends’ unique 
funding source, as one of the Jungto Society-affiliated organisations, enabled Good 
Friends to keep their independent voice and adhere to its advocacy role which was free 
from the influence of funding organisations. 
The main reason that Good Friends was not able to improve its funding capacity 
was that since its establishment, Good Friends consistently engaged in advocacies, such 
as food aid to North Korea, North Korean human rights and defectors, and the 
reunification movement. Good Friends’ strong adherence to these advocacies needed 
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less financial support from the general public, the corporate sector and the South Korean 
government compared to the KSM’s direct humanitarian and development assistance to 
North Korea. In May 1999, Good Friends expanded its mandate and major programmes 
but still remained as an advocacy NGO promoting the issues of food aid to North Korea, 
North Korean human rights and defectors, and the reunification movement. In 1999, 
Good Friends entrusted the delivery of direct humanitarian and development assistance 
to North Korea to the Joint Together Society (JTS), one of the Jungto Society-affiliated 
organisations. 
 
 
Table 4.6 Government Funding for Good Friends from 2000 to 2007 (Thousand Korean 
 won) 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Government 
Funding 1) 66,000 43,000 · · 20,000 17,000 · 24,000 
 
Note: 1) The Kim Dae-Jung administration adopted ‘Non-profit Organisation Support Act’ on 16 
December 1999. Based on this act the South Korean civil society organisations including the 
humanitarian NGOs received the government financial support since 2000.   
 
Source: Ministry of Public Administration and Security, 2007 Biyoungrimingandanche 
Gongikhwaldongjiwonsaeob Seonjungnaeyeok [English Translation: The List of Non-profit Organisations 
that chosen the beneficiary of Government Support in the fiscal year 2007], Seoul: Ministry of Public 
Administration and Security, 2007.; Ministry of Public Administration and Security, 2000 Mingandanche 
Bojogeum Jiwon Naeyeok [English Translation: Government Financial Support for NGOs], Seoul: 
Ministry of Public Administration and Security, 2006.  
 
 
     In contrast to other South Korean humanitarian NGOs which were able to 
increase their funding capacity by diversifying their mandates and programmes to direct 
humanitarian and development assistance to North Korea, Good Friends consistently 
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adhered to the advocacy activities which received less financial support from the 
general public, corporate bodies and the South Korean government. Since the South 
Korean government began to provide financial support for NGO projects in 2000, for 
instance, Good Friends only received a total of 170,000,000 won in eight years from 
2000 to 2007.111 The legal basis for government financial support of Good Friends’ 
projects was not ‘The Rules of Implementation of Humanitarian Assistance to North 
Korea’, a major basis of government funding for the KSM and other humanitarian 
NGOs. The ‘Non-profit Organisation Support Act’ enacted to support civil society 
organisations on 16 December 1999, instead, was the only legal basis of government 
funding for Good Friends projects.  
Good Friends was one of the Jungto Society-affiliated organisations and was 
driven by a strong religious motivation based on Buddhism. The organisational 
structure and the religious motivation, both in terms of organisational structure and 
personnel levels, were enough to sustain the standing of Good Friends. Maintaining a 
close organisational relationship with the Jungto Society, Good Friends relied on human 
resource and material supports from them. The staff of Good Friends were all Buddhists 
working on a voluntary basis,112 driven by a strong religious motivation. The Jungto 
Society provided free board and accommodation for them in return.113 In regard to 
other organisational expenditures, Good Friends used the building of the Jungto Society 
another small amount of administrative costs were fulfilled by public donations through 
the Good Friends’ website or street fundraising.114 
       Since Good Friends and its staff were free from financial burden, Good Friends 
did not have a strong motivation to improve its funding capacity.115 Due to the 
limitation of available data on the funding capacity of Good Friends, it is difficult to 
221 
examine any changes made. In contrast to the KSM which achieved significant 
organisation development since 1996through the improvement in funding capacity, 
Good Friends was mostly reliant on small-scale public donations, such as membership 
fees and street fundraising.116 During the same period of 1996 to 2007, as a result, 
Good Friends was not able to achieve organisational development for sufficient and 
more effective advocacy. During the early years of Good Friends from 1996 until 2000, 
around 30 personnel, except for the President Revd Beobryun, worked for Good Friends, 
and then the number of full time staff gradually decreased. Around 2007, the full time 
staff of Good Friends decreased to around six personnel.117 
     Due to the distinctive funding capacity above, Good Friends was free from over-
reliance on a single funding source and therefore was able to maintain its critical voice 
in proselytising the South Korean government and civil society to take action to relieve 
the food crisis in North Korea. Good Friends’ unique funding capacity, as one of the 
Jungto Society-affiliated organisations and its organisational characteristics driven by a 
strong religious motivation, enabled Good Friends to keep its independent voice and 
adhere to its advocacy role, free from the influences of funding organisations, mainly 
the South Korean government. During the entire period from 1995 to 2007, 
consequently, negative political and military actions, such as North Korea’s missile 
launch and nuclear test in 2006, made it difficult for the South Korean humanitarian 
NGOs to criticise the South Korean government’s policy which suspended food aid to 
North Korea because they were highly reliant on government funding. Good Friends, 
however, was able to advocate strongly, pressing the South Korean government and 
civil society to resume the provision of humanitarian food aid to North Korea, 
irrespective of political and military incidents.  
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4.3.3 The Expertise of Good Friends 
 
Throughout the 12 years from 1996 to 2007, Good Friends improved its expertise in the 
advocacy of humanitarian food aid to North Korea, but the expertise of Good Friends 
mainly came from individual personnel, rather than the organisational structure. Good 
Friends maintained a personnel-centred structure in which a few founders continued to 
play an overarching management role. In contrast to other humanitarian NGOs which 
generally developed their organisational structure and expertise, the organisational 
structure of Good Friends became downsized after its peak at the beginning of the Kim 
Dae-Jung administration in 1998. The individual expertise of key personnel thereby 
shaped the organisational expertise of Good Friends.  
In 1996, Good Friends was founded with a function-centred structure and 
divisions. The major reason that Good Friends was able to establish such subdivided 
divisions in the early stages of its establishment was that it was free from the financial 
burden of administration, in particular salaries.118 The full time administrative staff of 
Good Friends did not receive any salary, as they were Buddhist who were fully 
motivated by the inevitability of humanitarian assistance to North Korean compatriots 
and Buddhism. From the establishment in 1996 until mid-2000 Good Friends was able 
to maintain seven divisions of Finance, Accounting, Planning and Coordination, 
Research and Analysis, Overseas Projects, General Affairs and Public Relations.119 
Based on the function-centred structure and divisions from 1996 until mid-1999, Good 
Friends extended its most active and influential advocacy. 
In 1999 and 2000, as the severity of the North Korean food crisis was relieved, 
the function-centred structure and divisions of Good Friends began to be replaced by a 
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personnel-centred structure. Changes in the operational environment in which Good 
Friends worked, resulted in the downsizing of its organisational structure. In 2000 the 
incident where four Good Friends personnel working at the Korean-Chinese border 
were detained by the Chinese government gave the momentum for Good Friends to 
reconsider its fundamental organisational objective.120 As the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh 
Moo-Hyun administrations took the position of pro food and humanitarian and 
development assistance to North Korea, the need for advocacy to pressurise the 
government to take humanitarian action decreased. Given such changes in the 
operational environment, the status and function of the Korean Joint Together Society 
(JTS), which was an affiliated NGO of Good Friend sand was mandated to deliver 
humanitarian and development assistance to North Korea, became more important. The 
role of Good Friends as an advocacy NGO, on the other hand, became relatively smaller. 
Good Friends thereby diversified its mandates to assistance to North Korean defectors, 
North Korean human rights, a peaceful unification movement and assistance to a North 
Korean defectors’ settlement in South Korea. In contrast to the KSM which was able to 
develop its organisational structure through the diversification of organisational 
mandates and projects, the diversification of Good Friends’ organisational mandate and 
projects resulted in a decline in its organisational structure.  
       In regard to the expertise of each division, despite the function-centred 
structure and divisions in the early stages of Good Friends, each division lacked 
divisional expertise, due to the qualifications of the personnel working for each division. 
Most administrative personnel were recruited from volunteer Buddhist believers 
therefore they lacked expertise in the divisional tasks.121 These personnel, instead, 
improved their expertise through learning by doing since its engagement in advocacy in 
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1996. From May 1999 until the diversification of the Good Friends mandates, each 
division actively engaged in their own tasks of research and analysis, fundraising, 
policy development and recommendation, and the advocacy of humanitarian food aid to 
North Korea. In doing so, each division was able to accumulate divisional expertise. 
After the diversification of organisational mandates, however, the organisational 
structure of Good Friends began to shrink and it facilitated the reformation from a 
function-centred structure and division to a personnel-centred structure. During the Roh 
Moo-Hyun administration, the previous function-centred structure and division of Good 
Friends collapsed except for the Research and Analysis Division.122 Only this Division 
was maintained and continued to carry out the research and analysis project on the 
North Korean food crisis. 
Lastly, in regard to the coordination of the overall structure and divisions, the 
President and other key personnel of Good Friends had authority in the coordination of 
the overall structure and projects.123 There was a Planning and Coordination Division 
within the structure of Good Friends, but it only worked until around May 1999. Revd 
Beobryun, the founder of Good Friends and the leader of the Jungto Society, and An-
Sook Jung, the first Secretary General of Good Friends, instead played a key role in the 
planning and coordination of the overall structure and projects.124 As the function-
centred structure of Good Friends began to be diluted after the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration, the role of these key personnel became more significant.   
 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
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This chapter showed that the organisational mandates, funding capacity and expertise of 
the KSM and Good Friends were important in the constitution of each NGO’s capacity 
to influence South Korean government food aid policy. 
      This chapter first examined the organisational capacity of the KSM. With regard 
to the mandate of the KSM, this chapter demonstrated that in 1996 and 1997 the KSM 
strongly adhered to one single mandate to advocate for the provision of food aid to 
North Korea. After the inauguration of the Kim Dae-Jung administration in 1998, the 
South Korean government became more pro food and humanitarian assistance to North 
Korea. The KSM therefore expanded their mandates to include inter-Korean exchange 
and cooperation. Such diversification of the organisational mandate resulted in the 
weakening of the humanitarian mandate to relieve the food crisis in North Korea, by 
diluting the previous single mandate and thereby scattering the organisational resources.  
      With regard to the funding capacity of the KSM, until early 1997, under the Kim 
Young-Sam administration’s restriction, the KSM maintained poor funding capacity. 
From 1998 to 2002 in the Kim Dae-Jung administration, the diversification of funding 
sources through new aid programmes, government deregulation in relation to NGO 
fundraising and government funding for humanitarian NGOs’ activities in North Korea 
contributed to the stabilisation of KSM funding capacity. From 2003 to 2007, the KSM 
further stabilised its funding capacity by diversifying funding sources. The stabilisation 
of funding capacity in turn contributed to the KSM’s organisational development. 
During this period, however, the ratio of government funding to non-government 
funding increased to an extent which might blunt the KSM’s advocacy role of 
pressuring the government. 
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This chapter then demonstrated that the KSM gradually achieved the 
organisational expertise in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea. In 1996 and 1997 
the KSM’s organisational structure was neither stabilised nor developed yet but had a 
unique structure encompassing various circles and groups in South Korean civil society. 
During the Kim Dae-Jung administration, the KSM began to stabilise its organisational 
structure by restructuring it to a function-centred structure, by establishing issue-
specific committees and divisions and by appointing experienced experts to these new 
positions. The KSM also strengthened coordination of the overall structure and 
divisions by strengthening the function of the Planning and Coordination Division and 
assigning more administrative staff. During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, the 
KSM further strengthened its role in advocacy, civil participation, policy research and 
development. It further stabilised its function-centred structure by dividing the existing 
four administrative divisions into five divisions and two centres according to its 
function. In doing so, the KSM was able to maintain the highest level of organisational 
expertise in the advocacy and delivery of humanitarian and development aid to North 
Korea. 
      Under the identical analytical framework, this chapter examined the 
organisational capacity of Good Friends and demonstrated that the organisational 
mandates, funding capacity and expertise of Good Friends changed over time. With 
regard to the organisational mandate, Good Friends diversified its mandates after 
adhering to a single mandate to relieve the food crisis in North Korea until mid-1999. 
Between 1999 and 2003 the diversification of mandates resulted in the weakening of 
Good Friends’ humanitarian mandate to relieve the food crisis in North Korea. From 
2004 and 2006, Good Friends then attempted to strengthen its humanitarian mandate, 
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but its commitment to advocacy was only occasional and secondary. From the end of 
2006 until 2007, Good Friends at last resumed its advocacy prompting the Roh Moo-
Hyun administration to increase the scale of food aid to North Korea.  
With regard to funding capacity, Good Friends maintained a poor level of 
funding capacity. However, its unique funding capacity, as one of the Jungto Society-
affiliated organisations, enabled them to keep its independent voice and adhere to an 
advocacy role which was free from the influence of funding organisations, mainly the 
South Korean government.  
Lastly, throughout the 12 years of advocacy from 1996 to 2007, Good Friends 
improved its organisational expertise in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea, but 
the expertise of Good Friends mainly came from individual personnel, rather than its 
organisational structure. Between 1996 and 1999, Good Friends had a function-centred 
structure and divisions, but the organisational expertise of Good Friends was low due to 
the lack of individual expertise in Good Friends’ personnel who were generally 
recruited from Buddhist volunteers. In contrast to other humanitarian NGOs who 
developed their organisational structure and expertise after government funding for 
NGO activities in 2000, the organisational structure of Good Friends gradually 
downsized with the weakening of its organisational mandate. Between 2000 and 2007, 
Good Friends maintained a personnel-centred structure in which the key personnel 
continued to play an overarching role. The individual expertise of key personnel thereby 
shaped the organisational expertise of Good Friends. 
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CHAPTER 5. THE ADVOCACY OF THE KOREAN SHARING  
MOVEMENT  
 
 
This chapter demonstrates Hypothesis II: Differing non-governmental organisation 
capacities were consequential in explaining the ability of non-governmental 
organisation advocacy to set agendas, network and engage in the grafting of norms in 
respect of South Korean government policy on food aid to North Korea. This thesis 
draws particularly from the works of Richard Price, Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn 
Sikkink 1  to provide an analytical framework for evaluating non-governmental 
organisation (NGO) influence on state food aid policy making. As shown in the 
theoretical framework in Chapter Two, differing NGO capacities are demonstrated 
through (i) agenda framing – where NGOs reframe the issue of food aid so as to 
resonate with the government and the public, (ii) networking – where a NGO expands 
its network both in terms of quantity and quality and (iii) a norm grafting stage – where 
a NGO exploits various tactics and strategies in order to change existing norms and 
practices in the government and the public.  
        This chapter demonstrates that differences in the Korean Sharing Movement’s 
organisational capacity were consequential in explaining the ability of KSM advocacy 
to set agendas, network and engage in the grafting of norms in respect of the Kim 
Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s policy on food aid to 
North Korea. The ability of KSM advocacy to set agendas, network and engage in the 
grafting of norms in respect of the South Korean government’s policy on food aid to 
North Korea, however, was not always timely and appropriate. This chapter 
demonstrates that changes in the issue characteristics of the food crisis, the South 
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Korean government’s domestic political structure and KSM capability circumscribed 
and, sometimes, promoted the ability of KSM advocacy to advocate for food aid to 
North Korea. 
       With regard to agenda setting, the KSM framed the issue of food aid to North 
Korea. In doing so, the KSM anticipated the issue of food aid would resonate with the 
government policy makers and South Korean civil society. This chapter first 
demonstrates that in the beginning of the advocacy movement between 1995 and 1997 
the KSM which was highly motivated by a normative mandate of food aid but lacked 
the organisational expertise in the advocacy movement mainly appealed to the sense of 
brotherly love and humanitarianism. As the advocacy of food aid became prolonged 
throughout the Kim Dae-Jung administration, however, the KSM showed improved 
expertise in the agenda framing, by exploiting more practical and obligatory factors in 
framing food aid to North Korea. During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, the KSM 
which changed its organisational mandate from the advocacy of food aid to the delivery 
of development aid was passive in the agenda framing of food aid to North Korea. 
Changes in the operational environment, such as the Ryongcheon Station Explosion in 
2004, North Korea’s missile and nuclear test and the severe flood damage in 2006, 
instead induced the KSM to frame the issue of food aid as ‘humanitarianism.’   
This chapter secondly demonstrates that the KSM gradually developed its 
networks, which enabled the KSM to get access to the key government policy makers 
and finally to exert influence on South Korean government food aid policy making 
towards North Korea. Such effective networking by the KSM was attributable to their 
unique organisational structure. In the beginning of the advocacy of food aid to North 
Korea in 1995, the KSM formed a wide range of networks with various religious groups 
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and civil society organisations. Such wide ranging and high status networks enabled the 
KSM to exert political influence on state food aid policy making as well as on civil 
society. During the Kim Dae-Jung administration, the KSM further established a high 
status network with policy makers in the government and high-ranking politicians. The 
KSM particularly established NGO consultative bodies and their personnel were 
appointed to advisory positions in differing government consultative bodies. Such wide-
ranging and high-status networks were consequential in the maximisation of the KSM 
influence on state food aid policy making. During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, 
lastly, the KSM played a steering role in the institutionalisation of the NGO-government 
consultative body enabling the KSM and other humanitarian NGOs to obtain access to 
government aid policy makers. In 2004, the KSM’s cooperative relationship with the 
National Assembly Research Meeting and the establishment of the Centre for Peace 
Sharing under the structure of the KSM finally contributed to increasing the quality of 
KSM network. 
Lastly, this chapter demonstrates that the KSM exploited differing grafting 
strategies to incorporate the norms and ideas which support the provision of food aid to 
North Korea into the norms and ideas of the South Korean government policy makers 
and civil society. These grafting strategies which were exploited by the KSM changed 
over time and gradually improved in respective of their impact on the state food aid 
policy-making process. Such improvement in their influence was attributable to the 
KSM’s consistent advocacy that demanded NGO participation in the state policy-
making process and the KSM’s organisational capacity that enabled their consistent 
advocacy since 1996. The KSM which proselytised the Kim Young-Sam administration 
and civil society to embrace new norms in relation to the provision of food aid to North 
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Korea exploited conventional strategies, such as nationwide campaigns, press 
conferences, domestic and international conferences, to change existing government and 
civil society norms and practices. During the Kim Dae-Jung administration, the ability 
of the KSM to exploit effective and timely grafting strategy, however, was not always 
effective. This chapter demonstrates that until the Inter-Korean Summit in June 2000, 
the KSM exploited conventional advocacy tactics. After the Inter-Korean Summit in 
2000 and through the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, the KSM actively exploited 
government and NGO consultative bodies which allowed it to gain access to the state 
food aid policy makers directly. 
This chapter uses different resources according to the subjects of analysis. The 
chapter uses annual reports, conference proceedings, web-databases, newspaper articles 
and masters’ theses as the background materials for the examination of the KSM in 
advocacy.2 Annual reports published by the KSM provide background information on 
the activities of these NGOs.3 This chapter next uses conference proceedings,4 email 
newsletters and web-databases of NGOs5 and newspaper articles.6 As one of its major 
advocacy strategies, the KSM organised a series of policy conferences, symposiums, 
forums and international conferences targeting the government and public; this chapter 
therefore examines conference proceedings too.7 The representatives and high-ranking 
personnel of the KSM met the government decision makers and politicians, through 
official or unofficial channels, so as to pressurise the government to change existing 
policy. The representatives and high-ranking personnel of the KSM generally have more 
information on the advocacy in which they are involved. To examine the role of 
representatives and high-ranking personnel of the KSM, this chapter therefore uses 
interviews with them.8 
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This chapter consists of three main sections, an introduction and conclusion 
section. The first section examines how the KSM framed the issue of food aid to North 
Korea. The second section next examines the networks which the KSM established so 
as to achieve its organisational goals. The third section lastly examines the grafting 
strategies which the KSM exploited to change existing norms and practices in the Kim 
Young-Sam administration and the public. 
 
 
5.2 Agenda Framing 
 
The KSM framed the issue of food aid to North Korea. By doing so, the KSM 
anticipated that the issue of food aid would resonate with the government policy makers 
and South Korean civil society. However, the agenda framing by the KSM changed over 
time. This section examines how the KSM framed the issue of food aid to North Korea 
throughout the three administrations of Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-
Hyun. It next analyses the causal relationship between changes in the agenda framing 
and the KSM’s organisational capacity. In doing so, this section demonstrates that the 
KSM framed the issue of food aid to North Korea differently and the KSM 
organisational capacity was consequential in explaining the ability of KSM advocacy to 
set agendas. In the beginning of the advocacy movement between 1995 and 1997 the 
KSM which was highly motivated by a normative mandate of food aid but lacked the 
organisational expertise in the advocacy movement mainly appealed to the sense of 
brotherly love and humanitarianism. During the Kim Dae-Jung administration, the KSM 
that accumulated its expertise in the advocacy of food aid exploited more practical and 
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obligatory factors in framing food aid to North Korea. The KSM framed the issue of 
food aid in three different ways: ‘the obligation of government’ in 1998, ‘a peaceful 
unification movement’ in 1999 and 2000 and ‘a mutually winning movement’ in 2001 
and 2002. During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, however, the KSM was heavily 
engaged in the delivery of development aid to North Korea, but passive in the advocacy 
of food aid to North Korea. Changes in the operational environment instead influenced 
the KSM agenda framing. The Ryongcheon Station Explosion in 2004 provided 
momentum so that the KSM framed the food aid to North Korea as ‘humanitarianism.’ 
The North Korea’s missile and nuclear test and the severe flood damage in 2006 also 
induced the KSM to frame the issue of food aid as ‘humanitarianism.’  
 The first part examines how the KSM framed the issue of food aid to North 
Korea in the Kim Young-Sam administration from 1995 to 1997. The second part next 
examines the agenda framing by the KSM in the Kim Dae-Jung administration from 
1998 to 2002. The third part lastly examines the agenda framing in the Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration from 2003 to 2007. 
 
 
5.2.1 Agenda Framing in the Kim Young-Sam Administration 
 
The first three years of KSM advocacy between 1995 and 1997 were when it struggled 
to find the most effective agenda-framing strategy. The operational environment was a 
factor which influenced the KSM strategy of agenda framing. Given the hostility 
towards North Korea in the first year of advocacy in 1995, the KSM adopted the most 
fundamental framing strategy of appealing to nationalism. It framed the issue of food 
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aid as ‘brotherly love’ and ‘a peaceful unification movement.’ To overcome the severe 
political confrontation and the prolonged hostility of the Kim Young-Sam 
administration and civil society in 1996, the KSM exploited the universal norm of 
humanitarianism for the first time. In 1997, however, the KSM again exploited the 
regional and ethnic distinctiveness of the advocacy of food aid to North Korea in issue 
framing, by framing the food aid as ‘a movement for preventing war and alleviating 
political and military tension on the Korean peninsula’.  
In 1995, the Inter-religious Committee, the predecessor of the KSM, framed the 
provision of food aid to North Korea in two different ways. These were ‘brotherly love’ 
and ‘a peaceful unification movement.’ Despite Kim Young-Sam administration’s 
decision to provide large-scale rice aid to North Korea, North Korea’s negative 
responses worsened the South Korean government’s position and public opinion on 
food aid to North Korea.9 The lack of data on the severity of the North Korean food 
crisis in addition made it difficult for the South Korean humanitarian NGOs to persuade 
the Kim Young-Sam administration and civil society to take action to relieve the 
humanitarian crisis.  
The Inter-religious Committee, established in October 1995, was lacking in 
organisational capacity to frame the provision of food aid to North Korea as a 
persuasive agenda. It therefore framed the provision of food aid to North Korea in the 
context of ‘brotherly love’ and ‘a peaceful unification movement.’ The issue of food aid 
was framed as ‘brotherly love’ for North Korean compatriots facing severe flood 
damages.10 Despite the prolonged political and military confrontation and the political 
differences between both Koreas, South Korean civil society still considered the North 
Korean people as compatriots. Given the lack of reliable data on the severity of the 
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North Korean food deficits in 1995, the Inter-religious Committee perceived the 
advocacy of food aid to North Korea as a temporary movement that required urgent 
relief aid.11 In 1995, the newly founded Inter-religious Committee did not have the 
organisational capacity to develop sophisticated agenda framing.12 For these reasons, 
the Inter-religious Committee exploited a simple but fundamental appeal strategy aimed 
at the emotions of the South Korean people, framing the provision of food aid to North 
Korea as ‘brotherly love for the North Korean compatriots’.  
The Inter-religious Committee, the predecessor of the KSM, also framed the 
provision of food aid to North Korea as ‘a part of the peaceful unification movement’. 
Before joining the establishment of the Inter-religious Committee, individual religious 
orders of the Inter-religious Committee were unfolding a unification movement. In the 
same vein, these religious orders framed the provision of food aid to North Korea as a 
practical activity for a peaceful unification movement. The year of 1995, more 
specifically, was the 50th anniversary of the independence of Korea from the Japanese 
occupation and many events to wish for a peaceful unification were actively carried out 
by religious circles.13 The Protestants were unfolding peaceful unification activities, 
declaring that 1995 was ‘the year of jubilee for peace and unification in the Korean 
peninsula’. After the manifestation of Cardinal Su-Hwan Kim on 7 January 
1995pertaining to his willingness to visit North Korea if the visit was deemed to 
contribute to building a reconciliation between both Koreas, the Catholics were 
unfolding a pan-national unification movement. 14  The Kim Young-Sam 
administration’s position began to worsen, following a series of negative incidents 
during the process of rice aid shipment to North Korea. At the same time, the Inter-
religious Committee was already unfolding a peaceful unification movement, framing 
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the provision of food aid to North Korea as ‘a part of the peaceful unification 
movement.’ 
     In 1996, the Inter-religious Committee which renamed to the Korean Sharing 
Movement (KSM) framed the provision of food aid to North Korea as ‘a humanitarian 
movement’ along with exploiting the existing framing of ‘brotherly love’ and ‘a 
peaceful unification movement.’ While the KSM and other South Korean humanitarian 
NGOs were unfolding the advocacy urging the Kim Young-Sam administration and civil 
society to take action to relieve the humanitarian crisis, the incident of the Kangreung 
Submarine Infiltration by North Korea in September 1996 worsened South Korean 
public opinion of North Korea as well as of the provision of food aid to North Korea. 
The South Korean government and civil society were furious about North Korea’s 
negative action and therefore it was difficult for the KSM to unfold its advocacy of food 
aid to North Korea.15 
In the midst of the worsening inter-Korean relations, the KSM needed new 
agenda framing so as to proselytise South Korean civil society to stick to the advocacy 
of food aid to North Korea. The KSM newly framed the provision of food aid to North 
Korea as a ‘humanitarian movement,’ separating the North Korean people from the 
North Korean regime.16 The KSM emphasised that the food aid to North Korea was not 
in itself supporting the North Korean regime, but supporting the North Korean 
compatriots in the desperate famine.17 
The KSM also exploited the framing of ‘brotherly love for the North Korean 
compatriots.’ At the press conference on 12 July for the ‘Declaration of a Pan-National 
Movement for Helping the North Korean Compatriots,’ the KSM emphasised that 
helping the North Korean compatriots was a pan-national movement and the South 
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Korean civil society needed to step forward.18 Through exploiting visual materials 
showing starving North Korean residents, a grandmother full of worries in a desolate 
field, a woman holding a child suffering malnutrition and the haggard appearance of 
women, KSM sought to appeal to the brotherly love of South Korean civil society.19 
Framing the provision of food aid to North Korea in ‘brotherly love’ for the North 
Korean compatriots, the KSM emphasised that the desperate people in the pictures and 
posters were the Korean compatriots who are the same ethnic group throughout the 
world.20 
In addition, the KSM consistently framed the provision of food aid to North 
Korea as ‘a peaceful unification movement’ and further intensified its persuasive power 
by developing a more touching rationale for the necessity of food aid to North Korea. 
The KSM emphasised that the provision of food aid to North Korea was a first step in 
building a foundation for a peaceful unification movement on the Korean peninsula.21 
It further emphasised that responsible and continuous food aid to North Korea, not 
temporary aid, would contribute to building trust between both Koreas.  
In 1997, the last year of the Kim Young-Sam administration, the KSM framed 
food aid to North Korea as ‘a humanitarian movement.’ In 1997, the Kim Young-Sam 
administration maintained a strategy to link the provision of food aid to North Korea 
with the Four-Party Talks. The conservative parties in South Korean civil society and 
political circles criticised the provision of food aid in the midst of a situation in which 
North Korea was not allowing the monitoring of aid distribution as meaningless, as it 
could be used to support the North Korean regime.22 To overcome this criticism, the 
KSM emphasised humanitarianism. It asserted that food aid was the correct 
interpretation of humanitarianism rather than adhering to the principle of ‘no monitoring, 
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no food aid.’23 Framing food aid as a purely humanitarian movement, the KSM sought 
to criticise the conservative approach. 
In 1997, the KSM also framed food aid as ‘a movement for preventing war and 
alleviating political and military tension on the Korean peninsula’. After North Korea’s 
official apology for the Kangreung Submarine Infiltration at the end of 1996, inter-
Korean political relations improved, but South Korean public opinion on North Korea 
was still hostile. Given the worsened operational environment, the KSM sought to 
proselytise the Kim Young-Sam administration and South Korean civil society to 
resume the provision of food aid to North Korea. To replace the existing hostile public 
opinion on the North Korean regime with greater peace and cooperation, the KSM 
framed the food aid to North Korea as ‘a movement for preventing a war and alleviating 
political and military tension on the Korean peninsula’. It emphasised that the political 
and military competition between both Koreas would result in endless military 
confrontation and a security crisis. As long as the political and military competition 
continued, the KSM emphasised, the further away a peaceful unification on the Korean 
peninsula would be.24 It asserted that the provision of food aid to North Korea was a 
practical way to build mutual trust between both Koreas. 
 
 
5.2.2 Agenda Framing in the Kim Dae-Jung Administration 
 
During the Kim Dae-Jung administration, the KSM exploited more practical and 
obligatory factors in the framing of food aid to North Korea, rather than appealing to 
emotion and nationalism as it had in the Kim Young-Sam administration. In 1998, the 
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KSM framed the issue of food aid to North Korea as ‘the obligation of government’. In 
1999 and 2000, it framed the issue of food aid as ‘a peaceful unification movement’. In 
2001 and 2002, the KSM framed food aid as ‘a mutually winning movement’.  
In 1998, the KSM framed the provision of food aid to North Korea as ‘the 
obligation of new administration,’ criticising the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s 
adherence to a strict mutualism linking the provision of food aid to North Korea to 
pending political issues. In 1998 the Kim Dae-Jung administration, which held a 
positive view on the provision of humanitarian aid to North Korea, established the 
engagement policy which emphasised inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. This 
policy, however, was not yet incorporated into the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s 
specific policy towards North Korea. Given this operational environment, the KSM 
framed the provision of food aid to North Korea as ‘the obligation of new 
administration.’ Bishop Chang-Mu Choi, the Executive Representative of the KSM, 
urged the Kim Dae-Jung administration to establish an active aid policy on 
humanitarian aid to North Korea at a policy discussion held with the theme of 
‘Unification Policy and Humanitarian Aid for North Korea under the New 
Administration’ on 7 February 1998.25 
The KSM further asserted the need for government-level food aid to North 
Korea through a ‘Petition to the President’ on 1 June and the policy debate on ‘The 
Evaluation of the Kim Dae-Jung Administration’s Sunshine Policy [the engagement 
policy] and the Future Direction of Private-Level Aid to North Korea’.26 Through these 
petitions and debates the KSM emphasised that the provision of food aid to North Korea 
was ‘not the object of the strict application of mutualism.’ The KSM asserted that the 
strict application of mutualism in relation to the provision of food and other types of aid 
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to North Korea would worsen the humanitarian crisis in North Korea by narrowing the 
range of government policy options. In 1998, in fact, the Kim Dae-Jung administration 
designated the reunion of separated families as one of the core tasks of the new 
administration linking the reunion of separated families with chemical-fertiliser aid to 
North Korea at the Inter-Korean Vice-Ministerial Talk in April 1998. This talk, however, 
produced no result and the chemical-fertiliser aid became impossible. Through the 
petition to the President on 1 June and policy debate on 13 October, the KSM 
accordingly asserted that the North Korean elders, who would be the beneficiaries of the 
reunion of separated families, would become the primary victims of the food deficit 
crisis, if the provision of government-level food and other types of aid were not 
delivered to North Korea as a result of the government’s strict adherence to 
mutualism.27 
       In 1999 and 2000, the KSM framed the provision of food aid to North Korea as 
‘a part of a peaceful unification movement’ which was exploited in the Kim Young-Sam 
administration. In 1999 and 2000, the Kim Dae-Jung administration still hesitated to 
provide large-scale government food aid to North Korea. Although the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration sought to achieve political rapprochement between both Koreas, North 
Korea’s lukewarm attitude towards the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s engagement 
policy made the Kim Dae-Jung administration adhere to strict reciprocity in the 
provision of food aid to North Korea. As the advocacy of food aid to North Korea 
became prolonged since 1995, in addition, the agenda framing which framed the 
provision of food aid to North Korea as ‘brotherly love’ and ‘humanitarianism’ for the 
North Korean compatriots began to lose its persuasive power.28 Given changes in the 
operational environment and the organisational capacity in 1999 and 2000, the KSM 
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exploited rational agenda framing, rather than appealing to the emotion of South 
Koreans. The KSM framed the need for large-scale government-level food aid to North 
Korea as ‘a part of the peaceful unification movement,’ arguing that the provision of 
food aid to North Korea coincided with the pursuit of the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration’s engagement policy. 29  Based on this agenda framing, the KSM 
intensified pressure on the Kim Dae-Jung administration to provide food aid to North 
Korea, particularly at the stage of agenda preparation for the Inter-Korean Summit in 
2000. 
In 2001 and 2002, the KSM framed food aid to North Korea as ‘a mutual 
winning movement,’ but the KSM’s agenda framing in this period was not significant 
due to its changes in mandate and the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s active role in the 
provision of food aid to North Korea. With the provision of large-scale government food 
aid to North Korea after the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000, South Korean civil society 
and the humanitarian NGOs began to perceive food aid to North Korea as the role of the 
government. With government policy change that allowed spending by the Inter-Korean 
Cooperation Fund (the Cooperation Fund) for NGO humanitarian and development aid 
to North Korea, the South Korean humanitarian NGOs, including the KSM, began to 
initiate its own humanitarian and development aid to North Korea. Given changes in the 
operational environment in 2001 and 2002, the KSM changed its mandate to the 
delivery of development aid, and therefore the advocacy of food aid to North Korea 
became a secondary issue for it. The KSM re-used another group’s agenda framing. In 
2001 and 2002, agricultural NGOs took the lead in steering food aid advocacy. 
Agricultural NGOs framed the provision of food aid to North Korea as the mutual 
winning movement which is mutually beneficial for the South Korean famers and the 
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North Korean compatriots.30 These NGOs organised vigorous nationwide advocacy 
urging the Kim Dae-Jung administration to provide surplus rice to North Korea. By 
adding their name to the statement issued by the NGO Council for Cooperation with 
North Korea (the NGO Council), the KSM supported the argument of the agricultural 
NGOs.  
 
 
5.2.3 Agenda Framing in the Roh Moo-Hyun Administration 
 
While the KSM re-used the existing agenda framing which was developed in the Kim 
Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung administration, changes in the operational environment 
influenced KSM agenda framing. The Ryongcheon Station Explosion in 2004 provided 
momentum so that KSM framed food aid to North Korea as ‘humanitarianism.’ The 
North Korea’s missile and nuclear test and the severe flood damage in 2006 also 
induced the KSM to frame the issue of food aid as ‘humanitarianism.’  
In 2003, the KSM framed the issue of food aid as ‘a part of a peaceful 
unification movement’. The Roh Moo-Hyun administration took presidential office in 
2003, emphasising ‘a participatory government.’ At his inaugural speech on 25 February 
2003, President Roh Moo-Hyun revealed the ‘Peace and Prosperity Policy’ which 
amended the flaws of the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s engagement policy.31 Under 
the Peace and Prosperity Policy, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration sought to further 
promote inter-Korean exchange and cooperation including humanitarian aid to North 
Korea. Despite Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s friendly policy towards North Korea, 
North Korea’s admittance of their uranium enrichment on 17 October 2002 radically 
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worsened South Korean public opinion on the provision of humanitarian and 
development aid to North Korea. The conservative political groups denounced North 
Korea’s behaviour, criticising the engagement policy of the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration, claiming it would result in the development of nuclear power in North 
Korea.32 Given the operational environment, the KSM framed the provision of food aid 
to North Korea as ‘a part of a peaceful unification movement’ and ‘a mutual winning 
movement’ to overcome the negative criticism on the provision of aid to North 
Korea. 33 The KSM asserted that the expansion of inter-Korean exchange and 
cooperation through humanitarian and development aid to North Korea was the one and 
only way to establish a foundation for peaceful unification.  
With the Ryongcheon Station Explosion in 2004, the KSM framed the 
provision of food aid to North Korea as ‘humanitarianism’ for the victims. On 22 April 
2004, the Ryongcheon Station Explosion brought about severe casualties in North 
Korea. The severity of the humanitarian crisis ignited a nationwide humanitarian aid 
movement for the victims. Framing the provision of food aid to North Korea as 
‘humanitarianism’ for the victims, the KSM disseminated various visual materials, such 
as photos, posters and press releases which exposed the severity of the Ryongcheon 
Station Explosion to South Korean civil society.34 The KSM urged the Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration to provide large-scale additional food aid to North Korea as well as the 
urgent relief aid to North Korea.  
In 2005, the KSM concentrated on the delivery of development aid to North 
Korea, framing it as ‘aid for sustainable and self-reliant development’. While the Roh 
Moo-Hyun administration consistently maintained a pro food aid to North Korea 
position in 2005, North Korea appealed for development aid instead of emergency food 
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aid rejecting the participation of the U.N. Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) for 2005 
in September 2004.35 As North Korea requested the ending of the emergency aid 
project of the U.N. organisations and international NGOs, including their withdrawal 
from North Korea in August 2005, the need for development aid to North Korea became 
more apparent. Given the operational environment in 2005, the KSM framed the 
provision of development aid to North Korea as ‘aid for sustainable and self-reliant 
development’.36 
Lastly, given the worsened inter-Korean relations following North Korea’s 
missile and nuclear test in 2006, the KSM resumed its advocacy, framing food aid as 
‘humanitarianism’ and this framing continued in 2007. In 2006 and 2007, the Roh Moo-
Hyun administration attempted to minimise the negative influence coming from the 
deterioration of inter-Korean relations by adhering to the policy separating non-political 
issues from politics.37 North Korea’s missile launch in July and nuclear test in October 
2006 nonetheless made it difficult for the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to adhere to 
the existing policy of pro food and fertiliser aid to North Korea. In the midst of the 
unfavourable political environment caused by North Korea’s missile launch, the flood 
resulted in severe damage in North Korea. As the flood damage occurred in July, the 
KSM framed the provision of food aid to North Korea as ‘humanitarianism’ for the 
North Korean flood victims. The KSM adopted an agenda-framing tactic which 
separated the provision of food aid to North Korea from the missile launch and nuclear 
test. The KSM asserted that although the missile launch and the nuclear test was a 
subject for criticism, the provision of food aid for the flood victims was a humanitarian 
activity.38 The provision of humanitarian aid, the KSM emphasised, should not be 
suspended for political reasons. Under this agenda framing, the KSM, along with other 
260 
NGOs from various areas of humanitarianism, peace, human rights and women’s rights, 
organised a joint press statement on 8 August and urged the Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration to resume the humanitarian action to relive the humanitarian crisis in 
North Korea.39 
 
 
5.3 Networking 
 
This section demonstrates that the KSM gradually developed its networks, which 
enabled the KSM to gain access to the key government policy makers and finally to 
exert significant political influence on South Korean government food aid policy 
making towards North Korea. Such effective networking of the KSM was attributable to 
its unique organisational structure.  
       In the beginning of the advocacy of food aid to North Korea in 1995, the KSM 
first formed a wide range of networks with various religious groups and civil society 
organisations. It gradually increased the quality of the networks through engaging with 
religious leaders, elder statesmen, expert groups, policy makers in the government and 
high-ranking politicians. Such wide ranging and high status networks were 
consequential in the maximisation of the influence of the KSM on state food aid policy 
making as well as on civil society. During the Kim Dae-Jung administration, the KSM 
consistently maintained a wide range of networks with various religious leaders, elder 
statesmen and expert groups. The KSM further established a high status network with 
policy makers in the government and high-ranking politicians. The KSM established 
NGO consultative bodies and their personnel were appointed to advisory positions in 
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differing government consultative bodies. Such wide-ranging and high-status networks 
were consequential in the maximisation of the KSM influence on state food aid policy 
making. During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, lastly, the KSM played a steering 
role in the institutionalisation of the NGO-government consultative body enabling the 
KSM and other humanitarian NGOs to obtain access to government aid policy makers. 
In 2004, the Ryongcheon Station Explosion in April provided momentum so that the 
NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea (the NGO Council), which was a 
consultative body among NGOs, and the government agreed to establish an official 
government and NGO consultative body which would replace the NGO Meeting for 
North Korea Assistance (the NGO Meeting) managed on temporary base. In 2004, the 
KSM’s cooperative relationship with the National Assembly Research Meeting and the 
establishment of the Centre for Peace Sharing under the structure of the KSM also 
contributed to increasing the quality of KSM network. 
The first part examines which kind of networks the KSM established in the Kim 
Young-Sam administration from 1995 to 1997. The second part next examines the 
networking by the KSM in the Kim Dae-Jung administration from 1998 to 2002. The 
third part lastly examines the networking in the Roh Moo-Hyun administration from 
2003 to 2007. 
 
 
5.3.1 Networking in the Kim Young-Sam Administration 
 
This section demonstrates that the unique organisational structure of the KSM enabled it 
to establish a wide high status of networks linking the whole South Korean civil society. 
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In 1995 the Inter-religious Committee, the predecessor of the KSM, was established as a 
broad network including the largest six South Korean religious orders. By including the 
rational-centrist NGOs, the KSM came to exercise its advocacy influence on the whole 
South Korean civil society as well as the six largest religious orders in 1996. In 1997 the 
KSM further broadened its network to overseas, while seeking to strengthen its network 
by establishing an umbrella body for the coordination of different networks and 
humanitarian NGOs.  
In 1995, the Inter-religious Committee was established as a network of broad 
issue that was able to exert direct influence on the six largest South Korean religious 
orders. These included Catholicism, Won-Buddhism, Confucianism, Chondogyo, the 
National Council of Churches in Korea (NCCK) and the Chogye Order.40 These 
religious orders were the largest religious groups in South Korea in terms of the number 
of believers and its influence on civil society.41 The total number of believers of these 
religious orders was roughly 22,358,012, which accounted for around 50.18 per cent of 
the total South Korean population in 1995.42 The participation of these religious orders 
did not mean that all believers of each order participated in the advocacy of food aid to 
North Korea. Considering the significant influence of the religious leaders in South 
Korean civil society, however, the engagement of the leaders in the advocacy of food 
aid to North Korea was enough to proselytise the Kim Young-Sam administration and 
South Korean civil society to embrace new norms of food aid to North Korea.  
The Inter-religious Committee also formed a wide network with key civil 
society organisations. They built a network with the Korea Civil Society Organisations’ 
Council (KCSOC) consisting of 38 rational-centrist NGOs which had steered the civil 
society movement in South Korea since the mid-1980s.43 Based on the network with 
263 
the KCSOC, the Inter-religious Committee was able to establish a network with the 
Korean Women’s Association United (KWAU), which is a coalition network consisting 
of 20 NGOs in the women’s rights movement.44 Based on the network with the 
KCSOC, the Inter-religious Committee was also able to work together with the National 
Alliance for Democracy and the Reunification of Korea (NADRK).45 The NADRK, as 
a representative alliance for the civil society movement, consisted of 27 NGOs from 14 
NGOs, such as the Council for National Labour Union, the National Confederation of 
Farmers Association, the Council for National University Student Representatives and 
13 regional movement groups in Seoul, Pusan and Gwangju. The NADRK had steered 
the various civil society movements, such as democratisation, the unification movement 
and the labour movement. The establishment of a network with the NADRK contributed 
to expanding the KSM’s network to various civil society organisations.  
In 1996, the civil society organisations and the six religious orders restructured 
the Inter-religious Committee into the KSM which had a permanent executive and 
administrative body. The Inter-religious Committee was a loose coalition network 
without an administrative body although the Inter-religious Committee maintained a 
wide network until the establishment of the KSM in June 1996. The strength of the 
network that the Inter-religious Committee established with other civil society 
organisations therefore was a weak network concerned with temporary issue.46 On 8 
June 1996, the KSM put in place multilayered board-level positions within the 
organisational structure of the KSM. It appointed religious leaders, NGO personnel, 
scholars, elder statesmen and congressmen to these positions. The positions of these 
Senior Advisors, the highest position of the KSM, were held by Su-Hwan Kim, the 
Catholic Cardinal, Won-Yong Kang, the Senior Pastor of National Council of Churches 
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in Korea, and Suk-Ju Kang, the Leader of the Chogye Order.47 The positions of 
Executive Representatives of the KSM were held by Wol-Ju Song, the Managing 
Director of the Chogye Order, Chang-Mu Choi, the Bishop for Social Action of the 
Archdiocese of Seoul and Young-Hoon Seo, the President of the Civil Association for a 
Clean Election and the Former Director of the Korea Broadcasting System.48 The 
positions of Co-representatives of the KSM were held by Man-Gil Kang, the Chief 
Director of the Unification Association of Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice, 
Moon-Kyu Kang, the Director of the Asian Citizen Movement Research Institute, Jae-
Jung Kim, the Ordinance of Chondogyo, Han-Bin Lee, the former Deputy Prime 
Minister, Yoong-Gu Lee, the former President of World Vision Korea, Professor Bong-
Ho Sohn, of Seoul National University and Co-representative of the Citizens’ Coalition 
for Economic Justice, Nak-Hwan Baek, the Chancellor of Inje University and Jin-Hyun 
Kim, the Chancellor of the University of Seoul.49 A further 22 personnel from religious 
organisations, civil society organisations and academia were also appointed to the 
position of co-representatives of the KSM. The position of Chair of the Central 
Committee was held by Nam-Ik Baek, the Secretary General of the Bishop Committee 
and the Vice-chairs were held by Jung-Ja Lee, the Secretary General of the Korea Civil 
Society Organisations’ Council, Young-Deok Park, the Executive of Hankook Ilbo and 
two other personnel from religious organisations. Appointing the Secretary General of 
KCSOC to the position of the Central Committee of the KSM, in particular, sought to 
strengthen the networks with other civil society organisations. The KSM lastly put in 
place the National Assembly Advisory Committee (the Advisory Committee) and a total 
of 54 national congressmen and women joined the Advisory Committee.50 Although 
these positions were symbolic ones, the constitution of the Advisory Committee was 
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very comprehensive including Hong-il Kim, the Congressman and first son of President 
Kim Dae-Jung, Hoi-Chang Lee, the President of the New Grand National Party and 
candidate for the 15th Presidential election, Dong-Young Jung, the 31st minister of 
Unification later in the Roh Moo-Hyun administration and Myung-Bak Lee, the 17th 
President of South Korea from 2008 to 2012.51 
In addition to widening the KSM network, the KSM increased the quality of its 
network by establishing links with expert groups such as the ‘Headquarters for 
Healthcare Professionals’ ‘Fundraising for the North Korean Flood Victims’ and 
‘Lawyers for a Democratic Society’ (MINBYUN).52 The network with health and 
medical expertise contributed in increasing the reliability of the advocacy by providing 
medical knowledge on the food crisis in North Korea. The participation of MINBYUN 
equipped with legal expertise, in particular, contributed in improving government law 
and regulations restricting South Korean humanitarian NGOs’ direct aid to North Korea 
and fundraising for North Korea.53 
While the KSM continued to expand its network in 1997, it also joined an 
umbrella body for the coordination of humanitarian activities among different networks 
and NGOs for the first time. In 1997, the KSM was active in networking with 
humanitarian NGOs such as Good Friends, World Vision Korea, Good Neighbours and 
other civil society organisations, such as the Labour Union of Nong-Hyup Bank, the 
National Federation of Finance Labour Union and the Federation of Korean Trade 
Unions.54 Based on these broadened networks, the KSM sought to develop active 
advocacy into a nationwide movement.  
The KSM also improved the strength of the network by joining the umbrella 
network which coordinates the advocacy of food aid to North Korea and different 
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humanitarian aid activities. By joining ‘Brotherly Love Pan-national Movement for the 
North Korean Compatriots Aid’ (the Brotherly Love Pan-national), which was an 
alliance network that consisted of 30 NGOs, the KSM was also able to build stronger 
networks with MINBYUN, NADRK, the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions 
(KCTU) and the Korean People’s Artist Federation (KPAF).55 The Brotherly Love Pan-
national established the ‘National Convention of Civil Societies for the Northern 
Brotherly Aid’ (National Convention) on 30 June 1997. The National Convention was 
the first and largest network consisting of a total of 112 organisations of humanitarian 
NGOs, civil society organisations and religious groups participating in the advocacy of 
food aid to North Korea. The National Convention was mandated to resolve the 
restrictions in relation to inter-Korean exchange and cooperation, to increase the 
efficiency in humanitarian aid to North Korea, to increase domestic and international 
solidarity for humanitarian aid to North Korea, to extend the advocacy that targets the 
government, corporations and the press, and to unfold a nationwide advocacy targeting 
South Korean civil society.56 The National Convention was not able to carry out any 
further activities after the 1st National General Meeting on 5 September. The meeting, 
however, became the momentum the humanitarian NGOs needed to establish the 
coordinated body for the effective advocacy of food aid to North Korea.  
The KSM established the international network with three main intentions: to 
proselytise the international community to take action to relieve the humanitarian crisis 
in North Korea, to publicise the advocacy of the South Korean humanitarian NGOs to 
the international community and to urge the international community to pressurise the 
South Korean government to resume food aid to North Korea. To this end, the KSM 
held the ‘International Council on the Food Shortage Crisis of North Korea’ in Seoul 
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from 10 to 12 March 1997.57 About 60 personnel from the South Korean humanitarian 
NGOs and international NGOs participated in this conference to share opinions on the 
food crisis in North Korea and support humanitarian activities. From 24 to 25 June 1997, 
the KSM sponsored another international conference, the ‘Musgrove II: International 
Consultation on the Emergency Food Situation in North Korea’. This meeting was 
attended by around 40 personnel including Ellsworth Culver, the President of Mercy 
Corps International, Catherine Bertini, the Executive Director of the United Nations 
World Food Programme (WFP), and Kathi Zellweger and Eric Weingartner from the 
WFP. 58  Through these international conferences, the KSM expanded its human 
resource and organisational networks. In addition to these conferences, the KSM 
established the Korean American Sharing Movement (KASM) on 2 September 1997. In 
doing so, it strengthened its overseas networks which could be exploited to pressurise 
the South Korean government and the international community from outside the South 
Korean territory.59 
 
 
5.3.2 Networking in the Kim Dae-Jung Administration 
 
The KSM improved its quality of networks by appointing various civil and government 
experts and scholars who had expertise in inter-Korean exchange and cooperation to the 
positions of the Policy Advisory Committee of the KSM. The KSM also strengthened its 
networks with other humanitarian NGOs, by establishing the official NGO consultative 
body of the ‘NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea’ (the NGO Council). 
Given the establishment of the Kim Dae-Jung administration that maintained the 
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favourable policy towards the humanitarian NGOs in 1998, the key network that the 
KSM exploited in 1998 was the Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation 
(the Korean Council), which was a consultation body attended by the government, 
political parties, civil society and NGOs. As private organisations and NGOs in charge 
of overall inter-Korean exchange and cooperation increased under the engagement 
policy of the Kim Dae-Jung administration, the Korean Council was established in 
September 1998, under the steering role of the Ministry of Unification.60 On the 
government side, the Kim Dae-Jung administration needed public support for the 
engagement policy. Through the establishment of the Korean Council, the Kim Dae-
Jung administration thereby attempted to subsume the political power and influence of 
rational-centrist NGOs. In doing so, the administration attempted to exploit these NGOs 
as the foundation of the Kim Dae-Jung administration for the implementation of its 
engagement policy towards North Korea.61 On the NGO side, the expectations of 
humanitarian NGOs and the KSM on the expansion of its advocacy influence on state 
policy making through the Korean Council was a major motivation of their attendance 
in the establishment of the Korean Council.62 The establishment of the Korean Council 
therefore became an official network which allowed the KSM access to key policy 
makers in state food aid policy making, as well as other humanitarian and civil society 
organisations.   
At the international level, from 15 to 17 October 1998, the KSM organised an 
international conference to expand its overseas network. The KSM held the ‘KSM 
World Conference’ in Los Angeles. Around sixty representatives from the KSM 
headquarters of the United States, Canada, the South Pacific, Russia and South Korea 
attended the conference.63 At the conference, the participants of the KSM overseas 
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offices agreed to establish the ‘KSM World Council’ and set the issues of humanitarian 
aid to North Korea and the reunion of separated families as its main projects. By 
strengthening the KSM’s overseas networks, the KSM expanded the target of advocacy 
towards other countries, such as the United States, which were deemed to contribute in 
resolving the humanitarian crisis in North Korea. By exploiting overseas networks, the 
KSM also sought to pressurise the South Korean government to provide food aid to 
North Korea.64 
In 1999 the most significant development in KSM networking was the 
establishment of the ‘NGO Meeting for North Korean Assistance’ (the NGO Meeting) 
and networking with professional groups and a local municipal. The KSM also 
increased the quality of networks by appointing various civil and government experts 
and scholars who had expertise in inter-Korean exchange and cooperation to positions 
of the Policy Advisory Committee of the KSM. The Kim Dae-Jung administration’s 
policy change that incorporated NGO personnel into the government consultative 
bodies contributed to the expansion of the KSM network. In 1999, lastly, the KSM 
made consistent efforts to establish a solidarity network with the international 
community.  
On 19 April 1999, the KSM, along with another twenty most active 
humanitarian NGOs, founded the NGO Meeting as a loose consultative body. The Kim 
Dae-Jung administration perceived the humanitarian NGOs as government counterparts 
in the promotion of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. 65  The Ministry of 
Unification needed an organisation representing the humanitarian NGOs for the purpose 
of efficient communication with the government. The President of World Vision Korea, 
Jae-Sik Oh, responded to such a demand from the government. Although it was a loose 
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consultative organisation without an administrative body, the South Korean 
humanitarian NGOs established the NGO Meeting.66 With this established, the KSM 
exploited the NGO Meeting as a key channel to get access to the decision makers in 
government food aid policy making. The representatives of the NGO Meeting, 
consisting of the representatives of the humanitarian NGOs, had frequent meetings with 
President Kim Dae-Jung and other government decision makers in relation to 
humanitarian aid to North Korea. Such meetings enabled the NGO Meeting to develop 
into an important organisation with significant influence on state food aid policy making 
in 1999.67 
The KSM broadened its networks towards professional groups and local 
municipals. It established the ‘Korean Sharing Movement Healthcare Cooperation 
Headquarters’ (Healthcare Headquarters) consisting of the six largest healthcare 
professional associations: ‘Korea Medical Association,’ ‘Korean Pharmaceutical 
Association,’ ‘Korean Dentists Association,’ ‘The Association of Korea Oriental 
Medicine,’ ‘Korean Hospital Association,’ and ‘Korean Pharmaceutical Manufacturers 
Association.’68 In 1999 the KSM also established a network with a local municipal for 
the first time. Among the nine local municipals in South Korea, the KSM established a 
cooperative network with Jejudo.69 It became the first step that broadened the KSM 
networks with other local municipals in the Roh Moo-Hyun administration.  
The KSM improved the quality of the network by appointing civil and 
government experts and scholars who had expertise in inter-Korean exchange and 
cooperation to positions in the Policy Advisory Committee of the KSM. These 
personnel, who mostly engaged in the government food and humanitarian aid policy-
making process through various channels, were Jong-Suk Lee, the 32nd Minister of 
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Unification from February 2006 to December 2006, Keum-Soon Lee, a researcher from 
KINU which is a government institute for inter-Korean issues and unification, Sung-Ho 
Je, a researcher from KINU, Hyeong-Jung Park, a researcher from KINU, Won-Hyeok 
Lim, a researcher from the Korea Development Institute, Cheol-Young Choi, a senior 
researcher from the Korea Legislation Research Institute, Professor Dae-Suk Choi of 
Dongguk University, Professor Young-Soo Kim of Sogang University and Jong-Hoon 
Lee, a researcher from the National Assembly Research and Analysis Bureau.70 Jong-
Suk Lee in particular became the Minister of Unification later during the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration in February 2006. Such improvement in the quality of the network 
through the expanded human resource networks finally contributed to the increase of the 
KSM’s advocacy influence on state food aid policy making.  
The Kim Dae-Jung administration’s policy change, which incorporated NGO 
personnel into government consultative bodies, contributed to the expansion of the 
KSM network. The representatives of the KSM were appointed to positions at the 
Unification Advisory Meeting, which is a unification policy advisory organisation that 
reports directly to the President. The executives of the KSM, such as Moon-Kyu Kang, 
Young-Hoon Suh, Revd Wol-Ju Song, Cardinal Su-Hwan Kim and Man-Gil Kang, were 
appointed as advisors at the Unification Advisory Meeting.71 The members of the 
Policy Advisory Committee of the KSM, Professor Dae-Suk Choi of Dongguk 
University and Professor Young-Su Kim of Sogang University, were also appointed to 
the positions as advisors at the Policy Advisory Committee of Humanitarian Support 
Bureau within the Ministry of Unification. In this way, the KSM came to exercise its 
influence on the early stages of the government policy-planning process. 
The KSM actively carried out their activities to form a solidarity network with 
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the international community. For the purpose of both expanding networks and 
maximising the advocacy that pressurises the international community, the KSM 
organised the ‘Korea-Japan NGO Forum on the Humanitarian Aid for North Korea’ at 
the ‘Korea-Japan NGO Symposium’ in Tokyo from 19 to 23 February. Through this 
forum, the KSM established a network with the Japanese NGOs.72 Under the same 
objective, the KSM also participated in the ‘Beijing International NGO Conference on 
the Humanitarian Support for North Korea’ organised by InterAction in Beijing from 3 
to 5 May 1999. 
In 2000 and 2001, the KSM replaced the NGO Meeting with ‘The NGO Council 
for Cooperation with North Korea’ (the NGO Council) as a key network to get access to 
government policy makers and other humanitarian NGOs. In 2001 the KSM and 
humanitarian NGOs founded an official NGO consultative body, the NGO Council, to 
replace the NGO Meeting. After the establishment of the NGO Council in 2001, the 
KSM began to build official networks with government decision makers. The KSM 
delivered the administrative function of the NGO Council, according to the rules and 
regulations of the NGO council. This stipulated that the NGO Council nominates one 
organisation among the member NGOs as an administrative organisation every two 
years.73 As stipulated in Article 4.3 of the rules and regulations of the NGO Council, 
the NGO Council delivered an advocacy function pressurising the government to 
provide humanitarian aid to North Korea. 74  The fact that Dong-Won Lim, the 
Unification Minister and a key decision maker in the Kim Dae-Jung administration, 
attended the foundation ceremony of the NGO Council and delivered the congratulatory 
speech indicated that the government also recognised the importance of the NGO 
Council in the government-NGO relationship.75 Exploiting the NGO Council, the KSM 
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was able to expand its organisational networks with the government decision makers in 
2001 and to improve the quality of its network. Young-Hoon Suh, the Senior Advisor of 
the KSM since its establishment in 1996, was promoted to the position of representative 
of the ruling party, the Democratic Party, from January to December 2000. In 2001, then, 
Young-Hoon Suh was appointed as the Secretary General of the South Korean Red 
Cross, which was an administrative organisation that took charge of all types of 
government-level humanitarian and development assistance to North Korea.76 
 
 
5.3.3 Networking in the Roh Moo-Hyun Administration 
 
The KSM and Roh Moo-Hyun administration institutionalised the NGO-government 
consultative body enabling the KSM and other humanitarian NGOs to exert direct 
influence on the state food aid policy process. In 2004, the Ryongcheon Station 
Explosion in April was the momentum that prompted the NGO Council, which was a 
consultative body among NGOs, and the government to establish ‘the Government-
Civilian Council for North Korean Aid Policy’(Government-Civilian Council) as the 
official government and NGO consultative body in relation to inter-Korean exchange 
and cooperation. In 2004, the KSM’s cooperative relationship with the National 
Assembly Research Meeting and the establishment of the Centre for Peace Sharing 
under the structure of the KSM also contributed to increasing the quality of the KSM 
network. 
With the inauguration of the Roh Moo-Hyun administration in 2003, there was 
some change in KSM networking. The Roh Moo-Hyun administration was pro civil 
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society organisations which advocated non-humanitarian issues rather than 
humanitarian aid NGOs. Only a few KSM personnel therefore maintained their 
positions as government policy advisors in 2003 and throughout the Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration. Young-Hoon Suh who was appointed as President of the South Korean 
Red Cross in the Kim Dae-Jung administration served until December 2003. Bishop 
Chang-Moon Choi, the Executive Representative of the KSM, was newly appointed to a 
position in the Unification Advisory Meeting for the President.77 The other executive 
members of the KSM who were appointed to positions in the Unification Advisory 
Meeting for the President in 1999 were not re-appointed in the Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration. The KSM members who had positions on the Policy Advisory 
Committee of Humanitarian Support Bureau in the Ministry of Unification were not re-
appointed, but instead other NGO personnel, who were mainly from the rational-centrist 
civil society NGOs, replaced them.78 
In 2004, the Ryongcheon Station Explosion provided momentum that 
strengthened the KSM network with religious and civil society organisations and the 
government through the establishment of the Government-Civilian Council. On 24 April, 
two days after the Ryongcheon Station Explosion, the NGO Council which was under 
the management of the KSM established the ‘North Korean Ryongcheon Station 
Explosion Victims’ Aid Movement’ (the Ryongcheon Movement) to help the explosion 
victims. A total of 55 NGOs, 30 NGOs from the NGO Council and another 25 NGOs 
from religious and civil society organisations, joined the Ryongcheon Movement.79 
Under the coordination role of the NGO Council, the South Korean civil society and the 
Roh Moo-Hyun administration extended a successful nationwide aid movement. Such 
was the success of the movement that finally the humanitarian NGOs and the Roh Moo-
275 
Hyun administration recognised the need for a consultative body between the South 
Korean NGOs and the government. The humanitarian NGOs and the Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration thereby agreed to establish the Government-Civilian Council on 1 
September.  
With the establishment of the National Assembly Research Meeting on 10 June 
2004, the KSM also came to form a close relationship with the Congressmen and 
women. A total of 27 congressmen and women evenly from the ruling and opposition 
parties attended the National Assembly Research Meeting. They discussed with the 
humanitarian NGOs and academics the reform of legislation and institutions for active 
inter-Korean exchange and cooperation.80 The Centre for Peace Sharing (CPS) of the 
KSM maintained a collaborative relationship with the National Assembly Research 
Meeting. The CPS and the National Assembly Research Meeting, for instance, 
organised a policy seminar on ‘A Strategy of Legislation Reform for Inter-Korean 
Cooperation in the 17th National Assembly’ on 22 June.81 They also organised a 
seminar on ‘How to Change the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund?’ on 12 July.82 This 
indicates that the government became more sensitive to the voices of the humanitarian 
NGOs as the personnel who kept a close relationship with the humanitarian NGOs were 
appointed as high ranking government decision makers during the Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration.  
The CPS, which was established under the structure of the KSM in 
2004,continuously contributed in establishing a policy network that connected the 
government, academics, NGOs and think tanks through regular policy forums. Before 
the establishment of the CPS, the KSM and humanitarian NGOs were prone to 
concentrate on individual projects and the delivery of aid to North Korea given the 
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difficulty of building a policy network. The CPS engaged in organising the policy 
forums on a regular basis. Most experts who had expertise in inter-Korean exchange and 
cooperation from the government, academia, NGOs and think tanks attended these 
policy forums regularly.83 In doing so, the CPS played a role in expanding the networks 
of the KSM, bringing experts from various areas together.   
Given the suspension of government food and fertiliser aid to North Korea after 
North Korea’s missile launch in July 2006, the KSM passively engaged in the advocacy 
of food aid to North Korea. The KSM exploited the NGO Council to pressurise the Roh 
Moo-Hyun administration to resume the food and fertiliser aid to North Korea. Since 
North Korea informed South Korea of the postponement of the 8.15 National 
Celebrations due to the flood in August,84 the NGO Council initiated its flood-aid 
movement. On 8 August, in particular, the NGO Council organised a joint press 
conference urging the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to resume the provision of 
humanitarian flood aid to North Korea.85 At this joint conference, 25 NGOs including 
the KSM attended.86 This joint press conference was a loose and temporary network in 
terms of strength and its sustainability, but this network was successful in igniting the 
humanitarian flood-assistance movement under the hostile operational environment 
caused by the missile launch in July.  
In 2006 the KSM exploited the Korean Council for Reconciliation and 
Cooperation (the NGO Council) to proselytise the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to 
resume the provision of humanitarian flood aid to North Korea. The Korean Council 
was one of the most influential NGOs in that the Korean Council was established to 
gain public consensus on the peace and unification movement among the government, 
political parties, progressive and conservative NGOs and religious organisations. To 
277 
maintain the high status of the Korean Council in state policy making, the former 
ministers and vice-ministers of unification, elder statesmen and the leaders of the 
humanitarian NGOs who maintained pro inter-Korean exchange and cooperation, were 
appointed to the positions of Executive and Chair of the Korean Council. When the 
flood damage became severe in August 2006, in fact, Se-Hyeon Jeong, the Chair of the 
Korean Council and the former Unification Minister in the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh 
Moo-Hyun administrations met Jong-Suk Lee, the Unification Minister in 2006 and 
urged the provision of large-scale government-level flood aid to North Korea 
irrespective of North Korea’s missile launch.87 
Given the favourable operational environment in 2007, there was no need for the 
KSM to unfold advocacy urging the Roh Moo-Hyun administration and South Korean 
civil society to provide food aid to North Korea. KSM networking for the advocacy of 
food aid to North Korea therefore was insignificant in 2007.  
 
 
5.4 Norm Grafting 
 
This section demonstrates that the KSM exploited differing grafting strategies to 
incorporate the norms and ideas which support the provision of food aid to North Korea 
into the norms and ideas of the South Korean government policy makers and civil 
society. These grafting strategies which were exploited by the KSM changed over time 
and gradually improved in respective of its impact on the state food aid policy-making 
process. Such development in their influence was attributable to KSM’s consistent 
advocacy that demanded NGO participation in the state policy-making process and 
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KSM’s organisational capacity that enabled their consistent advocacy from 1996. The 
KSM first proselytised the Kim Young-Sam administration and civil society to embrace 
new norms in relation to the provision of food aid to North Korea. At the stage of norm 
grafting, the KSM exploited conventional strategies, such as nationwide campaigns, 
press conferences, domestic and international conferences, to change existing 
government and civil society norms and practices. During the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration, the KSM proselytised the government and civil society to embrace new 
norms in relation to the provision of food aid to North Korea. At the stage of norm 
grafting, the KSM exploited timely strategies to change existing norms and practices in 
the government and the public. The ability of the KSM, however, was not always 
effective. This chapter demonstrates that the grafting strategy during the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration was divided by period into two categories. Until the Inter-Korean 
Summit in June 2000, the KSM exploited conventional advocacy tactics, including 
public campaigns, policy workshops and a petition to the President. After the Inter-
Korean Summit in 2000, the KSM exploited government and NGO consultative bodies. 
During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, lastly, the KSM’s activities to change norms 
in civil society gradually decreased, but KSM grafting strategies were the most effective 
in respective of its impact on the state food aid policy-making process. It was possible 
as the KSM exploited the NGO and government consultative bodies which allowed it to 
gain access to the state food aid policy makers directly. 
The first part examines which kind of grafting strategies the KSM exploited to 
incorporate the norms supporting the provision of food aid to North Korea into the 
government policy makers and the civil society in the Kim Young-Sam administration 
from 1995 to 1997. The second part next examines the norm grafting by the KSM in the 
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Kim Dae-Jung administration from 1998 to 2002. The third part lastly examines the 
norm grafting in the Roh Moo-Hyun administration from 2003 to 2007. 
 
 
5.4.1 Norm Grafting in the Kim Young-Sam Administration 
 
If the previous two stages of agenda setting and networking are the preparatory stages, 
the stage of grafting is the substantial stage when NGOs attempt to persuade the state 
and the public to embrace new norms and ideas through their advocacy, and thereby 
seek to induce the state as the fundamental target to change their policy and practice.  
This section demonstrates that given the differing operational environment and 
organisational capacity between 1995 and 1997, the KSM exploited different strategies 
to proselytise the government and South Korean civil society to embrace the norm of 
food aid to North Korea. This section demonstrates the grafting strategies which the 
KSM mainly exploited. These were gradually developed from conventional activities, 
such as public campaigns, press releases and lobbying politicians, at the beginning of its 
advocacy in 1995 and 1996 to the more specialised activities, such as holding the 
presidential candidate debate and the international networks, in 1997.  
In mid-1995 when the first 150,000 tonnes of rice aid was delivered to North 
Korea in June, the perception of ‘anticommunism and hostility towards North Korea’ 
was dominant in South Korean civil society although the Kim Young-Sam 
administration had decided to provide rice aid irrespective of the absence of the 
humanitarian NGOs who advocated the provision of food aid to North Korea. Given the 
accumulated ‘mistrust’ and ‘hostility’ towards North Korea which resulted from the 
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political and military confrontations during the half century of separation after the 
armistice of the Korean War in 1953, the conservatives of South Korean civil society 
perceived the food aid to North Korea as ‘an irresponsible and indiscreet behaviour 
supporting the North Korean regime.’88 South Korean civil society understood the 
necessity of food aid to North Korea, but concern and antipathy that the food aid to 
North Korea would ultimately support the hostile North Korean regime, still remained 
as a dominant view in South Korean civil society.89 
Given this operational environment in 1995, the Inter-religious Committee, the 
predecessor of the KSM, exploited the strategy of information politics which 
disseminates ongoing information on the food crisis in North Korea, through public 
campaigns and press conferences. The Inter-religious Committee which consists of the 
six largest religious orders was relatively free from the hostility and the ideological 
disputes in South Korean civil society.90 By organising a series of continued public 
campaigns and exploiting the mass media, therefore, the KSM steered its advocacy. The 
Inter-religious Committee disseminated ongoing information on the food crisis in North 
Korea. Organising these public campaigns and press conferences, the religious leaders 
also actively appealed to South Korean civil society to participate in the advocacy of 
food aid to North Korea.91 In doing so, the Inter-religious Committee sought to replace 
the hostility towards North Korea and the negative view on the provision of food aid 
with ‘brotherly love’ and ‘a peaceful unification.’ 
The Inter-religious Committee also exploited a wide range of networks in 
developing its advocacy of food aid to North Korea into a nationwide movement. The 
Inter-religious Committee established various networks with differing civil society 
organisations that had steered the civil society movements since 1980. Exploiting the 
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wide networks with KCSOC, KWAU, CCEJ and NADRK, the Inter-religious 
Committee sought to develop its advocacy of food aid to North Korea into a nationwide 
movement. The Inter-religious Committee and the KCSOC, which consisted of 38 
rational-centrist NGOs, held a joint press conference for ‘A Pan-national Fundraising 
Movement for Helping the North Korean Flood Victims’ on 5 September 1997.92 On 15 
September, the KWAU, which is a coalition network that consisted of 20 NGOs in 
women’s rights movements,93 initiated its advocacy of food aid to North Korea by 
commencing the ‘Campaign to Help the North Korean Flood Victims’ for a month.94 
On the same day, NADRK, which consisted 27 of the most pioneering civil society 
organisations, announced its engagement in advocacy and fundraising campaigns. 
NADRK asserted that the Kim Young-Sam administration which worried about the 
conservative parties in South Korean civil society was taking a lukewarm position on 
the provision of flood aid to North Korea.95 
     After the Kangreung Submarine Infiltration in September 1996, the KSM could 
not extend its advocacy of food aid to North Korea. To maximise the leverage of food 
aid, the Kim Young-Sam administration further pressurised the international community 
to refrain from providing unconditional food aid to North Korea.96 South Korean civil 
society, as shown by the public opinion poll taken by Gallup Korea right after the 
aftermath of 150,000 tonnes of rice aid in 1995, was divided into two parties: a group 
who maintained ‘hostility’ towards North Korea (41.3 per cent) and a group who 
perceived North Korea as the object of ‘cooperation’ (53.7 per cent).97 
Given this operational environment in 1996, the KSM exploited the public 
campaigns to proselytise the Kim Young-Sam administration and South Korean civil 
society to take action to relieve the food crisis in North Korea. On 15 January, the 
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religious leaders of the Inter-religious Committee organised a public campaign by 
framing the provision of food aid as ‘brotherly love that surpasses the differences in 
ideology and political system between both Koreas.’98 On 29 and 31 January, NADRK 
maintained a network with the Inter-religious Committee urging the Kim Young-Sam 
administration to step forward in helping the North Korean flood victims, while 
announcing ‘Fundraising for the North Korean Flood Victims.’99 NADRK also visited 
the Ministry of Unification on 8 February and urged the Kim Young-Sam administration 
for a more active and steering role in helping North Korea through criticisms that “the 
current policy where the Kim Young-Sam administration pressurised the Japanese and 
U.S. government not to provide large-scale government-level rice aid to North Korea at 
the Hawaii Meeting on 24 January was irresponsible behaviour, ignoring the 
humanitarian crisis in North Korea.”100 On 17 September, the KSM further extended 
the ‘Campaign for Thrift and Saving and Helping the North Korean Compatriots’ during 
Chusuk which is the biggest national holiday.101 
Through these public campaigns in 1996, the KSM sought to maximise the 
effectiveness of advocacy, by disseminating ongoing information of the severity of the 
North Korean food crisis and framing the food aid to North Korea as ‘humanitarianism,’ 
‘brotherly love,’ and ‘a part of a peaceful unification movement.’ At these public 
campaigns, the KSM used visual materials expressing the severity of the food crisis in 
North Korea such as photos of starving children and woman appearing haggard.102 
Disseminating this ongoing information and newly framed agenda through mass media 
and press conferences with the major daily newspapers, such as Hankook Ilbo, 
JoongAng Daily and Hankyoreh, the KSM proselytised the Kim Young-Sam 
administration and civil society to resume the food aid to North Korea. In the same vein, 
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by appointing the executive of Hankook Ilbo, Young-Deok Park, to the position of Vice-
chair of the Central Committee of the KSM, the KSM sought to maximise the 
effectiveness of the campaign. In fact, Hankook Ilbo was the most active newspaper 
company in publishing events and campaigns by the humanitarian NGOs and the KSM 
for food aid to North Korea.103 
In 1996, the KSM began to unfold the institution reform movement which 
demanded the improvement of policy and institutions in relation to the operational 
environment for NGOs. The Kim Young-Sam administration had prohibited fundraising 
by the humanitarian NGOs and private level aid to North Korea, while adhering to the 
policy that links food aid to North Korea with North Korea’s participation in the Four-
Party Talks. Given the government policy, NADRK on 30 May and seven Protestant 
groups on 12 June urged the government to allow rice and cash aid to North Korea by 
NGOs.104The KSM in particular initiated the ‘National Campaign for Helping the North 
Korean Compatriots’ at its inauguration ceremony on 12 July, and urged government 
institutional reform to allow private level emergency relief activities for North Korea, 
approve aid to North Korea through international agencies and pledge efforts at the 
government level in response to the structural and chronic food crisis in North Korea. 
On 12 December, MINBYUN, which was a professional group that consists of lawyers, 
instituted an administrative litigation against the government decision that prohibits 
private-level aid, which was not through the South Korean Red Cross, to North Korea 
and the direct contact with North Korean residents.105 
In 1996, the KSM also exploited a policy network with the key policy makers in 
state food aid policy making towards North Korea, so as to pressurise the Kim Young-
Sam administration to resume food aid to North Korea. On 16 July, the KSM organised 
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the ‘Meeting with the Representatives of Political Parties and Congressmen’ as a part of 
its advocacy.106 At this meeting, a total of 18 people, mainly congressmen, including 
Kim Dae-Jung, the President of the People’s Party and Kwan-Woong Park, the Chair of 
the Committee on Unification and Foreign Affairs in the National Assembly, and the 
representatives of humanitarian NGOs attended and adopted the statement. The 
statement urged inter-Korean meeting at government level, the government’s active role 
in the provision of aid to North Korea, the private level of aid to North Korea and the 
private level aid to North Korea through the international agencies.107 This meeting was 
the first case that the KSM exploited as a policy network, with the key policy makers in 
the National Assembly, to exercise more direct influence on state food aid policy 
making towards North Korea. Despite these efforts of the KSM in 1996, however, the 
Kangreung Submarine Infiltration in September made it difficult for the KSM to 
continue to unfold its active advocacy that urged the Kim Young-Sam administration 
and the public to provide food aid to North Korea. In the midst of such a situation on 5 
November, the KSM, along with other social and religious leaders, organised a press 
conference. At this press conference, the KSM framed the characteristics of food aid to 
North Korea as an expression of ‘brotherly love,’ by separating the North Korean 
residents from the North Korean regime. In doing so, the KSM sought to continue its 
advocacy urging for the resumption of aid for the North Korean compatriots. 
In 1997, the last year of the Kim Young-Sam administration, the KSM could not 
unfold its advocacy of food aid to North Korea publicly due to the Kangreung 
Submarine Infiltration in 1996. After North Korea’s official statement of apology on 29 
December 1996, the Kim Young-Sam administration continued adhering to its policy 
that linked food aid to North Korea with the Four-Party Talks, and that the official 
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request by the North Korean government must come first to provide large-scale 
government-level food aid. Public opinion on the provision of food aid to North Korea 
was also at its worst as the Kangreung Submarine Infiltration gave the impression that 
North Korea was still continuing its military action, in spite of South Korea’s aid.  
The most distinctive feature of the KSM’s advocacy strategy in 1997 was in 
exploiting a timely event: organising the ‘Presidential Candidate Policy Debate on the 
Unification and Humanitarian Aid to North Korea.’108 While the presidential election 
campaign was going on, the KSM and Sisa Press, which is a weekly Korean publication, 
organised the ‘Presidential Candidate Policy Debate on the Unification and 
Humanitarian Aid to North Korea’ on 18 November.109 This event was possible due to 
the organisational structure of the KSM was able to exercise its advocacy influence on 
the six religious orders and civil society organisations, which made it difficult for the 
presidential candidates to refuse to participate in the policy debate. At this presidential 
candidate debate, the three presidential candidates of Lee Hoe-Chang, Kim Dae-Jung 
and Lee In-Jae expressed their views on humanitarian aid to North Korea.110 Among 
the presidential candidates, in particular, Kim Dae-Jung maintained the same view as 
the Kim Young-Sam administration in relation to the condition of food aid, by stating 
that “the inter-governmental talks must take place prior to the large-scale government-
level aid to North Korea.”111 Kim Dae-Jung, however, expressed his position of support 
for the measure of aid-channel diversification and the promotion of private-level aid to 
North Korea that had been consistently demanded by the KSM and other humanitarian 
NGOs. Kim Dae-Jung also supported KSM’s rationale for food aid to North Korea, 
presenting his opinion that three positive meanings exist in humanitarian aid to North 
Korea: alleviating hunger of the North Korean compatriots, restoring brotherly love and 
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building peaceful inter-Korean relations. The convening of the presidential candidate 
debate on the provision of humanitarian aid to North Korea itself was the movement 
that proved how important the issue of humanitarian aid to North Korea was in South 
Korean politics and civil society in that a presidential candidate debate with a single 
subject has only been held twice in the history of the South Korean presidential election. 
The presidential candidate debate was also the place designated by the KSM to 
pressurise the presidential candidates to accept the demands of the humanitarian NGOs 
in relation to the humanitarian aid to North Korea. Through the opening speech of the 
presidential candidate debate, the KSM urged unconditional food aid irrespective of the 
Four-Party Talks, government policy change allowing private-level aid to North Korea, 
aid delivery channel diversification and large-scale government aid to North Korea.112 
The KSM also exploited the international network to pressurise the Kim 
Young-Sam administration and the international community to take action to relieve the 
food crisis in North Korea. Through networking with the international NGOs and 
international organisations such as the UNDP and WFP, the KSM sought to use the 
international NGOs and organisation’s appeal for food aid to North Korea, as a rationale 
to proselytise the Kim Young-Sam administration and South Korean civil society. The 
KSM also collaborated with the international NGOs and organisations in advocacy that 
urged the international community to step forward in the issue of humanitarian aid to 
North Korea. For this, the KSM held the ‘International Council on the Food Shortage 
Crisis of North Korea’ in Seoul from 10 to 12 March 1997.113 Around sixty personnel 
from the South Korean humanitarian NGOs and international NGOs participated in this 
conference, to share their opinions and information on the food crisis in North Korea 
and support humanitarian activities. From 24 to 25 June 1997, the KSM held another 
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international conference: ‘Musgrove II: International Consultation on Emergency Food 
Situation in North Korea.’ At this meeting, around 40 well known personnel including 
Ellsworth Culver, the President of Mercy Corps International, Catherine Bertini, the 
Executive Director of the WFP, and Kathi Zellweger and Eric Weingartner from the 
WFP attended and appealed for the food aid for North Korea.114  Based on the 
agreement on the severity of the food crisis in North Korea, and the recognition of the 
international community and South Korean government’s passive role in humanitarian 
aid to North Korea, the participants of the Musgrove II asserted the need for the South 
Korean and U.S. governments to urgently provide food aid to North Korea. They 
emphasised the important role of the South Korean and U.S. governments in the relief 
of the food crisis in North Korea and the need of development aid for sustainable 
agricultural development. The participants of Musgrove II also agreed to search for a 
more active role for the South Korean NGOs in the alleviation of the food crisis in 
North Korea, to improve the information exchange system among the South Korean 
NGOs, international NGOs and agencies, and to strengthen international networks.115 
In 1997, the KSM exploited the movement to urge government institution 
change to improve the operational environment in which the humanitarian NGOs 
worked. On 21 February, NADRK maintained the network with the KSM and urged the 
Kim Young-Sam administration to allow private-level aid to North Korea, while 
welcoming the Kim Young-Sam administration’s decision to provide humanitarian aid 
to North Korea through the WFP on 20 February.116 After the government decision that 
allowed private-level aid to North Korea on 31 March, MINBYUN took a step further 
urging the Kim Young-Sam administration to abolish the policy that maintained a single 
channel through the South Korean Red Cross, while welcoming the policy change 
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allowing private-level aid to North Korea.117 Through its public statement on 21 April, 
the National Council of Churches in Korea (NCCK), which is a rational-centrist 
Christian council that consisted of eight Christian religious bodies, urged the Kim 
Young-Sam administration on the following issues: i) to provide humanitarian aid to 
North Korea through the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Fund, which is the 
government funding allocated to the promotion of inter-Korean relations, ii) abolish the 
governmental measures that restrict corporation and mass media’s activities in relation 
to humanitarian aid to North Korea, iii) put in place the legal and institutional measures 
required for private-level direct aid to North Korea and iv) participate in the 
humanitarian activities of the international agencies such as the WFP and UNDP. In 
April, 717 female personnel in the field of women’s rights, in areas including academia, 
medicine, humanitarian NGOs and political circles, presented the same assertion as that 
of the NCCK.118 
The KSM also continued to exploit the public campaigns in 1997. On 8 
February the KSM and Good Friends resumed their campaign for humanitarian aid to 
North Korea, which was suspended after the Submarine Infiltration incident, through 
the commencement of the ‘New Year’s Campaign for Helping the North Korean 
Compatriots.’119 On 12 February, the KSM again organised the ‘Meeting and Press 
Conference of the Elder Statesmen Concerning the State Affairs.’ 120  The KSM 
continuously initiated the ‘National Campaign for 10,000 tonnes of Maize Help for the 
North Korean Compatriots’ from 27 March to 2 April and developed the fundraising 
movement into the ‘National Campaign for 100,000 tonnes of Maize Aid to the North 
Korean Compatriots’ on 9 April. 121  Under this fundraising movement, the KSM 
organised the ‘Maize Soup Dinner for People concerned about the Food Crisis in North 
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Korea’ event on 12 April. Around 700 participants consisting of elder statesmen, 
religious leaders from the six religious orders, scholars, businessmen, the 
representatives of humanitarian and civil society organisations and the congressmen 
from the Korean National Assembly attended the event. In particular, Man-Sub Lee, the 
former Chairman of the National Assembly, and Se-Hyung Cho, the Acting President of 
the People’s Party which was the major opposition party, attended the event and urged 
the Kim Young-Sam administration and the public to resume food aid to North Korea.122 
Through this event, the KSM raised 1,889,560,000 won, which was equivalent to more 
than 10,000 tonnes of maize.123 This event also provided the momentum which made 
the advocacy of food aid to North Korea, which stopped after the Kangreung Submarine 
Infiltration, resume and become a national movement once again.  
 
 
5.4.2 Norm Grafting in the Kim Dae-Jung Administration 
 
During the Kim Dae-Jung administration, the grafting strategy exploited by the KSM 
was divided into two categories by period. Until the Inter-Korean Summit in June 2000, 
the KSM mainly exploited conventional advocacy strategies, such as public campaigns 
and policy workshops and a petition to the President. After the Inter-Korean Summit in 
2000, the KSM mainly exploited government and NGO consultative bodies. 
In 1998, the main strategies that the KSM exploited were policy workshops and 
a petition to the President, while exploiting public campaigns as one of the major 
grafting strategies. President Kim maintained a positive view on government-level food 
aid to North Korea. He also had a positive view on the role of humanitarian NGOs in 
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that they and their activities contributed in solving the humanitarian crisis in North 
Korea and building trust between both Koreas. The South Korean civil society also 
began to perceive North Korea and its residents as the object of unification and 
cooperation and as fellow Korean compatriots in 1998. Despite the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration’s positive view on the provision of food aid to North Korea at the macro 
level, however, the Kim Dae-Jung administration still maintained the policy that the 
inter-Korean talks at government level should precede any provision of food aid to 
North Korea. The IMF economic crisis and North Korea’s sceptical view on Kim Dae-
Jung administration’s engagement policy made it difficult for the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration to provide large-scale government-level food aid to North Korea.  
Given the operational environment, the KSM exploited policy workshops and a 
petition to the President in order to pressurise President Kim Dae-Jung to implement his 
pledge of food aid to North Korea which he made before the presidential election. In 
1998 the Kim Dae-Jung administration did not establish its policy on food aid to North 
Korea. To pressurise it, the KSM organised an internal policy workshop with the theme 
of ‘Unification Policy and Humanitarian Aid to North Korea under the New 
Administration’ on 7 February. 124  At the workshop, the KSM and participants 
pressurised the Kim Dae-Jung administration to provide large-scale food aid to North 
Korea.125 
On 1 June after the breakdown of the fertiliser aid at the Inter-Korean Vice-
Ministerial Talk in April, the KSM urged four issues through its ‘A Petition to the 
President.’126 The KSM criticised that the application of a strict mutualism might lead 
to a situation of diplomatic confrontation between both Koreas. Diplomatic 
confrontation would result in the death from starvation of the North Korean elderly, 
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people aged in their sixties, who might be the beneficiaries of the reunion of separated 
families that the Kim Dae-Jung administration prioritised in the government agenda. 
The KSM asserted that the Kim Dae-Jung administration must prevent large-scale death 
through famine, by supporting the resuscitation of North Korean agriculture, through 
the provision of chemical fertiliser aid to North Korea. The KSM also urged the Kim 
Dae-Jung administration to provide large-scale government-level food aid to North 
Korea. It lastly urged the Kim Dae-Jung administration to allow private-level 
fundraising, the use of an Automatic Response Service (ARS) in fundraising and a 
matching fund system where the government matched the amount of funds an NGO 
raised.  
On 13 October, the KSM held a policy workshop on ‘The Evaluation of the 
Kim Dae-Jung Administration’s Sunshine Policy [the engagement policy] and the 
Future Direction of Private-Level Aid to North Korea.’ The KSM urged the Kim Dae-
Jung administration to improve the transparency in aid distribution through aid delivery 
channel diversification and to abolish the Regulation Act on Fundraising and Donation 
that restricted private-level fundraising. At the workshop, the KSM pressurised the Kim 
Dae-Jung administration to establish a favourable environment in which the 
humanitarian NGOs, civil society and the corporate sector were able to participate in aid 
to North Korea through the benefit of tax exemption on donations.127 
The KSM organised another policy workshop ‘Policy Direction for 
Revitalising Inter-Korean Exchange and Improving the Related Policies’ on 27 
November. At this workshop, Sung-Ho Je, a member of the KSM’s Policy Advisory 
Committee, called for the participation of humanitarian NGOs in the government 
consultative body of the ‘Nation Council for Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation,’ 
292 
the institutional reform for the promotion of private-level aid to North Korea and the 
expenditure of the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund for private-level aid to North 
Korea.128 
In 1998, the KSM consistently exploited public campaigns. It set 25 April as 
‘The Day of International Fasting for Northern Brotherly Aid’ by holding a press 
conference on 20 April.129 The day of fasting event was held in 107 cities in 36 
countries around the world and the six religious orders and 100 South Korean NGOs 
participated in the event in Seoul. Many politicians and religious leaders from around 
the world participated. In-Deok Kang, the Unification Minister, participated in the event 
in Seoul and Jimmy Carter, the former U.S. President, attended the event in the United 
States.130 From religious circles, Pope John Paul II, the Dalai Lama, Konrad Raiser, the 
President of the World Council of Churches, Pastor Billy Graham and June Bensor, the 
President of the World Evangelical Alliance participated in local events in their own 
countries to appeal for the need for humanitarian aid to North Korea.131 For this event, 
for the first time the Kim Dae-Jung administration allowed the use of ARS in 
fundraising.132 From 1 August to 6 September, the KSM also organised a ‘March to 
Overcome the National Crisis and Help Children of South and North Korea.’ On 3 
December, the KSM organised a ‘Dinner to Help the North Korean Compatriots Come 
out of Winter’.133 In doing so, it sought to continue to sustain the advocacy of food aid 
to North Korea that was withering in the midst of the IMF economic crisis.  
In 1999 the KSM mainly exploited government consultative bodies and 
international networks. Although the Kim Dae-Jung administration announced the 
engagement policy that encourages inter-Korean exchange and cooperation, the Kim 
Dae-Jung administration did not provide any of the government-level food aid that 
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President Kim pledged in the presidential election campaign in 1997. The Kim Dae-
Jung administration adhered to the principle of mutualism in relation to the provision of 
food and development aid to North Korea, while proclaiming that the inter-Korean talks 
at government level must come first before the issue of food aid. This government 
position was a different one from that of the KSM which it had continued to assert since 
1998. Given this operational environment, the KSM exploited the government 
consultative bodies to pressurise the Kim Dae-Jung administration to provide 
government-level food aid to North Korea. The representatives of humanitarian NGOs, 
who had been at the forefront of the advocacy of food aid to North Korea, were 
appointed to positions in the government’s consultative bodies and were able to exercise 
direct influence on state food aid policy making. The executives of the KSM, Moon-
Kyu Kang, Young-Hoon Suh, Revd Wol-Ju Song, Cardinal Su-Hwan Kim and Man-Gil 
Kang were appointed as members of the Unification Advisory Meeting which is a direct 
advisory council to the President on unification policies.134 These personnel formed the 
channel through which the KSM was able to exercise their direct influence on the 
highest policy maker, the President. The status of the NGO Meeting consisted of 
representatives from humanitarian NGOs, mainly representatives from the KSM. In 
January the NGO Meeting organised a meeting with Se-Hyeon Jeong, the Vice-minister 
of the Ministry of Unification and urged the government to take the measure of allowing 
the private-level aid delivery channel to North Korea.135 
In 1999, the KSM exploited international networks for publicising the activities 
of the South Korean humanitarian NGOs to the international community, to pressurise 
the international community which was entering a stage of ‘donor fatigue,’ to continue 
to provide humanitarian aid to North Korea. In the ‘Korea-Japan NGO Symposium’ 
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from 19 to 23 February, the KSM organised the ‘Korea-Japan NGO Forum on 
Humanitarian Aid for North Korea.’ At this forum, the KSM urged the South Korean 
and Japanese governments and the Japanese humanitarian NGOs to take further action 
to relieve the humanitarian crisis in North Korea. The KSM also exploited this forum to 
urge the Kim Dae-Jung administration to step forward to promote private-level aid by 
adopting a matching fund system.136 In July the KSM and the NGO Meeting also 
organised the ‘Conference on the Current Situation of North Korea.’ At this conference, 
the KSM and the NGO Meeting invited Eric Weingartner, the NGO liaison officer for 
the WFP in North Korea. By emphasising the severity of the food crisis in North Korea 
at the conference, the KSM and the NGO Meeting proselytised the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration and South Korean civil society to take further action to relieve the 
humanitarian crisis in North Korea.137 
In 2000 the KSM mainly exploited policy workshops and conferences and the 
international networks. On 15 March 2000, both Koreas finally agreed to hold the Inter-
Korean Summit in June, and the Kim Dae-Jung administration began to collect agendas 
to be discussed at the Summit. Given this operational environment, on 15 May 2000, the 
KSM along with other humanitarian NGOs organised a workshop with the theme of 
‘The Meaning of the Inter-Korean Summit and the Role of Humanitarian NGOs’ on 15 
May.138 At this meeting, the KSM asserted that the humanitarian NGOs had been 
playing a steering role in leading public opinion and humanitarian aid to North Korea 
and should not be excluded in the process of expected humanitarian aid to North Korea, 
as the result of the government-level rapprochement after the Inter-Korean Summit.139 
The KSM also organised ‘The 4th Anniversary Conference of the KSM’ on 7 July. At 
this conference, Yong-Sun Lee, the Secretary General of the KSM, criticised the decline 
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of public interest in humanitarian aid to North Korea and the withdrawal of the 
international NGOs from North Korea.140 Emphasising the ongoing food deficits in 
North Korea, Lee asserted that the role of the South Korean humanitarian NGOs and 
civil society were still important in the alleviation of the humanitarian crisis in North 
Korea. 141  Lee further asserted the adoption of a matching fund system, the 
establishment of a government-NGO partnership in humanitarian aid to North Korea, 
and the involvement of NGO personnel in the National Council for Inter-Korean 
Exchange and Cooperation.142 
The NGO Meeting also held a workshop for its member groups from 15 to 16 
September on the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s decision to provide government-level 
food aid, on loan terms, on 14 September. 143  Criticising the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration’s unilateral aid excluding the humanitarian NGOs in the process of aid 
delivery to North Korea, the participants in the workshop reiterated the need for the 
provision of food aid through the NGO channel.144 The NGO Meeting urged the 
establishment of a North Korean development aid plan for sustainable development 
under joint government-private efforts, allowing the humanitarian NGOs to deliver and 
distribute the government-pledged food and fertiliser aid. The NGO Meeting also urged 
the establishment of a government-NGO consultative body. 145  At the workshop, 
Kyung-Suk Suh, the Director of the Executive Committee of the KSM, further asserted 
that the Kim Dae-Jung administration had to collaborate with the international 
community to prevent a situation where the international community withdrew from 
North Korea, due to the South Korean government’s provision of large-scale food aid to 
North Korea.146 After the workshop, the NGO Meeting organised another meeting on 6 
October inviting Jae-Kyu Park, the Unification Minister, and delivered their demands 
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from the workshop.147 
From 29 June to 1 July, Jong-Mu Lee, the Director of the Office of Planning and 
Coordination of the KSM and Kyung-Suk Suh, the Director of the Executive Committee 
of the KSM, participated in ‘The 2nd International NGO Conference on Humanitarian 
Support to North Korea.’148 At the conference, they consistently asserted that the Kim 
Dae-Jung administration lacked serious consideration on the government-NGO role in 
relation to the delivery of food aid to North Korea. Lee and Suh also criticised the 
decline in humanitarian aid to North Korea by the international community, in spite of 
the continued food deficits in North Korea.149 By emphasising the continued foreign 
aid from the outside of North Korea, Lee and Suh asserted the international 
community’s continued aid to North Korea. 
In 2001 KSM advocacy was insignificant compared to the previous years. While 
mainly focusing on the delivery of development aid to North Korea, the KSM mainly 
exploited the NGO Council and the international networks to pressurise the Kim Dae-
Jung administration and the international community. After the Inter-Korean Summit in 
2000, the Kim Dae-Jung administration decided to provide large-scale rice aid on loan 
terms in 2000. Given the operational environment in 2001, the KSM had diversified the 
direction of its mandates and projects to development aid to North Korea. The main 
strategies that the KSM exploited to proselytise South Korean civil society firstly was 
the NGO Council. The NGO Council organised a meeting on 20 July and fifteen NGOs 
and two personnel from the Ministry of Unification attended the meeting.150 At this 
meeting, the humanitarian NGOs decided to organise a public campaign to proselytise 
South Korean civil society to support the government plan to provide surplus-rice aid to 
North Korea through the 5th Inter-Korean Ministerial Talk on September.151 On 28 
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September, the NGO Council meeting was held with fifteen NGOs and the participation 
of the personnel from the Ministry of Unification. At this meeting NGOs proposed the 
establishment of a government-NGO consultative body for cooperation between the 
government and NGOs in relation to inter-Korean exchange and cooperation.152 Before 
this meeting, the executives of the Grand National Party (GNP) which consistently 
opposed the provision of large-scale food aid to North Korea suddenly revealed its 
ratification of 300,000 tonnes of surplus-rice aid to North Korea.153 It, however, faced 
severe opposition from the conservative parties within the GNP and the conservative 
media, Chosun Ilbo. In this situation, the NGO Council, held on 28 September, agreed 
to organise a public campaign to pressurise the Kim Dae-Jung administration to provide 
surplus-rice aid to North Korea.154 The last NGO Council meeting in 2001 was held on 
30 November with fourteen NGOs and three personnel from the Ministry of Unification. 
On the day before the meeting, the NGO Council issued an official statement opposing 
the amendment of the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act raised by the GNP. 
In the statement, the NGO Council criticised the amendment of the Inter-Korean 
Exchange and Cooperation Act in that it was possible to restrict the autonomy of 
government in pursuing the engagement policy toward North Korea.155 The NGO 
Council therefore decided to attend the public hearing organised by the National 
Assembly in relation to the amendment of the Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation 
Act.156 In addition, the NGO Council made a decision to pressurise the government to 
establish a government-NGO consultative body, in order to assess government and 
private-level aid to North Korea in 2001 and plan the projects of 2002.157 Through the 
NGO Council meeting, the humanitarian NGOs and the government made it possible to 
establish a cooperative relationship in relation to aid policy making towards North 
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Korea.  
In 2001, the KSM exploited the international networks to pressurise the South 
Korean government and the international community to take further action to relieve the 
humanitarian crisis in North Korea. The NGO Council organised two council meetings 
on 9 March and 20 April. 158  Fourteen NGOs and a Deputy Director of the 
Humanitarian Assistance Bureau of the Ministry of Unification attended the meeting on 
9 March.159 At the meeting on 20 April, eighteen NGOs and two personnel from the 
Ministry of Unification attended. At these meetings, the NGOs called for government 
cooperation in organising the international NGO conference160 and finally the NGO 
Council held ‘The 3rd International NGO Conference on Humanitarian Assistance to 
North Korea’ on 20 June. Attending this conference were 160 people from NGOs and 
the United Nations, and government personnel from fifteen countries including South 
Korea, New Zealand and Canada.161 The conference suggested continued support of the 
South Korean government for North Korea and cooperation between the government 
and NGOs. The conference also suggested networking among the U.N. agencies, 
government and NGOs and the establishment of ‘a code of conduct’ for the South 
Korean humanitarian NGOs in the North Korean aid. The conference further urged the 
U.S. and Japanese governments and their NGOs to take more active action to relieve the 
humanitarian crisis in North Korea.162 
Lastly, in 2002 the last year of the Kim Dae-Jung administration, KSM advocacy 
and its grafting strategy were not significant. Based on the recognition of the need for 
large-scale food aid to North Korea, the Kim Dae-Jung administration continued to 
proselytise North Korea to hold related talks to discuss food aid and other issues in 
2002.163  Given the operational environment in 2002, the KSM did not need to 
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pressurise the Kim Dae-Jung administration to provide food aid to North Korea. The 
KSM instead continued to support agricultural NGOs’ advocacy that sought to 
proselytise the Kim Dae-Jung administration to provide surplus-rice aid to North Korea.  
In 2002, the KSM exploited the NGO Council to support agricultural NGOs’ 
surplus-rice-aid movement. While KSM and humanitarian NGOs’ advocacy had 
withered since 2000, the National Confederation of Farmers Association (Junnong) 
initiated its advocacy urging the government to provide domestic surplus rice to North 
Korea.164 The Junnong’s ‘Unification Rice-Aid Movement’ started with the initiative of 
the GNP’s scheme to provide surplus rice in 2001. Although the provision of surplus-
rice aid was not committed in 2001, the Junnong organised the Unification Rice-Aid 
Movement on 25 January 2002 and this movement developed into a nationwide farmers’ 
movement. From 22 April, the Junnong strengthened its movement, changing its name 
to the ‘Movement Urging the Government to Provide 450,000 tonnes of Rice to North 
Korea’.165 At the final date of the movement on 15 May, the Junnong, along with other 
NGOs involved in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea, such as the National 
Alliance for Democracy and the Reunification of Korea and the Korean Confederation 
of Trade Unions, organised a press release and a protest at the front of the National 
Assembly. Through the press release and protest, the Junnong urged the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration to provide surplus rice to North Korea.166 In the midst of the advocacy 
of surplus-rice aid to North Korea by the Junnong in 2002, the role of the NGO Council 
and the KSM was passive.  
 
 
5.4.3 Norm Grafting in the Roh Moo-Hyun Administration 
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During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, the KSM’s activities to change norms in 
civil society decreased, but KSM grafting strategies were the most effective in that the 
KSM exploited the NGO and government consultative bodies which allowed the KSM 
to get access to the state food aid policy makers directly. 
In 2003, the KSM sought to increase its influence on state policy making in 
relation to inter-Korean exchange and cooperation including the provision of food aid to 
North Korea. The KSM first exploited the Centre for Peace Sharing (CPS). The CPS 
was established as a civil think tank specialised in policy research and development in 
relation to inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. The CPS was mandated to expand 
domestic networking among NGOs, academia and the government. During the year of 
2003, after its establishment in November, the CPS organised a policy seminar in 
December. On 1 December, the government personnel from the Ministry of Unification 
and the Ministry of Agriculture, NGO personnel and academics attended the foundation 
memorial seminar. 167  These personnel evaluated the former Kim Dae-Jung 
administration’s policy towards North Korea and suggested policy recommendations for 
the Roh Moo-Hyun administration. At this seminar, in particular, Gi-Beom Lee, the 
President of Okedongmu, which was a humanitarian NGO specialised in aid for North 
Korean children, raised that the humanitarian NGOs began to lose their regulatory and 
advocacy role against the government since the South Korean humanitarian NGOs 
received government financial support from the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund.168 He 
asserted the need for independent roles for NGOs so they could be able to regulate the 
government and advocate new norms and values being ignored by the government. In 
this way, the CPS became an influential civil think tank collecting civil policy 
suggestions in relation to government policy on inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. 
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The CPS also facilitated the consultative network that connects NGOs, academics and 
the government. Exploiting the CPS, the KSM continued to pressurise the Roh Moo-
Hyun administration to maintain and further develop inter-Korean exchange and 
cooperation, as well as the provision of food aid to North Korea.       
In 2004, the KSM exploited the CPS as a key method to pressurise the Roh Moo-
Hyun administration to incorporate NGO personnel into the state policy-making process 
in relation to inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. On 22 June, the CPS and the 
Korean Council organised a policy seminar, and at this seminar the KSM emphasised 
the role of the National Assembly in inter-Korean exchange and cooperation.169 After 
the KSM’s recommendation at the seminar on 22 June, the KSM and the National 
Assembly Research Meeting jointly organised a seminar on ‘How to Change the Inter-
Korean Cooperation Fund?’ on 12 July. At this seminar, Jong-Moo Lee, the Head of the 
CPS suggested the allocation of 1 per cent of the national budget to the Inter-Korean 
Cooperation Fund, the permanent establishment of the National Council for the 
Management of the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund, the transformation of the National 
Council to a government-civilian consultative body and the expenditure of 20 per cent 
of the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund through NGOs.170 Lee in particular supported the 
legislation of ‘The Basic Act of Advancing Inter-Korean Relations’ that Congressman 
Chae-Jung Lim proposed to improve transparency and consensus in the implementation 
of government policy towards North Korea. Gi-Sun Won, the Head of the Inter-Korean 
Cooperation Fund of the Ministry of Unification, revealed the government decision to 
establish the Government-Civilian Council for North Korean Aid Policy that consisted 
of NGOs, the Ministry of Unification, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of 
Health and Welfare.171 Also, the CPS organised a series of 10policy forums during the 
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year of 2004. Through these policy seminars and conferences, the KSM continued to 
pressurise the Roh Moo-Hyun administration and the law makers at the National 
Assembly to improve government policy and regulations that restricted NGO 
participation in state policy making in relation to inter-Korean exchange and 
cooperation.   
The outbreak of the Ryongcheon Station Explosion in April 2004 provided 
momentum which ignited the advocacy of humanitarian aid to North Korea that was 
gradually fading after the government’s decision to provide government-level food and 
development aid to North Korea since 2000. After the Explosion, the KSM and the 
NGO Council established a network of the ‘Ryongcheon Movement’ consisting of 55 
NGOs. Despite this being a temporary network for 3 months, the Ryongcheon 
Movement actively engaged in organising public campaigns, press releases, lobbying 
the government, fundraising and delivering emergency and recovery aid directly to 
North Korea. In terms of the scale of fundraising, as a result, the Ryongcheon 
Movement raised $ 24.56 million, which was the largest fundraising amount that had 
been made for such a short period in Korean history.172 In addition, the successful role 
of the Ryongcheon Movement in steering and coordinating various humanitarian 
activities and actors became a critical force leading to the Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration finally establishing the ‘Government-Civilian Council for North Korean 
Aid Policy’ (the Government-Civilian Council) on 1 September.173 
Like the year 2004, the KSM in 2005 consistently sought to improve the role of 
NGOs in state policy making in relation to inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. To 
achieve these organisational goals, the main strategies that the KSM exploited were 
NGO and government consultative bodies, such as the Government-Civilian Council. 
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The KSM first exploited the Government-Civilian Council that was established on 1 
September. At the preparatory meetings for the establishment of the Government-
Civilian Council, the KSM delivered the administrative function of the NGO Council 
which was a counterpart of the government representing the humanitarian NGOs. Here 
the KSM insisted that the status of the Government-Civilian Council should be raised to 
the rank of Ministerial level.174 As a result of the Ministry of Unification’s persuasion, 
the Government-Civilian Council was established as a Vice-ministerial level body. After 
the establishment of the Government-Civilian Council, the NGO Council and the 
government agreed to establish the ‘Common Plan for 2005,’ ‘the Preparation of the 
Master Plan and Joint Projects for 2005’ (Master Plan) and ‘The Publication of the 
Proceeding of 10 years of Humanitarian Assistance to North Korea’. Although the 
Government and NGOs agreed to prepare the Master Plan, however, it was dissipated in 
the preparation because of the passive government stance. Some humanitarian NGOs 
also opposed the preparation of the Master Plan because of the lack of coordinative 
capability of the NGO Council as the consultative body among the humanitarian NGOs. 
These NGOs opposing the Master Plan also worried that the Master Plan might result in 
the restriction of NGO activities.175 In addition, the Government-Civilian Council 
proved inefficient to drive the preparation of the Master Plan, due to the absence of its 
permanent executive body. The Ministry of Unification and the NGO designated to the 
administrative organisation of the NGO Council took charge of the administrative role 
of the Government-Civilian Council. Without an increase in budget and personnel for 
managing the Government-Civilian Council, it was impossible to maintain efficiency.176 
The Government-Civilian Council meetings in fact were inefficient due to the lack of 
meeting information, the absence of preparation and coordination before the meeting, 
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and thereby the outcomes of the meeting were often too general. In this sense, Dong-
Wan Kang, Hyeon-Mo Yang and Won-Suk Suh evaluated the Government-Civilian 
Council as the policy implementation body, not the consultative body for policy 
making. 177  Although both movements of the promotion of the status of the 
Government-Civilian Council and the establishment of the Master Plan were not 
successful, the efforts of the NGO Council and the KSM that actively engaged in that 
process were meaningful in that these movements attempted to improve the influence of 
the humanitarian NGOs in the state policy-making process, by increasing the 
participation of NGO personnel.  
In 2005 the KSM exploited the CPS to institutionalise the provision of food aid to 
North Korea into state law and the participation of civil society in the state policy-
making process. The CPS held nine policy forums and four seminars in 2005. The 
topics of these policy forums and seminars were four aid related issues, two peace and 
unification related issues, three inter-Korean related issues and three general North 
Korea related issues.178 At these policy forums and seminars, the personnel from the 
government, NGOs, academics and the research institutes attended and made legal and 
institutional recommendations for the government and the National Assembly. The CPS, 
for instance, organised a policy forum with the Korea International Cooperation Agency 
(KOICA) on the theme of ‘A Strategy of Development Assistance to North Korea’ on 25 
October.179 At the forum, Professor Dae-Suk Choi of Dongguk University and the 
Policy Advisor of the KSM, asserted that the Government-Civilian Council was a 
consultative body that had no legal ground and therefore was an inefficient body.180 To 
be an efficient consultative body between the government and NGOs, Choi 
recommended that the executive body of the Government-Civilian Council and the 
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Inter-Korean Cooperation Foundation, which are supported by a legal foundation, 
should be established.181 
Under the suspension of government food and fertiliser aid after the missile 
launch in July, the flood damage in August 2006was the momentum that motivated the 
unfolding of the humanitarian flood-aid movement by the KSM. Given the operational 
environment, the KSM sought to proselytise the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to 
resume the flood and food aid to North Korea irrespective of North Korea’s missile 
launch. For this, the KSM exploited the existing consultative bodies of the NGO 
Council. The NGO Council extended the humanitarian flood-aid movement, separating 
the flood and food aid from the missile issue.182 After the missile launch in July, the 
representatives of the KSM gathered twice on 20 and 28 July and discussed the position 
of the KSM on North Korea’s missile launch. As a result of the two meetings, the 
representatives of the KSM adopted the official statement that the humanitarian flood 
aid, including the food and fertiliser aid, should be separated from the military and 
political issues while assuring transparency in the aid distribution.183 As the outbreak of 
the flood damage became known to South Korean Society in August, then, the KSM 
and the NGO Council organised an issue network that consisted of humanitarian, civil 
society, human rights and woman NGOs. Through the adoption of the Joint Statement, 
these NGOs and the KSM urged the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to resume 
humanitarian flood and food aid to North Korea.184 
The Korean Council, within which the KSM worked as a member, engaged in the 
advocacy of flood and food aid to North Korea. The Korean Council was active in the 
policy recommendation for the promotion of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation 
and the public consensus on the humanitarian aid to North Korea. At the 25th Sub-
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committee for Welfare on 7 March, the Korean Council suggested the establishment of a 
government agency to support private-level aid to North Korea.185 The 27th Sub-
committee for Welfare on 19 September recommended the government and NGOs work 
to improve public awareness over the contribution of the South Korean government in 
the humanitarian relief in North Korea and the necessity of continued aid to North 
Korea.186 After North Korea’s nuclear test, the 28th Sub-committee for Welfare on 23 
November suggested delivering the humanitarian food aid through the WFP rather than 
the bilateral channel. With the outbreak of the flood in July, in particular, Se-Hyeon 
Jeong, the President of the Korean Council and the former Minister of Unification, met 
Jong-Seok Lee, the Minister of Unification and urged the government to resume the 
humanitarian food and fertiliser aid to North Korea.187 
The 6.15 Joint Statement South Korean Committee (the 6.15 Committee) that was 
established in 2005 also engaged in the advocacy of flood aid to North Korea. The 6.15 
Committee was an umbrella body that consists of personnel mainly from the 
humanitarian NGOs including the KSM, former politicians and the unification 
movement NGOs. In this sense, the 6.15 Committee was one of the most influential 
networks to exert significant influence in state policy making towards North Korea. 
Given the suspension of food and fertiliser aid by the Roh Moo-Hyun administration 
after North Korea’s missile launch in July, the 6.15 Joint Statement North Korean 
Committee which was a counterpart in North Korea requested flood aid through the 
6.15 Committee on 9 August. Responding to the request, the 6.15 Committee met Jong-
Seok Lee and urged for government resumption of the emergency aid for the North 
Korean flood victims. At the meeting, the 6.15 Committee further emphasised that the 
scale of aid should not be a symbolic, but a significant amount including the food aid.188 
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In 2007, the last year of the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, the KSM, along 
with the NGO Council, were devoted to improving NGO practices in relation to 
humanitarian and development aid to North Korea. The KSM and the NGO Council 
engaged in the preparation of ‘A Code of Conduct’ that provided guidelines in the 
delivery of humanitarian and development aid to North Korea. After the peak of the 
North Korean food deficits around 1998, the international community and the domestic 
conservative groups criticised the South Korean humanitarian NGOs in that they did not 
secure transparency in the delivery of aid, heavily emphasising brotherly love and 
humanitarianism. Despite the public opinion polls that called for the improvement of 
monitoring aid distribution in North Korea, the humanitarian NGOs were not able to 
improve this monitoring. In this situation, donor fatigue regarding the continued aid to 
North Korea began to accumulate in South Korean civil society. 189  Given this 
operational environment, the NGO Council started a preparatory meeting for the 
establishment of ‘A Code of Conduct’ in 2007 and held two preparatory meetings on 28 
May and 18 September.190 
In 2007, the KSM sought to evaluate the role and activities of humanitarian 
NGOs during the Roh Moo-Hyun administration and provide policy recommendations 
for the future direction of humanitarian NGOs in the new administration in 2008. In this 
process, the KSM exploited the CPS and the Korean Council. The CPS and the Korean 
Council organised six policy forums and expert conferences in 2007. Through these 
joint forums and conferences, the KSM and the Korean Council sought to evaluate the 
role and activities of humanitarian NGOs during the Roh Moo-Hyun administration. 
The KSM and the Korean Council next sought to identify the role of NGOs and 
government in the new administration.191 At the policy forum on 9 October, in 
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particular, Jeong-Soo Kim, the Head of the Humanitarian Cooperation Bureau of the 
Ministry of Unification, for the first time as a government official, suggested that the 
government needed to establish the policy and legal foundations to allow the 
government to provide humanitarian and development aid to North Korea prior 
to/without the official request of North Korea.192 
 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter demonstrated that the KSM’s capacities were consequential in explaining 
the ability of KSM advocacy to set agendas, network and engage in the grafting of 
norms in respect of the Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun  
administrations’ policy on food aid to North Korea between 1995 and 2007. 
In the beginning of the advocacy of food aid to North Korean between 1995 and 
1997, the lack of organisational experience and expertise in the advocacy of food aid 
which resulted from KSM’s short organisational activities resulted in adopting the 
existing agenda framing although the existing agenda framing was the most 
fundamental framing strategy appealing to the emotion of people. The KSM first 
adopted the most fundamental framing strategy of appealing to nationalism by framing 
food aid to North Korea as ‘brotherly love’ and ‘a peaceful unification movement.’ By 
doing so, the KSM sought to mitigate the hostility inherent in South Korean civil society. 
To overcome the severe political confrontation and the prolonged hostility behind the 
Kim Young-Sam administration and civil society in 1996, the KSM exploited the 
universal norm of humanitarianism for the first time. In 1997, the KSM again exploited 
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the regional and ethnic distinctiveness of its advocacy in issue framing by framing the 
food aid to North Korea as ‘a movement for preventing war and alleviating political and 
military tension on the Korean peninsula’.  
However, a strong mandate to advocate food aid to North Korea and the 
distinctive organisational structure consisting of a wide range of networks and advocacy 
instead enabled the KSM to unfold its influential advocacy nationwide. During the Kim 
Young-Sam administration, firstly, the unique organisational structure of the KSM 
enabled it to establish a wide range of high-status networks able to influence the whole 
South Korean civil society. In 1995, the Inter-religious Committee, the predecessor of 
the KSM, was established as a broad network including the largest six South Korean 
religious orders. By including the rational-centrist NGOs in the establishment of the 
KSM, the KSM came to exercise its advocacy influence on the whole South Korean 
civil society as well as the six largest religious orders in 1996. In 1997 the KSM further 
broadened its network to overseas, while seeking to strengthen its network by 
establishing an umbrella body for the coordination of different networks and 
humanitarian NGOs.  
With regard to norm grafting in the Kim Young-Sam administration, the grafting 
strategies which the KSM mainly exploited gradually developed from 1995. Although 
the Inter-religious Committee, the predecessor of the KSM, was established in 1995, the 
representatives, directors, board members, secretary and staff of the KSM already had 
expertise in social movement through South Korea’s democratisation movement during 
the 1970s and 1980s. In the beginning of the advocacy of food aid to North Korea from 
1995 and 1996, however, the KSM largely relied on conventional activities, such as 
public campaigns, press releases and lobbying politicians. It was attributable to the fact 
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that the KSM had no experience in the advocacy of aid during that time. The KSM 
which accumulated its expertise in the advocacy of food aid through the two years of 
movement then moved to a more developed form of grafting strategy in 1997, 
exploiting more influential and nationwide movements. A presidential candidate debate 
on the issue of food aid to North Korea in particular was a movement that was able to 
convey the KSM and other humanitarian NGOs’ demands to the state food aid policy 
makers. The reason that the KSM was able to exploit such influential and vigorous 
nationwide grafting strategies in 1997 was that the KSM was motivated by a strong 
humanitarian mandate and that the KSM had a broad network which was established as 
an overarching constitution enabled them to network with various groups in South 
Korean civil society.  
       The advocacy of the KSM in the Kim Dae-Jung administration can be divided 
into two stages at the point of the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000. The style of the 
advocacy of the KSM was closely related to the changes in KSM organisational 
capacity at this time. Before the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000, the KSM adhered to 
their mandate to advocate for the provision of food aid to North Korea although this had 
become weakened in comparison to the mandate in the Kim Young-Sam administration. 
As the advocacy of food aid to North Korean continued, the KSM was also able to 
accumulate organisational expertise in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea. Based 
on these improvements in organisational capacity, the ability of the KSM in agenda 
framing, networking and norm grafting consistently developed. The KSM was timely in 
its framing of the issue of food aid and effectively responding to changes in inter-
Korean relations. When the Kim Dae-Jung administration had not yet established its 
policy towards North Korea in 1998, the KSM framed the food aid to North Korea as 
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‘the obligation of government.’ When the Kim Dae-Jung administration proclaimed its 
engagement policy in 1999 and 2000, the KSM framed the food aid as ‘a peaceful 
unification movement.’ With regard to the networking during this period, the KSM 
consistently broadened its networks with other humanitarian and social movement 
NGOs and also increased the status of networks by networking with government policy 
makers, experts groups and social and political elders. With regard to the norm grafting 
during this period, the KSM mainly exploited conventional advocacy strategies, such as 
public campaigns, policy workshops for the increase of public awareness about the food 
crisis in North Korea and a petition to the President. The KSM in addition exploited the 
government consultative bodies, such as the Unification Advisory Meeting, the Korean 
Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation and the NGO Council for Cooperation with 
North Korea. 
      After the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000, then, the KSM expanded their mandates 
to include inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. Such diversification of the 
organisational mandate resulted in the weakening of the humanitarian mandate to 
relieve the food crisis in North Korea, by diluting the previous single mandate and 
thereby scattering the organisational resources. On the contrary, with regard to the 
funding capacity, the KSM expanded its funding sources and therefore stabilised its 
organisational ground. The diversification of funding sources through new aid 
programmes, government deregulation in relation to NGO fundraising and government 
funding for humanitarian NGOs’ activities in North Korea contributed to the 
stabilisation of KSM funding capacity. With improvement in the funding capacity, the 
KSM began to stabilise its organisational structure by restructuring it to a function-
centred structure, by establishing issue-specific committees and divisions and by 
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appointing experienced experts to these new positions. The KSM further strengthened 
coordination of the overall structure and divisions by strengthening the function of the 
Planning and Coordination Division and assigning more administrative staff.  
      Changes in the political operational environment in where the KSM worked and 
in the organisational capacity of the KSM resulted in changes in the ability of the KSM 
in the agenda framing, networking and norm grafting. The mandate of the KSM which 
was weakened after the Inter-Korean Summit in June 2000 resulted in the weakening of 
the ability of KSM in the agenda framing. In 2001 and 2002, the KSM framed the food 
aid to North Korea as ‘a mutually winning movement’ for both South and North Korea 
but it was less appealing framing compared to appealing to the sense of brotherly love 
and humanitarianism. During this period between 2000 and 2002, however, the KSM 
consistently improved its quality of networks. By exploiting its unique organisational 
structure, the KSM appointed various civil and government experts and scholars who 
had expertise in inter-Korean exchange and cooperation to positions on the Policy 
Advisory Committee of the KSM. The KSM also strengthened its networks with other 
humanitarian NGOs, by establishing the official NGO consultative body of the ‘NGO 
Council for Cooperation with North Korea.’ Based on these high status networks, the 
KSM exploited these networks as main grafting strategy. After the Inter-Korean Summit 
in 2000, more specifically, the exploited the government and NGO consultative bodies, 
such as the Unification Advisory Meeting, the Korean Council for Reconciliation and 
Cooperation and the NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea, rather than the 
conventional advocacy strategies. Between 2000 and 2002, the KSM in addition 
organised various advocacy activities abroad. Through these activities at the 
international level, the KSM pressurised the international community to take further 
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action to relieve the food crisis in North Korea. Through these international activities, 
the KSM sought to pressurise the Kim Dae-Jung administration from the outside. 
        The Roh Moo-Hyun administration was the most active government in 
respect of the institutionalisation of NGO participation in state policy making and the 
provision of aid to North Korea. Given this operational environment, the KSM 
diversified its mandate to the delivery of development aid to North Korea. The 
diversification of KSM organisational mandate resulted in the weakening of the 
humanitarian mandate to relieve the food crisis in North Korea, by diluting the previous 
single mandate and thereby scattering the organisational resources. KSM advocacy of 
food aid therefore was not the primary mandate. During the Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration, the KSM thereby was prone to re-use existing agenda framing which 
was developed during the previous administrations.  
      During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, however, the KSM strengthened its 
role in civil participation, policy research and development. It further stabilised its 
function-centred structure by dividing the existing four administrative divisions into 
five divisions and two centres according to its function. In doing so, the KSM was able 
to maintain the highest level of organisational expertise in the advocacy and delivery of 
humanitarian and development aid to North Korea. Such improvement in the 
organisational expertise enabled the KSM to increase the quality of networks. In 
addition, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s institutionalisation of government-NGO 
consultative bodies in the state policy-making process enabled the KSM to expand its 
networks with state policy makers. In 2004, the NGO Council, which was steered by the 
KSM, and the Roh Moo-Hyun administration established ‘the Government-Civilian 
Council for North Korean Aid Policy’ as the official government and NGO consultative 
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body in relation to inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. In this year of 2004, the 
KSM’s cooperative relationship with the National Assembly Research Meeting and the 
establishment of the Centre for Peace Sharing under the structure of the KSM also 
increased the quality of the KSM network, enabling the KSM to get access to congress 
law makers, experts from other humanitarian NGOs, academia and think tanks, and 
government officials. In the same vein, the KSM exploited these networks as a main 
grafting strategy. KSM advocacy targeting civil society decreased, but the KSM grafting 
strategies were the most effective in respect of its influence on the state policy-making 
process. The KSM strengthened the role of NGO consultative bodies as the counterpart 
of government in state aid policy making. Based on these consolidated networks, the 
KSM engaged in the establishment of government consultative bodies and exploited 
these institutions to get access to state food aid policy makers directly. 
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CHAPTER 6. THE ADVOCACY OF GOOD FRIENDS  
 
  
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter demonstrates that differing non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
capacities were consequential in explaining the ability of NGO advocacy to set agendas, 
network and engage in the grafting of norms in respect of South Korean government 
policy on food aid to North Korea.  
With regard to agenda framing, Good Friends framed the issue of food aid to 
North Korea in four different ways: ‘brotherly love,’ ‘a facilitator for the improvement 
of North Korean human rights and the peaceful unification,’ ‘the protection of human 
rights’ and ‘humanitarianism.’  
In regard to networking, Good Friends was active in networking with other 
humanitarian NGOs particularly the Korean Sharing Movement (KSM) and NGO 
consultative bodies, such as the NGO Council for Cooperation with North Korea (the 
NGO Council), the Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation (the Korean 
Council) and the 6.15 Joint Statement South Korean Committee (the 6.15 Committee). 
The distinctive characteristic of Good Friends networking, however, was that Good 
Friends established a wide network with the international community particularly NGOs, 
government personnel in the United States and Japan and United Nations agencies.  
Based on such agenda framing and established networking, Good Friends 
pressurised the government and South Korean civil society to embrace new norms in 
relation to food aid to North Korea. At this stage of norm grafting, Good Friends mainly 
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used information politics, which collects ongoing information on the severity of food 
shortages in North Korea and disseminates the information through various channels of 
public campaigns, the mass media and press conferences, workshops and policy 
conferences, and publishing reports. The ability of Good Friends advocacy to set 
agendas, network and engage in the grafting of norms in respect of South Korean 
government policy on food aid to North Korea, however, was not always timely or 
effective. This chapter demonstrates that changes in the issue characteristics of the food 
crisis, the domestic political structure and changes in Good Friends’ capability 
circumscribed or promoted the advocacy capacity of Good Friends. 
For the examination of Good Friends advocacy, this chapter uses annual reports, 
conference proceedings, web-databases, newspaper articles and masters’ theses1 as the 
background materials. Annual reports 2  published by Good Friends also provide 
background information on the activities of Good Friends. To have access to detailed 
data on their activities, this chapter uses conference proceedings,3 email newsletters and 
web-databases of NGOs4 and newspaper articles.5 As one of the major strategies for 
advocacy directed at the government and the public, Good Friends organised a series of 
policy conferences, symposiums, forums and international conferences;6 the chapters 
therefore examine conference proceedings too. The representatives and high-ranking 
personnel of Good Friends generally have more information on the advocacy in which 
they were involved. To examine the role of representatives and high-ranking personnel 
of Good Friends, the chapter therefore uses interviews with the representatives and 
high-ranking personnel.7 
This chapter consists of three main sections, an introduction and conclusion 
section. The first section examines how Good Friends framed the issue of food aid to 
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North Korea. The second section next examines the networks which Good Friends 
established so as to achieve its organisational goals. The third section lastly examines 
the grafting strategies which Good Friends exploited to change the existing norms and 
practices of the government and the public with new norms and practices. 
 
 
6.2 Agenda Setting 
 
This section demonstrates that by reframing the issue of food aid to North Korea, Good 
Friends sought to promote the new norm of food aid to North Korea to resonate with the 
government and civil society. Good Friends framed the issue of food aid to North Korea 
in four different ways: ‘brotherly love,’ ‘a facilitator for the improvement of North 
Korean human rights and the peaceful unification,’ ‘the protection of human rights’ and 
‘humanitarianism.’ Changes in the operational environment and the organisational 
capacity of Good Friends explain these different ways of agenda framing. To 
demonstrate this argument, this section examines how Good Friends framed the issue of 
food aid to North Korea and shows why the ways of Good Friends agenda framing 
changed over time.  
 
 
6.2.1 Agenda Framing in the Kim Young-Sam Administration 
 
During the Kim Young-Sam administration, Good Friends’ agenda framing was 
consistent in seeking to replace the dominant hostility towards North Korea with 
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‘brotherly love,’ allowing South Korean civil society to recognise the North Korean 
people as their compatriots, thereby helping them, irrespective of the differences in 
ideology and the political system. In this sense, Good Friends consistently framed the 
food aid to North Korea as ‘brother love’ for the North Korean compatriots during the 
Kim Young-Sam administration. 
In 1995, the Korean Buddhist Sharing Movement (KBSM), the predecessor of 
Good Friends, concluded that appealing to ‘brotherly love’ produced the strongest 
persuasive power to overcome the dominant hostility towards North Korea.8 Good 
Friends therefore used ‘brotherly love’ for the North Korean compatriots as a main 
frame to support South Korean civil society. 
On 12 December 1996, Good Friends was established at the time that the KSM’s 
advocacy was almost suspended by the Kangreung Submarine Infiltration in September 
1996. Given the suspension of the advocacy of food aid to North Korea, Good Friends 
sought to press the Kim Young-Sam administration and South Korean civil society to 
resume the humanitarian aid to North Korea.9 Good Friends recognised that the only 
rationale able to overcome the ideological hostility towards North Korea was to press 
South Korean civil society to take action to relieve the humanitarian crisis in North 
Korea through ‘brotherly love’ for the North Korean compatriots.10 Based on this basic 
concept and the agenda framing, Good Friends endeavoured to collect ongoing 
information and visual data concerning the situation of food deficits through a refuge 
survey at the Korean-Chinese border.11 Disseminating this ongoing information and 
visual data, Good Friends created a sense of ‘urgency’ and ‘compassion’ in South 
Korean civil society, by allowing them to imagine the painful situation of their North 
Korean compatriots and children, who might die after only a few hours or days, without 
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urgent food aid.12 
 
 
6.2.2 Agenda Framing in the Kim Dae-Jung Administration 
 
From 1998 until 1999, Good Friends consistently engaged in the advocacy of food aid 
to North Korea pressurising the Kim Dae-Jung administration and the international 
community to provide food aid to North Korea. In the agenda framing during this period, 
Good Friends used a different agenda framing strategy, dividing the object of the 
advocacy movement into the two groups of South Korean civil society and the 
international community. Similarly with its activities, Good Friends continuously 
framed food aid to North Korea as that of a norm of ‘brotherly love’ for compatriots.13 
With regard to the agenda framing for the international community, however, Good 
Friends used the universal value of ‘humanitarianism.’ Good Friends visited the United 
States six times between 1997 and 1999 and Japan four times between 1998 and 1999. 
Good Friends sought to urge the policy makers and NGOs in the U.S., Japanese NGOs 
and the international agencies, such as the WFP, UNDP and UNICEF, to take further 
action to relieve the humanitarian crisis in North Korea.14 In these advocacy activities 
to press the international community, Good Friends appealed to the norm of 
‘humanitarianism.’ 
From 2000 to 2002, Good Friends framed food aid to North Korea as a 
‘facilitator’ for the improvement of the North Korean human rights condition and 
unification. Given the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s pledge of government-level food 
aid to North Korea after the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000, Good Friends began to 
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diversify its mandate to the issues of North Korean human rights and refugees at the 
Korean-Chinese border and the reunification movement. Good Friends, however, did 
not terminate the advocacy of food aid entirely. Good Friends consistently incorporated 
the advocacy of food aid to North Korea into the diversified mandates along with 
projects of North Korean human rights and the peaceful unification movement.15 Good 
Friends, for instance, organised ‘24 Hours, 1000 Days Devotional Service for the 
National Reconciliation and Unification’ from 1 March 2000 to 26 November 2002. 
Good Friends also advocated for the Kim Dae-Jung administration and South Korean 
civil society to take further action to relieve the humanitarian crisis in North Korea.16 In 
these advocacy activities, Good Friends framed the food aid to North Korea as a 
‘facilitator’ for the improvement of North Korean human rights and inter-Korean 
reconciliation.17 
 
 
6.2.3 Agenda Framing in the Roh Moo-Hyun Administration 
 
Good Friends exploited the universal values of human rights and humanitarianism in 
agenda framing. Good Friends framed the food aid to North Korea as ‘the protection of 
the right to food’ in 2003, 2004 and 2005. With the resumption of the advocacy of food 
aid to North Korea in 2006, Good Friends framed the food aid to North Korea as 
‘humanitarianism,’ separating the North Korean flood victims from the North Korean 
regime which conducted negative military actions, such as the missile and nuclear test 
in 2006, in the midst of the internal humanitarian crisis. 
In2003, Good Friends framed the food aid to North Korea as ‘the protection of 
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basic human rights.’ Before Good Friends’ human rights framing in 2003, the South 
Korean humanitarian NGOs had described the provision of humanitarian aid to North 
Korea as ‘an activity of improving human rights of the North Korean People’ at ‘The 3rd 
International NGO Conference on Humanitarian Aid to North Korea’ from 17 to 20 
June 2001.’18 This framing, however, aimed to pressurise the international community, 
who were showing donor fatigue in relation to humanitarian aid to North Korea, to take 
more action to relieve the crisis. From 2003, Good Friends adopted this framing for the 
domestic advocacy movement. Framing the food aid to North Korea as ‘the protection 
of the right to food for North Korean compatriots,’ Good Friends asserted that North 
Korean human rights had deteriorated as a consequence of the food crisis.19 Although 
Good Friends concluded the importance of the civil and political rights of the North 
Korean people, Good Friends also denounced the human rights movement of these 
NGOs. Good Friends worried that the human rights movement were prone to be 
diverted into a regime change movement due to their heavy focus on civil and political 
rights. Good Friends therefore asserted that under the severe food deficit, the right to 
food which was derived from the economic rights was much more critical for North 
Korean people than their civil and political rights.20 
    In the midst of the worsening public opinion due to North Korea’s missile launch 
on 5 July and nuclear test on 9 October in 2006, Good Friends framed the food aid to 
North Korea as the action of ‘humanitarianism’. North Korea’s missile and nuclear test 
in 2006 were enough to stir a sense of betrayal in South Korean civil society as these 
military provocations occurred while the Roh administration and South Korean civil 
society continued to provide large-scale food and development aid to North Korea.21 
Immediately after the missile launch and nuclear test in July 2006, Good Friends came 
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to understand the high possibility of the recurrence of a second food deficit crisis in 
North Korea resulting from the flood damage in July 2006.22 Given this operational 
environment, Good Friends separated the North Korean flood victims from the North 
Koran regime, appealing to the universal norm of ‘humanitarianism.’23 In doing so, 
Good Friends attempted to overcome the sense of betrayal in South Korean civil society 
and thereby resume the food aid for flood victims in North Korea. 
 
 
6.3 Networking 
 
The distinctive characteristics of Good Friends’ networks were that Good Friends 
focused on building international networks and that Good Friends networking was 
limited to a specific period between 1996 and 1999. Since its inception in December 
1996 Good Friends established a wide network with the international community, 
particularly the policy makers in the U.S. government, U.S. and Japanese NGOs, and 
the U.N. agencies of the WFP, UNDP and UNICEF. With the diversification of the 
Good Friends’ mandate and the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s positive policy on the 
provision of large-scale food aid to North Korea late in its administration, however, 
Good Friends networking focused on maintaining the existing networks. 
 
 
6.3.1 Networking in the Kim Young-Sam Administration 
 
Good Friends was established by 33 Buddhist organisations.24 Good Friends further 
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maintained a wide collaborative network with other humanitarian NGOs in relation to 
the advocacy of food aid to North Korea. The distinctive characteristic of Good Friends 
networking, however, was its effort to establish the international network in 1997. 
     Good Friends maintained a strong network with the Buddhist organisations. As 
examined in the chapter on the organisational mandate, the KBSM, the predecessor of 
Good Friends, was established by 33 Buddhist organisations in late 1996.25 For this 
reason, Good Friends played a steering role in the Buddhist organisations in the 
advocacy of food aid to North Korea. During the year of 1997, Good Friends organised 
twelve workshops and eight independent public campaigns, along with various Buddhist 
groups in 1997.26 Good Friends also issued an appeal letter to Buddhist leaders on 18 
April.27 On 4 June, Good Friends, in addition, held a workshop urging the leaders and 
executives of Buddhist organisations to take further action to relieve the food crisis in 
North Korea.28 
Good Friends was active in establishing networks with other humanitarian NGOs. 
The President of Good Friends, Revd Beobryun, strengthened its network with the KSM 
by accepting the position of Co-chair of the Executive Committee of the KSM.29 In 
doing so, Good Friends actively engaged in the preparation of most events and 
campaigns by the KSM. Good Friends also expanded its network by joining the 
Brotherly Love Pan-national which was an alliance network consisting of 30 NGOs.30 
The Brotherly Love Pan-national then established the National Convention of Civil 
Societies for Northern Brotherly Aid’ (the National Convention) on 30 June 1997.31 
The National Convention was the first and largest network consisting of a total of 112 
organisations of humanitarian NGOs, civil society organisations and religious groups 
participating in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea.32 By actively joining these 
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networks, Good Friends widened its networks with other humanitarian NGOs. 
 Good Friends was the most active in building international networks. Good 
Friends actively attended international conferences, including the ‘International Council 
on the Food Shortage Crisis of North Korea’ in Seoul from 10-12 March 1997 and the 
‘Musgrove II: International Consultation on Emergency Food Situation in North Korea’ 
from 24 to 25 June 1997.33 In doing so, Good Friends sought to expand its international 
networks.  
Good Friends endeavoured to establish its own networks in the United States. 
In 1997, Good Friends visited the United States three times. For the first trip from 13 to 
25 March, Good Friends visited five areas of San Diego, Los Angeles, Orange County, 
Chicago and New York. For the second trip, from 31 August to 10 September, Good 
Friends visited Washington, D.C., Los Angeles and New York. During the last trip from 
15 to 20 December 1997, they visited Washington, D.C. and New York.34 The main 
objectives of these trips were to establish a network with the local Korean community 
leaders and Korean-Americans, the relief NGOs, the U.S. government officials and the 
U.N. agencies. In doing so, Good Friends pressed these groups to take action to relieve 
the humanitarian crisis in North Korea. In 1997, however, the first and second trips had 
a limited outcome in that Good Friends had difficulties in getting access to the policy 
makers in the U.S. government and the U.N. agencies. The last trip from 15 to 20 
December 1997 resulted in the status of Good Friends in the United States improving 
after they issued ‘The Report of ’97 Food Deficits Testified by 204 Food Refugees.’ 
This was important as at that time there was a lack of reliable and ongoing information 
regarding the North Korea food crisis.35 Before going to the U.S., Good Friends 
prepared ‘The Report of Food Deficits Testified by 472 North Korean Food Refugees’ 
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which was a more developed version of ‘The Report of ’97 Food Deficits Testified by 
204 Food Refugees’ in 1997. The report contributed to increasing Good Friends’ 
international network by allowing Good Friends to obtain access to the policy makers in 
the U.S. government and the international agencies which began to recognise the value 
of the scientific data of the food crisis in North Korea. 
Based on this report, Good Friends was able to get access to U.N. agencies, 
the policy makers in the U.S. government and the U.S. NGOs. Good Friends established 
networks with U.N. personnel, such as Xiaolin Chai, the Programme Officer for the 
Asia Section of UNICEF, Mohamed Kouhene from the WFP, and Andres Ramirez and 
Kazuhide Kuroda, the Emergency Relief Coordinators of the UNHCR. Good Friends 
also met Tony P. Hall, a Congressman of the House of Representatives, Leonard Rogers 
and David N. Hagen from the Bureau for Humanitarian Response Office of Food for 
Peace of the U.S. Agency for International Development Bureau (USAID) and Richard 
F. Ragan, Director for Democracy, Human Rights, and Humanitarian Affairs of the 
National Security Council in the White House. 36  Good Friends also established 
networks with U.S. NGOs, such as Stephen W. Linton, the President of the Eugene Bell 
Foundation, Andrew Natsios, the Vice President of World Vision, Mike Jedrejczyk, the 
Human Rights Watch Representative of Washington, D.C. and James K. Bishop, a 
Representative of InterAction.37 
 
 
6.3.2 Networking in the Kim Dae-Jung Administration 
 
From 1998 to 1999, Good Friends established networks with the international 
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community in particular the policy makers in the U.S. government, U.S. and Japanese 
NGOs and U.N. agencies. With the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s active policy on the 
provision of food aid to North Korea and the deregulation of NGO participation in the 
state policy making process after the political rapprochement in June 2000, Good 
Friends came to establish a network which was able to gain access to state policy 
makers and to strengthen a collaborative network with other humanitarian NGOs. 
Following the first trip in December 1997, Good Friends made a second trip to 
the U.S. from 20 to 27 February 1998. After this second trip and networking, Good 
Friends organised two other trips to the U.S. in 1998 and another trip in 1999. Good 
Friends also carried out three trips to Japan in 1998 and another trip in 1999.38 Also, 
Good Friends exploited international conferences to widen its international networks. 
Good Friends, along with the KSM, the International Corn Foundation and Okedongmu 
held the ‘Korea-Japan NGO Forum on the Humanitarian Aid for North Korea’ at the 
‘Korea-Japan NGO Symposium’ in Tokyo from 19 to 22 February 1999.39 Good 
Friends participated in the ‘Beijing International NGO Conference on the Humanitarian 
Support for North Korea’ in Beijing from 3 to 5 May 1999.40 On 13 October 1999, 
Good Friends also held a workshop ‘The Situation of Refugees in Asia and the Role of 
NGOs to Solve the North Korean Refugee Issues’ during the ‘International NGO 
Conference in Seoul.’41 
After the political rapprochement in June 2000, the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration was more active in the promotion of NGO participation in state policy 
making. Given this operational environment, Good Friends began to institutionalise 
networks with the state as well as other humanitarian NGOs. An-Sook Jung, the 
Secretary General of Good Friends was appointed to the position of Policy Advisory to 
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the Committee of Humanitarian Support Bureau within the Ministry of Unification from 
August 2000 to July 2001.42 Good Friends also appointed Hee-Ryong Won, the 
Congressman of the Grand National Party, to the position of Joint-representative of 
Good Friends in 2000.43 In doing so, Good Friends came to have a network which was 
able to exert direct influence on the state policy-making process.  
Besides, Good Friend consistently maintained a collaborative network with the 
KSM and other humanitarian NGOs, attending the establishment of the NGO 
consultative body. In January 2001, Good Friends and other humanitarian NGOs finally 
developed the ‘NGO Meeting for North Korean Assistance’ which was a temporary 
NGO consultative body established in April 1999 to ‘the NGO Council for Cooperation 
with North Korea (the NGO Council) which had permanent status and an administrative 
body.44 With the establishment of the NGO Council, Good Friends came to have an 
institutionalised network which was able to enable Good Friends and other 
humanitarian NGOs to coordinate their advocacy and aid programmes. The NGO 
Council also played the role of representing the humanitarian NGOs at the discussion 
table with the government in relation to inter-Korean exchange and cooperation 
including food aid to North Korea. Good Friends thereby came to have an official 
network linking them with other humanitarian NGOs and the state too.  
 
 
6.3.3 Networking in the Roh Moo-Hyun Administration 
 
From 2003 until 2005, Good Friends endeavoured to establish its international network 
to publicise framing the norm of ‘the right to food’ to the international community. With 
348 
the establishment of the Peace Foundation in 2004, Good Friends further strengthened 
its network with various social and religious leaders and distinguished academics.45 In 
the advocacy of food aid to North Korea which resumed after the flood damage in 2006 
and 2007, Good Friends mainly exploited NGO consultative bodies, such as the Korean 
Council, the NGO Council and the 6.15 Committee, to get access to other humanitarian 
NGOs and the state food aid decision makers.46 
Given the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s continued food aid to North Korea 
and the relatively stable food demand and consumption in North Korea between 2003 
and 2005, the advocacy of food aid to North Korea by Good Friends was not active. 
Good Friends instead focused on the issues of North Korean human rights and refugees 
at the Korean-Chinese border, framing the food aid to North Korea as ‘the right to food’ 
and targeting the international community. Good Friends focused on the establishment 
of the international network to publicise the framing of ‘the right to food’ to the 
international Community. Good Friends organised a joint press conference with the 
French human rights NGO, the ‘International Federation for Human Rights’ during ‘The 
31st U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ in November 2003.47 In 
March 2004, Good Friends attended ‘The 60th U.N. Human Rights Committee’ as an 
observer and organised ‘A Symposium on the Improvement of North Korean Human 
Rights’ in Geneva. Through these activities, Good Friends expanded its networks with 
the international community and the U.N. human rights agencies in 2003 and 2004. 
At the domestic level, the establishment of the Peace Foundation in 2004 
provided Good Friends with a strong network. The Peace Foundation aimed to advocate 
peace and unification in the Korean peninsula, but the Peace Foundation often engaged 
in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea. In respect of networking, Revd Beobryun 
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maintained his two positions as the President of Good Friends and the President of the 
Peace Foundation.48 An-Sook Jung, the former Secretary General of Good Friends, was 
also appointed to the position of Secretary General of the Peace Foundation.49 Through 
this process, the wide network of the Peace Foundation was exploited for the advocacy 
of food aid to North Korea.  
Sik An, a Policy Advisor of Good Friends, proposed ‘The Special Act for the 
Humanitarian Aid to the North Korean Residents’ at the Peace Foundation’s policy 
symposium on 15 November 2005.50 The executive boards of the Peace Foundation 
consisted of personnel who maintained a close relationship with Good Friends. Young-
Hoon Suh, the former President of the Korean Red Cross and as Advisor of the KSM, 
knew Good Friends through the joint activities with the KSM since 1996. Jae-Sik Oh, 
the former President of World Vision Korea and Steve Linton, the President of the 
Eugene Bell Foundation, sat on the advisory committee. Both were personnel who had 
worked with Good Friends since 1997. Min Cho, a senior researcher from the KINU, 
Professor Young-Soo Kim of Sogang University and Sung-Ryeol Cho, the Director of 
the Centre for International Relations Studies of the Research Institute for International 
Affairs were appointed to the Board of Directors and were also actively engaged in 
Good Friends’ activities.51 Nak-Cheong Baek, who was the Executive Director of the 
6.15 Committee, exercised direct influence on the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s 
policy towards North Korea in relation to inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. Baek 
was one member of the advisory committee of the Peace Foundation. Such wide 
networks of the Peace Foundation were exploited by Good Friends too. 
With the suspension of government food aid to North Korea after North Korea’s 
missile test in July 2006, Good Friends resumed its advocacy exploiting its 
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collaborative networks, such as the Korean Council, the NGO Council and the 6.15 
Committee. Good Friends urged the Roh Moo-Hyun administration and South Korean 
civil society to resume the flood aid and government food aid suspended after the 
missile and nuclear test.  
 
 
6.4 Norm Grafting 
 
Good Friends exploited the differing grafting strategies to promote the government and 
South Korean civil society to embrace the norm of food aid to North Korea. The main 
grafting strategy which Good Friends exploited to pressurise the Kim Young-Sam 
administration and civil society to take action to relieve the humanitarian crisis in North 
Korea was to increase public awareness of food aid to North Korea. To this end, Good 
Friends mainly exploited the conventional grafting strategies of public education on the 
issue, press releases and press conferences, public campaigns and lobbying politicians, 
political parties and the government.  
Until the resumption of the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s large-scale food aid 
in 2000, Good Friends consistently exploited information politics and international 
networks as the main grafting strategies. Between 1998 and 2000, Good Friends 
particularly devoted time to the research of and publication on the severity of the food 
crisis in North Korea and disseminating this ongoing information to South Korean civil 
society through various channels. Another distinctive characteristic in this period was 
the advocacy movement exploiting international networks. Good Friends organised 
advocacy trips to the United States and Japan to let the international community know 
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the severity of the food crisis in North Korea and thereby take action to relieve the 
humanitarian crisis in North Korea.  
After the Inter-Korean Summit Talk in June 2000, the large-scale government 
food aid to North Korea accelerated the diversification of the Good Friends 
organisational mandate. Such diversification resulted in the weakening of Good Friends 
activity for norm grafting until the suspension of food aid after the missile launch in 
June 2006. 
The flood damage in July 2006 became a strong motivation for Good Friends to 
resume its advocacy movement urging for the recommencement of food and flood aid to 
North Korea. Given changes in the operational environment, Good Friends exploited 
two major grafting strategies: information politics, which publicises the recurrence of 
severe famine in North Korea, and accountability politics, which proselytises the 
relevant authority, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, to take action to relieve the 
humanitarian crisis. 
 
 
6.4.1 Norm Grafting in the Kim Young-Sam Administration 
 
Good Friends extended the most vigorous advocacy of food aid to North Korea 
throughout its entire advocacy from 1996 to 2007. The main grafting strategy which 
Good Friends exploited to press the Kim Young-Sam administration and the civil 
society to take action to relieve the humanitarian crisis in North Korea was to increase 
public awareness of the food aid to North Korea. To this end, Good Friends mainly 
exploited the conventional grafting strategies of public education on the issue, press 
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releases and press conferences, public campaigns and lobbying politicians, political 
parties and the government. 
Good Friends exploited information politics. Good Friends quickly and credibly 
generated ongoing information on the situation of food deficits and disseminated it in a 
timely manner to press the Kim Young-Sam administration and civil society to resume 
the food aid to North Korea. In 1996 and 1997 the actual condition of the food crisis in 
North Korea became known to the international society, but the awareness of the food 
deficits was still low in South Korean civil society. To identify the severity of the food 
deficits in North Korea, Good Friends carried out ten field surveys through interviews 
with North Korean refugees at the Korean-Chinese border during the year 1997 starting 
with the first on 17 December 1996.52 
Based on these field surveys, the tactics that Good Friends exploited to urge the 
Kim Young-Sam administration and civil society to resume food aid to North Korea 
were through public lectures, conferences and publishing related reports. In 1997 Good 
Friends organised a total of 58 public lectures and these public lectures targeted 
influential political and social groups. Good Friends organised two lectures for 
congressional aides on 3 and 25 April and one public lecture for the judicial apprentices 
at the Government Judicial Research and Training Institute on 2 June.53 Good Friends 
held four public lectures for the biggest and most influential civil movement NGOs in 
South Korea; four public lectures for the local branches of the National Alliance for 
Democracy & Reunification of Korea; one public lecture for the People’s Solidarity for 
Participatory Democracy on 9 July; and one public lecture for the Korean Teachers & 
Educational Workers Union on 10 June.54 Good Friends delivered lectures at thirteen 
different universities and three youth clubs. Also, good Friends informed the seminar 
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and conference participants of the severity of the food crisis in North Korea, attending 
seven seminars and conferences pertaining to the food crisis in North Korea.55 Lastly, 
Good Friends published three reports on the situation of food deficits in North Korea, 
during the year 1996 and 1997, with press conferences. These reports were ‘A Report on 
the Field Survey in Korean-Chinese’ on 23 December 1996, ‘1600 km along the Yalu 
River and Dumen River’ on 31 January 1997 and ‘Child Malnutrition and Cause of 
Death’ on 28 October 1997.56 
       Good Friends exploited the mass media and press conferences to disseminate 
ongoing information on the food deficits in North Korea, and thereby promoted 
government food aid to North Korea. In the year 1995 and 1996 the press was not active 
in reporting the advocacy by Good Friends and other humanitarian NGOs. It was 
attributable to the hostility towards North Korea in the aftermath of the submarine 
incident and more fundamentally the Kim Young-Sam administration’s restriction on the 
press releases of public campaigns. The press consequently took a passive position on 
the advocacy of food aid to North Korea until 1996. As the advocacy by Good Friends 
and other humanitarian NGOs came to expand to a nationwide movement in 1997, the 
mass media in South Korea began to report the activities of advocacy of food aid to 
North Korea. Good Friends also actively organised interviews and press conferences, 
perceiving the importance of the mass media in the advocacy. In 1997 Good Friends 
organised seventeen press conferences urging the Kim Young-Sam administration and 
the civil society to resume food aid to North Korea.57 Good Friends also actively 
acceded to significant press interviews; Good Friends interviewed seventeen different 
media, including newspapers, radio, television and magazines 27 times during the year 
of 1997. 
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The public campaign was one of a major grafting tactic that Good Friends 
exploited in 1996 and 1997. Good Friends, along with the KSM, organised a movement 
of ‘One Million Signatures for Helping the North Korean Compatriots’ on 5 July. For 
one month as from 15 August, a total of 1,078,453 people, including 348 representatives 
from religious, business and civil society circles, 70 congressmen and women and 
20,000 overseas Koreans, participated in the movement and signed the list.58 The 
signature list was delivered to the Ministry of Unification after the press conference on 
26 August. Good Friends was also active in organising joint campaigns, such as the 
‘National Campaign for 10,000 tonnes of Maize Help for the North Korean Compatriots’ 
from 27 March to 2 April, the ‘National Campaign for 100,000 tonnes of Maize Aid to 
the North Korean Compatriots’ from 9 April to 8 June, the ‘National Campaign for 
30,000 tonnes of Maize Help for the North Korean Compatriots’ on 13 June and ‘The 
Peace March for the North Korean Compatriots in Hunger’ on 17 July.59 Good Friends 
also organised independent street campaigns and fundraising at eight provinces, 
including Seoul, Busan, Daegu and Daejeon, every Saturday throughout the year of 
1997. 60  Through these national and independent campaigns, Good Friends 
disseminated ongoing information on the severity of the food crisis in North Korea, and 
urged the Kim Young-Sam administration and civil society to resume food aid to North 
Korea.  
     Good Friends was active in urging the government for food aid to North Korea, 
through its direct lobbying of the Ministry of Unification, the National Assembly, the 
political parties and other policy makers in the Kim Young-Sam administration.61 Good 
Friends extended the advocacy targeting the Ministry of Unification, which was a major 
policy-making body in relation to food aid to North Korea. During the year 1997 Good 
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Friends visited the Ministry of Unification four times – 14 January, 15 May, 25 
September and 10 October – to urge the government to provide food aid to North 
Korea.62 Good Friends delivered the result of the ‘One Million Signatures for Helping 
the North Korean Compatriots’ to the Ministry of Unification on 26 August. In addition, 
Good Friends delivered another petition, the ‘NGOs’ Opinion on the Food Aid to North 
Korea,’ to the Unification Minister on 9 September.63 Good Friends also visited the 
People’s Party (the major opposition party) on 9 July and the National Assembly on 15 
July. Good Friends met the leaders of the Grand National Party (the ruling party) and 
the People’s Party on 18 July and urged an active role for Congress in relation to food 
aid to North Korea. On 23 July, Good Friends also delivered ‘A Petition Urging the 
Active Role of Government in the Relief of Humanitarian Crisis in DPRK’ to the 
National Assembly.64 Good Friends met Gi-Moon Ban, a Senior Advisor on Foreign 
Affairs and Security for the President, on 14 July and urged the provision of food aid to 
North Korea.65 
 
 
6.4.2 Norm Grafting in the Kim Dae-Jung Administration 
 
Until the resumption of large-scale food aid in 2000, Good Friends consistently 
exploited information politics and international networks as the main grafting strategies. 
Between 1998 and 2000, Good Friends activity continued to focus on research and 
publication about the severity of the food crisis in North Korea. It disseminated this 
ongoing information to South Korean civil society through various channels, such as 
reports and books, press releases and conferences, public lectures, workshops and 
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seminars. Another distinctive characteristic in this period was that the advocacy 
movement exploited international networks. Good Friends organised an advocacy trip to 
the United States and Japan to let the international community know about the severity 
of the food crisis and to promote action to relieve the humanitarian crisis in North Korea.  
In 1998 and 1999, Good Friends was the most active NGO in research and 
publication on the severity of the food crisis in North Korea. Good Friends was also 
active in improving public awareness of the food crisis in North Korea by disseminating 
these research outcomes through various channels. Good Friends published a second 
evaluation paper on the mortality rate per family and village, infant mortality and the 
causes of death, titled ‘Report on the Food Deficits Testified by 472 North Korean Food 
Refugees’ in February 1998, following the first report in December 1997. Good Friends 
then published more two reports and increased the number of interviewees to 770 and 
1,019 in April and May 1998 respectively.66 In a report based on 1,694 interviewees 
published in December 1998, Good Friends provided the specific figure of 3.5 million 
as the overall death toll by famine.67 These reports in 1998 were the first reports 
publicising the severity of food deficits in North Korea to South Korean civil society 
and the international community and the results shocked them. These reports were then 
used as basic sources, in various academic debates and policy workshops, on the causes 
and impact of the North Korean famine. The death toll of 3.5 million which was 
extrapolated by Good Friends was frequently exploited as the maximum figure despite 
scientific suspicion of its reliability.68 
Good Friends continuously disseminated ongoing information on the food crisis 
in North Korea through publishing various reports and books: ‘The Status of the North 
Korean Food Refugees in China and their Human Rights’ in March, ‘Searching for a 
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National Hope’ in May, ‘People Crossing the Dumen River’ in August, and ‘[ I ] Want 
to Live as a Human Being’ and ‘A Hard March’ in December 1999.69 In March 1998, 
Good Friends, along with Hankyoreh which was a daily newspaper with a progressive 
disposition, published a series of articles in the name of ‘Ah! Starving North Korea’ 
from 10 March.70 These articles showed the appalling sights of North Korean refugees 
at the Korean-Chinese border. As Young-Sun Lee, the former Secretary General of the 
KSM, evaluated, these articles contributed to resuscitating the public interest in the food 
aid to North Korea which lessened after the Kangreung Submarine Infiltration in 
1996.71 
Good Friends held eighteen lectures in 1998 and three lectures in 1999 which 
targeted civil society NGOs, universities and religious organisations.72 Good Friends 
also organised four policy meetings, three workshops, three forums and symposiums 
and one seminar.73 Through these various forms of awareness activities, Good Friends 
pressed the Kim Dae-Jung administration, and South Korean civil society to take action 
to relieve the humanitarian crisis in North Korea. 
Good Friends visited the United States three times in 1998 and once in 1999. 
Good Friends met the U.S. government personnel of the Korean Division and the 
Human Rights Division of the U.S. State Department and the USAID, the members of 
the Senate and the House of Representatives. Good Friends met the personnel of U.N. 
agencies, such as UNICEF, UNDP, WFP, WHO and OCHCR. Good Friends also 
organised meetings with the NGO personnel from World Vision, Human Rights Watch 
and InterAction.74 Good Friends exploited their reports on every trip to the United 
States. Good Friends also visited Japan three times in 1998 and once in 1999. Good 
Friends met the representatives from Japanese civil society, such as the Japanese 
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Cardinal, the Nippon Foundation, the World Conference on Religion and Peace (WCRP) 
and Caritas Japan, and pressurised Japanese civil society to take further action to relieve 
the humanitarian crisis in North Korea. Good Friends also exploited the Japanese mass 
media, such as TV-Asahi, NHK and Nippon TV.75  Good Friends was active in 
interviewing the overseas media, such as the BBC and CNN. Good Friends interviewed 
these overseas media twelve times in 1998 and seven times in 1999.76 Through these 
activities, Good Friends sought to proselytise the international community to take 
further action to relieve the humanitarian crisis in North Korea. 
After the Inter-Korean Summit Talk in June 2000, Good Friends activities for 
norm grafting radically lessened, and from 2000 to 2002, the organisation maintained a 
minimal level of advocacy. From 1 March 2000 until 26 November 2002 Good Friends 
organised ‘24 Hours, 1000 Days Devotional Service for the National Reconciliation and 
Unification.’ During this movement, Good Friends organised a street campaign too, 
which urged continued public interest in the humanitarian aid to North Korea and 
fundraising.77  As a result of the street campaign and fundraising, Good Friends 
delivered 30,000,000 won’s worth of humanitarian aid, which was equivalent to 
$23,715.47, through the Korean Joint Together Society (JTS), which is affiliated to 
Good Friends, to North Korea in 2000 and 100,000,000 won, which was equivalent to 
$75,872.76 in 2001. Good Friends also organised ‘A Place for Unification Dialogue,’ a 
series of informal meetings where various experts were invited by Good Friends to 
speak about the topics of unification, human rights and peace. Good Friends organised 
143 meetings from 3 March 2000 to 22 November 2002, but only four of these meetings 
were on the topic of the food crisis in North Korea.78 This indicates that changes in the 
organisational mandate of Good Friends between 2000 and 2002 resulted in the 
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weakening of organisational activities related to the advocacy of food aid to North 
Korea. 
 
 
6.4.3 Norm Grafting in the Roh Administration 
 
Between 2003, when the Roh administration took office, and June 2005 when Good 
Friends began to recognise the recurrence of the food deficits in North Korea, Good 
Friends activities in respect of norm grafting were not as significant as the activities in 
the Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung administrations. A few activities organised by 
Good Friends both at the domestic and international level were meaningful in terms of 
the norm grafting in relation to the food aid to North Korea.  
Good Friends organised a series of dialogue meetings on the topic of inter-
Korean exchange and cooperation between May 2003 and June 2005.79 The topic of 
food aid to North Korea was not the primary topic of these meetings. The dialogue 
meetings from October to November 2004,however,contributed to sustaining advocacy 
of food aid to North Korea. 
Good Friends invited key NGO personnel who played a steering role in the 
advocacy of food aid to North Korea since 1995 to increase public awareness about 
continued food aid to North Korea. Good Friends invited Ok-Jae Roh, the Secretary 
General of Good Friends, Young-Sik Kang, the Secretary General of the KSM, two 
North Korean refugees who settled in South Korea, Stephen W. Linton, the President of 
the Eugene Bell Foundation and Sung-Hoon Kim, the Joint-representative of the 
Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice, as guest speakers at the dialogue meetings.80 
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These personnel urged continued assistance to North Korea, and improved 
accountability and transparency in the implementation of aid held at a policy 
symposium on 15 November 2005. At this symposium, Sik An, a Policy Advisor to 
Good Friends, recommended that the government pass legislation which he called ‘The 
Special Act for Humanitarian Aid to the North Korean Residents.’81 Through this 
petition, Good Friends urged the Roh administration to assure a consistent provision of 
food, agricultural and medical aid to North Korea, the continuation of inter-Korean 
exchange and cooperation, the allocation of 1 per cent of the national budget to 
humanitarian aid to North Korea and improved transparency in aid distribution in North 
Korea.82 The basis of this symposium was that as the provision of government food aid 
to North Korea was made without a legal basis it was therefore highly influenced by 
inter-Korean relations. Good Friends suggested for the first time that legislation 
assuring the stable and consistent provision of food aid to North Korea irrespective of 
the inter-Korean relations should be made.  
Good Friends engaged in international advocacy activities to pressurise the 
international community to continue its aid to North Korea. In November 2003 Good 
Friends issued ‘The Alternative Report on the North Korean Social Rights’ and 
submitted this report to the U.N. Human Rights Committee. On 23 February 2004 Good 
Friends also issued ‘The Report on the North Korean Human Rights and the Right to 
Food’ while holding the NGO conference on the topic of North Korean human rights 
and peace on the Korean peninsula. Around the 60th U.N. Human Rights Committee in 
2004, Good Friends organised ‘The Symposium for the Improvement of North Korean 
Human Rights’ in Geneva in March and ‘The Press Conference for the Settlement of the 
North Korean Food Crisis’ in April. On 22 December 2004, lastly, Good Friends met the 
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U.N. Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in North Korea. All these 
activities were ostensibly the advocacy of human rights in North Korea, but Good 
Friends focused more on economic, social and cultural rights which are closely linked 
with the right to food, rather than civil and political rights. Through these activities, 
Good Friends urged the international community, in particular the U.N. human rights 
agencies, to take more action to relieve the food crisis in North Korea.83 
Good Friends focused on activities to publicise the recurrence of the second 
food crisis in North Korea to South Korean civil society through its organisational 
periodical ‘North Korea Today’ and the mass media. From March 2006, Good Friends 
strengthened the function in the delivery of ongoing information on the internal 
situation of North Korea. For this, Good Friends increased the frequency of ‘North 
Korea Today,’ which had been issued as the organisational periodical of Good Friends 
since 2004, from monthly to biweekly. ‘North Korea Today’ delivered the most detailed 
and ongoing information of the flood damage in North Korea. 
In mid-2006, North Korea’s cancellation of the ‘8.15 Unification Celebration,’ 
which was an event to celebrate the national independence of Korea from the Japanese 
occupation on 15 August 1945, was prompted the mass media to begin to show their 
interest in the severity of the flood damage in North Korea. In this situation, Good 
Friends exploited the mass media to publicise the issue to South Korean civil society. 
Good Friends, along with the Peace Foundation, held the ‘Expert Conference on the 
Possibility of Food Crisis’ on 26 December 2006. At this conference, Revd Beobryun 
urged urgent and large-scale food aid to North Korea, asserting that the suspension of 
food aid and the radical decrease of food production due to the flood in July would 
result in the food deficit in North Korea in 2007.84 After the conference, the agenda of 
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the second food crisis began to be taken up by various popular media. As a result of this 
conference on December 2006 up until 22 April 2007, when the Roh administration 
decided to resume the government food aid to North Korea, the popular media in South 
Korea printed the activities of Good Friends 20 times.85 
While Good Friends focused on the increase in public awareness about the food 
crisis through its organisational periodical and the mass media, Good Friends had 
consistently asserted that the immediate food aid, around 800,000 tonnes of maize 
which was additional to the 500,000 tonnes of government food aid on loan terms, 
should be delivered to North Korea.86 To achieve this goal, Good Friends organised an 
independent public campaign of ‘The Movement of 1,000 tonnes of Life-Saving Maize 
Aid to North Korea’ on 2 August 2007. Such grafting activities in 2006 and 2007 
contributed to awakening the public interest on the recurrence of the North Korean food 
crisis. Such efforts finally made the Roh administration, which was gathering the 
agenda for the Summit Talk in Pyongyang in October 2007, discuss the agenda of 
additional food aid with North Korea at the Summit Talk.87 
Good Friends and Hyung-Geun Jeong, the Congressman of the Grand National 
Party, organised a policy conference for the discussion of legislative reform to assure 
the legal basis for food aid to North Korea. At this conference on 4 September 2007, 
Good Friends suggested ‘The Act of Humanitarian Assistance to North Korea,’ which 
was a more developed version of the first version which Sik An, a Policy Advisor of 
Good Friends, proposed at the policy symposium on 15 November 2005.88 The 
background of this recommendation was that by urging the adoption of this act, Good 
Friends sought to increase the South Korean government’s responsibility, aid 
effectiveness, and transparency and consensus in state aid policy making. In this sense, 
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Good Friends asserted that the provision of food aid to North Korea should be 
institutionalised by law and therefore should be delivered irrespective of inter-Korean 
political issues. Good Friends also asserted the need for improved monitoring and 
restrictions on government food aid to North Korea. Good Friends lastly recommended 
the establishment of the Special Committee of Humanitarian Assistance to North Korea 
consisting of the government, the National Assembly, local municipals and NGOs to 
improve the consensus on government food aid policy making.89 
 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter demonstrated that differing NGO capacities were consequential in 
explaining the ability of NGO advocacy to set agendas, network and engage in the 
grafting of norms in respect of South Korean government policy on food aid to North 
Korea. 
During the Kim Young-Sam administration, Good Friends lacked expertise in 
the advocacy movement due to its voluntary-based recruitment, but Good Friends was 
driven by a strong mandate to proselytise South Korean civil society to take action to 
relieve the humanitarian crisis in North Korea. Under this strong mandate, Good 
Friends’ agenda framing was consistent in seeking to replacing the dominant hostility 
towards North Korea with ‘brotherly love,’ so that South Korean civil society 
recognised the North Korean people as their compatriots and so help them irrespective 
of the differences in ideology and the political system. In this sense, during the Kim 
Young-Sam administration Good Friends consistently framed the food aid to North 
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Korea as ‘brotherly love’ for the North Korean compatriots.  
With regard to networking in the Kim Young-Sam administration, Good Friends 
represented the Buddhist circle. Good Friends further maintained a wide collaborative 
network with other humanitarian NGOs. The distinctive characteristic of Good Friends 
networking, however, was its effort to establish an international network particularly in 
1997.  
Based on the agenda of framing and networking above, Good Friends extended 
the most vigorous advocacy of food aid to North Korea throughout its entire advocacy 
movement between 1996 and 2007. The main grafting strategy which Good Friends 
exploited to pressurise the Kim Young-Sam administration and civil society to take 
action to relieve the humanitarian crisis in North Korea was to increase public 
awareness of the necessity of food aid for North Korea. To this end, Good Friends 
mainly exploited conventional grafting strategies, such as public education, press 
releases, press conferences, public campaigns and lobbying politicians, political parties 
and the government. 
During the Kim Dae-Jung administration, the strong mandate of Good Friends 
was consequential in explaining the distinctive characteristics of Good Friends agenda 
framing. In the early Kim Dae-Jung administration Good Friends consistently framed 
the issue of food aid to North Korea as ‘humanitarianism.’ Improvement in the inter-
Korean relations after the Inter-Korean Summit in June 2000, however, induced Good 
Friends to diversify its organisational mandate, and this resulted in changes in agenda 
framing. After the Inter-Korean Summit Talk in June 2000, therefore, Good Friends 
framed the agenda of the issue of food aid to North Korea as a ‘facilitator for the 
improvement of North Korean human rights and peaceful unification’. 
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With regard to networking in the Kim Dae-Jung administration, during the two 
early years of the Kim Dae-Jung administration from 1998 to 1999, Good Friends was 
driven by a strong mandate to establish networks with the international community. The 
Kim Dae-Jung administration’s deregulation of NGO participation in the state policy-
making process also provided momentum that enabled Good Friends to establish a 
network allowing them to obtain access to state policy makers and to strengthen 
collaboration with other humanitarian NGOs. With the resumption of government food 
aid in 2000, however, the ability of Good Friends to establish networks and maintain 
these networks began to weaken as the organisational mandate of Good Friends 
diminished.  
With regard to norm grafting in the Kim Dae-Jung administration, Good 
Friends exploited information politics and the international networks in which Good 
Friends had a relatively high level of expertise given the poor funding arrangements and 
a less competitive organisational structure. Between 1998 and 2000, Good Friends 
devoted its attention to research and publication on the severity of the food crisis in 
North Korea and disseminating this ongoing information to the South Korean civil 
society through various channels, such as reports and books, press releases and 
conferences, public lectures, workshops and seminars. Another distinctive characteristic 
in this period was the advocacy movement exploiting international networks. Good 
Friends organised advocacy trip to the United States and Japan to let the international 
community know the severity of food crisis in North Korea and thereby take action to 
relieve the humanitarian crisis in North Korea. After the Inter-Korean Summit Talk in 
June 2000, the large-scale government food aid to North Korea resulted in the 
weakening of Good Friends’ grafting activities, weakening Good Friends organisational 
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mandate of the advocacy of food aid to North Korea.  
During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, the advocacy of food aid to North 
Korea was not the primary mandate of Good Friends. The poor level of funding 
continued and resulted in the shrinking of Good Friends’ organisational structure and 
divisions. The Ryongcheon Station Explosion in 2004 and the consecutive flood in 2006 
and 2007, provided momentum to renew the advocacy of food aid to North Korea as a 
key organisational mandate. Good Friends exploited the universal values of human 
rights and humanitarianism in agenda framing. Good Friends framed the food aid to 
North Korea as ‘the protection of right to food’ in 2003, 2004 and 2005. With the 
resumption of the advocacy of food aid to North Korea in 2006, Good Friends framed 
the food aid to North Korea as ‘humanitarianism,’ separating the North Korean flood 
victims from the North Korean regime which conducted the missile and nuclear test. 
With regard to networking in the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, Good Friends 
endeavoured to establish an international network to publicise the framing of ‘the right 
to food’ from 2003 until 2005. With the establishment of the Peace Foundation in 2004, 
Good Friends further strengthened its network with various social and religious leaders 
and distinguished academics. From2006 to 2007, Good Friends exploited NGO 
consultative bodies, such as the Korean Council, the NGO Council and the 6.15 
Committee, to obtain access to other humanitarian NGOs and state food aid decision 
makers.  
With regard to norm grafting, while the Roh Moo-Hyun administration 
continued to provide large-scale food aid to North Korea, Good Friends’ activities 
remained minimal until 2006. In the midst of the suspension of food aid after the missile 
launch in June 2006, the flood damage in July became a strong motivation for Good 
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Friends to resume advocacy urging the recommencement of food and flood aid. Good 
Friends exploited two major grafting strategies. Good Friends endeavoured to increase 
public awareness about the recurrence of severe famine in North Korea and proselytised 
the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to provide flood aid to North Korea. 
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1 Some masters’ theses that were written by NGO personnel provides detailed data on 
the relationship between NGOs and the South Korean government and those theses are 
as follows: Lee, Daebuk Indojiwon Sistemeui Banjeon Bangan Yeongu [English 
Translation: Study of a Plan for the Development of the Humanitarian Assistance 
System for North Korea].; Seung-Joon Lee, "A Study on the Cooperation Between 
Government and NGOs for Humanitarian Support to DPRK: Focusing on Its Patterns 
and Improvements." Dissertation/Thesis, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, 2006.; 
Kyung-Min Song, "A Study on Process and Development of the Humanitarian Aid 
Campaign for North Korea: Focused on Activities of Korean Sharing Movement." 
Dissertation/Thesis, Graduate School of NGO Studies, 2005. Among those theses, as the 
Director of Centre for Peace Sharing under the Korean Sharing Movement, Lee’s thesis, 
‘Study of a Plan for the Development of the Humanitarian food aid System for North 
Korea,’ provides the detailed internal data on the role of humanitarian NGOs.   
2 It mainly used the white papers and annual reports as follows: NGO Council for 
Cooperation with North Korea, Daebukjiwon 10nyeon Baekseo [English Translation: 
White Paper of the 10-years of Aids to North Korea].; Good Friends, Joeunbeotdeul 
10Junyeon Ginyeom Jaryogib [English Translation: Good Friends 10-years of 
Foundation Anniversary Report]. 
3 It used proceedings mainly from Good Friends and NGO Council for Cooperation 
with North Korea. 
4 It mainly referred to the databases of Good Friends (www.goodfriends.or.kr), KSM 
(www.ksm.or.kr), SARANGBANG Group for Human Rights 
(www.sarangbang.or.kr/kr/new/index.php), and Cyber NGO Materials 
(www.demos.or.kr/bbs/zboard.php?&id=english). These web-databases provide email 
newsletters, conference proceedings, statements, press releases, reports, and collection 
of newspaper and magazine articles on the activities of humanitarian NGOs as well as 
their own materials.   
5 It used the newspaper articles from the major publishers in South Korea such as 
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CHAPTER 7. THE IMPACT OF HUMANITARIAN NON-GOVERNMENTAL 
    ORGANISATIONS ON CHANGES IN SOUTH KOREAN     
    GOVERNMENT’S FOOD AID POLICY MAKING TOWARDS  
     NORTH KOREA  
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter demonstrates Hypothesis Three: The differences in non-governmental 
organisation capacity shaped different outcomes at different stages of South Korea’s 
food aid policy making. South Korea’s food aid policy processes are disaggregated 
according to the different stages of agenda setting, the formation of a discursive 
position, and institutional and policy development. 
In the previous chapters, this thesis demonstrated the assumption and two 
hypotheses of this thesis. Chapter 3 demonstrated the assumption of this thesis that the 
issue characteristics of the North Korean food crisis and the domestic political structure 
of South Korean government food aid policy making changed over time, shaping the 
differing operational environment in which South Korean humanitarian NGOs worked. 
Chapter 4 next demonstrated that organisational mandates, funding arrangements and 
expertise were important in the constitution of each NGO’s capacity to influence South 
Korean government food aid policy. Chapter 5 and 6 then demonstrated that differing 
NGO capacities were consequential in explaining the ability of NGO advocacy to set 
agendas, network and engage in the grafting of norms in respect of South Korean 
government policy on food aid to North Korea. Based on the examination of the 
operational environment and NGO advocacy of food aid to North Korea in the previous 
chapters, this chapter demonstrates that South Korean humanitarian NGO advocacy was 
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consequential in explaining changes in South Korea’s food aid policy making in respect 
of state agenda setting, the formation of a discursive position and institutional and 
policy development. Humanitarian NGO advocacy finally contributed to government 
establishment of a legal framework that could provide for more consistent and large 
scale food aid to North Korea. However, the changes at different stages of the state’s 
food aid policy-making processes, as the outcome of humanitarian NGO advocacy of 
food aid to North Korea, were different. This chapter demonstrates that these differences 
were attributable to the differing abilities of NGO to set agendas, network and graft new 
norms in respect of government policy on food aid to North Korea and the changes at 
the operational environment in where humanitarian NGOs worked.  
      This chapter consists of four main sections. The first section examines how 
successful the KSM and Good Friends were in norm grafting in public opinion and civil 
society. The second section examines KSM and Good Friends’ influence on government 
agenda and discursive position change. The third section examines how successful the 
KSM and Good Friends were in grafting new norms within government institutions. 
The last section demonstrates how successful KSM and Good Friends advocacy was in 
changes in government food aid policy and why these changes took place. Each section 
consists of three parts, the Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun 
administrations, and examines each topic within them. 
 
 
 
7.2 Norm Competition in Civil Society 
 
Richard Price argues that norm competition and adoption in civil society generally 
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precedes changes in the government policy-making process.1 Before the examination of 
changes in South Korean government food aid policy towards North Korea, this section 
demonstrates that KSM and Good Friends advocacy of food aid to North Korea shaped 
different outcomes at the stage of norm grafting in South Korean civil society. 
    This section demonstrates that in 1995 and 1997 the KSM and Good Friends 
successfully introduced the new norm of brotherly love into South Korean civil society 
replacing the dominant norm of hostility towards North Korea. Despite the less 
organised advocacy in this period, the KSM and Good Friends appealed to the emotion 
of the South Korean people by framing the food aid to North Korea as an expression of 
brotherly love. Such agenda framing began to replace the predominant norm of hostility 
towards North Korea with the norm of brotherly love. 
      In the early Kim Dae-Jung administration from 1998 to 1999, KSM and Good 
Friends advocacy continued to replace hostility towards North Korea with the norms of 
brotherly love, peaceful unification and humanitarianism. During this period, however, 
the more significant contribution of KSM and Good Friends advocacy was the 
establishment of the favourable operational environment in which the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration was able to sustain the engagement policy towards North Korea. Given 
the favourable operational environment, the Inter-Korean Summit in June 2000 finally 
provided the momentum from which the norms of brotherly love, peaceful unification 
and humanitarianism became more set in the South Korean civil society. 
       This section lastly demonstrates that during the Roh Moo-Hyun administration 
from 2003 to 2007 the norms of brotherly love, peaceful unification and 
humanitarianism underpinning the provision of food aid to North Korea became 
dominant norms in South Korean civil society. The influence of the KSM and Good 
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Friends in norm grafting, however, was less significant compared to the previous two 
administrations. Given the weakened organisational mandate of KSM and Good Friends 
in the Roh Mo-Hyun administration, the political rapprochement between both Koreas 
was a decisive factor which enabled these norms to be self-reliant irrespective of NGO 
advocacy. 
To demonstrate the arguments above, the following section examines the impact 
of KSM and Good Friends advocacy of food aid to North Korea on norm grafting in 
South Korean civil society and how this impact differed in each administration. It also 
examines the causal relationship between the differences in norm grafting and NGO 
abilities. This section consists of three parts. Each part examines how KSM and Good 
Friends advocacy changed norms in South Korean civil society under the three different 
administrations of Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun.  
 
 
7.2.1 Norm Competition in Civil Society under the Kim Young-Sam  
    Administration 
 
This part demonstrates that in 1995 and 1996 the KSM and Good Friends successfully 
introduced the new norm of brotherly love into South Korean civil society replacing the 
dominant norm of hostility towards North Korea. During this period, the funding 
capacities and the organisational structures of the KSM and Good Friends were not 
developed yet. The motivation of the KSM and Good Friends which was driven by a 
strong mandate to relieve the humanitarian crisis in North Korea enabled them to unfold 
nationwide advocacy of food aid to North Korea. The persuasive agenda framing and 
active advocacy activities by the KSM and Good Friends finally contributed to the 
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mitigation of hostility towards North Korea which had been revived after the incident of 
the Kangreung Submarine Infiltration in September 1996. 
     Before the advocacy movement by the humanitarian NGOs in June 1995, only 
20.3 per cent supported the rice aid.2 In August, a public opinion poll indicated that this 
had increased to 53.7 per cent with 41.3 per cent perceiving that the food aid to North 
Korea as a wrong decision.3 Public opinion on food aid to North Korea was still evenly 
divided, but South Korean civil society began to recognise North Korea as the object of 
aid. A public opinion poll in 1996 showed no change in public opinion from 1995. It is, 
however, possible to extrapolate the norm grafting in civil society by looking at change 
in the scale of private fundraising. Private fundraising by humanitarian NGOs in 1996 
increased by 6.2 times to $1,550,000 compared to $250,000 in 1995.4 This radical 
increase in the scale of private fundraising can be understood as the increase of public 
participation in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea. This can be further interpreted 
as the norm of brotherly love compared to the norm of hostility towards North Korea. 
This significant change within a relatively short period was possible due to the effective 
agenda framing by the KSM and Good Friends. 
The advocacy spread throughout the nation in 1996; however, the Kangreung 
Submarine Infiltration discouraged the movement and resulted in public opinion on the 
provision of humanitarian aid to North Korea worsening. With North Korea’s official 
statement of apology on 29 December 1996, the favourable operational environment 
allowed the humanitarian NGOs resume advocacy of food aid to North Korea. In this 
new operational environment, the KSM and Good Friends attempted to convert hostility 
towards North Korea into a movement for preventing war and alleviating political and 
military tension on the Korean peninsula. As a result, private fundraising increased by 
383 
15 times to $20.56 million compared to 1996. This fundraising was made while the 
activities of humanitarian NGOs were restricted through the adoption of various 
measures and acts. These measures and acts included the prohibition of private aid to 
North Korea by ‘The Measure of Aid Channel Unification,’ the restriction of media 
coverage of NGO fundraising events by ‘The Measure of the Press Report on the Event 
of Fundraising,’ the restriction of NGO fundraisings by ‘The Regulation Act on 
Fundraising and Donation’ and prosecutor’s accusation of humanitarian NGOs in 1997.5 
Considering this operational environment, the drastic increase in public participation in 
fundraising for humanitarian aid to North Korea indicated that the existing hostility 
after the submarine incident was replaced by a desire for aid to North Korea. The result 
of the public opinion poll by Gwangju Social Research Centre on 30 April 1997 showed 
that 79.1 per cent supported the food aid to North Korea.6 Such a result indicates that 
the norm in civil society had changed from the worst public opinion after the submarine 
incident.  
 
 
7.2.2 Norm Competition in Civil Society under the Kim Dae-Jung Administration 
 
In 1998 and 1999 KSM and Good Friends advocacy replaced hostility towards North 
Korea with the norms of brotherly love, peaceful unification and humanitarianism. 
During this period, the contribution of the KSM and Good Friends in particular was the 
establishment of a favourable operational environment. As KSM and Good Friends’ 
advocacy of food aid to North Korea continued from 1995, KSM and Good Friends’ 
organisational capability in the exploitation of effective norm-grafting strategy became 
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more sophisticated. The KSM and Good Friends consistently increased the quality and 
quantity of their networks which allowed them to reach differing social groups and 
organisations. Exploiting these wide-ranging networks, the KSM and Good Friends 
focused on the establishment of a favourable operational environment in which the Kim 
Dae-Jung administration was able to sustain the engagement policy towards North 
Korea, rather than the advocacy of food aid to North Korean itself. The Inter-Korean 
Summit in June 2000, as the outcome of a continued engagement policy, finally 
provided momentum from which the norms of brotherly love, peaceful unification and 
humanitarianism became set in South Korean civil society. 
     During the early years of the Kim Dae-Jung administration in 1998 and 1999, 
KSM and Good Friends advocacy replaced the hostility towards North Korea with the 
norms of brotherly love, peaceful unification and humanitarianism. Public opinion in 
November 1998 supporting the provision of food aid to North Korea increased to 67.5 
per cent.7 The opinion poll also showed 80.4 per cent of the respondents viewed the 
food deficits in North Korea as at ‘a serious level.’8 In 1999, although 88.9 per cent still 
supported food aid to North Korea, North Korea’s military action, in the West Sea Battle 
in 1999, made South Korean civil society perceive that more conditions should be 
placed on the provision of food aid to North Korea.  
The political rapprochement after the Inter-Korean Summit in June 2000 
provided momentum from which the norms of brotherly love, peaceful unification and 
humanitarianism introduced by the KSM and Good Friends became set in South Korean 
civil society. The political rapprochement, however, was possible due to KSM and Good 
Friends advocacy contributing to the establishment of a favourable operational 
environment which the Kim Dae-Jung administration was able to sustain the 
385 
engagement policy towards North Korea. KSM and Good Friends advocacy improved 
public awareness about the severity of the food crisis in North Korea. Recognition of 
the ongoing situation in North Korea contributed to the increase of support for the Kim 
Dae-Jung administration’s engagement policy.9 The public support for the engagement 
policy in turn shaped a favourable operational environment in which the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration was able to sustain its policy amidst the consecutive military actions by 
North Korea between 1998 and 1999. The two Korean summits in June 2000 finally 
achieved political rapprochement in the Korean peninsula. In this sense, Unification 
Minister Jae-Gyu Park thanked the humanitarian NGOs for the Inter-Korean Summit.10 
The Inter-Korean Summit in 2000 accelerated norm grafting in South Korean civil 
society, assuring the advent of peaceful inter-Korean relations. South Korean civil 
society which watched the historic event of the Inter-Korean Summit came to realise 
that the situation of extreme hostility towards North Korea could no longer be sustained. 
In the public opinion poll after the Inter-Korean Summit 78.7 per cent of the 
respondents supported the humanitarian aid to North Korea.11 This figure implicates 
that the political rapprochement between both Koreas was a critical incident in which 
the norms of peace and reconciliation introduced by the KSM and Good Friends finally 
became set in South Korean civil society. 
  
 
7.2.3 Norm Competition in Civil Society under the Roh Moo-Hyun Administration 
 
From 2003 to 2007 the norms of brotherly love, peaceful unification and 
humanitarianism became more dominant in South Korean civil society. The influence of 
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the KSM and Good Friends in norm grafting during the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, 
however, was not significant compared to the previous two administrations. The 
increase in inter-Korean exchange and cooperation and the political rapprochement 
instead were the decisive factors which enabled the norms of brotherly love, peaceful 
unification and humanitarianism to be self-reliant irrespective of NGO advocacy. While 
the Roh Moo-Hyun administration maintained an active policy towards North Korea in 
relation to the provision of food aid, the KSM and Good Friends engaged in the delivery 
of development aid to North Korea and the advocacy of North Korean human rights 
respectively. The influence of KSM and Good Friends in norm grafting behind South 
Korean civil society therefore was not significant.  
During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, the norms of brotherly love, peaceful 
unification and humanitarianism underpinning the provision of food aid to North Korea 
became dominant norms in South Korean civil society. Public opinion polls in March 
2003 and February 2004 showed that 66.7 per cent and 66 per cent of the public 
respectively supported the provision of food aid to North Korea.12 Such positive 
opinion continued in the midst of the negative operational environment during North 
Korea’s military action in 2006. After North Korea’s missile launch in July and nuclear 
test in October 2006, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration suspended all types of aid to 
North Korea, but public opinion which supported the humanitarian aid to North Korea 
did not change much. South Korean civil society instead demanded that the Roh Moo-
Hyun administration make food aid to North Korean conditional on inter-Korean issues. 
The public opinion poll from 17 to 18 October in 2006 after the nuclear test showed that 
62.3 per cent suggested the partial amendment of the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s 
aid policy, 16.8 per cent suggested the suspension of aid and 15.2 per cent supported the 
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current aid policy.13 These results indicate that the norms of brotherly love, peaceful 
unification and humanitarianism were concrete as much as free from the negative 
external environment.  
The scale of private aid to North Korea made it possible to grasp changes in the 
norm of South Korean civil society. In 2003 the scale of private aid increased to 
$63,860,000 from $45,770,000 in 2002.14 In 2004, the scale of private aid radically 
increased to $132,500,000, which was the largest amount since the outbreak of the food 
crisis in 1995.15 Such a large amount of private aid in 2004 was attributable to the 
Ryongcheon Station Explosion incident. The total funding which was raised through 
campaigns for the Ryongcheon Station victims was $23,580,000 in 3 months from April 
to July. After the Ryongcheon Station Explosion, the scale of private aid in 2005, 2006 
and 2007 were still high although there was a slight decrease after North Korea’s 
missile launch and nuclear test in 2006. In 2005 the scale of private aid to North Korea 
was $76,660,000.16 In 2006 the scale of private aid was recorded at $70,880,000.17 In 
2007, it again increased to $96,980,000.18 In conclusion, since the Kim Young-Sam 
administration the average scale of private aid radically increased. During the Kim 
Young-Sam administration the average scale of private aid was $7,453,300, and it 
increased to $35,560,000 during the Kim Dae-Jung administration. This figure then 
reached$70,000,000 in the Roh Moo-Hyun administration. Such a consistent and radical 
increase of private aid to North Korea indicates the increase of civil participation in 
North Korean relief operations. The increase of civil participation implies that the 
norms of brotherly love, peaceful unification and humanitarianism underpinning the 
provision of private aid to North Korea were the dominant norms in South Korean civil 
society. 
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The influence of the KSM and Good Friends in norm grafting during the Roh 
Moo-Hyun administration, however, was not significant compared to the previous two 
administrations of Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung. Given the operational 
environment in 2003 in which the Roh Moo-Hyun administration consistently 
proclaimed the provision of large-scale government food aid to North Korea, the KSM 
and Good Friends converted their organisational mandates and activities to non-food aid 
issues, such as the delivery of development aid, the advocacy of North Korean human 
rights and policy recommendations for aid effectiveness and unification. Although the 
agricultural NGOs advocated the provision of surplus rice aid to North Korea in 2003, 
the KSM and Good Friends were passive in this movement.  
In 2004, the incident of the Ryongcheon Station Explosion was the momentum 
which ignited the resumption of KSM and Good Friends advocacy. The advocacy of 
food aid to North Korea, however, was not the major mandate of the KSM and Good 
Friends during the Roh Moo-Hyun administration. In 2004, the KSM and Good Friends 
exploited information politics which disseminated ongoing information about the 
humanitarian crisis of the Ryongcheon Station Explosion to increase public awareness. 
Such KSM and Good Friends advocacy contributed to the revitalisation of the sense of 
brotherly love and humanitarianism.19 
After the Ryongcheon movement in 2005, the KSM and Good Friends again 
strived for the delivery of development aid to North Korea and the advocacy of North 
Korean human rights respectively, framing these issues as the peaceful unification 
movement. The KSM advocated the need for development aid to North Korea in that 
only development was able to solve the fundamental causes of the food crisis in North 
Korea. The policy conferences and seminars therefore aimed to search for efficient 
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development aid strategy and practice. Good Friends extended a movement urging the 
Roh Moo-Hyun administration to establish rules and policies which assure stable 
humanitarian aid to North Korea irrespective of inter-Korean political and economic 
issues. It also held a related conference in 2005.  
With North Korea’s missile launch in July 2006, the KSM and Good Friends 
resumed their advocacy of food aid, separating North Korea’s military action from the 
issue of food aid. In this process, KSM and Good Friends advocacy mainly exploited 
various government-NGO consultative channels, rather than targeting the general public.  
Although the KSM and Good Friends continued the advocacy of food aid to 
North Korea, it was not the major mandate and focus of activities for the KSM and 
Good Friends during the Roh Moo-Hyun administration. In addition, KSM and Good 
Friends advocacy usually did not target civil society. The influence of the KSM and 
Good Friends in norm grafting during the Roh Moo-Hyun administration therefore was 
not significant compared to the previous two administrations of Kim Young-Sam and 
Kim Dae-Jung. 
       The political rapprochement which became more concrete during the Roh 
Moo-Hyun administration, instead, was the decisive factor which enabled the norms of 
brotherly love, peaceful unification and humanitarianism to be self-reliant. Under the 
Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s ‘Peace and Prosperity Policy’ towards North Korea, 
and inter-Korean exchange and cooperation at both the private and government level 
radically increased. During the Kim Young-Sam administration the cases of private 
inter-Korean exchange and cooperation remained at a minimal level – 221 cases – and 
the number of civil participants who visited North Korea was only 1,727 during the five 
years from 1993 to 1997.20 Under the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s engagement 
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policy and the political rapprochement in 2000, these figures significantly increased to 
3,417 and 37,572.21 During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration it radically increased to 
50,827 and the number of civil participant increased to 387,529.22 Such increases of 
inter-Korean exchange and cooperation and public participation in inter-Korean 
exchange and cooperation programmes enabled the South Korean civil society to 
perceive North Korea as the target of brotherly love, peaceful unification and 
humanitarianism. The improvement of public awareness finally contributed to making 
the norms of brotherly love and humanitarianism more concrete in South Korean civil 
society. 
 
 
7.3 Changes in Government Agenda and Discursive Position 
 
This section examines KSM and Good Friends’ influence on government agenda and 
discursive position change. This section demonstrates that the KSM and Good Friends 
were consequential in changes in the Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-
Hyun administrations’ agenda and discursive positions. However, the domestic political 
structure of each administration and the issue characteristics of humanitarian crisis in 
North Korea circumscribed or promoted KSM and Good Friends’ influence on state 
agenda setting and discursive position changes too.  
      This section first demonstrates that between 1995 and 1997, KSM and Good 
Friends advocacy began to incorporate the issue of food aid to North Korea into the 
Kim Young-Sam administration’s agenda and discursive position. The Kim Young-Sam 
administration, however, still attached its political interests to the provision of food aid 
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to North Korea contrary to the demand of the humanitarian NGOs which emphasised 
humanitarianism. The main reason which the Kim Young-Sam administration still 
maintained the stance of conditional aid to North Korea was attributable to its non-
democratic policy making structure and a negative view on the role of NGO in state 
policy making. In addition, given this operational environment the KSM and Good 
Friends who, had just initiated its advocacy movement, did not develop an effective 
advocacy strategy to pressurise the Kim Young-Sam administration although the KSM 
and Good Friends were good at conventional advocacy activities such as nationwide 
public campaigns. 
      KSM and Good Friends advocacy promoted changes in the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration’s agenda and discursive position. As Kim Dae-Jung, who maintained a 
close relationship with humanitarian NGOs, was elected as the 15th President, the KSM 
and Good Friends were easily able to incorporate the issue of food aid into the Kim 
Dae-Jung administration’s agenda throughout the administration. During this period, the 
KSM and Good Friends also improved their expertise to exert direct influence on the 
Kim Dae-Jung administration’s food aid policy making process. The Kim Dae-Jung 
administration, however, still stuck to the principle of strict reciprocity linking food aid 
to North Korea with political and military issues. This was because the opposition from 
the conservative party and mass media in South Korean society and the low level of 
political confrontation even after the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000 made it difficult for 
the Kim Dae-Jung administration to provide unconditional aid to North Korea. 
      This section lastly demonstrates that the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s agenda 
and discursive position favourable to the provision of large-scale food aid to North 
Korea was secure throughout the administration from 2003 to 2007. It implies that KSM 
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and Good Friends advocacy of food aid to North Korea entered the self-steering stage in 
which a state seeks to adhere to the specific norms introduced irrespective of external 
pressure such as from NGO advocacy. This favourable agenda setting and discursive 
position of the Roh Moo-Hyun administration first of all was attributable to the high 
degree of the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s accommodation to NGO advocacy. 
Secondly, humanitarian crises, such as the Ryongcheon Station Explosion in 2004 and 
the flood damage in 2006, provided momentum which made humanitarian NGOs 
resume their advocacy of humanitarian aid to North Korea. The resumption of NGO 
advocacy set favourable public opinion on government food aid to North Korea in 
concrete. 
The following section consists of three parts. Each part examines how the KSM 
and Good Friends influenced changes in government agenda and discursive position in 
the three different administrations of Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-
Hyun.  
 
 
7.3.1 Changes in the Kim Young-Sam Administration’s Agenda and Discursive  
     Position 
 
In 1995 and 1996, changes in the Kim Young-Sam administration’s agenda and 
discursive position were not significant although the Kim Young-Sam administration 
recognised the outbreak of the food crisis in North Korea. This was attributable to the 
Kim Young-Sam administration’s closed political structure and the lack of 
organisational expertise and activities of the KSM and Good Friends. North Korea’s 
continued military provocations in 1996 further made it difficult for the Kim Young-
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Sam administration to maintain a positive position in relation to the provision of food 
aid to North Korea. Given this operational environment, the Kim Young-Sam 
administration still conceived the food aid to North Korea as leverage to solve inter-
Korean political and military issues although it began to incorporate the issue of food 
aid to North Korea, which the KSM and Good Friends consistently urged, in the 
government agenda.  
Before June 1995, the severity of food crisis in North Korea was not known to 
South Korean civil society. The domestic political structure of government food aid 
policy making in the Kim Young-Sam administration was non-democratic. The first 
food aid of 150,000 tonnes of rice in 1995 was made by a few policy makers within the 
Blue House to solve the nuclear issue. Change in the government agenda in relation to 
the first food aid in June, began with North Korea’s request to Japan for food aid in the 
autumn of 1994 and January 1995.23 In January 1995, President Kim Young-Sam, who 
heard about North Korea’s food request to Japan, gave a strict order to take all necessary 
measures to provide rice aid prior to the delivery of the Japanese aid.24 President Kim 
overtly expressed his intention to provide grain and raw materials to North Korea at his 
visit to Berlin on 7 March 1995. After this change in the official discursive position, 
President Kim and the Unification Minister Ung-Bae Na consistently expressed a 
government intention to provide food aid to North Korea through various channels. 
President Kim announced the food aid to North Korea on 15 May. Unification Minister 
Na and Vice-Minister Young-Dae Song in May and June pressurised North Korea into 
participating in the Beijing Talks for the discussion of 150,000 tonnes of rice aid in 
June.25 
As the severity of the food crisis in North Korea became known to the 
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international community in 1996, the negative responses by North Korea in the process 
of rice aid shipment in 1995, however, worsened the Kim Young-Sam administration’s 
position towards North Korea. President Kim stated as “[we] can’t shake hands with 
those who have nuclear.”26 On 24 January 1996 the Kim Young-Sam administration, 
along with the U.S. and Japan, held the ‘High-Ranking Policy Meeting on Rice Aid to 
North Korea’ in Hawaii and agreed not to provide large-scale food aid to North Korea 
anymore. 
In the midst of the Kim Young-Sam administration’s adherence to its hard-line 
position towards food aid to North Korea in 1997, the KSM organised various 
campaigns, public statements and fundraising for humanitarian aid to North Korea 
based on their extensive network with other religious and civil society organisations and 
professional groups. As the result of the active advocacy movement under the steering 
role of the KSM, public participation in the advocacy movement and the scale of 
fundraising radically increased. Given the increased support for the provision of food 
aid, the Kim Young-Sam administration was not able to exclude the demands of the 
NGOs and public urging the Kim Young-Sam administration’s active action to relieve 
the food crisis in North Korea from the government agenda. Through various statements, 
the Kim Young-Sam administration referred to the food aid to North Korea. Although it 
took the policy linking the provision of food aid to North Korea with inter-Korean 
political issues, this policy itself indicates that the issue of food aid to North Korea was 
incorporated into the government agenda. In May Unification Minister Okie Kwon 
stated that the food aid to North Korea could be made on three conditions: an official 
request by North Korea, holding food-aid related talks and the cessation of North 
Korea’s broadcast slandering South Korea in the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ).27On 15 
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July, Prime Minister Su-Sung Lee revealed that food aid to North Korea would be 
possible when North Korea accepted the Four-Party Talks for the discussion of the 
nuclear issue. On 31 July, 15 August and 8 September, President Kim also consistently 
assured its policy linking the Four-Party Talks to the food aid to North Korea.  
While the KSM and Good Friends were unfolding active advocacy in 1997, 
public opinion supporting food aid to North Korea increased to 79.1 per cent, which 
was the highest figure throughout the entire period of the advocacy movement from 
1995 to 2007.28 Despite this nationwide support, the discursive position of the Kim 
Young-Sam administration, which linked food aid to the Four-Party Talks, did not 
change in 1997.  
The Kim Young-Sam administration’s consistent adherence to the policy linking 
food aid to political issues resulted from three factors: Firstly, North Korea’s continued 
provocations made the Kim Young-Sam administration adhere to a realist and practical 
approach.29 Secondly, the Kim Young-Sam administration was passive in exploiting the 
policy network linking the government and NGOs. The high-ranking decision makers in 
relation to food aid to North Korea in the Kim Young-Sam administration, such as the 
Unification Minister and Vice-minister, perceived the humanitarian NGOs as interest 
groups with narrow organisational interests.30 Thirdly, despite the worst food deficits in 
1997, even the humanitarian NGOs including the KSM and Good Friends were not 
aware of the severity of the food crisis in North Korea. The KSM and Good Friends, 
who had just initiated their first ever advocacy movement of food aid, did not recognise 
the importance of research of the on-going humanitarian impact on the North Korean 
people in the planning of their advocacy movement. The lack of reliable information on 
the food crisis in North Korea in turn resulted in the decision makers in the Kim Young-
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Sam administration having a sceptical view of the need for food aid to North Korea and 
the NGO activities advocating for food aid to North Korea. Kwon, the Unification 
Minister, stated at the Unification and National Security Policy Coordination Meeting 
on 11 April that “the government food aid to North Korea is impossible without holding 
the Four-Party Talks, although the government is able to provide emergency food aid 
when the famine situation worsens in North Korea.”31 In 1997, the Kim Young-Sam 
administration’s discursive position linking food aid to political issues therefore did not 
change in 1997 although the advocacy movement by the KSM and Good Friends 
developed into a nationwide movement. 
 
 
7.3.2 Changes in the Kim Dae-Jung Administration’s Agenda and Discursive  
     Position 
 
As Kim Dae-Jung, who maintained a close relationship with the humanitarian NGOs, 
was elected as the 15th President in 1998, the KSM and Good Friends easily 
incorporated the issue of food aid into the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s agenda 
throughout the administration. Given the favourable operational environment until the 
Inter-Korean Summit, the KSM and Good Friends improved their expertise to exert 
direct influence on the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s food aid policy making process, 
and finally contributed to favourable changes in the Kim Dae-Jung administration 
agenda and discursive positions in relation to food aid to North Korea. The Kim Dae-
Jung administration, however, still stuck to the principle of strict reciprocity linking 
food aid to North Korea with political and military issues. This was because the 
opposition from the conservative party and mass media in South Korean society and the 
397 
low level of political confrontation even after the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000 made it 
difficult for the Kim Dae-Jung administration to provide unconditional aid to North 
Korea. The Kim Dae-Jung administration’s active role in relation to the food aid to 
North Korea after the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000 in addition began to mitigate 
organisational mandate of the KSM and Good Friends. The weakened organisational 
mandate of the KSM and Good Friends in turn resulted in the undermining of entire 
advocacy of food aid to North Korea. 
From 1998 to 2002, the issue of food aid to North Korea which had been 
advocated by KSM and Good Friends was the main agenda of the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration. Between 1995 and 1997, Kim Dae-Jung who was the President of the 
National Council for New Politics (NCNP) and the opposition party, maintained a 
positive stance on food aid to North Korea and the role of humanitarian NGOs in the 
aspect of advocacy and delivery of humanitarian aid to North Korea.32 Such positive 
stance were identified through the statements which Kim Dae-Jung and other party 
leaders delivered at various events. These events were a congress policy meeting 
organised by the KSM in July 1996, the Dinner of North Korean Corn Stew organised 
by the KSM and Good Friends on 12 April 1997, and the presidential candidate debate 
organised by the KSM on 18 November 1997.33 After Kim Dae-Jung was elected as the 
15th President at the end of 1998, he showed a positive perception on the role of 
humanitarian NGOs, delivering his thanks for their efforts at the New Year’s Greetings 
of the Korea Civil Society Organisations’ Council (KCSOC) on 4 January 1998.34 
The Kim Dae-Jung administration overtly proclaimed its favourable discursive 
position on food aid to North Korea. President Kim announced that “the government 
will not spare any efforts in the provision of food aid to North Korea”35 at his inaugural 
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speech on 25 February 1998.36 The Kim Dae-Jung administration included the issue of 
large-scale food aid on the agenda of the Inter-Korean Vice-ministerial Talk in June 
1999.37 In 2001, Dong-Won Lim, who was the Special Envoy to North Korea, also 
revealed the government position of food aid to North Korea through the special speech 
at the 4th International NGO Conference for Aid to North Korea on 20 June 2001.38 In 
particular, the email newsletter issued by the Ministry of Unification in May 2001, ‘Fact 
Paper: Humanitarian Aid,’ clearly showed the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s discursive 
position favourable to the provision of food aid to North Korea.39 
Despite the active advocacy of ‘unconditional’ food aid to North Korea by 
humanitarian NGOs between 1998 and 1999, however, the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration still adhered to the principle of strict reciprocity linking food aid to North 
Korea with political and military issues. Such positions of the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration were found in President Kim’s statement in 2000. On 9 March 2000 
President Kim delivered an important statement in Berlin where he made government 
food aid to North Korea conditional on the holding of inter-Korean talks.40 The main 
reason the Kim Dae-Jung administration adhered to the principle of strict reciprocity 
was that North Korea was continuing military action, such as the West Sea Battle in 
1999, despite the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s engagement policy.41 Given this 
operational environment, the Kim Dae-Jung administration needed North Korea to 
behave responsibly in order to avoid criticism from the opposition party and 
conservative groups. The Kim Dae-Jung administration therefore maintained the 
principle of strict reciprocity despite KSM and Good Friends advocacy.  
Opposition from the conservative party and the media was another reason why 
the Kim Dae-Jung administration adhered to the principle of strict reciprocity in the 
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provision of food aid to North Korea. After the first provision of large-scale food aid in 
2000, the opposition party, the Grand National Party (GNP) and the conservative media 
(mainly the Chosun Ilbo) vigorously criticised the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s 
decision.42 Such severe criticism eventually made it difficult for the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration to commit themselves to the additional pledge of 100,000 tonnes through 
the WFP in 2000.43 
       Lastly, the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s active role in relation to the food aid 
to North Korea after the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000 began to mitigate the 
organisational mandate of the KSM and Good Friends. The weakened organisational 
mandate of the KSM and Good Friends in turn resulted in the undermining of the entire 
advocacy of food aid to North Korea. While the Kim Dae-Jung administration had 
proclaimed its engagement policy towards North Korea since 1998, the KSM and Good 
Friends began to move its organisational mandate from the advocacy of food aid to the 
delivery of development aid and the human rights movement respectively. As large-
scale food aid to North Korea resumed after the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000, such 
changed accelerated. KSM and Good Friends advocacy between 2000 and 2002 
therefore was not enough to induce the Kim Dae-Jung administration to relinquish its 
principle of strict reciprocity from the food aid to North Korea. 
 
 
7.3.3 Changes in the Roh Moo-Hyun Administration’s Agenda and Discursive  
     Position 
 
From 2003 to 2007, the agenda and discursive position of the Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration favourable to the provision of large-scale food aid to North Korea was 
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secure throughout the administration. Such concrete agenda setting and a discursive 
position continued in the midst of the rupture of the inter-Korean relations in 2003, 
2004, 2005 and 2006. It was attributable to the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s positive 
view on the provision of food aid to North Korea. Firstly, such a positive view was 
possible since the Roh Moo-Hyun administration inherited the engagement policy of the 
Kim Dae-Jung administration. Secondly, South Korean humanitarian NGOs, including 
the KSM and Good Friends and the rational-centrist NGOs that achieved radical 
organisational development under financial and institutional support from the Kim Dae-
Jung administration, contributed to the establishment of the Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration at the Presidential election in 2002. The Roh Moo-Hyun administration, 
therefore, was receptive to the demand of the humanitarian NGOs to provide food aid to 
North Korea. Lastly, humanitarian crises in North Korea in 2004 and 2006 provided 
momentum that made the KSM and Good Friends resume their advocacy of 
humanitarian aid to North Korea. The public support for food aid to North Korea that 
was resuscitated by KSM and Good Friends advocacy enabled the Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration to maintain its agenda and discursive position favourable to food aid to 
North Korea even in the midst of the unfavourable operational environment in 2004, 
2005 and 2006. 
President Roh started his presidency in 2003 while there was increasing 
criticism that the engagement policy resulted in the development of North Korea’s 
nuclear weapons after North Korea’s admission of uranium enrichment activity on 17 
October 2002.44 On 4 November 2004the Bush administration, which pursued a hostile 
policy towards North Korea, was re-elected on 4 November 2004. Given this hostile 
policy, in 2005 North Korea proclaimed its participation in the Six-Party Talks on 10 
401 
February. On 19 April 2005 Sung-Ryeol Han, the Vice-ambassador of North Korea to 
the U.N., further announced the plan to extract weapons-grade plutonium from spent 
fuel rods in order to make nuclear weapons.45 On 13 July 2006, although the Roh Moo-
Hyun administration established a plan for large-scale food and fertiliser aid to North 
Korea, one week ahead of the 19th Inter-Korean Ministerial Talk, North Korea 
conducted middle and long-range missile tests.  
Despite such a negative operational environment in 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006, 
the Roh Moo-Hyun administration maintained an active and positive stance on the 
provision of large-scale food aid to North Korea.46 At his inaugural speech in 2003, 
President Roh proclaimed the continuation of large-scale food aid to North Korea. In 
2004 the Roh Moo-Hyun administration pledged a total of 500,000 tonnes of food aid to 
North Korea irrespective of the criticism from the opposition party.47 While the Inter-
Korean Ministerial Talk for the discussion of food aid became uncertain under the 
advent of the second Bush administration in 2005, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration 
consistently pressurised North Korea to respond to its request to hold the Inter-Korean 
Ministerial Talk to discuss food aid and other pending issues.48 On 3 and 9 August 2006 
after North Korea’s missile test, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration which suspended 
the provision of large-scale food and chemical fertiliser aid to North Korea revealed its 
intention to resume humanitarian aid to North Korea, stating “With increased requests 
from the political parties and NGOs, the Government is sincerely considering the 
resumption of humanitarian aid to North Korea.”49 
The formation of Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s agenda and discursive 
position favourable to large-scale food aid to North Korea was attributable to the effort 
of humanitarian NGOs. In 2002 there was a strong movement urging for the amendment 
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of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the United States and South Korea 
after the incident where two Korean students were run down and killed by a U.S. armed 
vehicle. In the movement that took place during the presidential election in 2002, 
humanitarian NGOs and other rational-centrist NGOs including the KSM and Good 
Friends played a steering role in the anti-U.S. movement. This anti-U.S. movement 
evolved into a nationwide movement, urging for the amendment of SOFA.50 The 
nationwide movement established an environment favourable to Roh Moo-Hyun who 
maintained a critical stance on the U.S.-Korean alliance and inherited the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration’s engagement policy. He was finally elected as the 16th President in 2002. 
This decisive role of humanitarian and other civil society NGOs in the presidential 
election was identified in the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s statement. After winning 
the election, President Roh Moo-Hyun attributed his victory to the efforts of 
humanitarian NGOs and civil society organisations at the ‘New Years’ Greeting of 
NGOs’ on 6 January 2003. At this event President Roh Moo-Hyun stated “[I] could not 
be elected without the civil society movement that has been prolonged for several 
decades.”51 
Humanitarian crises in North Korea in 2004 and 2006 were the momentum 
which made humanitarian NGOs resume their advocacy of humanitarian aid to North 
Korea. NGO advocacy contributed to the formation of favourable public opinion which 
made the Roh Moo-Hyun administration maintain its policy towards North Korea in the 
midst of North Korea’s negative actions in 2004 and 2006. As the result of the National 
Assembly Election in April 2004, the opposition party that maintained a negative stance 
on large-scale food aid to North Korea became the majority in the National Assembly. 
North Korea’s missile launch and nuclear test in 2006 were the incidents which put the 
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Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s positive stance on the provision of food aid to North 
Korea in jeopardy.  
With the incidents of the Ryongcheon Station Explosion in 2004 and the floods 
in 2006, however, humanitarian NGOs came to have an opportunity to overcome these 
negative political environments. Immediately after the Ryongcheon Station Explosion in 
2004, the KSM, Good Friends and other humanitarian NGOs extended their active 
advocacy of humanitarian aid to North Korea, disseminating ongoing information of the 
humanitarian crisis in the Ryongcheon station area. As a result of this movement, 
humanitarian NGOs raised $132,500,000, which was the largest amount since the 
outbreak of North Korean food crisis in 1995. 52  This radical increase of civil 
participation in the campaign for the Ryongcheon Station Victims indicates that KSM 
and Good Friends advocacy established a favourable operational environment in which 
the Roh Moo-Hyun administration was able to maintain its pro food aid stance in the 
midst of the unfavourable political environment in 2004. 
While the Roh Moo-Hyun administration suspended all types of aid including 
food aid to North Korea after North Korea’s missile launch in 2006, flood struck North 
Korea and resulted in severe grain loss and casualties in North Korea. Humanitarian 
NGOs including the KSM and Good Friends resumed advocacy of flood aid to North 
Korea and exploited government and NGO consultative bodies, such as the NGO 
Council for Cooperation with North Korea, the Government-Civilian Council for North 
Korean Aid Policy, the Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation (the Korean 
Council) and the 6.15 Joint Statement South Korean Committee. With the radical and 
swift expansion of the flood aid movement, the opposition party, the Grand National 
Party (GNP), which had opposed large-scale government food aid to North Korea, 
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changed its discursive position, expressing “The GNP consistently supports the 
‘humanitarian’ assistance to North Korea.”53 On 8 August, the President of the Korean 
Council met Jong-Suk Lee, the Unification Minister, to urge the Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration to resume humanitarian aid to North Korea.54 On 9 August, the members 
of the 6.15 Joint Statement South Korean Committee and the NGO Council also visited 
the Ministry of Unification and met Unification Minister Lee. On 10 August, the 
government official then revealed that the government would resume the provision of 
government flood aid to North Korea.55 
 
 
7.4 Changes in Government Institutions 
 
This section demonstrates that the KSM and Good Friends were successful in grafting 
new norms within government institutions and finally entering into the stage of rule-
consistent behaviour in which a state seeks to commit itself to their policy by 
deregulating rules and government regulations and establishing relevant procedures and 
institutions irrespective of the existence of external monitoring or pressure. 
      In 1995 and 1996, despite KSM and Good Friends advocacy that urged for 
government institutional change allowing private aid to North Korea, the Kim Young-
Sam administration’s approach to the demands of humanitarian NGOs was passive. 
Such passive position of the Kim Young-Sam administration in relation to institutional 
change was due to its non-democratic political structure that was not receptive to NGO 
advocacy and the lack of organisational expertise of the KSM and Good Friends. . As 
the advocacy of food aid to North Korea continued in 1997, however, the KSM and 
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Good Friends came to recognise the value of institutional change to effect efficient aid 
to North Korea, and they therefore promoted a movement urging institutional change in 
the Kim Young-Sam administration. This movement contributed to the deregulation of 
the Kim Young-Sam administration’s rules and regulations that circumscribed the 
private food and humanitarian aid to North Korea and the operational environment for 
NGO activity.  
     During the Kim Dae-Jung administration between 1998 and 2002, KSM and 
Good Friends advocacy entered into the initial stage of rule-consistent behaviour in 
which a state seeks to commit itself to their policy by establishing relevant procedures 
and institutions irrespective of the existence of external monitoring or pressure. From 
1996, the KSM and Good Friends gradually increased their advocacy of institutional 
changes. Given the favourable operational environment after the establishment of the 
Kim Dae-Jung administration in 1998, the KSM and Good Friends augmented the 
quality of advocacy demanding institutional changes. Between 1998 and 1999, as a 
result, the Kim Dae-Jung administration made various institutional changes promoting 
civil participation in state food aid policy making and NGO activities in the aspect of 
the delivery of aid to North Korea, fundraising and public campaigns. The political 
rapprochement in 2000 in particular provided the momentum for the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration to establish a government procedure and institution for large-scale 
government food aid policy making.     
This section lastly demonstrates that the Roh Moo-Hyun administration was also 
active in institutional changes for the provision of large and stable food aid to North 
Korea. Legislation by the Roh Moo-Hyun administration and an inter-Korean summit 
statement stipulated the provision of stable food aid to North Korea irrespective of inter-
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Korean relations and issues. In addition, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration was active 
in the preparation of rules and regulations assuring NGO and civil society participation 
in the state food aid policy-making process. Such institutional change was attributable 
to the political stance of the Roh Moo-Hyun administration which maintained a positive 
stance on the provision of large-scale food aid to North Korea and NGO participation in 
state policy making and execution. With regard to KSM and Good Friends influence on 
changes in the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s food aid policy making institution, 
during the Roh-Moo-Hyun administration, the KSM and Good Friends mainly engaged 
in the delivery of development aid to North Korea and the advocacy of North Korean 
human rights respectively. By exploiting government-NGO consultative bodies, 
however, the KSM and Good Friends consistently urged for the institutionalisation of 
food aid to North Korea and NGO and civil participation in state food aid policy making 
process. The Roh Moo-Hyun administration was receptive to the demands of NGOs. 
The institutional changes in the Roh Moo-Hyun administration therefore indicates that 
KSM and Good Friends advocacy entered into the stage of rule-consistent behaviour in 
which the South Korean government sought to commit itself to the provision of food aid 
to North Korea through institutional change. 
      The next section consists of three parts. Each part examines how KSM and 
Good Friends advocacy changed norms in South Korean civil society under the three 
different administrations of Kim Young-Sam, Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun. 
      
 
7.4.1 Changes in the Government Institutions of the Kim Young-Sam  
    Administration      
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Despite the fact that Kim Young-Sam did not respond to the advocacy of food aid to 
North Korea, the KSM and Good Friends in 1995 and 1996 began to press for 
government institutional change to allow private aid to North Korea. Despite KSM and 
Good Friends advocacy that urged for government institutional change, however, the 
Kim Young-Sam administration’s approach to the demands of humanitarian NGOs was 
passive. Such passive position was due to its non-democratic political structure that was 
not receptive to NGO advocacy. In addition, the KSM and Good Friends did not 
develop their expertise in the advocacy of institutional reform due to its limited 
organisational experience. While the demand for private channel to deliver 
humanitarian aid to North Korea radically increased in 1997, then, the KSM and Good 
Friends advocacy that urged for the deregulation allowing private aid to North Korea 
contributed to institutional change in respect of food aid to North Korea and to the 
operational environment for NGO activity. 
The Kim Young-Sam administration adopted ‘A Policy to Unify Private Aid to 
North Korea through the Red Cross Channel,’ which allowed the delivery of private aid 
to North Korea through the Red Cross channel on 14 September. This first institutional 
change, however, was the Kim Young-Sam administration’s measure to reflect the 
increase of private aid to North Korea through overseas channels. As private aid 
radically increased after August, the Kim Young-Sam administration understood that 
they could not prevent the direct delivery of aid to North Korea as the private aid to 
North Korea was delivered through overseas channels. 56  The Kim Young-Sam 
administration therefore authorised the delivery of private aid to North Korea through 
the national Red Cross. This measure, however, was a passive change whereby the Kim 
Young-Sam administration aimed to regulate NGO activities, rather than to deregulate 
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NGO activities in relation to aid to North Korea. This measure still restricted rice and 
cash assistance by the public, the participation of individual corporations and the media 
in public campaigns and fundraising, the direct delivery of aid to North Korea and 
fundraising targeting unspecified individuals and the public.57 The one contribution of 
this measure was it assured the domestic operational condition in which the 
humanitarian NGOs were able to continue their advocacy, fundraising and other related 
activities in relation to humanitarian aid to North Korea.  
In 1995 and 1996, the Kim Young-Sam administration still regulated the 
advocacy movement by the humanitarian NGOs. On 30 December 1995, the Kim 
Young-Sam administration abolished the act of ‘The Prohibition of Fundraising and 
Donation,’ which was enacted in 1951, and replaced it with the newly established ‘The 
Regulation Act on Fundraising and Donation.’ This new act, however, was the same as 
the old act except its name had changed. This act which was enforced on 1 July 1996 
was a measure to regulate private fundraising by the humanitarian NGOs. It stipulated 
the need for government permission for fundraising and that expenses for administration 
be within 2 per cent of the raised fund.58 In reality the Kim Young-Sam administration 
was not active in giving permission for private fundraising. Given such poor funding 
arrangements in 1996, humanitarian NGOs’ development of their organisational 
capacity and activities was restricted. Based on this act, the Kim Young-Sam 
administration also prosecuted the KSM and the National Alliance for Democracy and 
Reunification of Korea (NADRK) in 1997.  
     On 17 December 1996, the Kim Young-Sam administration established the 
Humanitarian Support Bureau within the Ministry of Unification. One of reasons behind 
this was, as Unification Minister Kwon said, to curb the vigorous activities of the 
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humanitarian NGOs and to improve the role of government in relation to aid to North 
Korea.59 The Humanitarian Bureau was in charge of the government-level aid to North 
Korea, the coordination of private aid to North Korea and the cooperation with the U.N. 
agencies in relation to the aid to North Korea.60 
      In 1997, the radical increase of private aid to North Korea and the consistent 
nationwide advocacy movement by the KSM and Good Friends began to change the 
Kim Young-Sam administration’s institution in relation to the provision of food aid to 
North Korea and the operational environment for NGO activity. Given the vigorous 
demands from the humanitarian NGOs and the external environment, 1997 was a 
transition point for the Kim Young-Sam administration in respect of the government 
institutional change. Responding to the consistent demands of the KSM and Good 
Friends, the Kim Young-Sam administration adopted a measure on 31 March expanding 
the items of aid allowed for North Korea. It authorised the delivery of private aid 
through the U.N. agencies, but still did not authorise the private delivery channel to 
North Korea.61 The Kim Young-Sam administration authorised corporate participation 
in humanitarian aid to North Korea through economic organisations. This measure 
authorised indoor fundraising and the media reporting on the breakdown of the 
fundraising but not fundraising advertisements. On 26 May 1997, the Kim Young-Sam 
administration adopted the ‘Agreement on Aid Delivery Procedure between the South 
and North Korean Red Cross.’ As the result of this agreement, the government and 
private-level aid to North Korea, which had been delivered through the International 
Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), could be delivered through direct inter-Korean 
channels. Although this agreement pertained to inter-government level aid, this 
agreement accommodated most of the demands that had been made by the KSM, Good 
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Friends and other humanitarian NGOs, such as direct inter-Korean aid, the expansion of 
aid beneficiary areas, the specification of the donor and designated donation.62 
 
 
7.4.2 Changes in the Government Institutions of the Kim Dae-Jung Administration 
 
Between 1998 and 2002, President Kim Dae-Jung undertook institutional changes promoting 
civil participation in government food aid policy making. The Kim Dae-Jung administration 
also took various measures to improve the operational environment for NGO activity in terms of 
the delivery of aid to North Korea, fundraising and public campaigns. Such changes firstly were 
attributable to the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s positive view that perceived the humanitarian 
NGOs as an important counterpart in the maintenance of inter-Korean relations. Secondly, the 
efforts of the KSM and Good Friends, which consistently urged for deregulation in respect of 
food aid to North Korea and the operational environment for NGO activity, were successful. 
From 1996, in fact, the KSM and Good Friends gradually increased their advocacy of 
institutional changes. With the establishment of the Kim Dae-Jung administration in 
1998, the KSM and Good Friends augmented the quality of their advocacy demanding 
institutional changes. Between 1998 and 1999, as a result, the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration made various institutional changes promoting civil participation in state 
food aid policy making and NGO activities in the aspect of the delivery of aid to North 
Korea, fundraising and public campaigns. The political rapprochement in 2000 further 
provided the momentum for the Kim Dae-Jung administration to establish a government 
procedure and institution for large-scale government food aid policy making although 
the worsened inter-Korean relations in 2002 temporarily interrupted the discussion of food aid 
through this procedure and these institutions. These institutional changes in government aid 
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policy-making procedures and institutions indicates that KSM and Good Friends advocacy 
finally entered into the initial stage of rule-consistent behaviour in which a state seeks to 
commit itself to their policy by establishing relevant procedures and institutions irrespective of 
the existence of external monitoring or pressure.    
     President Kim Dae-Jung took action on civil participation in government aid 
policy making, proclaiming the name of the administration as the ‘People’s Government’ 
at his inaugural speech in 1998.63 The most distinctive institutional change was the 
establishment of the Government-Civilian Council for North Korean Aid Policy (the 
Government-Civilian Council) in 2001. Although both Koreas reached political 
rapprochement after the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000, the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration still perceived the importance of confidence building between both 
Koreas through the expansion of private inter-Korean exchange and cooperation. In this 
sense, the Kim Dae-Jung administration and the NGO Council for Cooperation with 
North Korea (the NGO Council) started meeting on the establishment of the 
Government-Civilian Council in December 2000. 64  In 2001, the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration and the NGO Council held the 1st Government-NGO Meeting on 21 
March with seven NGO personnel from the NGO Council, four government personnel 
and two personnel from the Blue House.65 At this meeting, the KSM and Good Friends 
personnel urged for the official establishment of the Government-Civilian Council. In 
August 2001 the Kim Dae-Jung administration finally established the Government-
Civilian Council which consisted of the Ministry of Unification, the NGO Council and 
civil experts from academics and government think tanks.66 The establishment of the 
Government-Civilian Council was a significant improvement in government institution 
change in that the Kim Dae-Jung administration, for the first time, established an 
official government-NGO consultative body assuring NGO participation in government 
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aid policy making.  
The Kim Dae-Jung administration next established the Korean Council for 
Reconciliation and Cooperation (the Korean Council) in order to strengthen a 
government function to canvass public opinion. Although the Korean Council was 
founded as a NGO, the Korean Council exerted significant influence on the government 
policy-making process. Such influence was possible as the Korean Council had 
characteristics of quasi-government status. The Korean Council maintained a close 
relationship with the Ministry of Unification as it was established under the steering role 
of the Ministry of Unification. President Kim stated in September 1998 that “[in regard 
to the future role and status of the Korean Council] I think that the Korean Council will 
evolve as an organisation which handles the overall affairs of inter-Korean exchange 
and cooperation at both government and private levels.”67 The executives of the Korean 
Council also consisted of former government personnel who were able to exert direct 
influence on the government aid policy making. These personnel included the former 
Unification Ministers and Vice-ministers and the former Chiefs of various bureaus of 
government, the representatives from various NGOs, congressmen and women and 
experts from civil and government think tanks and academics.68 Representatives of the 
KSM and Good Friends and other humanitarian NGOs were also appointed to the 
executive membership of the Korean Council.69 With the establishment of the Korean 
Council, therefore, the KSM and Good Friends came to convey their demands directly 
to government aid policy making, in particular the Ministry of Unification.  
The Kim Dae-Jung administration expanded civil participation in the highest 
government aid policy-making process by improving the status of policy advisory 
organisations to the President, such as the National Unification Advisory Council 
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(NUAC) and the Unification Advisory Meeting (UAM). The Kim Dae-Jung 
administration strengthened the function of NUAC by canvassing public opinion and 
conveying these opinions to the President. Under President Kim’s order on 22 April 
1998, the elder statesmen from various circles and the representatives of humanitarian 
NGOs were newly appointed to be advisors to the NUAC.70 The Kim Dae-Jung 
administration also strengthened the function of the UAM as an advisory organisation to 
the President on the issue of unification. The Kim Dae-Jung administration improved 
the status of the UAM by having the President appoint the chair of the UAM and 
assuring the term of the UAM members to 30 months. 71  Given the improved 
organisational status of the UAM, the elder executives of the KSM, such as Moon-Kyu 
Kang, Young-Hoon Suh, Wol-Ju Song, Cardinal Su-Hwan Kim and Man-Gil were 
appointed to be advisors to the UAM on 19 May 1999.72 As a result, the humanitarian 
NGOs including the KSM and Good Friends came to secure a direct communication 
channel allowing the humanitarian NGOs to reach the highest decision maker, the 
President, through the quarterly meetings with the President.73 
In 1999, the civil experts who maintained a close relationship with the 
humanitarian NGOs were appointed to be expert advisory members of the Policy 
Advisory Committee of the Humanitarian Support Bureau within the Ministry of 
Unification. The policy advisory members of the KSM, such as Professor Dae-Suh Choi 
of Dongguk University, and Professor Young-Su Kim of Sogang University, played the 
role of delivering the KSM and Good Friends’ demands to government food aid policy 
making.74 In 2000 other KSM advisors, Keum-Soon Lee and Jong-Hoon Lee, and An-
Sook Jung, the Secretary General of Good Friends, were newly appointed to the 
government advisory committee in August 2000. Also, on 20 January 2000 Young-Hoon 
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Suh, who had been involved in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea as a Senior 
Adviser of the KSM since its establishment, was promoted to the role of President of 
the National Council for New Politics (NCNP), the ruling party, on 20 January 2000.  
The Kim Dae-Jung administration was favourable to the demand of 
humanitarian NGOs which urged for an improvement in the operational environment 
for NGO activity. The Kim Dae-Jung administration first did this in relation to North 
Korea. The Kim Dae-Jung administration took ‘The Measure to Revitalize Private Aid 
to North Korea’ on 18 March 1998.75 This measure approved the participation of 
humanitarian NGOs in the delivery of aid to North Korea through the South Korean 
Red Cross, and NGO visits to North Korea. This measure also allowed the participation 
of the media and individual companies in sponsorship, donation and events for 
humanitarian aid to North Korea. 76  On 10 February 1999 the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration adopted ‘The Measure for Delivery Channel Diversification for Private 
Humanitarian Aid to North Korea.’ 77  With the adoption of this measure, the 
government allowed the humanitarian NGOs to directly engage in negotiation with 
North Korea for project planning, acquisition, distribution, monitoring and 
assessment.78 
The Kim Dae-Jung administration approved the Audio Response System (ARS) 
for NGO fundraising. The KSM, for the first time, organised the event of ‘The Day of 
International Fasting for the North Korean Compatriots’ using the ARS on 25 April 
1998. The adoption of the ARS in fundraising contributed to the radical increase in 
fundraising for food aid to North Korea. The scale of funds which was raised through 
the ARS at the event of ‘24 Hours of Hunger Experience’ by World Vision Korea in 
June recorded 2.37 billion won,79 which was the equivalent of 16,470 tonnes of 
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maize.80 
On 16 December 1999, the ‘Non-profit Organisation Support Act’ suggested by 
Sang-Cheon Park and 91 other Congressmen was passed.81 Since its first attempt in the 
name of the ‘Civil Movement Assistance Act’ by the NCNP, the opposition party at that 
time in 1997, the discussion on the legislation of this act continued in 1998 and it was 
finally adopted in 1999. This act was presented to promote the civil society movement 
by providing government support for NGO activity for which the humanitarian NGOs 
consistently urged. According to this act, the Kim Dae-Jung administration provided 
NGOs with financial support for NGO activity and projects, tax reduction and postal 
service.82 
On 21 October 1999, the Kim Dae-Jung administration adopted a measure of the 
‘Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund for Private Humanitarian Aid to North Korea.’83 With 
the adoption of this measure, humanitarian NGOs came to receive government financial 
support for their aid to North Korea. All the measures above influenced the increase in 
NGO advocacy in government aid policy making by allowing the humanitarian NGOs 
to improve their organisational development for efficient and systemic advocacy. In fact, 
the deregulation of NGO activities related to North Korea aid contributed to the 
revitalisation of NGO activity and public participation in NGO advocacy and aid 
operations. As examined in Chapter 3, the approval of fundraising using the ARS and 
the financial support for humanitarian NGOs contributed to the stabilisation of funding 
capacity of humanitarian NGOs who were in chronic financial difficulties.84 
     Given the political rapprochement after the Inter-Korean Summit in June 2000, 
the Kim Dae-Jung administration took the first step for institutional reform for large-
scale food aid to North Korea. After the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000, the public 
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support for food aid to North Korea formed a favourable operational environment 
enabling the Kim Dae-Jung administration to prepare the institutional ground for stable 
and large-scale aid to North Korea. At the preparatory stage, the Bureau of 
Humanitarian Assistance within the Ministry of Unification first calculated the scale of 
food aid through consultation with the humanitarian NGOs, NGO consultative bodies 
and experts from the private and government research institutes and academics.85 The 
Blue House also consulted on the issue with the unification policy advisors within the 
UAM and the NUAC.86 The National Security Policy Coordination Meeting within the 
Blue House then decided the maximum limit of food aid and the conditions which 
would be discussed at the envoy meeting table and entrust these decisions to the special 
envoy.87 The special envoy then discussed the issue of food aid with other pending 
issues at the envoy meeting table and made a provisional agreement on the provision of 
food aid, generally by including the phrase ‘both Koreas agreed to cooperate with each 
other based on the principle of mutual cooperation, brotherly love and humanitarianism’ 
in the agreement of the special envoy meeting.88 After the special meeting, the Inter-
Korean Ministerial or Vice-ministerial Talk was held for more specific discussion on the 
pending issues including the issue of food aid and then made the decision on food aid 
and the scale official.89 The Committee of Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation next 
discussed the delivery method, the exact amount of aid, the type of food delivered, 
monitoring and the other conditions of aid.90 After final approval from the National 
Council for Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation which was a meeting attended by 
most of the Ministers, the Ministry of Unification shipped the food aid to North Korea. 
In 2001 the suspension of the Inter-Korean Ministerial Talk after the 9.11 Terror made it 
difficult for the Kim Dae-Jung administration to discuss the issue of food aid.91 This 
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procedure and institution, however, became standard for the provision of government 
food aid to North Korea once it resumed in 2002. 
 
 
7.4.3 Changes in the Government Institutions of the Roh Moo-Hyun  
    Administration 
 
The Roh Moo-Hyun administration established institutions to be responsible for stable 
food aid to North Korea, free from inter-Korean political and military issues. Such 
changes in institutions by the Roh Moo-Hyun administration were attributable to its 
political stance which maintained a positive view of the provision of large-scale food 
aid to North Korea and NGO participation in government policy making. With regard to 
KSM and Good Friends influence on changes in the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s 
food aid policy making institution, during the Roh-Moo-Hyun administration, the KSM 
and Good Friends mainly engaged in the delivery of development aid to North Korea 
and the advocacy of North Korean human rights respectively. By exploiting 
government-NGO consultative bodies, however, the KSM and Good Friends 
consistently urged for the institutionalisation of food aid to North Korea and NGO and 
civil participation in state food aid policy making process. The Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration was receptive to such demands of NGOs that urged for institutional 
reform. The active institutional changes in the Roh Moo-Hyun administration therefore 
indicates that KSM and Good Friends advocacy entered into the stage of rule-consistent 
behaviour in which the South Korean government sought to commit itself to the 
provision of food aid to North Korea through institutional change. 
The Roh Moo-Hyun administration established institutions responsible for stable 
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food aid, free from inter-Korean political and military issues. On 18 June 2004, Gyung-
Bin Ko, the Head of the Social and Cultural Exchange Bureau at the Ministry of 
Unification, revealed the government plan of the establishment of the Government-
Civilian Council for North Korean Aid Policy (The Government-Civilian Council) at 
the NGO Council workshop.92 On 1 September, the Ministry of Unification established 
the Government-Civilian Council.93 The Government-Civilian Council which consists 
of an equal number of NGO and government personnel aimed to establish a macro plan 
on government and private aid to North Korea and to coordinate the role of government 
and NGOs in the provision of aid to North Korea.94 Under these objectives, the 
Government-Civilian Council was mandated to establish the ‘Government-NGO Master 
Plan for Aid to North Korea in 2005.’ 95  Although the master plan was not 
accomplished in 2005 due to the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s concern over reduced 
government autonomy in the decision of government aid to North Korea, the 
Government-Civilian Council adopted ‘The Assessment of Humanitarian Assistance to 
North Korea in 2004 and Plan for 2005.’96 This plan for 2005 as a macro plan covering 
government and NGO aid to North Korea stipulated the continued provision of 
government food and fertiliser aid to North Korea.97 
The Roh Moo-Hyun administration adopted the ‘Act of Advancing Inter-Korean 
Relations’ on 29 December 2005. This act aimed to regulate overall government and 
NGO aid to North Korea and to assure the provision of stable and consensus-based 
government aid policy towards North Korea. This act stipulated the establishment of the 
‘Basic Plan for Advancing Inter-Korean Relations’ every five years.98 The Basic Plan 
for 2008 and 2012 which was adopted in 2007 stipulated the continued provision of 
food and humanitarian aid to North Korea under improved monitoring in cooperation 
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with NGOs. This act stipulated the establishment of the Inter-Korean Emergency 
Management and Cooperation System for efficient emergency aid to the vulnerable and 
flood victims in North Korea. The act also stipulated the improvement of legal and 
institutional grounds for advancing inter-Korean relations, the improvement of 
consensus on the pursuit of government policy toward North Korea and the pursuit of 
consistent cooperation with the international community through participation in U.N. 
agency appeals and operations.99 
On 4 October 2007 both Koreas adopted the ‘Statement of Advancing Inter-
Korean Relations and Peaceful Prosperity’ at the Inter-Korean Summit. According to 
this statement, Article 7 stipulated “Both Koreas continue to cooperate with each other 
in the pursuit of humanitarian cooperation projects.”100 With regard to the inclusion of 
this article in the summit statement, Yong-Sun Lee, the Chairman of the Steering 
Committee of the KSM, interpreted the inclusion of this stipulation as a simple 
reference assuring that the South Korean government would provide humanitarian aid to 
North Korea once North Korea confronts the severe floods and natural disasters in the 
future.101 The inclusion of this article was the first institutionalisation of humanitarian 
aid between both Koreas. Before this agreement, both Koreas adopted various 
agreements and declarations on the provision of food aid at the ministerial and vice-
ministerial level.102 These agreements and declarations, however, had a temporary 
effect covering ‘one-shot provision of food aid to North Korea’. With the inclusion of 
the continuation of humanitarian aid in the statement at the summit level, the Roh Moo-
Hyun administration came to have a legal foundation enabling the provision of stable 
food aid to North Korea which was free from inter-Korean political and military issues. 
The establishment of institutions assuring the South Korean government’s stable 
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and large-scale food aid to North Korea was attributable to the political stance of the 
Roh Moo-Hyun administration. With the establishment of the Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration in 2003, President Roh Moo-Hyun proclaimed the succession of the 
engagement policy which sought to promote inter-Korean trust and peace through inter-
Korean exchange and cooperation.103 The Roh Moo-Hyun administration recognised 
that the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s strict adherence to the principle of reciprocity in 
the pursuit of inter-Korean exchange and cooperation resulted in a limited role for the 
Kim Dae-Jung administration in the severe food crisis in North Korea from 1998 to 
1999.The Roh Moo-Hyun administration took a position which was more active in the 
provision of aid to North Korea, by easing the application of the principle of reciprocity 
in the aid to North Korea.104 The Roh Moo-Hyun administration therefore was more 
active in the provision of food aid to North Korea.  
With regard to the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s stance on NGO participation 
in the government aid policy making, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration took a more 
active policy compared to the Kim Dae-Jung administration which assured NGO 
participation in the execution of government aid policy towards North Korea. The Roh 
Moo-Hyun administration assured NGO participation in government aid policy making 
towards North Korea as well as in the execution of government aid policy. The reason 
for this was attributable to the personal career of President Roh Moo-Hyun. As a human 
rights lawyer President Roh Moo-Hyun had maintained a close relationship with NGOs 
since before his victory in the presidential election. During the presidential election in 
2002, the rational-centrist NGOs including humanitarian NGOs influenced the 
establishment of the Roh Moo-Hyun administration. For these reasons the Roh Moo-
Hyun administration was active in promoting civil and NGO participation in 
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government policy making. 
During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration from 2003 to 2007, it recruited NGO 
personnel for the government and the Blue House. Among a total of 416 government 
positions, NGO personnel accounted for 50.5 per cent in the Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration.105 It was also active in the establishment of institutions assuring NGO 
participation in government policy making. The Roh Moo-Hyun administration 
established the Committee of Civil Society Development under the Prime Minister’s 
Office for the discussion of institutional development promoting civil and NGO 
participation in government policy making and execution. 106  This Committee 
contributed to the improvement of the financial arrangements of NGOs enabling the 
Roh Moo-Hyun administration to amend the Regulation Act on Fundraising and 
Donation.107 Such an improved funding capacity of humanitarian NGOs eventually 
influenced the improvement of NGO advocacy influence over the administration and 
the public.  
The Roh Moo-Hyun administration appointed civil and NGO personnel to 
positions in the government consultative bodies for aid policy making towards North 
Korea. Nine civilian personnel were appointed to the membership of the National 
Committee on Advancing Inter-Korean Relations.108 Three civilian personnel were 
appointed to positions in the National Council for Inter-Korean Exchange and 
Cooperation. Such civilian personnel were mostly from NGOs or were those who 
maintained a close relationship with humanitarian NGOs.109 The Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration also established the Government-Civilian Council for North Korean Aid 
Policy which consisted of equal numbers of NGO and government personnel.110 
Given the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s favourable stance, KSM and Good 
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Friends advocacy which consistently urged for the institutionalisation of stable and 
large-scale government food aid to North Korea and NGO participation in government 
aid policy making contributed to the institutional changes in the Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration. President Roh Moo-Hyun in his inaugural speech showed democratic 
leadership in state policy making, implementation and assessment, emphasising the 
concept of ‘good governance.’111 In this sense, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration was 
active in the deregulation of government rules and regulations. 
Humanitarian NGOs contributed to the establishment of government institutions, 
pressurising the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to take progressive actions expanding 
NGO participation in government policy making. With regard to the establishment of 
the Government-Civilian Council on 1 September 2004, humanitarian NGOs had 
consistently urged for the establishment of the Government-Civilian Council since 2000. 
Following the establishment of the NGO Council, which is a consultative body among 
humanitarian NGOs, in 2000, humanitarian NGOs had consistently urged for the 
establishment of a government and civilian consultative body.112 The incident of the 
Ryongcheon Station Explosion in 2004 finally provided momentum which made the 
Roh Moo-Hyun administration realise the need for coordinated aid to North Korea 
through the establishment of the Government-Civilian Council.113 
On 29 December 2005, humanitarian NGOs supported government efforts to 
adopt ‘The Act of Advancing Inter-Korean Relations’. This act was proposed by Chae-
Jung Lim, a Congressman of the ruling party, on 28 April 2003 for the first time, but it 
did not receive support from the Roh Moo-Hyun administration and humanitarian 
NGOs at that time.114 In 2004 Congressman Lim again proposed this act on 3 August 
2004 with the cooperation of the Ministry of Unification. In this process of legislation, 
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humanitarian NGOs, mainly from the KSM and the People’s Solidarity for Participatory 
Democracy (PSPD), supported the adoption of this act. This act aimed to improve the 
legal and institutional grounds for advancing inter-Korean relations, to improve the 
consensus among the national congress, government and civil society on the pursuit of 
government policy toward North Korea, and to prepare a basic plan for a stable and 
consistent aid policy towards North Korea.115 With the support from the humanitarian 
NGOs and the ruling party, this act was finally adopted.  
On 4 October 2007, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration and North Korea 
adopted the ‘Statement of Advancing Inter-Korean Relations and Peaceful Prosperity’ at 
the Inter-Korean Summit, which stipulated the cooperation for humanitarian and 
development aid between both Koreas in Article 7.116 The inclusion of this article into 
the statement indicates that a demand for stable and consistent aid to North Korea from 
the humanitarian NGOs was institutionalised. On 20 August 2007 before the Inter-
Korean Summit the humanitarian NGOs who had consistently advocated for large-scale 
food aid to North Korea met government personnel at the Government-NGO meeting. 
At this meeting the KSM and Good Friends urged for the continuation of humanitarian 
and development aid to North Korea.117 Good Friends in particular pressurised the Roh 
Moo-Hyun administration to provide more food aid to North Korea, additional to the 
bilateral food aid to North Korea on loan terms, emphasising the dangers of a second 
famine in North Korea after the severe floods in 2006 and 2007.118 
With regard to the amendment of the ‘Regulation Act on Fundraising and 
Donation,’ the KSM had consistently urged for the deregulation of rules on NGO 
fundraising and the increase of administrative expenses through the amendment of the 
‘Regulation Act on Fundraising and Donation.’119 Given these consistent demands from 
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humanitarian NGOs, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration which maintained a close 
relationship with NGOs established the Committee of Civil Society Development under 
the Prime Minister’s Office in 2003. Under the recommendation of this committee, the 
Roh Moo-Hyun administration replaced the existing ‘Regulation Act on fundraising and 
Donation’ with the ‘Act on Fundraising and Expense’ on 24 March 2006. This amended 
act increased the rate of expenses for NGO administration from 2 per cent to 15 per cent. 
This act also deregulated the need for NGOs to gain government approval for 
fundraising events to a simple registration system which did not need government 
permission.120 
With regard to the institutional changes for the improvement of the operational 
environment for NGOs and NGO participation in government policy making, the KSM 
and Good Friends had consistently urged for an increase in government financial 
support for humanitarian NGOs and civil participation in government aid policy making 
towards North Korea based on the ‘Law on Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund’ and ‘Inter-
Korean Exchange and Cooperation Act’ since 1998.121 On 8 March 2005 the Roh Moo-
Hyun administration finally adopted the ‘Relaxation of Regulation on the NGO 
Qualification for North Korea Assistance,’ which resulted in an increase in the number 
of NGOs receiving government financial support.122 On 31 May 2005 the Roh Moo-
Hyun administration also appointed three civilian personnel who were engaged in the 
advocacy of food aid to North Korea and the civil society movement to the members of 
the ‘National Council for Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation’ which is the final 
decision making institution in relation to the provision of aid to North Korea.123 
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7.5 Changes in Government Food Aid Policy  
 
This section demonstrates that KSM and Good Friends advocacy was consequential in 
explaining changes in the amount of South Korea’s food aid to North Korea. KSM and 
Good Friends advocacy contributed to government establishment of a legal framework 
that could provide for more consistent and large scale food aid to North Korea. The Roh 
Moo-Hyun administration finally delivered the largest and consistent amount of food 
aid to North Korea. 
     This section demonstrates that in the early stage of KSM and Good Friends 
advocacy of food aid to North Korea in 1995 and 1996, the KSM and Good Friends’ 
influence on the Kim Young-Sam administration’s food aid policy making was not 
significant. In this period, the Kim Young-Sam administration’s food aid decision-
making structure was a highly non-democratic one which had been driven by political 
interests. In addition, KSM and Good Friends’ organisational capacities were not strong 
enough to change the Kim Young-Sam administration’s food aid policy making. In 1997, 
then, the Kim Young-Sam administration made three consecutive decisions about food 
aid to North Korea. The direct trigger of these decisions was the recovered inter-Korean 
relations. In addition to this direct trigger, the Kim Young-Sam administration was not 
able to ignore KSM and Good Friends advocacy of food aid to North Korea that 
developed into a nationwide movement in 1997. 
      During the Kim Dae-Jung administration from 1998 to 2002, KSM and Good 
Friends advocacy contributed to the resumption of food aid to North Korea and finally 
paved the way for the institutionalisation of the large scale of food aid to North Korea. 
While the Kim Dae-Jung administration maintained a favourable policy towards NGOs 
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in 1998 and 1999, the KSM and Good Friends gradually improved their organisational 
expertise in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea. Despite such organisational 
development in 1998 and 1999, however, the KSM and Good Friends were not able to 
overcome the severe political and military confrontations between both Koreas, and 
therefore the amount of government food aid to North Korea in this period proved to be 
only 40,000 tonnes. In 2000, then, the Inter-Korean Summit that made sure of the 
incoming political rapprochement in the Korean peninsula was a decisive factor that 
finally enabled the Kim Dae-Jung administration to pledge 500,000 tonnes of rice aid to 
North Korea on loan terms from 2000 onwards. The role of the KSM and Good Friends 
in the resumption of large-scale food aid to North Korea was to consistently promote the 
advocacy of food aid to North Korea based on strong humanitarian mandates and 
improved funding and organisational expertise in advocacy. Such advocacy finally 
contributed to the establishment of a favourable operational environment in which the 
Kim Dae-Jung administration was able to accomplish the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000.        
      This section lastly demonstrates that KSM and Good Friends advocacy 
contributed to government establishment of a legal framework that could provide for 
more consistent and large scale food aid to North Korea. The Roh Moo-Hyun 
institutionalised the provision of food aid to North Korea, irrespective of varies of inter-
Korean relations. Based on this institutionalised mechanism, the Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration sought to commit to the provision of large-scale food aid to North Korea 
throughout its administration. The Roh Moo-Hyun administration delivered an average 
of 400,000-500,000 tonnes of food aid annually to North Korea in fact. The breakdown 
in inter-Korean relations in 2005 and 2006 however made it difficult for the Roh Moo-
Hyun administration to continue providing food aid to North Korea. While the Roh 
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Moo-Hyun administration suspended food aid to North Korea in 2005 and 2006, the 
KSM and Good Friends played a decisive role in making the Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration resume the food aid to North Korea. In 2005, as a result, the Roh Moo-
Hyun administration resumed its food aid to North Korea. In 2006, however, the KSM 
and Good Friends advocacy of food aid to North Korea did not overcome the aftermath 
of the North Korean nuclear test. After KSM and Good Friends’ vigorous advocacy of 
food aid for flood victims in North Korea in 2006, instead, the Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration resumed 100,000 tonnes of food aid for flood victims.  
      
 
7.5.1 Changes in the Kim Young-Sam Administration’s Food Aid Policy 
 
In the early stage of KSM and Good Friends advocacy when the KSM and Good 
Friends were driven by a strong mandate but did not develop their expertise in the 
advocacy of food aid to North Korea in 1995 and 1996, KSM and Good Friends 
influence on the Kim Young-Sam administration’s food aid policy making was not 
significant. In 1995, the KSM and Good Friends organisational capacity was not strong 
enough to overcome the hostile inter-Korean relations and the Kim Young-Sam 
administration’s non-democratic decision making. On 11 June 1996, then, the active 
advocacy of the Inter-Religious Committee, the predecessor of the KSM, and other 
humanitarian NGOs 124  pressed the Kim Young-Sam administration to pledge $3 
million’s worth of food aid to North Korea, but the military provocation of North Korea 
again acted as an obstacle to the Kim Young-Sam administration’s direct food aid to 
North Korea. In 1997, the Kim Young-Sam administration resumed the food aid to 
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North Korea by delivering relatively large scale of food aid through the three 
consecutive decisions on food aid to North Korea. The direct trigger of these decisions 
was the recovered inter-Korean relations. In addition to this direct trigger, the KSM and 
Good Friends improved their organisational expertise in advocacy movement through 
the past three years of activities and therefore were successful in the organising a 
nationwide movement in 1997. While South Korean civil society and NGOs were 
vigorously demanding the provision of food aid to North Korea in 1997, the Kim 
Young-Sam administration was not able to ignore such demands. 
After 1995, the Kim Young-Sam administration maintained a practical 
approach to food aid to North Korea, linking food aid to North Korea to political issues. 
Given this operational environment, the rice-aid decision in 1995 was made by a few 
high-ranking politicians and the Blue House irrespective of an official standard 
operational procedure – institutions, legislation and procedure – for government 
decision making in relation to North Korea. Ji-Sun Hong, Chief of the Korea Trade-
Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA), received a direct order from the Blue House 
and met the officials from the North Korean government to discuss food aid in China on 
6 June.125 Hong and the North Korean government agreed to hold the inter-Korean 
talks in order to discuss rice aid.126 Finally, the ‘Beijing Rice Talks’ for the discussion 
of rice aid was held in Beijing from 17 to 21June.127 
On 23 August 1995, the Kim Young-Sam administration prepared another plan 
to provide additional aid worth $2 million to North Korea through the International 
Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (IFRC).128 This plan was made for two 
underlying reasons. The Kim Young-Sam administration first was sensitive to the 
normative leverage of being a leading state in the international community in their 
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efforts to relieve the food crisis in North Korea. In this sense, the Kim Young-Sam 
administration pledged this additional food aid to North Korea, proclaiming the 
importance of the collaboration with the international community.129 Secondly, the Kim 
Young-Sam administration perceived that the provision of food aid to North Korea 
would contribute to improving their bargaining power at the Four-Party Talks, by 
increasing the leverage of engagement of the South Korean government.130 The ruling 
party which maintained a conservative view on food aid to North Korea in the aftermath 
of the first rice aid in June 1995, however, put a break on the scale of the government 
aid plan. The ruling party insisted on conditional aid requiring an official request by 
North Korea and it decreased the aid from $2 million to $50,000.131 The pledge of $2 
million of aid through the IFRC eventually died out in 1995.  
After the withdrawal of the $2 million pledge in 1995, the Kim Young-Sam 
administration established its basic policy of food aid to North Korea, which was based 
on a practical approach linking food aid to political issues. On 27 September 1995, the 
Kim Young-Sam administration attended the Rice Aid Talks in Beijing and presented 
three principles required for government food aid. This principle included an official 
request for aid by the North Korean authorities, holding the related inter-Korean talks 
within the Korean peninsula and the release of the abducted crew of the Woosung.132 
North Korea, however, did not accept these principles, and thereby additional food aid 
at the inter-government level in 1995 was not made. 
On 11 June 1996, the Kim Young-Sam administration pledged $3 million’s 
worth of food aid through the WFP and UNICEF. As Unification Minister Kwon stated 
“The government, as a member state of the U.N., decided to provide $3 million of food 
aid through the U.N. agencies”133 at the press conference, the normative leverage 
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saving its face in the international community was a major underlying trigger behind the 
$3 million of aid in June. This pledge, however, was also influenced by the advocacy of 
food aid to North Korea by the KSM and Good Friends. As Unification Minister Kwon 
testifies, $3 million’s worth of food aid was made to appease the increasing demands of 
humanitarian NGOs that urged the Kim Young-Sam administration to resume the food 
aid to North Korea.134 After this decision was made in June 1996, North Korea’s 
military actions, the Kangreung Submarine Infiltration in September 1996, made the 
Kim Young-Sam administration suspend all type of inter-Korean exchange and 
cooperation including the humanitarian aid to North Korea. 
On 29 December 1996,North Korea’s official apology became a direct trigger 
which enabled the Kim Young-Sam administration to resume the food aid to North 
Korea. After North Korea’s apology, the Kim Young-Sam administration revealed its 
plan to provide 9,852 tonnes of food aid through the WFP on 20 February.135 On 20 
June the Kim Young-Sam administration decided to provide more large-scale food aid, a 
total of 50,300 tonnes – 50,000 tonnes of maize and 300 tonnes of dried milk – through 
the WFP.136 The direct trigger of these decisions was the recovered inter-Korean 
relations. On 29 May, South Korea, the U.S. and North Korea resumed discussion on 
the Four-Party Talks which was followed by a second meeting on 18 June. This took 
place after the meeting between South Korea, the U.S. and Japan concerning North 
Korea policy coordination on 9 June. During this process the U.S. government proposed 
the Kim Young-Sam administration provide additional food aid to North Korea to entice 
North Korea into the Four-Party Talks. 137  The Kim Young-Sam administration 
accordingly decided to provide 50,300 tonnes of food aid through the WFP on 20 June. 
After this decision, South Korea, the U.S. and North Korea agreed to hold the 
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Preliminary Talks on 5 August, and finally the first Four-Party Talks were held in 
Geneva on 9 December 1997.  
In the Kim Young-Sam administration’s food aid decisions in 1997, it was not 
able to ignore the public and NGO demands on food aid to North Korea which 
developed into a nationwide movement in 1997. Throughout 1997, the KSM and Good 
Friends extended their most active advocacy movement urging the Kim Young-Sam 
administration and civil society to resume food aid to North Korea in 1997. As the 
public opinion poll on 30 April 1997 showed that 79.1 per cent of the respondents were 
in favour of food aid to North Korea,138 the KSM and Good Friends contributed to 
mitigating the hostility towards North Korea by improving public awareness about the 
severity of the food crisis in North Korea and appealing to brotherly love and 
humanitarianism. Given the favourable public opinion on the provision of food aid to 
North Korea in 1997, the issue of the food aid to North Korea was a major issue for the 
Kim Young-Sam administration in 1997. 139  Although the Kim Young-Sam 
administration made the provision of food aid to North Korea conditional on inter-
Korean politics, the Kim Young-Sam administration was not able to ignore the demands 
from the humanitarian NGOs and civil society particularly in this year of 1997. It was 
an important period in terms of canvassing public opinion in view of the presidential 
election which was held later in that year. 
The influence of the advocacy by the KSM and Good Friends was more definite 
in the decision made in August 1997. On 23 August the Kim Young-Sam administration 
pledged another 8,398 tonnes of corn-soya blend and 781 tonnes of dried milk through 
the WFP. The background to this decision can be narrowed down into two factors. 
Firstly, given the absence of political issues in August 1997, such as the Four-Party 
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Talks and North Korea’s appeal for food aid, public opinion demanding food aid to 
North Korea was a direct trigger for an additional pledge in August. Jong-Yeol Lee, the 
Chief of the Humanitarian Support Bureau within the Ministry of Unification, stated at 
a press interview on the additional pledge that “[the additional aid] is in accordance with 
the government policy of providing humanitarian aid to the North Korean compatriots 
from brotherly love and humanitarianism.”140 At that time, the KSM and Good Friends 
organised a nationwide movement urging the Kim Young-Sam administration to take 
further action to relieve the humanitarian crisis in North Korea through the ‘One Million 
Signatures for Helping the North Korean Compatriots’ from 5 July to 15 August. As 
public opinion on the food aid to North Korea developed into a nationwide movement 
in an explosive manner, the Kim Young-Sam administration pledged this additional food 
aid to North Korea.141 
 
 
7.5.2 Changes in the Kim Dae-Jung Administration’s Food Aid Policy 
 
During the Kim Dae-Jung administration from 1998 to 2002, KSM and Good Friends 
advocacy contributed to the resumption of food aid to North Korea and finally paved 
the way for the institutionalisation of the large scale of food aid to North Korea. While 
the Kim Dae-Jung administration maintained a favourable policy towards NGOs in 
1998 and 1999, the KSM and Good Friends gradually improved their organisational 
expertise in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea. Despite such organisational 
development in 1998 and 1999, however, the KSM and Good Friends were not able to 
overcome the severe political and military confrontations between both Koreas, and 
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therefore the amount of government food aid to North Korea in this period proved to be 
only 40,000 tonnes.142 The Inter-Korean Summit in 2000 which made sure of the 
incoming political rapprochement in the Korean peninsula was a decisive factor which 
enabled the Kim Dae-Jung administration to pledge 500,000 tonnes of rice aid to North 
Korea from 2000 onwards. The role of the KSM and Good Friends in the resumption of 
large-scale food aid to North Korea was to consistently promote the advocacy of food 
aid to North Korea based on strong humanitarian mandates and improved funding and 
organisational expertise in advocacy. Such advocacy finally contributed to the 
establishment of a favourable operational environment in which the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration was able to accomplish the Inter-Korean Summit in 2000. 
Right after the inauguration of President Kim in 1998, more specifically, the 
Kim Dae-Jung administration pledged 40,000 tonnes, which was distributed through the 
WFP. The Kim Dae-Jung administration’s quick decision was possible as President Kim 
had overtly supported the demand of the provision of food aid to North Korea from 
humanitarian NGOs, from the time when he was the President of the NCNP during the 
Kim Young-Sam administration. After winning the presidential election, President Kim 
maintained a close relationship with the humanitarian NGOs and expressed his positive 
stance on the provision of food aid to North Korea through his inaugural speech on 25 
February, stating “[I will be] flexible in the provision of humanitarian aid to North 
Korea for the relief of the food crisis in North Korea,” and then pledged 40,000 tonnes 
of food aid to North Korea in March 1998.143 
Despite the severe food deficits in North Korea and the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration’s positive stance on the provision of food aid to North Korea between 
1998 and 1999, however, the amount of food aid in 1998 was just 40,000 tonnes and no 
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food aid was made in 1999.144 The reason that such a small amount of food aid in 1998 
and 1999 was made despite the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s positive discursive 
position on the provision of food aid to North Korea was attributable to the weakening 
of KSM and Good Friends advocacy and the political confrontation between both 
Koreas.  
As the Kim Dae-Jung administration overtly expressed its positive stance on the 
provision of large-scale food aid to North Korea in 1998 and 1999, the KSM and Good 
Friends expected that the Kim Dae-Jung administration would soon provide large-scale 
food aid to North Korea.145 Given this prospect, the KSM began to convert its main 
mandate from the advocacy of food aid to direct delivery of humanitarian and 
development aid to North Korea.146 Good Friends also changed the priority of its 
movement to the issue of North Korean human rights and refugees.147 During this 
period between 1998 and 1999, therefore, KSM and Good Friends advocacy of food aid 
to North Korea still continued, but the scale of advocacy gradually diminished.  
Meanwhile, the Kim Dae-Jung administration adhered to the principle of strict 
reciprocity in the provision of food aid to North Korea during this period. Although the 
Kim Dae-Jung administration adopted the engagement policy, which emphasised peace 
building in the Korean peninsula through inter-Korean exchange and cooperation, as the 
main policy towards North Korea, there was still severe political confrontation and 
mistrust between both Koreas which had been ongoing since the Korean War in 1950.148 
In addition, North Korea’s military action, such as the West Sea Battle in June 1999, 
made it difficult for the Kim Dae-Jung administration, to execute its aid policy, which 
included the issue of food aid in the government main agenda, by rupturing the inter-
Korean talks which were expected to discuss the issue of food aid.149 To make North 
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Korea terminate its military actions and respond to the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s 
engagement policy, therefore, the Kim Dae-Jung administration made the provision of 
food aid conditional on favourable behaviour from North Korea and the holding of 
inter-Korean talks, adhering to the principle of reciprocity.150.  
The Inter-Korean Summit which made sure of incoming political rapprochement 
in the Korean peninsula was a decisive factor which enabled the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration to pledge 500,000 tonnes of rice aid to North Korea. The influence of 
KSM and Good Friends advocacy in this decision was identified in two aspects: the 
establishment of a favourable operational environment for the Inter-Korean Summit and 
active participation in the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s aid policy making.  
In the early years of the Kim Dae-Jung administration from 1998 until the Inter-
Korean Summit, the KSM and Good Friends exploited information politics 
disseminating ongoing information on the desperate situation in North Korea in order to 
improve public awareness about the severity of the humanitarian crisis in North Korea. 
As shown in the section on norm grafting in this chapter, such efforts contributed to an 
increase in public support for the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s engagement policy as 
well as support for the provision of food aid to North Korea, replacing the hostility 
towards North Korea with the norms of brotherly love, peaceful unification and 
humanitarianism. The increase in private level inter-Korean exchange and cooperation 
by humanitarian NGOs prevented inter-Korean relations from developing into the 
breakdown of inter-Korean communication in the situation of political and military 
confrontation.151 Based on support from the South Korean civil society for the Kim 
Dae-Jung administration’s engagement policy, the Kim Dae-Jung administration in 1998 
and 1999was able to maintain its engagement policy in the midst of the rupture of inter-
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Korean relations. In 2000, the Kim Dae-Jung administration was finally able to visit 
North Korea for the Inter-Korean Summit. The political rapprochement between both 
Koreas enabled the Kim Dae-Jung administration to resume large-scale food aid to 
North Korea in 2000. In this sense, Jae-Gyu Park, the Unification Minister in 2000, 
attributed the accomplishment of the Inter-Korean Summit to the efforts of the 
humanitarian NGOs through his statement at the NGO Council meeting on 6 October in 
2000.152 
The demands of the KSM and Good Friends which was delivered to government 
aid policy makers through the government consultation of the humanitarian NGOs were 
incorporated into the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s food aid decision in 2000. After 
the Inter-Korean Summit in June 2000, the 2nd Ministerial Talk which discussed the 
issue of food aid was held on 29 August 2000.153 Before North Korea’s appeal for food 
aid at the 2nd Ministerial Talk, the South Korean government already knew that the issue 
of food aid would be raised at the 2nd Ministerial Talk, through consultation with 
humanitarian NGOs.154 The chiefs and directors of the Humanitarian Support Bureau of 
the Ministry of Unification, who were responsible for the humanitarian aid to North 
Korea, already perceived the importance of food aid issue through consultation with 
NGO personnel in the meetings of the NGO Council.155 NGO personnel, who were 
appointed as advisors to the government consultative bodies, delivered their opinions on 
the urgent need of large-scale food aid to North Korea to the government policy makers. 
As the result of these consultations with the humanitarian NGOs, the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration came to make the internal decision on the provision of around 600,000 
tonnes of food aid to North Korea before the 2nd Ministerial Talk.156 
The worsened international environment after the 9.11 Terror in 2001 
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temporarily made it difficult for the Kim Dae-Jung administration to pledge food aid to 
North Korea in 2001. With the pledge of 500,000 tonnes of food aid in 2002, however, 
KSM and Good Friends advocacy of food aid to North Korea finally entered into the 
stage of ‘rule-consistent behaviour’ which the South Korean government sought to 
‘consistently’ commit themselves to in their policy of food aid to North Korea. Since the 
9.11 Terror in the United States, the Kim Dae-Jung administration maintained a military 
alert. At the 6th Ministerial Talk on 9 November North Korea denounced the Kim Dae-
Jung administration’s military alert, and the Ministerial Talk which was expected to 
discuss the provision of food aid broke down.157 The provision of government food aid 
in 2001 therefore ended up with the provision of only 100,000 tonnes of maize through 
the WFP, which was pledged in 2000 but could not be committed due to severe criticism 
from the opposition party and conservative media. 
In 2002, the Kim Dae-Jung administration resumed food aid to North Korea and 
the decision on food aid was made through the same procedures and institutions in 
which the pledge of aid in 2000 was made. After 2002, the South Korean government 
continued to provide around 500,000 tonnes of food aid yearly throughout the Roh 
Moo-Hyun administration except for 2006. This continuous food aid to North Korea 
indicates that KSM and Good Friends advocacy of food aid to North Korea entered into 
the stage of ‘rule-consistent behaviour’ which the South Korean government sought to 
‘consistently’ commit themselves to in their policy of food aid to North Korea, 
irrespective of NGO pressure. 
     The institutionalised aid policy-making process in 2002 was as follow. At the 
internal preparatory meetings before the Special Envoy Meetings which were the very 
first procedure in the government food-aid decision, the government canvassed public 
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opinion on the provision of food aid to North Korea through public opinion polls and  
consultation with the humanitarian NGOs. At this stage humanitarian NGOs which 
consistently urged for large-scale government food aid to North Korea exploited 
government consultative bodies, such as the UAM, the Korean Council, the NUAC and 
the Policy Advisory Committee of the Humanitarian Support Bureau within the 
Ministry of Unification.158 The NGO personnel who were appointed to the membership 
of these consultative bodies pressurised the government food aid decision makers within 
the Kim Dae-Jung administration to provide large-scale food aid to North Korea.159 
Such consultation with civil society and the humanitarian NGOs at the early stage of 
government aid policy making finally influenced the establishment of provisional plans 
for food aid, 500,000 tonnes in 2000 and 300,000 tonnes in 2002, at the preparatory 
meetings before the Special Envoy Meetings.160 In this sense, Lim the Special Envoy to 
North Korea in 2000 and 2002 stated that the amount of aid cannot be decided without 
public consensus.161 After the establishment of the provisional plans for food aid to 
North Korea, the authority to execute them was entirely the government decision 
makers’, the Special Envoys’ or the Unification Ministers’. 
 
 
7.5.3 Changes in the Roh Moo-Hyun Administration’s Food Aid Policy 
 
During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, KSM and Good Friends advocacy 
contributed to government establishment of a legal framework that could provide for 
more consistent and large scale food aid to North Korea. The Roh Moo-Hyun sought to 
institutionalise the provision of food aid to North Korea, irrespective of varies of inter-
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Korean relations. Based on this institutionalised mechanism, the Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration committed to the provision of large-scale food aid to North Korea 
throughout its administration. In fact, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration delivered an 
average of 400,000-500,000 tonnes of food aid annually to North Korea throughout its 
period. The breakdown in inter-Korean relations in 2005 and 2006, however, made the 
Roh Moo-Hyun administration suspend food aid to North Korea. Given the suspension 
of government food aid in 2005 and 2006, the KSM and Good Friends already had the 
highest level of organisational expertise in respect of the impact of advocacy movement. 
During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, the KSM and Good Friends maintained 
multiple channels that allowed them to get access to the key food aid decision makers in 
the Roh Moo-Hyun administration and that allowed them to establish the strong and 
systemic issue networks for an efficient advocacy movement pressurising the civil 
society. The KSM and Good Friends consequently played a decisive role in making 
government resume the food aid to North Korea. In 2005, the Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration resumed 500,000 tonnes of food aid to North Korea. After the North 
Korea’s nuclear test in 2006, however, the KSM and Good Friends were not able to 
organise the advocacy of food aid to North Korea due to the negative public opinion on 
the North Korea’s nuclear test. Given the devastated operational environment, the KSM 
and Good Friends unfolded the movement for food aid to flood victims in North Korea. 
After KSM and Good Friends’ vigorous advocacy of food aid for flood victims in North 
Korea in 2006, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration resumed 100,000 tonnes of food aid 
for flood victims.  
     Between 2003 and 2007 the South Korean government delivered a total of 
2,044,000 tonnes of food aid to North Korea, which was the largest amount given 
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exceeding by 173,000 tonnes the amount that was delivered from the United States 
during the same period.162 With regard to the type of delivery and the continuity, the 
Roh Moo-Hyun administration consistently delivered 400,000 tonnes of bilateral food 
aid on loan terms in each of the years 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2007. In 2003 the Roh 
Moo-Hyun administration delivered 400,000 tonnes of food aid to North Korea, and 
100,000 tonnes of food aid was distributed to North Korea through the WFP channel. In 
2004, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration shipped 400,000 tonnes of food aid on loan 
terms and pledged 100,000 tonnes through the WFP. After North Korea’s decision to 
withdraw from the U.N. Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) in late 2004, however, the 
Roh Moo-Hyun administration converted 100,000 tonnes of food aid which was due to 
be distributed to North Korea through the WFP in 2005 to bilateral aid. The total 
amount of bilateral aid in 2005 therefore became 500,000 tonnes. In 2006, food aid 
through the multilateral agencies such as the WFP, UNICEF and UNDP was not made. 
The large-scale food aid on loan terms which had been consistently delivered since 
2002 was not made. In 2006, instead, 100,000 tonnes of food aid for flood victims was 
made. In 2007, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration resumed 400,000 tonnes of food aid 
on loan terms and 44,000 tonnes through the multilateral channel.163 After the Inter-
Korean Summit, the Roh administration pledged another 50,000 tonnes of maize aid to 
North Korea, but this pledge was not realised. Such consistent food aid to North Korea 
from the Roh Moo-Hyun administration finally ranked the South Korean government as 
the largest food aid donor between 1995 and 2007. The South Korean government 
delivered 3,406,934 tonnes of food aid to North Korea, which was 1,320,240 tonnes 
more than the 2,086,694 tonnes from the second largest donor, the United States.164 
Among the total amount of food aid to North Korea between 1995 and 2007, 59.95 per 
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cent was made by the Roh Moo-Hyun administration.  
The consistent food aid to North Korea was attributable to the Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration’s positive stance on the provision of food aid to North Korea. It had a 
positive stance on food aid to North Korea and finally institutionalised this stance into 
government policies and the inter-Korean agreement. In 2003 President Roh Moo-Hyun 
proclaimed the ‘Peace and Prosperity Policy’ which succeeded the engagement policy. 
To assure the continuity of the engagement policy in 2003, the Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration reappointed Se-Hyeon Jeong, the last Unification Minister in the Kim 
Dae-Jung administration, to the first Unification Minister of the Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration. Jeong who was one of key policy makers in the pursuit of the 
engagement policy towards North Korea in the Kim Dae-Jung administration 
transplanted the engagement policy into the Roh Moo-Hyun administration. In the same 
vein, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration succeeded Kim Dae-Jung administration’s 
positive stance on large-scale food aid to North Korea and exploited Kim Dae-Jung 
administration’s procedures and institutions for aid decision making without any radical 
changes.165  The Roh Moo-Hyun administration also eased the application of the 
principle of reciprocity in the provision of food aid to North Korea.166 Given this 
operational environment, the 100,000 tonnes of food aid through the WFP was made 
without any serious political consideration in April right after President Roh Moo-
Hyun’s inauguration in February 2003. 167  In May 2003 the Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration agreed on 400,000 tonnes of bilateral food aid to North Korea. 
The political rapprochement between both Koreas shaped the favourable 
operational environment for the decision making of large-scale food aid in 2003, 2004 
and 2007. On 27 April 2003 both Koreas made an agreement on the inter-Korean road 
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and railway connection, the Gaesung Industrial Park and the Kumgang Mountain 
Tourist Project at the 10th Inter-Korean Ministerial Talk. In this favourable environment, 
the Roh Moo-Hyun administration was able to make a tentative pledge on the provision 
of food and fertiliser aid, by including the sentence of ‘[Both Koreas] cooperate to solve 
the humanitarian issues based on brotherly love’ in the meeting agreement of the 10th 
Inter-Korean Ministerial Talk.168 Such a favourable operational environment continued 
in 2004. At the 14th Inter-Korean Ministerial Talk in May 2004 North Korea agreed to 
hold the Inter-Korean Military Talk which had been consistently requested by the South 
Korean government.169 Both Koreas also agreed to collaborate with each other in the 
issues raised by each counterpart.170 After this agreement, the 9th Committee on Inter-
Korean Economic Cooperation was held to discuss the provision of food aid and other 
inter-Korean exchange and cooperation issues and finally the decision of 400,000 
tonnes of rice aid was made.171 On 9 October 2006, North Korea’s nuclear test resulted 
in the suspension of this bilateral food aid. With the adoption of the ‘2.13 Agreement’ 
that agreed the freeze of North Korea’s nuclear facilities and compensation for the 
freeze in February 2007, both Koreas held the 20th Inter-Korean Ministerial Talk from 
27 February to 2 March.172 This talk made an agreement on the separated families, the 
holding of the 13th Committee on Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation and the next 
Inter-Korean Ministerial Talk. Given this favourable environment, the Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration made a provisional agreement to resume large-scale food aid on loan 
terms.173 The Committee on Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation in April finally 
agreed to provide 400,000 tonnes of rice aid.174 
In 2005 and 2006, the rupture of inter-Korean relations resulted in the 
suspension of the inter-Korean talks for the discussion of food aid to North Korea. KSM 
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and Good Friends advocacy provided the momentum to make a favourable operational 
environment which enabled the Roh Moo-Hyun administration to resume its bilateral 
food aid to North Korea in 2005, emergency food aid for flood victims in 2006 and 
bilateral aid on loan terms in 2007. Despite the political rapprochement in the inter-
Korean relations in 2005, the Bush administration’s hostile policy towards North Korea 
which had continued since the 9.11 Terror in 2001 resulted in North Korea’s strong 
response. On 19 April 2005 North Korea revealed that they would reprocess a spent fuel 
rod to develop nuclear weapons.175 North Korea’s declaration prevented the Inter-
Korean Ministerial Talk for the discussion of bilateral food aid to North Korea being 
held. Given this worsened operational environment, the 6.15 Committee, to which the 
KSM and Good Friends were affiliated, played a decisive role enabling the Roh Moo-
Hyun administration to resume its large-scale bilateral food aid.176 The 6.15 Committee 
held the event of the ‘Grand Celebration for 6.15 Unification’ in Pyongyang from 14 to 
17 June 2005.177 The committee included Dong-Young Jeong, the Unification Minister, 
in the membership of the exchange which visited Pyongyang for the event. During the 
event in Pyongyang, Unification Minister Jeong met Kim Jeong-Il as the Special Envoy 
to North Korea.178 This envoy meeting finally contributed to the recovery of inter-
Korean relations that had deteriorated after the nuclear issue. After the Special Envoy 
Meeting, the 15th Inter-Korean Ministerial Talk was held on 23 June and the Roh Moo-
Hyun administration came to resume the provision of 500,000 tonnes of rice aid to 
North Korea in 2005. In this regard, the key decision makers such as Unification 
Minister Jeong and Vice-minister Bong-Jo Rhee who engaged in the recovery of inter-
Korean relations and the resumption of bilateral food aid to North Korea appreciated the 
efforts of humanitarian and unification NGOs which contributed to the situation, 
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maintaining momentum and preventing inter-Korean relations from evolving into an 
irreversible position.179 
In 2006, many government officials in the Ministry of Unification, such as 
Gyoung-Bin Ko, the former Director of the Humanitarian Assistance Bureau, and 
Chang-Seok Yang, the Director General of the Inter-Korean Transit Office, evaluated 
the provision of 100,000 tonnes of food aid for flood victims in North Korea as a 
representative case where humanitarian NGO advocacy had changed a government 
decision.180 After North Korea’s missile test on 6 July 2006, the sense of betrayal 
towards North Korea increased in South Korean civil society.181 The Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration eventually suspended the provision of bilateral food aid to North Korea. 
With this decision, humanitarian NGOs resumed their advocacy of food aid for flood 
victims. In their advocacy, humanitarian NGOs mainly exploited various institutions 
that were already institutionalised in government food aid policy making, such as the 
National Council for Inter-Korean Exchange and Cooperation, the Unification Advisory 
Meeting and the Policy Advisory Committee of the Humanitarian Support Bureau of the 
Ministry of Unification. Humanitarian NGOs also exploited the Government-Civilian 
Council for North Korean Aid Policy and the NGO Council for Cooperation with North 
Korea. The Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation and the 6.15 Committee 
also supported humanitarian NGO advocacy in late 2006.  
Humanitarian NGOs, in particular Good Friends, appealed for flood relief in 
North Korea, disseminating ongoing information of flood damage in North Korea. In 
doing so, Good Friends and other humanitarian NGO sought to overcome the sense of 
betrayal in South Korean civil society which resulted from North Korea’s missile test. 
Such efforts by humanitarian NGOs were successful in changing government aid policy 
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towards North Korea. On 20 August 2006 the Roh Moo-Hyun administration finally 
made a decision to give 100,000 tonnes of food aid to the flood victims in North 
Korea.182 The Roh Moo-Hyun administration, however, did not resume its general 
bilateral food aid of 400,000 tonnes because of North Korea’s nuclear test on 9 October 
2006. 
 
 
7.6 Conclusion  
 
Based on the examination of the operational environment and NGO advocacy of food 
aid to North Korea in the previous chapters, this chapter demonstrated that South 
Korean humanitarian NGO advocacy was consequential in explaining changes in South 
Korea’s food aid policy making in respect of the norm grafting in civil society, state 
agenda setting, the formation of a discursive position and institutional and policy 
development. Humanitarian NGO advocacy finally contributed to government 
establishment of a legal framework that could provide for more consistent and large 
scale food aid to North Korea. However, the changes at different stages of the state’s 
food aid policy-making processes, as the outcome of humanitarian NGO advocacy of 
food aid to North Korea, were different. This chapter demonstrated that these 
differences were attributable to the differing abilities of NGO to set agendas, network 
and graft new norms and the changes at the operational environment in where 
humanitarian NGOs worked. 
       As this chapter has demonstrated, despite the fact that the advocacy movement 
was less organised at its inception in 1995 and 1996 due to a lack of organisational 
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expertise in the advocacy of food aid, a strong humanitarian mandate and brotherly love 
motivated the KSM and Good Friends. Such a strong mandate was consequential in 
explaining changes in norms in South Korean civil society and Kim Young-Sam 
administration’s food aid policy making in respect of state agenda setting, the formation 
of a discursive position and institutional and policy development. During this period, 
the KSM and Good Friends appealed to brotherly love and humanitarianism and such 
agenda framing contributed to mitigating the predominant norm of hostility towards 
North Korea. In 1997, as the advocacy of food aid to North Korea prolonged, KSM and 
Good Friends advocacy began to ease the hostility towards North Korea that had been 
revived after the incident of the Kangreung Submarine Infiltration in September 1996, 
replacing the norms of brotherly love and humanitarianism. 
     With regard to changes in the government’s agenda and discursive position, in 
1995 and 1996 the KSM and Good Friends influence on the Kim Young-Sam 
administration was significant, but it did not lead to the clear changes in the Kim 
Young-Sam administration’s discursive position on food aid to North Korea. Firstly, the 
Kim Young-Sam administration maintained a negative view on the role of humanitarian 
NGOs in state food aid policy making process. Secondly, North Korea’s continued 
negative actions in 1995 and 1996 made it difficult for the Kim Young-Sam 
administration to maintain a positive position in relation to the provision of food aid to 
North Korea. Lastly, the low level of the organisational expertise of the KSM and Good 
Friends in respect of the advocacy of food aid to North Korea in 1995 and 1996 was not 
able to overcome Kim Young-Sam administration’s negative view on humanitarian 
NGOs and North Korea’s negative actions. Under the recovered inter-Korean relations 
in 1997, nationwide advocacy by the KSM and Good Friends that improved their 
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organisational expertise in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea were finally able to 
incorporate the issue of food aid to North Korea into the agenda of the Kim Young-Sam 
administration.  
This chapter also showed that despite KSM and Good Friends advocacy which 
pressed for government institutional change to allow private aid to North Korea in 1995 
and 1996, the Kim Young-Sam administration was passive towards the demands of the 
NGOs. During this period of 1995 and 1996, the KSM and Good Friends advocacy 
demanding the deregulation of government rules and acts circumscribing NGO 
activities in relation to advocacy of and aid to North Korea was not significant since the 
KSM and Good Friends focused on the advocacy of food aid to North Korea, rather 
than demanding deregulation. In addition, Kim Young-Sam administration’s passive 
attitude in relation to institutional change was attributable to its political structure which 
maintained a negative view on the role of humanitarian NGOs in state policy making. In 
1997, however, the radical increase of private aid to North Korea and the consistent 
nationwide advocacy movement by the KSM and Good Friends finally induced the Kim 
Young Sam administration to improve government institutions and rules in relation to 
the provision of food aid to North Korea and the operational environment for NGO 
activity. 
       With regard to changes in the Kim Young-Sam administration’s food aid policy 
as the final stage and fundamental goal of NGO advocacy, in the beginning of the 
advocacy of food aid to North Korea in 1995 and 1996, KSM and Good Friends 
influence on the Kim Young-Sam administration’s food aid policy making was not 
significant. In this period, the Kim Young-Sam administration’s food aid decision 
making was made through a non-democratic process which was driven by political 
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interests. KSM and Good Friends capacities to influence state food aid policy making in 
addition was not enough to overcome the non-democratic structure of the Kim Young-
Sam administration’s food aid policy making. KSM and Good Friends advocacy in 1996 
therefore ended up with achieving the outcome of influencing the Kim Young-Sam 
administration to pledge $3 million’s worth of food aid to North Korea. In 1997, the 
Kim Young-Sam administration made three consecutive decisions about food aid to 
North Korea. The direct trigger of these decisions was the recovered inter-Korean 
relations. Given the favourable political environment, however, the KSM and Good 
Friends which were highly motivated by humanitarianism and brotherly love and which 
achieved organisational improvement through the prolonged advocacy movement since 
1995 extended their most vigorous nationwide advocacy throughout 1997, and such 
activity made the Kim Young-Sam administration pledge additional food aid to North 
Korea. 
       During the Kim Dae-Jung administration from 1998 to 2002, KSM and Good 
Friends advocacy achieved radical changes in the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s 
agenda setting, discursive position, institution, and policy in relation to the provision of 
food aid to North Korea. KSM and Good Friends advocacy replaced the hostility 
towards North Korea in 1998 and 1999 with the norms of brotherly love, peaceful 
unification and humanitarianism which supported the food aid to North Korea. During 
this period, the more significant contribution of KSM and Good Friends advocacy was 
the accomplishment of political rapprochement between both Koreas. KSM and Good 
Friends advocacy contributed to the establishment of sustainable ground which the Kim 
Dae-Jung administration was able to pursue in its engagement policy. The Kim Dae-
Jung administration finally achieved political rapprochement through the Inter-Korean 
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Summit in 2000. The political rapprochement in turn provided momentum so that the 
norms of brotherly love, peaceful unification and humanitarianism, which the KSM and 
Good Friends had consistently advocated, became set in South Korean civil society.  
As Kim Dae-Jung who maintained a favourable view on the role of NGOs in the 
advocacy of food aid to North Korea was elected as the 15th president, the KSM and 
Good Friends were easily able to incorporate the issue of food aid to North Korea into 
one of the key government agenda items. In fact, the Kim Dae-Jung administration 
consistently proclaimed the provision of large-scale food aid to North Korea throughout 
the Kim Dae-Jung administration. Despite KSM and Good Friends advocacy that 
consistently urged for ‘unconditional’ aid to North Korea, however, the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration adhered to the principle of strict reciprocity linking food aid to North 
Korea with inter-Korean issues. It was because of the political confrontation between 
both Koreas and the criticism from the conservative party that made it difficult for the 
Kim Dae-Jung administration to provide unconditional aid to North Korea. From 2000 
onwards, the thing that made it possible to ease the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s 
application of strict reciprocity policy was the political rapprochement after the Inter-
Korean Summit in June 2000. Given the political rapprochement, the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration was more susceptible to the demand of humanitarian NGOs urging for 
unconditioned aid to North Korea.  
With regard to changes in government institutions, KSM and Good Friends 
advocacy promoted the improvement of government institution in relation to state food 
aid policy making and the operational environment for NGO activities. President Kim 
who perceived humanitarian NGOs as an importance counterpart in the maintenance of 
inter-Korean relations undertook institutional changes promoting civil participation in 
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government food aid policy making. The Kim Dae-Jung administration also took 
various measures to improve the operational environment for NGO activity in respect of 
the delivery of aid to North Korea, fundraising and public campaigns. Given the 
political rapprochement in 2000, the Kim Dae-Jung administration took the first step for 
the provision of large-scale food aid to North Korea for which the KSM and Good 
Friends had consistently urged. In 2001, the worsened inter-Korean relations 
temporarily interrupted the discussion of food aid through these procedures and 
institutions. The establishment of government aid policy making procedures and 
institutions in the Kim Dae-Jung administration, however, indicates that KSM and Good 
Friends’ organisational expertise in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea reached at 
the level of which they successfully pressurise changes in government institutions in 
respect of food aid to North Korea. Such improvement indicates that KSM and Good 
Friends advocacy finally entered into the initial stage of rule-consistent behaviour in 
which a state seeks to commit itself to their policy by establishing relevant procedures 
and institutions irrespective of the existence of external monitoring or pressure. 
      The chapter also demonstrated that KSM and Good Friends advocacy promoted 
changes in the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s food aid policy. Between 1998 and 1999, 
the amount of government food aid to North Korea was only 40,000 tonnes. During this 
period, the Kim Dae-Jung administration maintained a positive discursive position 
supporting large-scale food aid to North Korea, but the Kim Dae-Jung administration 
also made food aid conditional on the inter-Korean talks. While the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration maintained a positive discursive position on the provision of food aid to 
North Korea between 1998 and 1999, the KSM and Good Friends began to diversify 
their organisational mandates. Such diversification of organisational mandates resulted 
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in the weakening of KSM and Good Friends advocacy. It thereby was not enough to 
overcome the political and military confrontations between both Koreas between 1998 
and 1999. The Inter-Korean Summit in 2000 was then a decisive factor that enabled the 
Kim Dae-Jung administration to pledge 500,000 tonnes of rice aid to North Korea. With 
regard to the political rapprochement, KSM and Good Friends advocacy contributed to 
the establishment of a favourable operational environment that made it possible for the 
Kim Dae-Jung administration to maintain the engagement policy. Under the favourable 
operational environment with the inauguration of the Kim Dae-Jung administration in 
1998, the KSM and Good Friends continued its advocacy of food aid to North Korea 
and newly organised a peaceful unification movement targeting the South Korean civil 
society throughout 1998 and 1999. Under the institutional and financial support from 
the Kim Dae-Jung administration in 1998 and 1999, in addition, the KSM and Good 
Friends radically improved their organisational expertise, by widening and 
strengthening their networks with key state policy makers in the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration. The KSM and Good Friends’ organisational expertise improved enabled 
them to establish a favourable operational environment that made it possible for the 
Kim Dae-Jung administration to maintain the engagement policy. The engagement 
policy adhered to by the Kim Dae-Jung administration finally resulted in the Inter-
Korean Summit successfully being held in 2000. Given the political rapprochement 
after the Inter-Korean Summit, the Kim Dae-Jung administration made the first pledge 
of 500,000 tonnes of food aid to North Korea in 2000. The worsened international 
environment after the 9.11 Terror in 2001 temporarily made it difficult for the Kim Dae-
Jung administration to pledge food aid to North Korea. With the pledge of another 
500,000 tonnes of food aid in 2002, however, KSM and Good Friends advocacy of food 
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aid to North Korea entered into the stage of ‘rule-consistent behaviour’ in which the 
South Korean government sought to commit itself to their policy of food aid to North 
Korea irrespective of NGO advocacy and pressure. 
        Lastly, this chapter demonstrated that during the Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration from 2003 to 2007 KSM and Good Friends advocacy finally reached the 
stage of rule-consistent behaviour in which the South Korean government sought to 
commit itself to their policy of pro food aid to North Korea. During the Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration, the norms of brotherly love, peaceful unification and humanitarianism 
underpinning the provision of food aid to North Korea became dominant norms in 
South Korean civil society. The role of the KSM and Good Friends in norm grafting, 
however, was not significant compared to the previous two administrations of Kim 
Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung. While the political rapprochement was a decisive factor 
that enabled these norms to be self-reliant, the KSM and Good Friends diverted their 
organisational capacities into the delivery of development aid to North Korea and the 
human rights movement. During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, KSM and Good 
Friends influence on the norm grafting behind the civil society therefore was not 
significant.   
With regard to changes in the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s agenda and 
discursive position, it was solid throughout the administration. The incorporation of the 
food aid issue into the government agenda, positive agenda setting and a positive 
discursive position was certain even in the midst of unfavourable operational 
environments in 2004, 2005 and 2006. Firstly, the positive discursive position of the 
Roh Moo-Hyun administration was attributable to the political orientation of the Roh 
Moo-Hyun administration that consistently supported the provision of food aid to North 
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Korea. Secondly, the positive discursive position was attributable to the efforts of 
humanitarian NGOs that consistently urged for food aid although the scale of advocacy 
movement was not significant compared to the one in the Kim Dae-Jung administration. 
Humanitarian crises in North Korea in 2004 and 2006, lastly, made the humanitarian 
NGOs resume their advocacy of humanitarian aid to North Korea. The resumption of 
NGO advocacy in turn influenced the formation of public opinion which pressurised the 
Roh Moo-Hyun administration in the midst of an unfavourable operational environment 
to take action to relieve the humanitarian crisis in 2004, 2005 and 2006. 
With regard to changes in government institutions, the Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration established institutions for stable food aid that were free from inter-
Korean political and military issues. The establishment of these institutions was 
attributable to the political stance of the Roh Moo-Hyun administration that maintained 
a positive stance on the provision of large-scale food aid to North Korea and NGO 
participation in government policy making and execution. Considering the fact that 
institutional changes in the Roh Moo-Hyun administration were the things for which the 
KSM and Good Friends consistently urged, however, the institutionalisation of stable 
and large-scale government food aid to North Korea, and NGO participation in 
government aid policy making in the Roh Moo-Hyun administration were also 
attributable to the efforts of KSM and Good Friends.  
With regard to changes in state food aid policy towards North Korea, this 
chapter demonstrated that KSM and Good Friends advocacy reached the stage of rule-
consistent behaviour in which the South Korean government provided large-scale food 
aid to North Korea on a consistent basis. The consistent food aid to North Korea was 
firstly attributable to the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s positive stance on the 
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provision of food aid to North Korea. Secondly, the political rapprochement between 
both Koreas shaped a favourable operational environment for the decision making of 
large-scale food aid to North Korea in the years of 2003, 2004 and 2007. The rupture of 
inter-Korean relations, however, still worked as a factor which made it difficult for the 
Roh Moo-Hyun administration to commit to their policy. The worsened operational 
environment resulted in the suspension of the inter-Korean talks for the discussion of 
government food aid to North Korea in 2005 and 2006. Given this operational 
environment, the KSM and Good Friends did not heavily engaged in the advocacy of 
food aid to North Korea since the KSM and Good Friends already diverted its 
organisational capacities into non-food aid issues, such as the delivery of development 
aid to North Korea and the human rights movement. The KSM and Good Friends 
however showed their improved organisational expertise in the advocacy of food aid to 
North Korea, by establishing and exploiting effective channels that allowed them to 
exert direct influence on the Roh Moo-Hyun administrations’ food aid policy making 
process. KSM and Good Friends advocacy finally provided momentum that made the 
Roh Moo-Hyun administration resume its bilateral food aid. 
      Lastly, this chapter demonstrated that changes at various stages of the state’s 
food aid policy-making process were different. These differences were attributable to 
the differing abilities of the NGOs to set agendas, network and graft new norms. 
Organisational mandates, funding capacities and expertise were important in the 
constitution of the differing abilities of the NGOs.  
      Firstly, during the Kim Young-Sam administration the KSM and Good Friends 
were heavily engaged in the advocacy of food aid to North Korea. While the funding 
capacity and organisational expertise of the KSM and Good Friends was not yet fully 
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developed, a strong mandate to relieve the humanitarian crisis in North Korea propelled 
KSM and Good Friends advocacy of food aid to North Korea. In addition, the KSM had 
a wide network that embraced differing social, religious and political groups and NGOs 
which enabled the KSM to organise a nationwide advocacy movement that pressurised 
the Kim Young-Sam administration. On the other hand, Good Friends, as a coalition 
body among the Buddhist circle, had exerted relatively limited influence on South 
Korean civil society as a whole in the Kim Young-Sam administration. 
      During the Kim Dae-Jung administration from 1998 to 2002, both the KSM and 
Good Friends were dedicated to the advocacy of food aid to North Korea. The strategies 
that the KSM and Good Friends exploited, however, were different from each other. By 
exploiting its wide networks, the KSM entered into the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s 
food aid policy-making process, and thereby the KSM sought to exert direct influence 
on the state food aid decisions towards North Korea. On the other hand, during the Kim 
Dae-Jung administration Good Friends built up its expertise in the research of the North 
Korean food crisis and then devoted time to disseminating the research outcomes to 
South Korean civil society to increase public awareness of the humanitarian crisis in 
North Korea. Such efforts contributed to the formation of favourable public opinion on 
the provision of food aid to North Korea. This favourable public opinion led to the 
increase in public support for the engagement policy that was the momentum which 
enabled the Kim Dae-Jung administration to resume the large-scale food aid to North 
Korea in 2000.    
      Lastly, in the Roh Moo-Hyun administration KSM and Good Friends’ influence 
in changes in the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s food aid policy making was different. 
During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, the KSM maintained a high level of 
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organisational expertise in that the KSM institutionalised its participation in the Roh 
Moo-Hyun administration’s food aid policy-making process. After 2000, however, the 
KSM changed its mandate from the advocacy of food aid to North Korea to the delivery 
of development aid and increased its reliance on government funding. Such changes in 
their organisational mandate and funding structure resulted in the weakening of KSM 
advocacy when the Roh Moo-Hyun administration encountered the situation where it 
could not provide food aid to North Korea due to the rupture of inter-Korean relations. 
On the other hand, although Good Friends changed its organisational mandate from the 
advocacy of food aid to North Korea to the human rights movement after 2000, Good 
Friends consistently maintained its primary organisational mandate, by framing the 
provision of food aid as protecting North Korea’s human rights. With regard to funding 
capacity, Good Friends was able to maintain its independence from donors, particularly 
the South Korean government as a main funding source. Although the scale of funding 
was insignificant throughout the entire period from 1996 to 2007, Good Friends, as a 
Jungto Society-affiliated organisation, received its funding from individual members 
and the Jungto Society which is a Buddhist ascetic exercise organisation. Unlike the 
KSM and other humanitarian NGOs in the advocacy movement that were passive in 
criticising the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s suspension of food aid to North Korea, 
Good Friends promoted an active advocacy movement that urged the Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration to resume the large-scale food aid to North Korea irrespective of inter-
Korean relations. 
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION: THE ROLE OF HUMANITARIAN NON- 
GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS IN SOUTH KOREAN 
GOVERNMENT FOOD AID POLICY MAKING TOWARDS 
NORTH KOREA FROM 1995 TO 2007 
 
 
As the conclusion of the thesis, this chapter provides the argument of the thesis, the 
contribution and limitations of the thesis, and future research agendas. This chapter first 
gives a summary of the overall thesis, which includes research questions, hypotheses, 
methodology and the key proven argument of the thesis. The chapter next reviews the 
academic and practical contribution of the thesis. It then clarifies the limitations of the 
thesis and tackles criticisms on the key argument of the thesis. This chapter, lastly, 
provides future research agendas that need further investigation.  
 
 
The Argument of the Thesis 
 
Given the demonstrable food crisis in North Korea from 1995 to 2007, the amount of 
food aid delivery from the South Korean government severely fluctuated, and the 
pattern of fluctuation did not relate to changes in North Korea’s food need. With regard 
to the explanation of the fluctuations during this period, the dominant approach that 
adopted a realist analytical framework however has provided only a partial explanation, 
ignoring the role of South Korean humanitarian NGOs in state food aid policy making 
despite their significant political role in state food aid policy making. This thesis 
therefore sought to provide an alternative explanation of state food aid policy making, 
477 
filling a gap in the current dominant state- and interest group-centred approaches to 
food aid policy making. The thesis focused on the hitherto neglected issue of the impact 
of NGOs on state food aid policy making.  
     From the literature review, this thesis first identified the research problems 
inherent in the analyses of South Korean government food aid policy making between 
1995 and 2007. These problems are why there was a discrepancy between the South 
Korean government’s policy pronouncements and their actual behaviour relating to food 
aid to North Korea; why the amount of food aid to North Korea fluctuated and finally 
reached the stage of consistent food aid delivery with large scale bilateral food aid to 
North Korea throughout most of the years between 2000 and 2007. To answer these two 
fundamental questions, this thesis questioned how and to what extent South Korean 
humanitarian NGOs have influenced their government food aid policy making on North 
Korea and why the extent of the influence from NGOs has differed between 
administrations. 
       To answer the research questions, this thesis developed three hypotheses as 
follows: 
 
Hypothesis I: Organisational mandates, funding capacities and expertise 
were important in the constitution of each non-governmental organisation’s 
capacity to influence South Korean government food aid policy. 
 
Hypothesis II: Differing non-governmental organisation capacities were 
consequential in explaining the capability of non-governmental organisation 
advocacy to set agendas, network and engage in the grafting of norms in 
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respect of South Korean government policy on food aid to North Korea.  
 
Hypothesis III: These differences in non-governmental organisation capacity 
shaped different outcomes at different stages of South Korea’s food aid 
policy-making. South Korea’s food aid policy processes are disaggregated 
according to the different stages of agenda setting, the formation of a 
discursive position, and institutional and policy development. 
 
 To demonstrate NGO influence on the state policy-making process, this thesis 
used a constructivist approach that includes non-state actor and normative factors in the 
analysis of state policy making. The thesis divided the NGO advocacy movement into 
the four stages of agenda framing, networking, grafting and institutionalisation in order 
to demonstrate the differing impacts of NGO advocacy on the state policy making-
process. By analysing these differing stages, it demonstrated that organisational 
mandates, funding capacities and the expertise of NGOs were important in the 
constitution of each NGO’s capacity to set agendas, network and engage in the grafting 
of norms in respect of South Korean government policy on food aid to North Korea. By 
analysing the causal relationship between the differing stages of state policy making and 
NGO advocacy, the thesis then demonstrated that NGO advocacy was consequential in 
explaining changes in South Korea’s food aid policy making. It also demonstrated that 
the differences in NGO capacity shaped different outcomes at different stages of South 
Korea’s food aid policy-making in respect of state agenda setting, the formation of a 
discursive position and institutional and policy development.       
Finally, this thesis demonstrated that strong organisational mandates and 
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networks are the critical factors that enable NGOs to overcome the poor funding 
capacity and under-developed expertise they experience at the beginning of an advocacy 
movement. In 1995 and 1996, the Korean Sharing Movement (KSM) and Good Friends 
had poor funding and an unstable organisational structure. During this period, however, 
the KSM and Good Friends were driven by a strong mandate to relieve the humanitarian 
crisis in North Korea. The KSM and Good Friends also had a wide network 
encompassing most of social groups. Such a strong mandate and wide networks enabled 
the KSM and Good Friends to incorporate the norms of brotherly love and 
humanitarianism that support the food aid to North Korea into the Kim Young-Sam 
administration’s agenda and to change discursive position. In 1997, a single mandate to 
relieve the humanitarian crisis in North Korea still motivated the KSM and Good 
Friends to steer the advocacy of food aid to North Korea and led to a nationwide 
advocacy. Such advocacy contributed to incorporating the norms of brotherly love and 
humanitarianism into the dominant norms in South Korean civil society. KSM and 
Good Friends advocacy finally made the Kim Young-Sam administration resume food 
aid to North Korea although the amount of food aid was not significant. While the Kim 
Dae-Jung administration maintained a favourable stance on the large scale of food aid to 
North Korea in 1998 and 1999, however, the KSM and Good Friends, who had expected 
the pledge of large-scale food aid with the inauguration of President Kim Dae-Jung, 
began to diversify their organisational mandates towards other non-food aid issues. The 
diversification of their organisational mandate led to the weakening of KSM and Good 
Friends advocacy to pressurise the Kim Dae-Jung administration to resume food aid to 
North Korea. The amount of food aid to North Korea in this period therefore was 
smaller than that of the Kim Young-Sam administration from 1995 to1997. 
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Secondly, it demonstrated that NGO funding capacity stabilised since 2000 and 
its organisational expertise accumulated through the prolonged advocacy movement 
since 1995 contributed to the maximisation of NGO influence on state food aid policy 
making process. Under the government financial support and the diversification of 
organisational mandates from 2000, the KSM and Good Friends gradually improved 
their funding arrangements. As the advocacy of food aid to North Korea prolonged 
since 1995, in addition, the KSM and Good Friends accumulated their expertise in 
advocacy movement. Between 2003 and 2007, the KSM and Good Friends thereby 
maintained the highest level of organisational expertise that enabled them to exert direct 
influence on government policy makers and institutions. During this period, KSM and 
Good Friends advocacy contributed to the institutionalisation of large-scale food aid to 
North Korea. The Roh Moo-Hyun administration delivered an average of 400,000 to 
500,000 tonnes of food aid annually to North Korea, except for 2006. In 2007, the Roh 
Moo-Hyun administration finally institutionalised the provision of large-scale food aid 
to North Korea by establishing ‘The 1st Basic Plan for Advancing Inter-Korean 
Relations’ and ‘2007 Inter-Korean Summit Statement.’ This plan and statement 
stipulated the provision of food aid to North Korea on a regular basis. These consistent 
food aid and the adoption of plan and statement indicates that KSM and Good Friends 
advocacy reached the stage of rule-consistent behaviour in which the South Korean 
government sought to commit itself to the provision of large-scale food aid to North 
Korea irrespective of changes in the inter-Korean relations and external pressure, such 
as humanitarian NGO advocacy. 
       Thirdly, the thesis demonstrated that the high reliance on government funding 
resulted in the weakening of the advocacy of food aid to North Korea. In the Roh Moo-
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Hyun administration, KSM and Good Friends’ influence in changes in the state food aid 
policy making was different. After 2000, the KSM increased its reliance on government 
funding, by diversifying its mandate from the advocacy of food aid to North Korea to 
the delivery of development aid. This high reliance on government funding resulted in 
the weakening of KSM advocacy when the Roh Moo-Hyun administration encountered 
the situation where it could not provide food aid to North Korea due to the rupture of 
inter-Korean relations. On the other hand, although Good Friends changed its 
organisational mandate from the advocacy of food aid to North Korea to the human 
rights movement after 2000, Good Friends consistently maintained organisational 
independence from external pressure, particularly the South Korean government as a 
main funding entity. Although the scale of funding was insignificant throughout the 
entire period from 1996 to 2007, Good Friends, as a Jungto Society-affiliated 
organisation, received its funding from individual members and the Jungto Society, 
which is a Buddhist ascetic exercise organisation. Unlike the KSM and other 
humanitarian NGOs in the advocacy movement that were passive in criticising the Roh 
Moo-Hyun administration’s suspension of food aid to North Korea, Good Friends were 
able to promote an active advocacy movement that urged the Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration to resume the large-scale food aid to North Korea irrespective of inter-
Korean relations. 
      Drawing on the literature review and a constructivist approach, this thesis was 
based upon an assumption that the issue characteristics of the North Korean food crisis 
and the domestic political structure of South Korean government food aid policy 
making changed over time, shaping the differing operational environment in which 
South Korean humanitarian NGOs worked.  
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This thesis firstly demonstrated that the outbreak of the food crisis in North 
Korea itself did not lead to the provision of food aid, but it was an important factor that 
increased government susceptibility to NGO advocacy. Despite the worst food crisis in 
North Korea from 1995 to 1999, in fact, the amount of food aid from the Kim Young-
Sam administration (1995-1997) and the Kim Dae-Jung administration (1998-1999) was 
insignificant. During this period, the humanitarian crisis of food shortages in North 
Korea gave the momentum that South Korean humanitarian NGOs needed to promote 
the most vigorous nationwide advocacy movement. The nationwide advocacy finally 
contributed to the increase of food aid to North Korea between 1995 and 1999. In this 
period, the South Korean government recognised the necessity of food aid to North 
Korea, but the actual delivery of food aid to North Korea was not significant. The 
amount of food aid to North Korea instead radically increased between 2000 and 2007 
when the severity of the North Korean food crisis was relieved compared to the severity 
between 1995 and 1999. It indicates that the incident itself was not a factor that led to 
the pledge of food aid by donors, but was a necessary factor that ignited NGO advocacy 
and increased government susceptibility to NGO advocacy.        
      Secondly, this thesis demonstrated that the domestic political structure in respect 
of government-NGO relationship and donor-recipient relations played as a factor that 
circumscribes NGO influence on state policy making process. A strong mandate and 
wide networks in 1996 and 1997 enabled the KSM and Good Friends to incorporate the 
norms of brotherly love and humanitarianism into the Kim Young-Sam administration’s 
agenda and to change discursive position. During this period, however, changes in the 
Kim Young-Sam’s administration’s agenda setting and discursive position did not lead 
to institutional changes and the pledge of food aid to North Korea. Given the hostile 
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inter-Korean relations in 1995 and 1996, KSM and Good Friends advocacy were not 
enough to overcome such hostile inter-Korean relations. During this period, the Kim 
Young-Sam administration also maintained a non-democratic political structure in 
respect of state food aid policy making, by excluding non-state actors in state policy 
making process. The provision of food aid to North Korea in 1995 and 1996 therefore 
was not made. During the first two years of the Kim Dae-Jung administration from 1998 
to 1999, in addition, KSM and Good Friends advocacy was successful in incorporating 
the norms of brotherly love, peaceful unification and humanitarianism into government 
agenda and discursive position. In this period, however, the amount of food aid to North 
Korea was not significant. While the Kim Dae-Jung administration still made food aid 
conditional on inter-Korean political and military issues, North Korea continued to 
perpetrate negative military actions, criticising the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s 
engagement policy. Although the Kim Dae-Jung administration officially pledged the 
provision of food aid to North Korea, the hostile inter-Korean relations made it difficult 
for the Kim Dae-Jung administration to deliver food aid to North Korea in 1998 and 
1999.  
As shown above, the domestic political structure in respect of donor-recipient 
relations and a government-NGO relationship circumscribed NGO influence on state 
policy making. On the other hand, NGOs advocacy changed the domestic political 
structure of South Korean government and thereby contributed to the resumption of 
government food aid to North Korea. Throughout 1997 when the presidential election 
was held, the KSM and Good Friends unfolded a nationwide advocacy of food aid to 
North Korea. KSM and Good Friends’ nationwide advocacy formed a favourable 
operational environment for presidential candidate Kim Dae-Jung who consistently 
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proclaimed the necessity for large scale food aid to North Korea. In 2000, the Inter-
Korean Summit, which signified the political rapprochement, provided momentum that 
enabled the Kim Dae-Jung administration to resume food aid to North Korea. The role 
of the KSM and Good Friends in the achievement of political rapprochement and the 
resumption of food aid to North Korea was founded in two different aspects. 
Humanitarian NGOs including the KSM and Good Friends first consistently 
proselytised the Kim Dae-Jung administration to provide food aid to North Korea. Such 
advocacy was successful in incorporating the issue of large-scale food aid to North 
Korea into the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s key agenda. Humanitarian NGO 
advocacy secondly contributed to the increase of public support for the Kim Dae-Jung 
administration’s engagement policy. The increase of public support for the engagement 
policy enabled the Kim Dae-Jung administration to maintain its policy in the midst of 
North Korea’s negative actions that jeopardised the beginning of the engagement policy 
between 1998 and 1999. The political rapprochement after the Inter-Korean Summit in 
2000 finally enabled the Kim Dae-Jung administration to resume large-scale food aid to 
North Korea.  
NGOs advocacy also contributed to the establishment of a favourable 
government-NGO relationship and donor-recipient relations. As President Roh Moo-
Hyun revealed at the NGO New Year’s Greeting in 2003, a civil movement which the 
KSM, Good Friends and other rational-centrist organisations unfolded at the nationwide 
level in the late 2002 contributed to the favourable environment for the winning of Roh 
Moo-Hyun administration at the presidential election in 2002. The Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration therefore maintained a cooperative relationship with NGOs and was 
receptive to the demands of humanitarian NGOs throughout its administration. NGOs 
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advocacy also contributed to the establishment of favourable donor-recipient relations, 
by promoting the Roh Moo-Hyun administration’s inter-Korean relations. Throughout 
the Roh Moo-Hyun administration from 2003 to 2007, South Korean government 
sought to commit itself to the provision of large-scale food aid to North Korea. The 
rupture of inter-Korean relations however made it difficult for the Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration to commit them to provide food aid to North Korea. Given the 
suspension of government food aid in 2005 and 2006, the KSM and Good Friends 
played a decisive role in making the Roh Moo-Hyun administration resume food aid to 
North Korea. After the rupture of the Inter-Korean Talks in 2005, the KSM and Good 
Friends with other government-NGO consultative bodies provided momentum that 
enabled the Roh Moo-Hyun administration and North Korea to resume the Inter-Korean 
Talks for food aid. The Roh Moo-Hyun administration finally resumed food aid to 
North Korea in 2005. In 2006 when the Roh Moo-Hyun administration suspended food 
aid after North Korea’s missile and nuclear test, KSM and Good Friends unfolded an 
active advocacy of food aid for flood victims in 2006. This advocacy movement 
provided momentum that the Roh Moo-Hyun administration resumed 100,000 tonnes of 
food aid for the flood victims in 2006. The resumption of food aid in 2006 became a 
breakthrough that contributed to the recovery of inter-Korean relations in 2006 and 
2007. The Roh Moo-Hyun administration thereby resumed 400,000 tonnes of 
government food aid in 2007, and after the 2nd Inter-Korean Summit the Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration pledged additional flood aid, 50,000 tonnes of maize, to North Korea. 
When a government-NGO relationship was amicable, such as in the Kim Dae-Jung and 
Roh Moo-Hyun administrations, in sum, government was more receptive to the 
demands of humanitarian NGOs that urged for the large scale of food aid to North 
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Korea. As shown above, in addition, the donor-recipient relations was not only an 
independent variable that affected NGO influence on state policy making but also a 
dependent variable that was affected by NGO advocacy. 
 
 
Discussion of the Thesis 
 
There are two criticisms that refute the key argument of this thesis that South Korean 
humanitarian NGO advocacy contributed to changes in state food aid policy making. 
The first challenge the realist scholars make is that the decisions concerning food aid to 
North Korea were highly motivated by the South Korean government’s political 
interests. As the grounds for the argument, the realist scholars present a causal 
relationship: that South Korean government food aid pledges were made at the time 
when both Koreas adopted the inter-Korean agreements on political, economic and 
military issues. As this thesis demonstrated, however, the decisions concerning food aid 
to North Korea had been made prior to the inter-Korean talks. The inter-Korean talks, 
where representatives from both Koreas signed most of the food aid agreements, were 
just a formality. Before the inter-Korean talks, more specifically, the South Korean 
government canvassed agendas that should be discussed at the talks. At this process, 
South Korean humanitarian NGOs were a significant political actor that influenced state 
food aid decision making by raising the issue of food aid with North Korea. As a result, 
the agreements regarding food aid to North Korea were made at this preparation stage of 
the inter-Korean talks. The inter-Korean talks were just a platform for both Koreas to 
formally announce and sign the agreements. When one focuses on the time when the 
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decisions regarding food aid to North Korea were made and the outcomes of the inter-
Korean talks were proclaimed, the argument by the realist scholars looks like gaining 
reliability. As the thesis demonstrated, however, examination of the entire state food aid 
decision-making process shows that political interest was not a unilateral factor that 
induced the South Korean government to provide food aid to North Korea.   
     Secondly, there is a criticism that no food aid was made in the Lee Myung-Bak 
administration (2008-2011) despite the key argument of this thesis that the provision of 
food aid to North Korea was institutionalised in the Roh Moo-Hyun administration 
(2003-2007). During the Roh Moo-Hyun administration, the South Korean government 
consistently provided large-scale food aid to North Korea, by institutionalising the 
provision of food aid to North Korea through the adoption of a government act and an 
Inter-Korean Summit Statement in 2007. These changes in policy and institution 
indicates that South Korean humanitarian NGO advocacy entered into the stage of rule-
consistent behaviour in which the state sought to commit itself to their pledge or policy 
irrespective of external pressure or monitoring. After the Roh Moo-Hyun administration 
(2003-2007), however, the Lee Myung-Bak administration suspended all types of aid to 
North Korea and invalidated the government act and statement that stipulated the 
provision of stable food aid to North Korea irrespective of changes in inter-Korean 
relations.  
      The radical changes in the Lee Myung-Bak administration that counter the key 
argument of this thesis that NGO advocacy finally reached at the rule-consistent 
behaviour needs a proper explanation from the author. The suspension of food aid to 
North Korea in the Lee Myung-Bak administration can be attributable to the 
incompleteness of the institutionalisation of food aid to North Korea, the mitigation of 
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the North Korean food crisis, the rupture of inter-Korean relations, the absence of NGO 
advocacy, and a unique relationship between a threat to national security and the norm 
of humanitarianism in South Korean civil society. 
     Firstly, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration institutionalised the provision of food 
aid to North Korea through the adoption of the Law on Advancing Inter-Korean 
Relations in 2005 and the Inter-Korean Summit Statement in 2007. The Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration and humanitarian NGOs, however, failed to secure the legitimacy of this 
law and statement. While the opposition party consistently opposed the adoption of this 
law that stipulated stable food aid to North Korea, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration 
and the ruling party enforced the adoption of the law. The opposition party also opposed 
the provision of food aid to North Korea, which was stipulated in the Inter-Korean 
Summit Statement in 2007, on the grounds that large-scale food aid to North Korea 
would be likely to be diverted to the military. The lack of legitimacy in the adoption of 
the law and statement consequently resulted in the law and statement dying out as the 
opposition party came to power in 2008. In addition, the adoption of the law and 
statement were made in the late Roh Moo-Hyun administration. This short period was 
not enough for these institutions to legitimise large-scale food aid to North Korea and 
for it to be internalised into South Korean civil society. Consequently, food aid 
institutions died out with the inauguration of the Lee Myung-Bak administration in 
2008.     
     Secondly, the mitigation of the North Korean food crisis and the consecutive 
military actions by North Korea made it difficult for the Lee Myung-Bak administration 
to continue the provision of food aid to North Korea. A humanitarian crisis itself does 
not lead to the resumption of food aid, but it is a necessary condition that ignites NGO 
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advocacy and increases government susceptibility to NGO demand. During the Lee 
Myung-Bak administration, however, the food crisis in North Korea became relieved. In 
addition to this, the unfavourable operational environment that made it difficult for the 
Lee Myung-Bak administration to resume food aid to North Korea was North Korea’s 
consecutive military actions. In July 2008, a South Korean tourist who visited 
Keumgang Mountain in North Korea was shot by the North Korean army. In March and 
November 2010, North Korea torpedoed a South Korean naval ship and bombarded 
Yeonpyung Island in South Korea. These negative actions by North Korea significantly 
damaged South Korea’s public opinion on the provision of humanitarian aid to North 
Korea.         
     Thirdly, the suspension of food aid to North Korea in the Lee Myung-Bak 
administration was attributable to the absence of NGO advocacy that urged the Lee 
Myung-Bak administration to resume food aid to North Korea. As mentioned earlier, the 
mitigation of the North Korean food crisis and the consecutive military actions by North 
Korea formed a negative operational environment that made it difficult for South 
Korean humanitarian NGOs to promote the advocacy of food aid to North Korea. In 
addition to this, however, humanitarian NGOs’ financial reliance on government 
funding jeopardised their organisational independence from government. As a result, 
while the Lee Myung-Bak administration suspended all types of humanitarian aid to 
North Korea under the negative inter-Korean relations, the humanitarian NGOs that 
vigorously promoted the advocacy movement between 1995 and 2007 kept silent, 
losing their critical role pressurising the government to resume food aid to North Korea 
irrespective of inter-Korean relations.   
       Lastly, the thesis argued that South Korean humanitarian NGO advocacy 
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replaced the existing hostility towards North Korea with the norms of brotherly love and 
humanitarianism. Despite the norm changes in South Korean civil society which 
gradually progressed between 1995 and 2007, however, the hostility towards North 
Korea became dominant again in South Korean civil society during the Lee Myung-Bak 
administration. Such quick norm shifting is attributable to a unique relationship between 
the sense of national security and the norm of humanitarianism in the Korean peninsula. 
Due to the unique political environment resulting from a divided country, North Korea 
is a security threat to South Korean civil society. Given the demonstrable food shortage, 
North Korea is also an entity in need of help from South Korean civil society. During 
the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administrations, humanitarian NGOs were easily 
able to replace the hostility towards North Korea with the norms of brotherly love and 
humanitarianism, by framing food aid to North Korea as an act to achieve national 
security. It was successful in the Kim Dae-Jung and Roh Moo-Hyun administration. 
Under North Korea’s consecutive military actions in the Lee Myung-Bak administration, 
however, negative propaganda that naive humanitarianism towards North Korea would 
threaten the national security of South Korea was quickly spread throughout South 
Korean civil society. Whilst hostility towards North Korea overwhelms the norms of 
brotherly love and humanitarianism, food aid to North Korea in the Lee Myung-Bak 
administration is consequently suspended. 
 
 
Future Research Agendas 
 
Given the demonstrable famine in North Korea between 1995 and 2007, the United 
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States provided the second largest food aid to North Korea. With regard to the 
motivation of U.S. food aid to North Korea, the dominant explanation is Marcus Noland 
and Stephan Haggard’s argument that the U.S. government used food aid to North 
Korea as a quid pro quo to solve political and military issues. At the beginning of the 
food crisis in North Korea, U.S. humanitarian NGOs organised active advocacy to 
pressurise U.S. and South Korean governments and the international community to 
provide food aid to North Korea. The political role of U.S. humanitarian NGOs in U.S. 
government food aid policy making towards North Korea hitherto has not received 
proper scholarly attention. More research could be done in this area. 
Future research might take the perspective of South Korean government attitudes 
to NGOs. South Korean government attitudes to NGOs changed over time. The Kim 
Young-Sam administration (1993-1997) perceived all types of NGOs as irresponsible 
actors pursuing organisational interests. The Kim Dae-Jung (1998-2002) administration 
perceived humanitarian NGOs as an important counterpart in the execution of 
government policy. The Roh Moo-Hyun (2003-2007) administration perceived NGOs as 
an important counterpart in state policy making as well as in the execution of 
government policy. In contrast to the Kim Dae-Jung administration, the Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration maintained a close relationship with civil society NGOs rather than 
humanitarian NGOs. Future study might examine why and how South Korean 
government attitudes to NGOs changed over time.   
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